Humanitarian Military Intervention Research Articles

Decolonising the Selectivity Debate in Military Humanitarian Intervention

Abstract Selectivity is often understood as global powers using military intervention in certain humanitarian crises but not in others based on perceived strategic interests at stake. Though the scholarship has acknowledged selectivity’s practice, more disputed has been its ‘problematic’ ascription. Critics have correctly identified selectivity as a problem of hypocrisy, while advocates have construed it as necessary and even pragmatic. Importantly, however, both camps have premised selectivity as a problem of ‘inaction’ towards ‘non-intervened’ crises. In contrast to this existing ‘bystander complicity’ paradigm of selectivity, this article argues that selectivity must be reinterpreted as a problem of global power ‘active complicity’ to better understand and appreciate its problematic ascription. The proposed active complicity paradigm reveals the neglected colonial and imperial underpinnings within selectivity. It destabilises and challenges the idea that global powers simply ‘stand by’ as onlookers to disassociated, faraway crises, and instead highlights their key role in enabling and perpetuating them.

State Sovereignty and the Protection of Human Rights. How Military Humanitarian Intervention is Supported by Citizens Around the World

According to international law, the sovereignty of nation-states and the rights of individuals constitute two equally important principles. However, in instances when a state massively violates human rights, then priority is given to the protection of individuals over the self-determination of the state, thereby justifying humanitarian military intervention. This paper presents findings from a survey across 26 countries, analyzing citizen support for such intervention. We find that the majority of respondents supports military intervention to protect human rights. To explain the differences in support, we draw on world society theory and modernization theory. At first sight, world society theory offers a better framework for understanding citizens' attitudes towards military intervention. However, charcateristics derived from modernization theory are affected by a “suppression effect:” individuals living in more modernized countries and holding postmaterialist values endorse enforcing human rights but concurrently reject the use of military force.

Is there a religious bias? Attitudes towards military humanitarian intervention in Germany

Abstract Is individual support for internationally agreed military humanitarian interventions (MHIs) subject to a religious bias? Conducting a vignette-based survey experiment, the paper provides micro-level evidence for such a bias within a highly unlikely sample: German university students. Participants in our survey experiment were more compassionate and indeed more supportive of an MHI when the victims of war-related violence were Christians rather than Muslims. The paper thus contributes to the literature on support for MHIs in two important ways: first, whereas the existing literature has a strong focus on the United States, this paper studies individuals’ support in another Western country that regularly contributes to MHIs, namely Germany. Second, while the existing literature has mainly examined how other social factors, such as the race or gender of the victims, affect individuals’ support for MHIs, drawing on social identity theory, this paper claims that religious identification also has an impact. Moreover, by showing that the religion of the victims of war-related violence shapes individuals’ attitudes towards MHIs through compassion, the paper also speaks to more recent literature that demonstrates that individuals’ attitudes towards refugees depend on – among other things – their religion. Against the background of a general rise of identitarian politics in many Western societies, our findings seem to be of particular relevance.

The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention and Anti-Atrocity Norms

Abstract The debate on whether military humanitarian intervention and anti-atrocity norms, such as the responsibility to protect, cause perverse incentives, and provocative violence by a rebel group, has yet to reach a consensus. Specifically, existing theories are unable to fully explain why “emboldened” rebel groups provoke the government in some cases but not others. This paper reconciles this unresolved debate by arguing that it is not anti-atrocity norms but the temporary feasibility of humanitarian intervention that induces the potential rebel group to actually provoke the government. The inherent temporariness of the feasibility of large-scale intervention causes a commitment problem: An expectation of a temporary intervention shifts the balance of power toward a potential rebel and opens a quickly closing window of opportunity. A three-player game shows that, among other findings, a higher probability of humanitarian intervention alleviates the potential rebel’s incentive to fight, implying that the criticism of anti-atrocity norms is a “false charge.” The model also (i) explains why weaker groups can rebel in the shadow of external intervention and (ii) presents a novel implication that lowering the intervention cost can exacerbate the adverse incentive when a domestic commitment problem caused by the consolidation of government power is not severe.

The Global South contestation narratives and the transformation of military humanitarian interventions in the early 1990s

The Global South contestation narratives and the transformation of military humanitarian interventions in the early 1990s

Exploring the limits of localisation through the UK’s contestation of R2P’s peaceful measures in Syria

This article explores how the UK’s selective neglect in linking the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to its peaceful responses to Syria reinforces the claim that R2P is predominantly understood as military humanitarian intervention, which is deleterious for building international consensus for atrocity prevention and response. It does this through an empirical case study of the UK’s responses to Syria during 2014-2016 when the UK’s peaceful responses expanded, providing rich data for examining their underlying motivations. The article provides a case study of the UK’s contestation of R2P’s peaceful measures that builds upon existing work around the limits of contestation and norm degeneration due to how it feeds back to the international level. The article also explores the intersection between contestation and localisation and how the UK’s particular localisation of R2P feeds into claims and fears of western imperialism, which obstructs effective atrocity prevention and response.

JUST ANOTHER CIVIL WAR?

When do Western powers intervene militarily on behalf of suffering strangers? Political elites’ perceptions of international conflicts may alter options for third-party management. Examining the precedent-setting case of the Kosovo Crisis via multi-language fieldwork, NATO archives, and content analysis, I discuss how Kosovo moved from the periphery of Western attention to becoming the litmus test of the Western security response. Contrary to literature that focuses on humanitarian norms or geopolitical interests as drivers of this NATO intervention, I argue that the Kosovo Crisis “earned” a humanitarian military intervention due to shifting favorable conflict perceptions, which encouraged Western institutional involvement. Such interactions between perceptions and intervention may apply to other global crises.

Conflict escalation during neutral and biased humanitarian military interventions

This article considers the effects of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict in the countries in which they have been used. Theoretically, neutral HMIs, in which interveners target all violent actors, are expected to have a pacifying effect on conflict intensity by increasing the cost of violence for all parties—while biased HMIs can escalate conflict intensity, by reducing the cost of violence and so encouraging the supported parties to become more violent. The empirical results show that neutral HMIs do seem to lead to lower conflict intensity in the targeted countries, relative to other conflict-affected countries. Anti-rebels HMIs are, observed to escalate conflict both in the short and the long run, while the evidence for anti-government HMIs is mixed.

Post-Intervention Reconstruction and the Responsibility to Rebuild

This article examines the relationship between the responsibility to rebuild and post-intervention reconstruction. It aims to determine whether the current interpretation of the responsibility to rebuild is the appropriate framework for attaining the goals of post-intervention reconstruction. The article argues that, despite the urgent need for a post-intervention strategy in the aftermath of humanitarian interventions, the responsibility to rebuild, as it is currently being framed, can end up undermining the goals of post-conflict reconstruction by dissuading states from participating in atrocity prevention, inadvertently increasing atrocity crimes and delegitimizing military humanitarian interventions. The analysis identifies the need for the responsibility to rebuild to incorporate an increased respect for post bellum proportionality and self-determination.

Selective humanitarians: how region and conflict perception drive military interventions in intrastate crises

Why are some violent intrastate crises more likely to prompt humanitarian military interventions than others? States appear to intervene robustly in reaction to some internal conflicts, such as Kosovo, but withhold similar options in more intense conflict, as in Darfur. Much of the research on this ‘selectivity gap’ focuses on universal norms or geopolitical interests. I, however, argue that the selectivity of these interventions is a product of regional variations interacting with conflict perceptions. This paper introduces a dataset of almost 1000 observations of intrastate armed conflict between 1989 and 2014, paired with international military responses and non-responses, as well as an Intervention Index that accounts for the intensity of military interventions. I find that once a threshold of human suffering is met via the existence of an internal armed conflict, powerful states will intervene depending on whether the conflict occurs in the Western sphere of influence and whether it is denoted as an identity war. A Western region coupled with no perceptions of identity-based civil war prompts the greatest odds of humanitarian military intervention. Such conclusions carry implications on the role of norms and interests in international politics, as biased by region, and for military intervention as a policy choice.

Ideology Matters: The Influence of Competing Message Framings on Public Attitudes toward Humanitarian Interventions

This study assessed the effects of different message framing strategies on average Americans’ attitude towards interventions in humanitarian crises abroad. Two survey experiments were conducted via Qualtrics between late 2019 and early 2020, where participants were randomly assigned to read a mock news story about a foreign humanitarian crisis written using one of the three framing techniques. Results of both studies indicated that the framing effect on respondents’ support for intervention interacted with ones’ political ideology and prompted distinctive reactions among different populations. Most intriguingly, the results of Study 2, which employed a non-student sample and a secondary frame, suggested that the specific order of message framings also influences public opinion towards humanitarian intervention. These findings contribute to the growing body of literature on the persuasiveness of message design and framing in the context of military humanitarian interventions (MHI). Accordingly, news organizations and policymakers are encouraged to consider these findings in specific contexts.

Beyond Military Humanitarian Intervention: From Assassination to Election Hacking?

This paper critically examines the implications of technology for the ethics of intervention and vice versa, especially regarding (but not limited to) the concept of military humanitarian intervention (MHI). To do so, it uses two recent pro-interventionist proposals as lenses through which to analyse the relationship between interventionism and technology. These are A. Altman and C.H. Wellman’s argument for the assassination of tyrannical leaders, and C. Fabre’s case for foreign electoral subversion. Existing and emerging technologies, the paper contends, play an important role in realising these proposals. This illustrates the potential of technology to facilitate interventionist practices that transcend the traditional concept of MHI, with its reliance on kinetic force and large-scale military operations. The question, of course, is whether this is normatively desirable. Here, the paper takes a critical view. While there is no knockdown argument against either assassination or electoral subversion for humanitarian purposes, both approaches face similar challenges, most notably regarding public accountability, effectiveness, and appropriate regulatory frameworks. The paper concludes by making alternative suggestions for how technology can be utilised to improve the protection of human rights. Overall, the paper shows that an engagement with technology is fruitful and necessary for the ethics of intervention.

The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequence of Military Humanitarian Intervention

The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequence of Military Humanitarian Intervention

An Analysis of Humanitarian Military Intervention in Nigeria: Focus on Saving Victims or Defeating Boko Haram?

ABSTRACT
 This paper discusses the humanitarian intervention in Nigeria because the Boko Haram’s attack. Humanitarian intervention was carried out because there had been gross human rights violations in an area and the government's inability to solve them. Boko Haram attack has caused a humanitarian crisis in Nigeria. Unfortunately, Nigeria has been unable to solve the problem. Boko Haram is a separatist group that wants to replace Nigeria’s legitimate government to Sharia Law. Thus, humanitarian intervention is needed. This paper will explain three sub chapters of the discussion, such as: First, the political and economic conditions in Nigeria. Second, process of Boko Haram attack. Third, humanitarian intervention efforts in Nigeria carried out by international actors, such as: The African Union, some countries in Africa, the United States and some international humanitarian agencies. The research method used in this study is a descriptive qualitative method. Data sources from literature and internet studies. This paper finds that the humanitarian intervention consists of a military approach and a socio-economic approach. In 2020, humanitarian interventions focus on recovery in education, health issues, and assisting the shelter of refugees.
 

Political and Economic Consequences of Humanitarian Military Interventions in Targeted Nations

This study investigates the impact of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict termination, conflict escalation, economic output and democratic performance using panel data on 144 countries covering time-period of 1960-2018. There is no scholarly consensus about whether HMIs are an effective mean of enforcing peace and causing economic and political stabilities. Our contribution is empirical and we use recently developed database on HMIs by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The results from multivariate analyses suggest that neutral interventions have positive impact on conflict termination whereas biased interventions, particularly against rebels, tend to escalate conflict. Neutral interventions have no significant negative impact on output whereas HMIs biased against governments and rebels lead to around 9 -8 percent decrease in per capita output. Finally, neutral and against governments HMIs lead to increase in democracy score. We estimate both contemporaneous and long-run decaying effects and as robustness check also carry out IV regressions with instruments constructed using Lewbel method.

Human rights institutionalization and US humanitarian military intervention

ABSTRACT Are human rights a core value of US foreign policy? If so, how does the United States enforce human rights standards? Extant studies maintain that mass media, public opinion, and/or political concerns drive US decisions to engage in humanitarian military interventions. In this study, we explore the extent to which “human rights institutionalization” through the State Department’s human rights reporting affects the likelihood of US humanitarian interventions. We find that human rights institutionalization is a viable, and perhaps even the best, explanation for the robust connection between human rights violations and deployment of the US military. These findings suggest that the United States is willing to undertake costly action to enforce international standards of human rights, but with some important caveats. Overall, we provide large-N, quantitative support for the broader shifts in US humanitarian intervention described by qualitative scholars and experts in US strategy and security policy.

Humanitarian Military Interventions: Conceptual Controversies and Their Consequences for Comparative Research

ABSTRACTThe article offers a much-needed impulse to the debate on humanitarian military interventions, which is characterized by conceptual confusion and a lack of comparative research. Based on a comprehensive review of the literature, we identify the most important definitional controversies and discuss the conceptual pros and cons of the respective positions. We illustrate how definitional choices affect comparative research using a new dataset covering all humanitarian military interventions since the Second World War. Classic definitions based on ideal types might have normative merits, but they cannot ground an empirical research programme because they vacate the universe of cases. However, military interventions for declared humanitarian purposes are here to stay, and they should be analysed instead of defined into oblivion. Thus, the definition should reflect the practice of humanitarian military interventions, not subordinate the humanitarian purpose to violations of sovereignty and international law. The definition must not be restricted to interventions reacting to death tolls that ‘shock the conscience of mankind’; it must also consider interventions in the early stages of conflict. Moreover, military interventions should not be disregarded when the humanitarian motive is not exclusive or predominant.

Practices and outcomes of humanitarian military interventions: a new data set

ABSTRACTDespite abundant debates on humanitarian military interventions, there is yet little empirical knowledge about these operations and their effects due to a lack of systematized data. To stimulate the necessary comparative research, this article introduces a new data set on all humanitarian military interventions between 1946 and 2015. The data set outlines the interveners’ proclaimed aims, mandates, and activities. Documentation of events in the target countries prior to, during, and after the interventions facilitates their evaluation. The data set consists of data matrices and structured case descriptions that document all coding decisions. A review of the spatial and temporal distribution of interveners and interventions refutes the prevalent view that the vast majority of humanitarian military interventions are conducted by Western states and that such missions subsided after the interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. The data set enables a wide range of quantitative and qualitative research. Despite its limited number of cases, it can reveal whether humanitarian military interventions generally decrease the duration and intensity of violence. Among other applications, it can help identify the conditions under which such interventions lead to an escalation or de-escalation of deadly violence.

The Responsibility to Protect in a world of already existing intervention

In the face of humanitarian crises, members of the international community are often presented with a choice: engage in forms of action, including military intervention, or stand by and watch. This framing ignores practices of intervention that are already taking place and contributing to the emergence and perpetuation of humanitarian crises. Despite calling for more attention to be paid to already existing intervention, literature on the Responsibility to Protect has not adequately understood its implications for the legitimacy and likely effectiveness of military intervention. To redress this gap, we argue, first, that a focus on already existing intervention complicates the moral calculus on which defences of military intervention as part of the Responsibility to Protect are based. Second, we claim that actors already engaged in damaging practices of intervention are bad international citizens who are not fit for the purpose of humanitarian military intervention. Third, we argue that in both ignoring already existing intervention and calling for additional military intervention under its third pillar, the Responsibility to Protect legitimises a moralistic form of militarism. These three arguments show that it is a mistake to follow recent literature in responding to already existing intervention by simply adding to the Responsibility to Protect, for instance, duties to engage in structural prevention and to support refugees. Rather, what is needed is a more fundamental rethink that departs from the Responsibility to Protect.

Revolution and Intervention

AbstractProvided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting political self‐determination, in cases of “ordinary oppression”, we normally think that rebellion might be permissible, but not military humanitarian intervention. Thus, according to the received view, the conditions for the permissibility of intervention coincide with the conditions for the permissibility of revolution in cases of supreme humanitarian emergency, but not in cases of ordinary oppression. In cases of ordinary oppression there is an asymmetry between the conditions for the permissibility of revolution and intervention (call this the Asymmetry View). Should we accept the Asymmetry View? I answer this question by outlining an account of political self‐determination and by illustrating the complex role that this notion should play in discussing the morality of revolution and intervention.