Idea Of Conscience Research Articles

Berkeley’s Passive Obedience: positive and negative norms

ABSTRACT In Berkeley’s Passive Obedience, moral duties are negative and positive as well as civil or legal and natural. Natural duties are from God and therefore valid norms. The supreme civil authority makes civil laws. We must obey the law because loyalty to supreme civil power is one of our natural duties: to be loyal is to obey, which means ‘do not rebel.’ This is a negative duty and as such categorical or unconditional. Positive duties are conditional on conscientious acceptance. I show in detail how this system of norms and duties works. These key ideas have not been studied in detail before. Next, can we criticize Berkeley’s unquestioning acceptance of chattel slavery if we apply his own notion of duties to it? The slave laws are necessarily evil, and hence they, according to Berkeley’s own doctrine, cannot be accepted. But first we need a clear conception of his idea of conscience and, a fortiori, conscientious objection and its legitimate scope. This paper fills the gap and helps us understand Passive Obedience better.

A lelkiismeret fogalma az ortodox etikában

The idea of conscience is a key concept in both Western and Eastern theologies. Beyond fundamental similarities in content, the specific accents in Eastern Orthodox theology are also worth considering. Here, the phenomenon of conscience is never simply treated as an ethical, philosophical or psychological entity, but the patristic, liturgical and spiritual dimensions are also an essential part of the discussion, which is in this manner always theonomous. Instead of a law-centered approach, Orthodox theology is personalistic and liturgical: conscience is the sanctuary of an encounter with God. It is God’s gift, yet it needs training within an ecclesial setting with the help of prayer, the theology of the fathers, Christian ascetic practices, the affective ethics of the liturgy, the contemplation of icons and the recital of Church hymns.

Az engedetlenség kötelessége – a modern politika egyik forrásánál

A tanulmány nem az alkotmányos ellenállás (ius resistendi) magyar, angol vagy lengyel ősi fogalmával foglalkozik, hanem az engedetlenség – ami nem politikai vagy erkölcsi lehetőség, hanem kötelesség – képzetének kialakulásával. A háború utáni politikai és erkölcsi gondolkodás hangsúlyozta, a természet törvény fogalmával együtt, az engedetlenség, parancsmegtagadás erkölcsi, sőt jogi kötelességét az igazságtalan törvény vagy parancs esetében. Noha a politikai gondolkodásban hagyományosan a fő probléma az volt, hogyan kerüljék el a lázadást, amely a politikai közösséget örökké fenyegeti, a lelkiismeret fogalma köré épülő keresztény erkölcsi gondolkodás története ezzel ellentétes fogalmat eredményezett, az engedetlenség kötelességének a fogalmát. A skolasztikában a tévedékeny lelkiismeret problémája vezetett a Szent Tamás és Szent Bonaventura közti vitához, amelyben az első amellett érvelt, hogy a lelkiismeretet minden esetben követni kell, akár az autoritással szemben is, míg a második azt írta, hogy a lelkiismeret és az autoritás ütközése esetén a lelkiismeretet félre kell tenni, mivel tévedhet. Az engedetlenség erkölcsi kötelességének képzete nyilvánvalóan Szent Tamásnak az ebben a vitában kifejtett érveléséből ered.

The emergence of conscience rights for health care professionals: How we moved historically from conscience to conscience rights

Summary Recent debates about conscience rights of health care professionals have sometimes been conducted in a vacuum. But they have a history, going back in part to ancient times, but predominantly in the Christian era. The conscience rights issue represents a convergence of the developing concept of rights and the changing views of conscience. The first part of the story begins with the idea of conscience, an idea found in ancient philosophy and Christian thought, and more or less associated with private and individual internal moral guidance. Rights, subjective rights, came into their own some time in the Middle Ages, as individual claims in a legal or political context. However, with a few exceptions, individuals were not able to assert any religious rights of conscience until much later, though discussion of the possibility began in the late sixteenth century. The thrust of this paper is to trace the convergence of rights claims and conscience. In the seventeenth century tolerance shifted, in theory, to advocacy of certain religious conscience rights as natural rights. In the eighteenth century, these rights were embodied in the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Conscientious objection from those opposing military service on religious grounds also arose during this period. The conscientious objection exceptions and cases became the model for the way courts addressed conscience rights. Preferred rights doctrines in the twentieth century, combined with greater constitutional sensitivity on the part of Federal courts and Congress, as well as human rights theories, helped to define discussions of conscience rights of health care professionals.

THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIENCE IN PRIVATE LAW

AbstractThis article argues that the idea of conscience can play a useful, albeit limited and highly general, explanatory role in private law, if we have regard to two distinctive contexts in which it is used. First, it tells us something about how equitable obligations arise and reminds us that they directly enforce moral duties. Second, it conveys the message that the courts are reluctant to impose primary liabilities which restrict the exercise of legal rights absent a past or prospective breach of moral duty by the defendant. Without further explanation, the indiscriminate invocation of conscience in both contexts can lead to confusion and uncertainty, but if the distinction between obligation and liability is observed, the explanatory force of conscience in relation to each becomes clearer, and it plays a valuable role in bolstering the authority of private law.

Meanings of troubled conscience and how to deal with it: expressions of Persian-speaking enrolled nurses in Sweden.

A feature of the healthcare system in Sweden, particularly in the care of older people, is its cultural diversity in terms of having considerable numbers of both caregivers and care recipients with an immigrant background. Considering the influence of culture in ethical decision-making processes, the idea of conscience and the adverse effects of a troubled conscience, it is important to study the concepts of conscience and troubled conscience in culturally diverse populations. There is no published study regarding troubled conscience among immigrant populations that includes enrolled nurses. To illuminate the meanings of troubled conscience and how to deal with it among enrolled nurses with Iranian backgrounds working in Swedish residential care for Persian-speaking people with dementia who have emigrated from Iran. The study was conducted with a phenomenological hermeneutic design. Ten enrolled nurses with an Iranian background, with at least one year's experience of taking care of older people with dementia, were interviewed. The study was reviewed by the Regional Ethical Review Board for ethical vetting of research involving humans. Appropriate measures were taken to ensure confidentiality and voluntary participation. The meanings of having a troubled conscience for the participants comprise not being a good person, including being an uncaring person, not acting according to one's values and living in a state of unease. Dealing with a troubled conscience involves trying to compensate for the harm one has caused and trying to prevent similar situations by being a responsible caregiver. The enrolled nurses understood themselves as caring people and not only caregivers. They knew that they should hear their conscience and respond to it by trying to be a caring person and acting according to their values. The findings should be interpreted in the given specific context.

Sounding Conscience: Walden ’s Global Bottoms

Abstract: This essay argues for the importance of Henry David Thoreau as a theorist of conscience. Conscience for Thoreau is a faculty that must be constructed through engagements with both the natural world and the diversity of human thought. Thoreau’s position on conscience thus exemplifies a more general theoretical claim in Walden: that political subjectivity in the modern era requires a transformation of self in light of global diversity. Though the fact that conscience arises through global engagement is central to Thoreau’s work, this has frequently been overlooked by the latter’s critics, including Walter Benn Michaels, Stanley Cavell, and Hannah Arendt. In restoring this point to Thoreau, I also suggest its broader theoretical importance with regard to Michel Foucault’s claim that the “practices of the self,” or techniques used to make oneself a subject adequate to the truth, have been lost in the modern era. Thoreau’s work demonstrates that, in fact, these practices were not lost; they simply transformed from a concern with a singular truth to an engagement with different ideas about how to live in the world. Focusing on the global connections embedded in Thoreau’s attempt to sound the bottom of Walden Pond, I call this sounding a “practice of the global self.” The essay goes on to look at how, specifically, Thoreau developed his notion of global conscience through his readings of Confucius, Mencius, and the Bhagavad Gita. In a brief coda, I consider how Thoreau’s work has a parallel with the idea of conscience found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

<b> Consciência histórica e representações: aproximações e afastamentos teóricos sobre a narrativa histórica e sua instrumentalização </b> - doi: 10.4025/actascieduc.v36i1.21447

Insights on factors in the conceptual sphere that ascribe meanings to the concepts of historical consciousness and representations are provided. The trajectories of the concepts are highlighted by various factors in the historical field. The concept of historical consciousness was mainly observed in the works of Jorn Rusen, whereas the concept of representations appeared mostly in theoretical discussions by Roger Chartier. The comparison between the authors is underscored by arguments put forward by Friedrich Nietzsche on his critique of the idea of conscience. A brief discussion will ensue on the adhesion to the category of historical consciousness in debates within the teaching of History in Brazil since 2000.

Conscience and the law in Thomas More

No figure in the early modern period is more identified with an ideal of personal conscience than Thomas More. However, the figure of More in modern imagination is almost completely at variance with the view of historians. Indeed, according to this consensus, far from being radically modern, More's understanding of conscience is carefully orthodox and conservative, in line with the scholastic concept of synderesis as developed by Bonaventure and Aquinas. This essay re‐examines the scholastic inheritance while also placing More's thought in the context of the legal framework of conscience, especially its place in the court of chancery, where More worked on a daily basis. By considering new pressures on the idea of conscience both within late medieval and Reformation theology, and within the new legal theories of More's contemporary St German, the essay suggests that More's thinking is more ambiguous and yet also more potentially radical than is supposed in revisionist commentary. Nowhere is the complexity of More's thinking more evident than in the last letters of his life, written in prison, where he uses the word with extraordinary frequency and depth of understanding.

Conscience: Developmental Perspectives from Rogers and Kohlberg

AbstractTheories of personal development can contribute to the understanding of conscience and conscience formation. (I) Clinical psychologist Carl Rogers has formulated a description of stages in the process of personal growth. While Rogers' stages run parallel to Kohlberg's stages of moral development, they contribute a more sensitive appreciation of some aspects of moral conscience. (II) Kohlberg's idea of conscience appears to be a postconventional phenomenon characterized by moral rationalism. This fact raises certain questions about the value of Kohlberg's work as a paradigm for Christian conscience formation. (III) Both Rogers and Kohlberg contribute to an understanding of conscience. In Christian theology, however, conscience is a multifaceted reality which represents a plurality of moral dimensions. While stage advance describes some characteristics of mature conscience, conscience is a broader reality than either Rogers' or Kohlberg's stages will satisfy to describe.

CONSCIENCE, MORAL TRUTH, AND MORAL ERRORS: SOME RESPONSES TO EDMUND LEITES

Edmund Leites's lucid article on conscience, casuistry, and moral decision in the Church of England in the late 17th and early 18th centuries has amply demonstrated how the idea of conscience developed and changed from a background assumption of moral autonomy to that of self-reliance in addition to the belief in moral autonomy. In this shift the art of moral casuistry has gradually lost its original relevance and even become a forgotten idea. It may be wondered why this happened and what significance may be adduced from this. It may also be wondered what philosophical evaluation can be rendered of casuistry independent of the historical nexus of its transformation. From a comparative perspective in connection with the Chinese heritage, Leites's paper provides excellent evidence for the surprising existence of similar strains of thought on conscience in Chinese and Western traditions even though the metaphysical and religious contexts and backgrounds of these strains of thought are radically different. This difference in metaphysical and religious contexts and backgrounds raises some profound philosophical questions which are indicated in Leites's comments on my original article. In this response, I shall first discuss similar strains of thought on conscience in Chinese and English sources, and then explore briefly the different metaphiscal structures underlying these thoughts. I shall finally consider what theoretical conclusions are warranted in light of both the article and the comments of Edmund Leites.

CONSCIENCE, CASUISTRY, AND MORAL DECISION: SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES*

The body of this paper is devoted to tracing out some aspects of the development of the idea of conscience in the Church of England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Surely, it may seem, a subject of limited interest to the readers of this journal! Yet I hope they will find otherwise. I chose to describe this phase of the history of conscience in the West because it illustrates a decisive shift in ideas about conscience which has occurred in many Western cultures besides England's: the belief that the individual ought in many cases to seek the aid of others in forming his moral judgments gives way to the belief that he ought to be self-reliant in such matters. A knowledge of this shift can advance the philosophical understanding of the idea of conscience and the work to be done in the comparative study of conscience ‘East‘and ‘West.'