Hume's Science Research Articles

Reading Hume on the passions

This paper provides a reception history of Book Two of the Treatise-Of the passions-as well as an attempt to reconcile Hume's ambitions to systematicity in Book Two with the distracted and distracting nature of the text. We currently have, I think, a good sense of the philosophical importance of Book Two within Hume's science of human nature. Yet we have not made much progress on understanding Book Two on its own terms, and especially why Book Two so often seems on the verge of falling into an explanatory heap. I aim to rectify this situation by giving a reading of Book Two that makes sense of the philosophical importance of Hume's system of the passions, yet also explains why he encounters so many difficulties in setting out his system; such that he is often forced to stretch his explanations to the very edge of the credible. I contend that Hume's system of the passions is best viewed as an unstable explanatory compound, one that progressively dissolves as Hume's explanatory intentions become increasingly ambitious.

The Science in Hume's Science of Man

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism.

‘An Authority from which there can be no appeal’: The place of Cicero in Hume's science of man

Hume's admiration for the Roman philosopher and statesman, Cicero, is well-known. Yet scholars have largely overlooked how Hume's interpretation of Cicero – initially as a Stoic, and subsequently as an academic sceptic – evolved with Hume's own intellectual development. Moreover, scholars tend to focus on Hume's debts to Cicero with regard either to his epistemological scepticism or his philosophy of religion. This essay suggests instead that Hume's engagement with Cicero was at its most intense, and productive, when evaluating the relationship between morality and religious belief. Closer attention to the place of Cicero in Hume's writings illuminates our understanding of Hume's intellectual development, particularly in the crucial pre- Treatise years. It also, however, shines light on Hume's interpretation of the history of occidental philosophy (not least the consequences of its engagements with Christian theology), and on how Hume saw his own work to relate to this history.

Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation by David Landy

Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation by David Landy

David Hume a věda o člověku

Hume built his philosophical system with the ambition to become a Newton of human nature. His science of man is the fulfillment of this project. Hume was inspired by the Newtonian experimental empirical method excluding hypotheses, and he applied this method to moral sciences; he took those to be the basis of all other knowledge. The observation of human cognitive faculties, however, brought him to sceptical conclusions concerning the rational justification of empirical sciences. His original ambitions are thus undermined and his scepticism leads to the loss of legitimacy of natural science. The core of Hume's science of man is twofold - it consists in the analysis of mind and of human social behaviour. Hume contributed to the development of psychology and helped to form social sciences as a specific research area. Following his empirical method based on observation, his science of man has rather a documentary role than any normative features.

The literary arts in Hume's science of the fancy

Philosophers have long disagreed about whether poetry, drama, and other literary arts are important to philosophy; and among those who believe that they are important, explanations of that importance have differed greatly. This paper aims to explain and illustrate some of the reasons why Hume found literature to be an important topic for philosophy and philosophers. Philosophy, he holds, can help to explain general and specific literary phenomena, to ground the science of criticism, and to suggest and justify ";principles of art,"; while at the same time literature can provide valuable ";experiments"; for philosophical theorizing and provide it with a model for the science of morals and (in some ways) for philosophy itself. Moreover, the literary arts can not only help one to write better philosophy, in Hume's view; they can also help one to write philosophy better.

Hume's influence on John Gregory and the history of medical ethics.

The concept of medicine as a profession in the English-language literature of medical ethics is of recent vintage, invented by the Scottish physician and medical ethicist, John Gregory (1724-1773). Gregory wrote the first secular, philosophical, clinical, and feminine medical ethics and bioethics in the English language and did so on the basis of Hume's principle of sympathy. This paper provides a brief account of Gregory's invention and the role that Humean sympathy plays in that invention, with reference to key texts in Gregory's work. The paper also considers two interesting and perhaps provocative ways in which Hume can be read through Gregory: first, sympathy as a principle of scientific discovery in Hume's science of man and moral physiology; and sympathy as gendered feminine in Hume's moral philosophy. Hume's principle of sympathy is at the core of Gregory's medical ethics and the histories of Western medical ethics and bioethics pivot on Gregory--and, therefore, on Hume--as it does on few other figures.

Probability in Hume's Science of Man

a t i c a l l y thus: t This r e l a t i o n s h i p may be represented diagramI n s t i n c t t o seek F Pass ion/ac t ion d i r e c t e d towards a . I n conf i rmat ion of t h i s model, w e may note Hume's statement t h a t human n a t u r e is compos'd o f two p r i n o i p a l p a r t s , which a r e rsquioCts Cn a l l i t 8 a c t i o n s , t h e a f f e c t i o n s and undars t a n d i n g , t h e former be ing b l i n d wi thout t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r (T493). A l s o t h e model enables us to make good sense of Hume's t a l k of pass ions as founded on suppos i t ions or b e l i e f s , and why, when w e pe rce ive t h e falsehood of such a suppos i t i on , our p a e s i o n s yietd t o our reason w i t h o u t any o p p o s i t 2 o n (T416). Turning now t o t h e e f f e c t o f merely probable b e l i e f on pass ion and a c t i o n , And t h i s is what Hume does s a y a t T153. evidence have, he says, an i n f l u e n c e on t h e parreions and i m a g i n a t i o n , p r o p o r t i o n ' d t o t h a t d e g r e e of forae and v i v aoity, whCoh t h e y communioate t o t h e i d e a s . B u t Hume also holds t h a t p r o b a b i l i t i e s can give rise t o new pass ions , namely t h o pass ions o f hope and fear. Th i s power of probabi l i t y is expla ined as fol lows. Be l i e f t h a t Q is F / w e might expec t t h a t such b e l i e f s , would a f f o c t t h e pass ions i n propor t ion to t h e i r v ivac i ty . I n f e r i o r degrees of