Hume's Argument Research Articles

Two (Failed) Versions of Hume's Argument Against Miracles

Two (Failed) Versions of Hume's Argument Against Miracles

Humean Arguments from Evil, Updating Procedures, and Perspectival Skeptical Theism

In a recent exchange with prominent skeptical theists, Paul Draper has argued that skeptical theism bears no relevance to Humean versions of the argument from suffering. His argument rests, however, on a particular way of construing epistemically rational updating procedures that is not adopted by all forms of skeptical theism. In particular, a perspectival variety of skeptical theism, I argue, is relevant to his Humean arguments. I then generalize this result and explain how any argument from evil employing probabilistic premises is similarly threatened.

Against the Humean Argument for Extended Simples

ABSTRACT Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality problem. First, the original argument only shows a disjunctive thesis: either extended simples are possible, or unextended complexes are possible. In order to reach the desired conclusion, some additional premise is needed. Yet, even though we agree that the Disjunction problem can be met, we argue that the Humean argument fails to establish the possibility of extended simples, for two reasons: the first comes from compositional pluralism, and the second is about the definition of accidental properties. We contend that the latter two problems put the proponents of the Humean argument in serious difficulty. Thus, metaphysicians who hold that there are extended simples should find better arguments for this view.

Problem opravdanosti induktivnog zaključivanja

In this paper, the author considers the classical strategies of defense from Hume's argument against induction, and assesses the extent to which they were found to be successful. Synthetic, linguistic, a priori, pragmatic, and inductive strategies of defending induction are considered, as well as the question of the extent to which the justification of induction is a problem for grounding scientific knowledge. A new argument is introduced for the a priori justification of induction, as well as a critique of the synthetic and inductive defenses of induction by Black and Jacquette.

Sentimentos e utilidade: uma investigação da moral em bases humeanas

The article main purpose is to develop an argument concerning the central problem of Hume's practical philosophy. The initial approach consists in determine the influence that reason and sentiments have on how moral judgments are ordinarily made. It will be argued that the base of moral distinctions is found in sentiments, with reason having an instrumental role in the process. In order to explain which principle offers a north to sentiments and is the moral compass of individuals, the second point developed in this article converges to investigating moral sentiments and utility from the humean argument about the natural virtue of benevolence and the artificial virtue of justice. To answer these questions, the argument will be grounded essentially on the Investigations on the Principles of Morals, using the Treatise of Human Nature and Hume’s commentators when is necessary to reinforce or clarify a specific point.

Complexity, Power Laws and a Humean Argument in Risk Management: The Fundamental Inadequacy of Probability Theory as a Foundation for Modeling Complex Risk in Banking

Whenever risk managers are confronted with deep uncertainty and organized complexity, probabilistic inference methods are used. These seem able to allow for crisp inputs and precise results. However, as has been noted by several thinkers (e.g., von Hayek in Studies in philosophy, politics and economics, Routledge, London, 1967; Weaver in American Scientist, 36: 536–544, 1948), such methods cannot be used effectively in such situations. This might basically sound like old wine in a new bottle and, in fact, objections to, and limitations of conventional, i.e., probabilistic risk modeling are anything but unheard of in the literature of banking and finance. However, this paper introduces for the first time an argument, inspired by reflections on the old riddle of induction, from which those shortcomings of the limited suitability of probability can be derived. It demonstrates that any choice of a particular probability distribution for a given risk management purpose is necessarily arbitrary, i.e., it is not grounded in the data but in the choices of the statistician or risk manager, and cannot be justified by appealing to something more objective. Thereby, this paper unmasks the illusion that financial data and extreme losses are well-described by non-standard probability functions such as power laws that have been embraced at the expense of bell curves in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. Moreover, although we do not propose a positive solution, we believe that articulating the real, and as yet unnoticed, source of the problem is a key step towards developing a principle and tractable response.

Time as an Empirical Concept in Special Relativity

According to a widespread view, Einstein's definition of time in his special relativity is founded on the positivist verification principle. The present paper challenges this received outlook. It argues that Einstein's position on the concept of time, to wit, simultaneity, is best understood as a mitigated version of concept empiricism. He contrasts his position to Newton's absolutist and Kant's transcendental arguments, and in part sides with Hume's and Mach's empiricist arguments. Nevertheless, Einstein worked out a concept empiricism that is considerably more moderate than what we find in the preceding empiricist tradition and early logical positivism. He did not think that the origin of concepts is in observations, but in conventions, and he also maintained a realist ontology of physical events, which he thought is necessary for his theory. Consequently, his philosophy of time in special relativity is not couched in terms of an antimetaphysical verificationism.

Hume's emotivist theory of moral judgements

AbstractHume is believed by many to hold an emotivist thesis, according to which all expressions of moral judgements are expressions of moral sentiments. However, most specialist scholars of Hume either deny that this is Hume's position or believe that he has failed to argue convincingly for it. I argue that Hume is an emotivist and that his true arguments for emotivism have been hitherto overlooked. Readers seeking to understand Hume's theory of moral judgements have traditionally looked to the first section of Book 3 of his Treatise, which discusses the relation between morality and reason. I argue that there is evidence elsewhere that better supports Hume's emotivist thesis. Hume's arguments for emotivism focus more on the causes of moral sentiments than on their relation to reason or belief, and he argues that moral sentiments are such as to arise whenever we contemplate morally relevant objects. He also holds that the presence of moral sentiments precludes any possibility of moral belief, because moral beliefs could only be less vivid copies of moral sentiments, and these cannot simultaneously exist. Hume concludes that all moral judgements must be expressions of sentiments.

Idolatry, indifference, and the scientific study of religion: two new Humean arguments

AbstractWe utilize contemporary cognitive and social science of religion to defend a controversial thesis: the human cognitive apparatus gratuitously inclines humans to religious activity oriented around entities other than the God of classical theism. Using this thesis, we update and defend two arguments drawn from David Hume: (i) the argument from idolatry, which argues that the God of classical theism does not exist, and (ii) the argument from indifference, which argues that if the God of classical theism exists, God is indifferent to our religious activity.

Laying Down Hume's Law

AbstractMost interpretations of Hume's is/ought passage (THN 3.1.1.27) can be broadly divided into two camps: those thinking Hume to rule out logical inferences from is to ought, and those thinking Hume to only raise surmountable difficulties for inferences from is to ought. I undermine the positive support for both these interpretations, and argue, by drawing parallels with Hume's argument on induction, that Hume's Law instead rules out all forms of inference from is to ought.

Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil

There’s a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and (ii) skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with this trend, Wes Morriston has recently formulated a Humean argument from evil, and his chief defense of it is that skeptical theism is irrelevant to it. Here I argue that skeptical theism is relevant to Humean arguments. To do this, I reveal the common structure of skeptical theism’s critiques. Seeing the common structure reveals why some versions of skeptical theism are irrelevant to Humean arguments from evil. It also points the way forward to formulating a relevant version. By combining skeptical theism with a plausible principle concerning reasonable belief, I formulate a version of skeptical theism that undermines Morriston’s argument that is also immune from his objections.

Hume's Pivotal Argument, and His Supposed Obligation of Reason

Treatise 1.4.1 argues that whenever we assess our probability of error, "we are oblig'd by our reason" to consider also the probability of error in that assessment, leading to a fatal regress which—but for irresistible nature—would extinguish all belief. The argument plays a huge role in the Treatise, and has recently attracted many defenders, rejecting the previously standard objection that iterated reflection need not imply reduction of probability. This paper, however, presses a more fundamental objection—that there is no obligation of reason to iterate in the first place—something obscured by the failure of previous analyses to focus on specific examples. Unlike the Treatise, Hume's Enquiry of 1748 is richly illustrated with examples, making it likely that he himself would have encountered these problems. And there are traces in the Enquiry of a fundamental change of view, corroborating the significance of this argument for his philosophical development.

HOW TO SOLVE HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

ABSTRACTThis paper explains what's wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume's argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.

The everlasting check: Hume on miracles

Alexander George's lucid interpretation of Hume's Of Miracles provides fresh insights into this provocative text, explaining the concepts and claims involved. He also shows why Hume's argument fails to engage with committed religious thought and why philosophical argumentation so often proves ineffective in shaking people's deeply held beliefs.

Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief

AbstractLouis Loeb has argued that Hume is pessimistic while Peirce is optimistic about the attainment of fully stable beliefs. In contrast, we argue that Hume was optimistic about such attainment but only if the scope of philosophical investigation is limited to first‐order explanatory questions. Further, we argue that Peirce, after reformulating the pragmatic maxim to accommodate the reality of counterfactuals, was pessimistic about such attainment. Finally, we articulate and respond to Peirce's objection that Hume's skeptical arguments in T 1.4.1 and his commitment to common sense indicate that Hume was confused about whether we could have stable beliefs at all.

Hume and the Independent Witnesses

The Humean argument concerning miracles says that one should always think it more likely that anyone who testifies to a miracle is lying or deluded than that the alleged miracle actually occurred, and so should always reject any single report of it. A longstanding and widely accepted objection is that even if this is right, the concurring and non-collusive testimony of many witnesses should make it rational to believe in whatever miracle they all report. I argue that on the contrary, even multiple reports from non-collusive witnesses lack the sort of independence that could make trouble for Hume.

Testimony, belief, and non-doxastic faith: the Humean argument for religious fictionalism

AbstractI set out an argument for religious fictionalism which, unusually, proceeds from realist assumptions to the conclusion that even though some people might know that God exists, others ought to accept only non-doxastically that God exists. The argument relies upon the idea that religious experiences can confer immediate warrant on religious beliefs, whereas the warrant conferred by testimony is defeated by some reasonable beliefs which many people have.

Hume on prophecy

AbstractHume claims that his argument against miracles applies ‘without any variation’ to prophecies. While Hume's argument against miracles has been thoroughly examined in the philosophical literature, his claim that this argument works against prophecies has been left relatively unexplored. In this article I examine Hume's conception of ‘prophecy’ and I argue that it is flawed. I also argue, however, that Hume's argument against miracles does indeed apply to prophecies, but only if we amend Hume's conception of ‘prophecy’. I articulate and defend such an amendment.

Shaping up location: Against the Humean argument for the extrinsicality of shape

Recently, we have been presented with an argument against the intrinsicality of shape that appeals to a plausible Humean principle. According to the argument, if shape is intrinsic and the location relation is fundamental, then we cannot explain the necessary correlation between an object’s shape and the shape of its location. And, it is claimed, the Humean principle tells us that an unexplained necessary correlation like this one is unacceptable. In this paper I respond to this argument by rejecting the favoured interpretation of the Humean principle. I claim that sometimes there are truths about what it means to stand in a given relation, even when that relation has no analysis. (For instance, though parthood is often taken to be fundamental, it is widely accepted that if one denies the transitivity of parthood, he or she fails to understand what it means to be a part). These truths sometimes entail that the relata of the relation have certain features. And it is not problematic for truths about what it means to stand in a relation to be unexplained. I argue that it is plausible to take is located at to be such a relation; an object’s having exactly the same shape as the region it is located at is part of what it means to be located at (rather than within or outside of) that region. I conclude with an amended formulation of the Humean claim that still captures the spirit of the principle without threatening the intrinsicality of shape.

Reid's response to Hume's perceptual relativity argument

Reid declared Hume's appeal to variation in the magnitude of a table with distance to be the best argument that had ever been offered for the ‘ideal hypothesis’ that we experience nothing but our own mental states. Reid's principal objection to this argument fails to apply to minimally visible points. He did establish that we have reason to take our perceptions to be caused by external objects. But his case that we directly perceive external objects is undermined by what Hume had to say about the role played by color in our perception of the primary qualities of bodies.