Houthi Research Articles

Domestic Diversionary War and Conflict Endurance in Weak States: The Houthi Conflict in Yemen (2004 – 2010)

ABSTRACT There is a vibrant literature on civil war onset and endurance. Previous research has demonstrated that weak states are unlikely to use diversionary measures given the greater likelihood of their defeat. I offer a theoretical contribution to the literature by disentangling why this is particularly the case. Using insights from the Houthi conflict in Yemen between 2004 and 2010, the article shows how the conflict, first initiated as a diversionary operation, increased the Houthi movement’s grievances and galvanised an intra-regime power struggle leading to conflict endurance. The article, thus, offers one of the few exploratory applications of the domestic diversionary war theory in weak states.

Yemen's Houthis (Ansar Allah): impact of the Iranian proxy force on security in the region (in light of the crisis in the Red Sea)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the activities of the Yemeni pro-iranian rebel group “Ansar Allah” (also called the Houthis) in the context of the maritime navigation crisis through the Red Sea that emerged at the end of 2023, which continues to this day. The relevance of the study lies in the fact that the activities of the Houthi group to effectively block most of the maritime traffic through the Red Sea have already caused significant economic damage, and the very safety of maritime navigation along the shortest route from Asia to Europe has actually been called into question. The object of the study is the Yemeni movement “Ansar Allah” (Yemen Houthis movement). The subject of the study is the activities and influence of the Houthi group on the international economy and the safety of maritime navigation through the Red Sea. The research methodology is based on general scientific research methods (content analysis, classification), as well as on special historical methods (narrative, historical-genetic). The scientific novelty of the article lies in a detailed analysis of the events of the crisis in the Red Sea, which began at the end of 2023 and is currently ongoing. The authors' particular contribution to the study is description of the activities of the Houthi movement in the Red Sea in the period from December 2023 to January 2024. Separately, the authors analyze the degree of influence of the crisis on Russia and possible ways to overcome it. In conclusion, the authors conclude that Iran, with the help of its proxy forces, was actually able to block an important sea route for international trade, as well as cause serious economic damage to Western countries and Israel. And the consequences of such damage could ultimately affect the rest of the world.

Securitisation imperatives and the exaggeration of Iranian involvement with the Houthi movement by international actors

AbstractThrough examination of elite‐level discourse between 2014 and 2015, this paper argues that the exaggeration of Iranian involvement with the Houthis served to justify the Saudi‐led intervention in Yemen. Ironically, this had the effect of benefiting Iran, as Riyadh moved their attention away from Iranian priorities in Syria, undermined their own international credibility and spent billions of dollars on this unwinnable conflict. Iran, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and some Western actors pushed the narrative that the Houthis were deeply connected with the Islamic Republic. While Iranian support was negligible during this period, Iran sought to increase Saudi insecurity through rhetorical support for the Houthis. Riyadh, keen to protect their interests in Yemen, over‐exaggerated this connection to justify their airstrikes and blockades, which began with Operation Decisive Storm (ODS) on March 25, 2015. Certain Western actors, sharing similar regional geopolitical priorities, adopted this narrative. This validated their support for the Saudi‐led intervention. This, in turn, has had devastating consequences for the people of Yemen. With these dynamics in mind, the paper asks three research questions: Was the Saudi‐led over‐exaggeration of Iranian involvement successful in securitising ODS to international audiences? Was ‘Iranian involvement’ over‐exaggerated? Who ultimately benefited from this narrative?

The Strategic Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Yemeni Conflict: Towards an Ending?

The conflict in Yemen, ongoing since 2015, between the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized central government, presents an international dimension, as part of the military campaign carried out by a coalition of Sunni countries led by Saudi Arabia, in support of the President Abd Mansur al-Hadi in fighting houthi forces; and the tactical and military assistance given to the Houthis by Iran. In that way, a proxy war was established by the two major powers of the Middle East region, in the context of a geopolitical rivalry, characterized by a fierce competition for the status of regional hegemonic power. However, Riyadh´s offer of a ceasefire in Yemen, and the diplomatic overtures granted to Saudi Arabia by the new Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, have represented a reversal of the status quo. Keywords: Yemen; Conflict; Saudi Arabia; Iran

Pandemonium in Yemen: A Historical Analysis of Yemen's Socio-political State

Pandemonium in Yemen:A Historical Analysis of Yemen's Socio-political State Naif Al Bidh (bio) Introduction In 2011, the domino effect of the Arab Spring had finally reached Yemen, initiating the mobilization of the peaceful youth within the capital, Sana'a. The frustrated Yemeni youth and women kindled the flames of socio-political change after decades of rule under Ali Abdullah Saleh's kleptocracy. Initially, the Yemeni uprising and other Arab uprisings were perceived as events that would instantly engender democratic transition after the ousting of their respective dictators. However, in hindsight, the 'Democratic Domino Theory' is irrelevant in the case of the Arab Spring. The Yemeni uprising was the result of the culmination of political and economic events that involved internal and external actors during the past two to three decades of Yemeni history. Hence, the Arab Spring should be viewed as a catalyst, and not the principal cause, for the Yemeni uprising. The West miscalculated the uprising in Yemen and elsewhere by failing to notice that the Yemeni socio-political infrastructure could not yet accommodate democracy. Thus, the events signaled the start of liberalization rather than democratization within Yemen. [End Page 84] This article argues that the Yemeni uprising and crisis stemmed from several factors. First, the injustices inflicted by Saleh's praetorian regime upon the Southern population before, during, and after the war of 1994, which allowed the Southern Secessionists to penetrate the political arena. Second, the consecutive wars against the Houthi movement and its gradual rise to power. Third, a self-destructing tribal-elite patronage system that led to rampant unemployment, inequality, and corruption, infuriating an already exhausted youth, and paving the way for the emergence of a counter-revolutionary opposition led by General Ali Mohsen and Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar, which is the fourth crucial element to the events that led up to Yemeni uprisings. Diverse Historic Experiences Among the many misperceived concepts about Yemen is the notion of a united Yemeni state and identity. Prior to the union of the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen), these two lands had never united under one polity for centuries.1 The multiple identities existent within Yemen today is the result of regionally distinct historical experiences. Arabia Felix2 was the name given to the ancient lands of Yemen and South Arabia. Within ancient Greek and Roman texts, it is evident that Arabia Felix was made up of several kingdoms and not a unified polity.3 The works of the Greek geographer Eratosthenes of Cyrene perhaps provide an idea of the diverse identities that exist within Yemen's history. Eratosthenes speaks of four distinct peoples residing within Yemen–namely, the Sabaens, the Minaeans, the Hadhramis and the Qatabanians who he named the Sabaioi, the Minaioi, the Chatramotitai and the Katabaneis.4 Today, this division is still noticeable, and there is a pattern about the polities within the regions comprising the Yemeni territory. The conquest or unity of Yemen, although rarely successful throughout history, was common by the hands of the northern polities, especially within the highlands, due to their more massive demographic structure and their aggressive nature. The existence of two or four civilizations, kingdoms, or states has predominated Yemen's history. These polities form within specific regions, namely, the northern [End Page 85] highlands (Sana'a and Sa'ada), the canyons of Hadhramaut, the Red Sea coast, and the Desert of Marib. This is mainly due to the diverse geographic terrain within Yemen, which is a vital factor in accumulating various distinct identities within a region smaller than most ancient civilizations. The geography of Yemen allowed for multiple societies to develop in isolation from one another and thus created diverse regional identities, cultural traits, and languages.5 These facts are crucial in understanding the socio-political issues within contemporary Yemen since the existence of a prolonged centralized united polity was rare. As the Ottoman and European Empires scrambled for influence and land, Yemen turned into a battlefield as various groups aligned themselves with one another to secure their interests. During the age of empires, cynicism became the status quo. As the Turks...

The Religious-Political Ideology of Houthis’ Rebellion in Yemen: Theoretical Perspective of the Divine Right to Rule

This article examines the religious-political ideology of the Houthi movement in Yemen. In particular, it explores the political objectives and historical roots of the Houthis’ rebellion that was initiated in 2004 and continued into 2009 through six rounds of wars, which were called Sa’dah wars. The Houthis implemented a military coup in 2014 against Mansour Hadi’s government and seized state institutions which led to Yemen’s current civil war. A catastrophic battle also erupted when the Saudi-led military coalition decided to intervene in the conflict in 2015, with the aim of restoring the legitimacy of the previous regime as well as defeating the Houthis insurgency. Despite numerous studies on the issues relating to civil war in Yemen, there is no adequate study on the perspective of Houthis’ religious-political ideology. This research is qualitative using in-depth interviews with seven experts and observers of the Yemeni war. This article analyses major reasons for the historical rebellion and the ongoing catastrophic war in Yemen, based on the Houthis’ religious-political ideology. The findings of this article inform that the current conflict in Yemen is rooted in historical circumstances which gave rise to a heavy responsibility or burden on the Houthis, whereby according to the theory of the divine right to rule, the Houthis and their ancestors, the Hashemites claim the monopoly of regional (present day Yemen) power. Thus, this theory has been considered as one of the key dynamics of the outbreak and the continuation of the current war in Yemen. It is very likely that the trend of increased Houthis’ rebellion will continue for the next few years in Yemen due to the movement’s firm aim of power struggle, based on their religious-political ideology of the ‘divine right to rule’.

The Marib front in Yemen’s Civil War

In February 2021, the Houthi movement in Yemen launched a new offensive to capture the strategically significant Marib province. The group – which has controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, since 2015 – is supported by Iran. The Yemeni government is supported by a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia and has fought the Houthis to a standstill with help from the Saudis in the form of airstrikes. If the Houthis succeed in capturing Marib, the group could use proceeds from the region’s natural resources to extend its offensive to the east and south.

From Fragile to Collapsed Statehood: The Case of the Republic of Yemen (1990-2020)

The unification of the two Yemeni states?the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), respectively?in 1990 has been a resounding failure. Merging the tribal-dominated northern and state-party dominated southern regimes meant increasing the number of factions competing for access to state resources to satisfy material and security needs of their respective networks of influence. In particular, efforts at growing the resource base of the unified state after 1990, by means of an expansion of oil and gas exploration and extraction, raised the revenue base of the state in an unsustainable manner. Such growth in national oil and gas rents increased rather than decreased competition over state authority to control the spoils. The major subsequent events, such as the 1994 civil war, the 2004-2010 “Saada wars” against the Houthi movement, the Yemeni version of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, the failure of the National Dialogue Conference (March 2013-January 2014), and the start of the Saudi and Emirati bombing campaign and subsequent ground war in Yemen since March 2015 all triggered major clashes between different factions of the Yemeni state bureaucracy, army, and civil society. On each of these occasions, efforts to freeze out some Yemeni actors produced escalating conflict between the remaining factions instead of a winning coalition that could have reestablished a degree of stability. The article explains how local, regional, and global factors have jointly overwhelmed the Yemeni actors, and how foreign intervention has led to the further deterioration of the pre-existing national crisis.

The Impact of the Religious Phenomenon on the Political Crisis in Yemen from 2011 to 2020: The Houthi Movement as a Case

The Impact of the Religious Phenomenon on the Political Crisis in Yemen from 2011 to 2020: The Houthi Movement as a Case

What Drives Saudi Airstrikes in Yemen? An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of Coalition Airstrikes, Houthi Attacks, and the Oil Market

Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a foreign military intervention against the Houthi movement, which took over major parts of Yemen. The intervention, which manifests mainly in airstrikes, has attracted widespread controversy in media and politics as well as a large body of (qualitative) academic literature discussing its background and ways to escape it. Complementary to these efforts and connecting to the literature on oil and conflict, this study provides unique quantitative insights into what drives the extent of military interaction. We use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to analyse the interactions between Saudi airstrikes in Yemen, gains of the Houthi movement on Yemeni ground, their attacks on Saudi Arabian soil, and crude oil prices. Our approach builds on high-resolution data from the Yemen Data Project and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. Our results show not only that the airstrike campaign has been factually impotent to repulse the Houthi movement but also that the movement’s expansion in Yemen has not driven Saudi airstrikes. These findings draw both suitability and justification of the intervention further into question. Moreover, although the data fail to show that oil price levels drive the developments, our model identifies oil price volatility as a determinant for the airstrikes. However, the intervention has, in turn, no significant effect on oil markets. Besides adding to the academic discourse on oil and conflict, our results have implications for energy and climate policy: a coordinated transition might not deteriorate regional security, while uncertainty and fluctuations can increase conflict potential.

One Problem in the Study of the Houthi Movement (Three Сliches of anti-Houthi Propaganda)

The article identifies and analyzes three main accusations leveled in the 2000s by the Yemeni Government against Houthis: a desire to restore the Imamate, gaining support from Iran and conversion to Twelver Shiism. It is shown that these accusations are incorrect and are consequences of the Yemeni authorities’ discrimination policy against practicing Zaydis and especially sayyids — Zaydi religious “aristocracy”. It is demonstrated that reestablishment of theocratic rule was not part of the Houthi political agenda since a majority of Yemenis were against it; the goal of allegations about Houthi connections with Tehran, made by the Yemeni political establishment, was to secure additional financial aid from Washington and Riyadh; Al-Houthi was not a Twelver Shiite and was critical of the main ideas of this denomination. The author of the article suggests that many Yemenis and several Russian and Western scholars believed the accusations due to the dominance of anti-Zaydi sentiment in the Yemeni information space and the fact that these accusations complement each other in a quasi-logical way: to reestablish the Imamate, Houthis need support, which can be gained from Iran, while conversion to Twelver Shiism guarantees such support.

Iran And Yemen; Study the Reflection of The Islamic Revolution of Iran On Yemen And Its Results

The Islamic Revolution of Iran took place in 1789. Undoubtedly, this revolution had repercussions on its peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, and one of the semi-peripheral countries of Iran that were affected by the revolution was Yemen. Yemen changed with the beginning of the Arab Spring and protest movements were formed in it, the content of which was very close to the foundations of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. These protests led to the revolution and eventually to the victory of the Houthi movement in Yemen and the Ansar Allah movement. But what are the consequences of this event in Yemen in Yemen and the Islamic Republic of Iran? The purpose of this study is to check the results of the export of the Iranian revolution in Yemen. The research findings show that the Islamic Revolution of Iran was exported to Yemen and a very close relationship was established between Yemen and the Islamic Republic. The Yemeni revolution has had very positive results for the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, like the addition of Yemen to the axis of resistance, resistance to Saudi Islam, etc., but to the results that happened to Yemen itself, we can become independent. Yemen touched on freedom of action in deciding and choosing its destiny. Yemen is embroiled in a bloody war that is still going on, and the living and economic situation of the people in Yemen is worse than before. The method of the present study is qualitative and based on the analytical description.

Translation and the narratives of legitimacy

AbstractHow legitimacy narratives in conflict zones are constructed and mediated through translation remains largely under-researched. This article investigates the strategies that the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, uses to construct narratives of legitimacy for the Houthi movement in his Security Council briefings on the conflict in Yemen and their Arabic translations. Using a combination of a narrative framework, which highlights the notion of agency, and a semiotic model of triadic signification, which highlights motivatedness in signification, this article identifies metonymization as a strategy in constructing such narratives of legitimacy, with three additional sub-strategies of labeling, naming, and selective appropriation. While the Arabic translations are generally faithful to their originals in terms of the strategies used, some demonstrate a remarkable departure from United Nations translation norms. These findings shed light on theoretical issues of translator agency under such norms, and the pedagogical implications of such agency are addressed.

Maoist Hybridity? A Comparative Analysis of the Links between Insurgent Strategic Practice and Tactical Hybridity in Contemporary Non-State Armed Groups

While the recent literature on hybrid warfare has focused overwhelmingly on Russia, military tactical hybridity among non-state actors has received less attention, and minimal comparative examination. This is surprising as the range of non-state actors successfully using hybridized irregular-conventional tactics (increasingly symmetrically) against states has grown. Examining this phenomenon comparatively in three divergent cases (Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Houthi Movement), this article tests an often-overlooked argument stating that military hybridity among non-state actors is a result of these groups’ common adoption of a specific form of Maoist-style warfare strategy – emulative insurgency.

El movimiento <em>ḥūṯī</em> (Anṣār Allāh) y la guerra en Yemen

El presente artículo intenta contribuir al conocimiento de la aguda situación que vive Yemen a partir de la guerra de 2014, alpunto de convertirse en la mayor crisis humanitaria en el mundoy superar otros casos en la región, como el sirio. Algunos medios de comunicación e investigadores han centrado su atención especialmen-te en la naturaleza y el desarrollo de la guerra, y han dejado de lado un estudio crítico sobre los distintos actores del conflicto. Uno de ellos es el movimiento ḥūṯī (también llamado Anṣār Allāh), clave en la presente guerra, y aunque con profundas raíces en la historia del país, mucho se desconoce sobre él. El texto intenta llenar este vacío con un estudio general sobre su historia y su relación con la de Yemen, sudimensión religiosa, tribal y política, así como con una descripción del movimiento que repasa importantes momentos históricos, como las Guerras de Ṣaʿda (2004-2010), su papel en las revueltas de 2011 y, finalmente, el gran impacto y poder que ha demostrado a partir de laguerra en 2014.

The limits of the sectarian narrative in Yemen

The conflict in Yemen presents an apparently quintessential example of sectarian conflict in the Middle East today. At the domestic level, the conflict is typically seen as one which pits Shia Muslims, in the form of the Zaydi Houthi movement, against its Sunni Muslim antagonists in the form of the deposed but internationally-recognised president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his supporters. At the regional level, the conflict is represented as proxy war between Iran, the sponsors of the Houthis and Sunni Muslim powers, led by Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) who intervened in 2015 with the objective of restoring Hadi to power. This paper argues that there are strict limits to the utility of the sectarian narrative in the analysis of the Yemeni conflict and presents a critical analysis of the sectarian framing of Yemeni political dynamics. It begins with a broad attempt to contextualise the discussion of sectarianism in the region. This is followed by an extended discussion of the view of the conflict as inherently sectarian at both the domestic and regional levels. This, in turn, is followed by a critique of the sectarian narrative, at both levels.

العلاقة بين الحوثيين والشيعة

هدف البحث التعريف بالمذهب الشيعي وفرقهم، والتعريف بالمذهب الحوثي ونشأتهم، وبيان عقائد الحوثيون، وإبراز العلاقة بين الحوثيين والزيدية والاثنا عشرية، وإبراز خطر الحوثيون وسبل الوقاية منهم. واستخدم البحث المنهج الإستقرائي والمنهج الوصفي التحليلي، وذلک بتتبع جذور الحرکة الحوثية ووصف عقائدها وتحليل العلاقة بينها وبين فرق الشيعة. وتوصل البحث إلى عدة نتائج من أهمها: أن الحرکة الحوثية في أصلها فرقة من فرق الزيدية وتسمى الجارودية وهي أقرب الفرق الاثنا عشرية ثم تحولت من حرکة ثقافية إلى عسکرية منذ عام 2004م. وأن من أهم عقائد الحوثيين في قضايا الإيمان إنکارهم لرؤية الله عزوجل والشفاعة لأهل الکبائر، وإنکار صفات الله وتأويلها. وأن موقف الحوثيون من الصحابة والسنة الطعن والتنقيص، وحصرهم الإمامة في علي وأبناءه. وأن الشيعة الاثنى عشرية أثرت على عقائد الحوثيين کالقول بالإمامة و الطعن في الصحابة والإيمان بالمهدي المنتظر والاحتفال بعيد الغدير. واتفاق الحوثيون مع الزيدية في قضايا عقدية وهذه القضايا أخذها الفريقين من المعتزلة وهي: رد خبر الاحاد في العقائد والخروج على الإمام الجائر ونفي الشفاعة ورؤية الله. Abstract: The research aimed to identify the Shiite sect and their groups, the Houthi sect and its upbringing, the Houthi doctrines, highlight the relationship between the Houthis and Zaidi and Twelver, and highlight the danger of the Houthis and how to prevent them. The research utilized the inductive and descriptive analytical method, by tracing the roots of the Houthi movement and describing its doctrines and analyzing the relationship between them and the Shiite groups.The research indicated several results, the most important of which are: the Houthi movement is originally a Zaidi group called Jaroudiya, which is the closest twelver, then it has been transformed from a cultural movement to a military one since 2004. And that one of the most important doctrines of the Houthis in the issues of faith; is their denial of God's vision and intercession to the people of major sins, and deny the God attributes and interpretation, The Houthis' position on the companionsand sunnis is based on aspersion and diminished, and confined the Imamate in Ali and his sons.In addition the Twelver Shiites influenced the Houthis' beliefs such as saying Imamate, aspersion the companions, believing in the awaited Mahdi and celebrating al-Ghadeer festival. The Houthis agreed with Zaidi on doctorine issues and these issues were taken by the two Mu'tazilis' groups: deny ones in the beliefs, out on the unfair Imam and deny intercession and vision of God. Key word : Relation , Houthis , Shi'a

The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status

On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim of restoring the rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and destroying the Houthi movement. Scholars and policy analysts moved quickly to examine the Yemen war as a sectarian struggle and a byproduct of Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the region. However, these traditional explanations fall short of unravelling the Saudi motive behind launching a large-scale operation in Yemen, its severely weakened and politically divided neighbor. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the abrupt Saudi aggressiveness toward Yemen. It argues that this intervention is driven by a non-material need: Saudi leadership aims to assert the Kingdom’s status as a regional power in the Middle East.

The Destruction of Yemen and Its Cultural Heritage

After losing control of the capital Sanaa to Yemen's northern Houthi movement, which is aligned with forces loyal to the former president ʿAli ʿAbd Allah Salih, current Yemeni President ʿAbd Rabbu Mansur Hadi turned to Saudi Arabia for help. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and its coalition of nine states began a bombing campaign in Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world. Prior to the conflict, Yemen was already 90-percent dependent on imported food and had been battling a severe water deficit. A twenty-eight-month-long siege of its civilian population has left the country in a situation that some humanitarian groups deem to be worse than the crisis in Syria. The media has barely covered Yemen's catastrophic crisis, partially because of overt censorship by the Saudi kingdom and a shielding of its systemic violations of international law by powerful allies including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. These countries are clearly more concerned with billion-dollar arms deals with the kingdom than with putting an end to what has been described as the worst food crisis since the establishment of the United Nations.

“Dancing on the heads of snakes”: The emergence of the Houthi movement and the role of securitizing subjectivity in Yemen’s civil war

On March 25, 2015 a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to force the Houthis (Ansar Allah or the Party of God) to withdraw from Sana’a and enable President Hadi to return to Yemen. Despite vast research on the structural causes of the Arab Uprisings in general, and on the Yemeni Spring in particular, the roles and implications of ontologically (in)secure communities in intra-state conflicts have not yet been sufficiently explored. This study examines the various exogenous and endogenous factors that led to the emergence of the Believing Youth (Shabab al-Moumineen) movement in the first place, and then the Houthi movement by applying Catherina Kinnvall’s “identity-signifier” and “securitizing subjectivity” analytical framework. The purpose here is to shed light on how the Houthis’ collective identity construction and their capability to adapt enabled them to substantially influence Yemeni domestic politics in the post-Arab Spring era.