Hume's Theory Research Articles

Resonating strings: understanding the transition from Hume’s Treatise to Second Enquiry

ABSTRACT What, if anything, changes between Hume's moral theory as presented in the Treatise of Human Nature and then in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals? This question has received increased attention, especially focused on Hume's presentation of sympathy and humanity, and the connection of those principles to Hume's account of moral sentiments. While there is a strong consensus that Hume is making important stylistic changes to the presentation of his views, scholars are divided on the question of whether there are also substantive changes to the views. This paper sides with those who hold that there are substantive changes, offering new evidence for that position. I argue that Hume revised his Treatise account of sympathy to better accommodate cases of affective difference and incapacity. After presenting these cases, I show that Hume's Treatise account of the sympathy mechanism and its role in the production of moral sentiments is more seriously threatened by the problem of affective difference and incapacity than the corresponding account in the second Enquiry. This gives us persuasive evidence in support of the interpretations that hold that there are substantive changes in the second Enquiry, while also helping to explain Hume's motivation for such changes.

Hume on causation: against the quasi-realist interpretation

ABSTRACT In recent years, a number of philosophers have promoted a quasi-realist (or projectivist) interpretation of Hume's theory of causation. In this paper, we argue against the quasi-realist interpretation of Hume, on the grounds that there is a direct clash between a fundamental element of Hume's system (his empiricist theory of content) and one of the main constraints that governs any form of quasi-realism (and so a fortiori, quasi-realism about causation).

The Humean theory of motivation: much ado about nothing?

The Humean theory of motivation: much ado about nothing?

A different causal perspective with Necessary Condition Analysis

This article delves deeper into the causal perspective of Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA). In contrast to traditional probabilistic sufficiency approaches in quantitative social science research about what will happen on average in a group of cases, NCA is interested in what will not occur in almost every case if a necessary condition is absent. Rooted in David Hume's theory of causation NCA explores factors that act as ‘must-haves’ or bottlenecks for the outcome. Operating from this necessity perspective, NCA functions deterministically (without exceptions) or non-deterministically (allowing exceptions). NCA can enrich theories and models in social science research by identifying essential factors. The article contributes to the literature by precisely describing the necessity causal perspective that is used in NCA, and by explaining how this is different from causal perspectives that are commonly used in social science research.

The Changing Process of Adolescents' Self-Independence Consciousness: From the Perspective of David Hume's Human Nature Theory and Freud's Psychodynamic Theory

During the mental development of contemporary teenagers, due to the influence of their own growth and the environment, many parts have more or less mental illness, which is obvious and recessive, but it is a part that needs attention in the process of understanding themselves. The emergence of self-consciousness is not a simple transfer of the object and content of consciousness, but a new stage of psychological development, which is the result of human socialization and one of the special forms of higher psychological activities. We do not know enough about other sources of adolescent consciousness, so it is worth considering carefully when the subject we propose produces consciousness rather than memory traces. The ideas that are active during adolescence will be more pronounced, and this situation will be closer to what the superego wants the individual to feel.

Hume on Self and Sympathy

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the ‘desire of company’, we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions.

HUME, HISTORY, AND THE USES OF SYMPATHY

ABSTRACTThis article focuses on the role of sympathy and antipathy in David Hume's History of England (1754–1762) in relation to the broader place of sympathy in Hume's moral philosophy. Hume, in his earlier philosophical work, argues that sympathy is a naturally occurring responsiveness to others’ feelings, similar to the resonance between musical strings. In his History, however, he carefully curates his readers’ emotional responses, inviting sympathy with figures of suffering—such as King Charles I and Mary Queen of Scots—while also, often almost simultaneously, stirring intense antipathy for those whose religious extremism he regards as socially dangerous and beyond comprehension. After first situating the emergence of Hume's theory of sympathy in its early eighteenth‐century context, this article explores in detail the techniques of sentimental management that appear across the six volumes of the History of England. The elaborate deployment of emotions in Hume's historiography is shown to be in tension both with some aspects of his philosophy of natural human sympathy and with his brief reflections on the writing of history. Hume channeled his readers’ sympathies toward particular targets and against others. A careful analysis of this usefully sheds light on the management of sympathy in modern historiography, on which Hume has had an enduring influence.

Hume on Time and Steadfast Unchanging Objects

AbstractIn this paper we consider a puzzle concerning Hume's account of time and what he calls “steadfast unchanging objects”—that is, unchanging objects coexisting with temporal successions. On the one hand, Hume maintains that steadfast unchanging objects are temporally indivisible. On the other, he allows that such unchanging objects are capable of undergoing a determinate number of alterations in a given length of time, which seems to imply that they are at least potentially temporally divisible. After arguing that Donald Baxter's influential interpretation of Hume's theory of time cannot resolve this tension, we propose that Hume offers a skeptical resolution of the difficulty.

SAMI’NA WA ATHO’NA PHILOSOPHY IN THE PROCESS OF ACCOUNTING EDUCATION BASED ON ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOLS

This study aims to examine the philosophy of compliance with sami’na wa atho’na in the accountingeducation process. The object of this research is a Vocational High School as known as SMK MHI Jember, avocational school that is established and operates in Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia. This type ofresearch is a qualitative research with Husserl Phenomenology method. The resource persons in this studyamounted to 4 people, namely the chairman of the pesantren foundation, the treasurer of the foundation, thechairman of the MHI Vocational School, and the accounting teacher of the MHI Vocational School. This studyshows that the phenomenon of strict sami’na wa atho’na is not just student compliance with the teacher, but aspart of ethical development in the accounting education process at SMK MHI. Theoretically, the results of thisstudy can contribute to the accounting learning process which in the process emphasizes the usefulness of theaccounting discipline through the formation of the ethical character of students, as David Hume's theory ofUtilitarian Ethics, that an activity and policy is said to be good if it can provide benefits to the majority ofsociety. In addition, accounting educators and educational institutions that have study programs or accountingexpertise competencies can take the results of this study into consideration for manifesting the philosophy ofsami'na wa ato'na in the development of the accounting education curriculum in the era of the independentcurriculum and the 4.0 industrial revolution, where the moral crisis is be of serious concern.

The Rescorla-Wagner Model: The culmination of Hume’s theory of causation.

The associative learning theory of Robert Rescorla and Allan Wagner has been duly celebrated for its 50-year reign as the predominant model in learning science. One special recognition is warranted: its close correspondence with David Hume's associative theory of causality judgment. Hume's rules by which causes come to suggest effects are not only embraced by the Rescorla-Wagner model, but their mechanistic account makes precise quantitative predictions that can be assessed by empirical evidence rather than by speculation and argumentation. Framed in this way, the Rescorla-Wagner model truly represents the scientific culmination of Hume's philosophical theory of causation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?

ABSTRACT In recent discussions of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM), several authors – not to mention other philosophers around the proverbial water cooler – have appealed to the simplicity of the theory to defend it. But the argument from simplicity has rarely been explicated or received much critical attention – until now. I begin by reconstructing the argument and then argue that it suffers from a number of problems. Most importantly, first, I argue that HTM is unlikely to be simpler than even close competing theories, and second, it is unlikely that a plausible version of the theory will be very simple. Moreover, I argue that a convincing case for HTM is likely to have to show that it is more virtuous than defenders have done so far.

Dual Minds: Lessons from the French Context of Hume's Social Theory

Hume's theory of mind is often interpreted in associationist terms, portraying the mind as psychological and social. It is also argued that in his most famous philosophical works Hume has an irreligious agenda. These views are problematic because they overlook the issue of social obedience to political authority. By contrast, I examine the connections between Hume's works and those of Bayle and Montaigne. I argue that the French context of Hume's social theory sheds a new light on the dual mind. Indebted to a French Pyrrhonian heritage, Hume invokes custom as an explanatory concept in psychology and in the natural history of society. He also introduces religious analogies as he adopts a historical perspective in social and political theory. Along with custom, faith is crucial in his theory of government. The double nature of the mind thus corresponds to two distinct approaches: the customary mind engaging in profane, habitual activities; and the faithful mind participating in the sacred. Hume's analogy between society and secular religion is comparable to Durkheim's anthropology of rituals. Hume's affinity with Montaigne, Bayle, and Durkheim concerning to the duality of the mind, as customary and faithful, emphasises his role in the history of the French humanities.

Self-Knowledge and Hume's Phenomenology of the Passions

AbstractTaxonomies of the passions have long claimed to serve a quest for self-knowledge, by specifying conditions under which certain passions arise, formal objects they possess, and qualities essential to their particular feelings. I argue that David Hume's theory of the passions provides resources for a different kind of self-knowledge – a sceptical self-knowledge depending on our ability to articulate how the passions feel rather than always identifying our passions as tokens of an identifiable passion-type. These resources are distinctions between four qualitative aspects that passions may possess – pleasantness or painfulness, calmness or violence, invigoration or softening, and directedness or lack thereof towards specific actions. Reflection on these aspects produces a more accurate understanding of the nature of our emotions and chastens our judgmental tendencies in ways that benefit both self and others.

Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism

We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making perceptual and moral judgments requires focusing on frequently co-occurring impressions (perceptions of objects or reactive sentiments) for tracking an existing object with its perceptual properties or an agent's character traits. Smith uses visual perception for the purpose of illustrating one source of the partiality of the sentiments people feel in response to actions. Before making a moral judgment, people have to disregard this partiality and accept that they are all equally important. Smith and Hume's different ways of relying on the same analogy reveals the still-overlooked and yet profound differences between their moral theories.

A DEFENSE OF HUMEAN PROPERTY THEORY

ABSTRACTTwo rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.

David Hume, economic rationality, and policy: Symposium introduction

Abstract This is an introduction to the symposium, David Hume, Economic Rationality, and Policy. Topics treated in the symposium include the idea of true preferences; Hume's theory of preferences in relation to his economic philosophy; justice and markets as a joint coordination regime; the instability of general, inflexible rules; conservatism and liberalism; the ethics of policy innovation; Hume and classical economics; group analytics and contemporary political sociology.

Satisfaction in action: Hume's endogenous theory of preferences and the virtues of commerce

Hume's theory of preferences would, from a contemporary point of view, be labelled an endogenous theory. He sees preferences largely as comparative desires that are formed and affected by the psychological process of sympathy. His view of preferences relates to his economic philosophy. Despite his understanding of preferences, Hume is, unlike some other thinkers with related perspectives like Thorstein Veblen, optimistic about the prospects of commercial society, claiming in one of his essays that the ages of commerce and refinement are both the happiest and the most virtuous. An important reason for his optimism lies in the fact that he understands happiness or well-being to largely consist in the process of actively pursuing one's preferences, not simply in the state of having one's preferences satisfied.

Hume's experimental psychology and the idea of erroneous preferences

Abstract Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is not only a canonical text of philosophy, but also a pioneering work of psychology, anticipating many findings of modern behavioural economics. According to Hume's theory of mind, the concept of rationality does not apply to choices or moral judgements. But in his theory of justice, Hume explains preference reversals between smaller-sooner and larger-later options in terms of farsighted ‘true’ preferences and psychologically-induced errors of short-sightedness. Anticipating a common idea in behavioural welfare economics, he proposes a role for government in helping individuals to overcome self-control problems in acting justly. I examine Hume's position and assess its coherence. I conclude that Hume's theory of mind is consistent and psychologically well-grounded, but does not support the concepts of true preference and error that appear in his theory of justice. However, the fundamental logic of that theory does not depend on assumptions about self-control problems.

David Hume, Economic Rationality, and Policy: Symposium Introduction

This is an introduction to the symposium, David Hume, Economic Rationality, and Policy, forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Topics treated in the symposium include the idea of true preferences; Hume's theory of preferences in relation to his economic philosophy; justice and markets as a joint coordination regime; the instability of general, inflexible rules; conservatism and liberalism; the ethics of policy innovation; Hume and classical economics; group analytics and contemporary political sociology.

Colloquium 2 How to Argue about Aristotle about Practical Reason

Abstract In this paper, I consider Aristotle’s views in relation to the Humean theory of motivation (HTM). I distinguish three principles which HTM is committed to: the ‘No Besires’ principle, the ‘Motivation Out—Desire In’ principle, and the ‘Desire Out—Desire In’ principle. To reject HTM, one only needs to reject one of these principles. I argue that while it is plausible to think that Aristotle accepts the first two principles, there are some grounds for thinking that he might reject the third.