Household Secondary Attack Rate Research Articles

Household secondary attack rate amongst the susceptible contacts of COVID-19 cases and its epidemiological profile: A retrospective study from central Gujarat, India.

Secondary attack rate (SAR) is a proportion of primary contacts developing the diseases within the incubation period upon exposure to a primary case among the total susceptible household contacts. The epidemiological profile and SAR will help in understanding the transmission dynamics of COVID-19 for further strengthening preventive and effective control measures. The study was conducted with the primary objective to estimate the household SAR of COVID-19 cases at Mahisagar District, Gujarat, and to study the epidemiological profile of primary and secondary cases of COVID-19. A retrospective study was conducted to estimate SAR among 245 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 898 susceptible household contacts in Mahisagar district through telephonic interview and questionnaire by the Investigator team. The household SAR was calculated from the current study in Mahisagar district, Gujarat, and was 13.9%. Among primary cases, 74.7% males were affected, and among secondary cases, 52.8% females were affected. The SAR among elderly was 23.9%, and the SAR among children was 3.9%. 74.1% household contacts had developed disease among symptomatic contacts as compared to asymptomatic household contacts. The household SAR in Mahisagar district, Gujarat, was found to be 13.9%. In primary cases, more males, and in secondary cases, more females were found to be affected. The household SAR was increased in elderly as compared to the younger age group. The SAR was more among the contacts of symptomatic cases than asymptomatic cases. Overall hospitalization in public hospitals was more than that in private hospitals.

Parametric analysis of the transmission dynamics during indigenous aggregated outbreaks caused by five SARS-CoV-2 strains in Nanjing, China.

SARS-CoV-2 strains have been of great concern due to their high infectivity and antibody evasion. In this study, data were collected on indigenous aggregated outbreaks in Nanjing from January 2020 to December 2022, caused by five strains including the original strain, the Delta variant, and the Omicron variant (BA.2, BA.5.2, and BF.7). The basic epidemiological characteristics of infected individuals were described and then parametric analysis of transmission dynamics was performed, including the calculation of incubation period, serial interval (SI), the basic reproductive number (R0), and the household secondary attack rate (HSAR). Finally, we compared the trends of transmission dynamic parameters of different strains. The incubation period for the original strain, the Delta variant, Omicron BA.2, Omicron BA.5.2, and Omicron BF.7 were 6 d (95% CI: 3.5-7.5 d), 5 d (95% CI: 4.0-6.0 d), 3 d (95% CI: 3.0-4.0 d), 3 d (95% CI: 3.0-3.0 d), and 2 d (95% CI: 2.0-3.0 d), respectively; Also, the SI of the five strains were 5.69 d, 4.79 d, 2.7 d, 2.12 d, and 2.43 d, respectively. Notably, the incubation period and SI of the five had both a progressive shortening trend (p < 0.001); Moreover, R0 of the five were 2.39 (95% CI: 1.30-4.29), 3.73 (95% CI: 2.66-5.15), 5.28 (95% CI: 3.52-8.10), 5.54 (95% CI: 2.69-11.17), 7.39 (95% CI: 2.97-18.76), with an increasing trend gradually (p < 0.01); HSAR of the five were 25.5% (95% CI: 20.1-31.7%), 27.4% (95% CI: 22.0-33.4%), 42.9% (95% CI: 34.3-51.8%), 53.1% (95% CI: 45.0-60.9%), 41.4% (95% CI, 25.5-59.3%), also with an increasing trend (p < 0.001). Compared to the original strain, the incubation period and SI decreased while R0 and HSAR increased, suggesting that transmission in the population was faster and the scope of the population was wider. Overall, it's crucial to keep implementing comprehensive measures like monitoring and alert systems, herd immunization plans, and outbreak control.

Vaccinated COVID-19 Index Cases Are Less Likely to Transmit SARS-CoV-2 to Their Household Contacts: A Cohort Study.

The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of index case vaccination on SARS-CoV-2 transmission to household contacts. In our epidemiological cohort study (May 2022-November 2023), we surveyed registered index case vaccination status and test results for contacts (testing on day 0, and on day 7 for negative contacts) and calculated the secondary attack rate (SAR), i.e., newly infected contacts/susceptible included contacts. The association of the independent variable, index case COVID-19 vaccination (yes/no), with household contact infection was determined using the adjusted odds ratio (aOR) and its 95% confidence interval (CI). We recorded 181 index cases and 314 contacts, of whom 250 agreed to participate; 16 contacts were excluded upon testing positive on day 0. Of the 234 included contacts, 49.1% were women, and the mean (SD) age was 51.9 (19.8) years. The overall SAR of 37.2% (87/234) was lower in the contacts of both vaccinated index cases (34.9% vs. 63.2%; p = 0.014) and index cases with a previous SARS-CoV-2 infection history (27.0% vs. 46.3%; p = 0.002). Index case vaccination showed a protective effect against infection for their household contacts (aOR = 0.21; 95% CI: 0.07, 0.67). The household SAR was high when the Omicron variant circulated. Vaccinated index cases were less likely to transmit SARS-CoV-2 to their contacts.

COVID-19, social determinants of transmission in the home. A population-based study.

Studying transmission within the home is essential to understand the transmission dynamics of numerous infectious diseases. For Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19), transmission within the home constitutes the majority exposure context. The risk of infection in this setting can be quantified by the household/intra-family secondary attack rate (SAR). In the literature, there are discrepancies in these values and little information about its social determinants. The aim of this study was to investigate transmission in the home by analyzing the influence of occupational social class, country of origin and gender/sex. This was a retrospective cohort study of a population registry of cohabiting contacts with COVID-19 cases diagnosed from 15 June to 23 December 2020, in the Murcia Region. The household SAR was analyzed considering the characteristics of the primary case (sex, age, symptoms, occupational social class, country of origin and number of people in the household) and contact (age and sex) using a multilevel binary logistic regression model. Among the 37727 contacts included, the intra-family SAR was 39.1%. The contacts of confirmed primary cases in the migrant population (Africa and Latin America) had higher attack rates, even after adjusting for the other variables. Older age and female sex were independent risk factors for contracting Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) within the home. There was greater intra-domiciliary transmission among immigrants, likely related to the conditions of the home and situation of social vulnerability. Women were more likely to be infected by transmission from a cohabiting infected individual.

Overestimation of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Household Transmission in Settings of High Community Transmission: Insights From an Informal Settlement Community in Salvador, Brazil.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant has spread globally. However, the contribution of community versus household transmission to the overall risk of infection remains unclear. Between November 2021 and March 2022, we conducted an active case-finding study in an urban informal settlement with biweekly visits across 1174 households with 3364 residents. Individuals displaying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)-related symptoms were identified, interviewed along with household contacts, and defined as index and secondary cases based on reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and symptom onset. In 61 households, we detected a total of 94 RT-PCR-positive cases. Of 69 sequenced samples, 67 cases (97.1%) were attributed to the Omicron BA.1* variant. Among 35 of their households, the secondary attack rate was 50.0% (95% confidence interval [CI], 37.0%-63.0%). Women (relative risk [RR], 1.6 [95% CI, .9-2.7]), older individuals (median difference, 15 [95% CI, 2-21] years), and those reporting symptoms (RR, 1.73 [95% CI, 1.0-3.0]) had a significantly increased risk for SARS-CoV-2 secondary infection. Genomic analysis revealed substantial acquisition of viruses from the community even among households with other SARS-CoV-2 infections. After excluding community acquisition, we estimated a household secondary attack rate of 24.2% (95% CI, 11.9%-40.9%). These findings underscore the ongoing risk of community acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 among households with current infections. The observed high attack rate necessitates swift booster vaccination, rapid testing availability, and therapeutic options to mitigate the severe outcomes of COVID-19.

Pediatric and Young Adult Household Transmission of the Initial Waves of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States: Administrative Claims Study.

The correlates responsible for the temporal changes of intrahousehold SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the United States have been understudied mainly due to a lack of available surveillance data. Specifically, early analyses of SARS-CoV-2 household secondary attack rates (SARs) were small in sample size and conducted cross-sectionally at single time points. From these limited data, it has been difficult to assess the role that different risk factors have had on intrahousehold disease transmission in different stages of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in children and youth. This study aimed to estimate the transmission dynamic and infectivity of SARS-CoV-2 among pediatric and young adult index cases (age 0 to 25 years) in the United States through the initial waves of the pandemic. Using administrative claims, we analyzed 19 million SARS-CoV-2 test records between January 2020 and February 2021. We identified 36,241 households with pediatric index cases and calculated household SARs utilizing complete case information. Using a retrospective cohort design, we estimated the household SARS-CoV-2 transmission between 4 index age groups (0 to 4 years, 5 to 11 years, 12 to 17 years, and 18 to 25 years) while adjusting for sex, family size, quarter of first SARS-CoV-2 positive record, and residential regions of the index cases. After filtering all household records for greater than one member in a household and missing information, only 36,241 (0.85%) of 4,270,130 households with a pediatric case remained in the analysis. Index cases aged between 0 and 17 years were a minority of the total index cases (n=11,484, 11%). The overall SAR of SARS-CoV-2 was 23.04% (95% CI 21.88-24.19). As a comparison, the SAR for all ages (0 to 65+ years) was 32.4% (95% CI 32.1-32.8), higher than the SAR for the population between 0 and 25 years of age. The highest SAR of 38.3% was observed in April 2020 (95% CI 31.6-45), while the lowest SAR of 15.6% was observed in September 2020 (95% CI 13.9-17.3). It consistently decreased from 32% to 21.1% as the age of index groups increased. In a multiple logistic regression analysis, we found that the youngest pediatric age group (0 to 4 years) had 1.69 times (95% CI 1.42-2.00) the odds of SARS-CoV-2 transmission to any family members when compared with the oldest group (18 to 25 years). Family size was significantly associated with household viral transmission (odds ratio 2.66, 95% CI 2.58-2.74). Using retrospective claims data, the pediatric index transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during the initial waves of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States was associated with location and family characteristics. Pediatric SAR (0 to 25 years) was less than the SAR for all age other groups. Less than 1% (n=36,241) of all household data were retained in the retrospective study for complete case analysis, perhaps biasing our findings. We have provided measures of baseline household pediatric transmission for tracking and comparing the infectivity of later SARS-CoV-2 variants.

Secondary attack rate of COVID-19 in shared households in Slovakia.

The objective of this study was to estimate the secondary attack rate in unvaccinated members of households of two regions in the Slovak Republic for the period November 2020 ‒ April 2021. SARS-CoV-2 infection poses ahigh risk of transmission in close-contact indoor settings, such as households. The household transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 varies widely across countries. We included 278 households for SARS-CoV-2 transmission analysis. We calculated the secondary attack rate (SAR). We assessed sex, level of disease severity and means of isolation during infection of index cases as determinants of disease transmissibilityRESULTS: The secondary attack rate in 278 households was estimated at 63.7% (95%CI: 58.2‒66.7%). The SARs were different by sex (60.2% in females, 67.5% in males). The highest SAR was observed in the households of asymptomatic cases (77.8%), followed by moderate severity (66.5%), hospital admissions (63.2%) and mild disease (58.2%). We found ahigh household secondary attack rate in two regions of Slovakia in the period when Alpha variant (B.1.1.7) of SARS-CoV-2 was dominant in the country. The results highlight the importance of monitoring transmission dynamics (Tab. 1, Fig. 1, Ref. 12). Text in PDF www.elis.sk Keywords: COVID-19, secondary attack rate, Slovak Republic, households.

Incidence and Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in US Child Care Centers After COVID-19 Vaccines

SARS-CoV-2 surveillance studies in US child care centers (CCCs) in the post-COVID-19 vaccine era are needed to provide information on incidence and transmission in this setting. To characterize SARS-CoV-2 incidence and transmission in children attending CCCs (students) and their child care providers (CCPs) and household contacts. This prospective surveillance cohort study was conducted from April 22, 2021, through March 31, 2022, and included 11 CCCs in 2 cities. A subset (surveillance group) of CCPs and students participated in active surveillance (weekly reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction [RT-PCR] swabs, symptom diaries, and optional baseline and end-of-study SARS-CoV-2 serologic testing), as well as all household contacts of surveillance students. Child care center directors reported weekly deidentified self-reported COVID-19 cases from all CCPs and students (self-report group). SARS-CoV-2 infection in CCC students. SARS-CoV-2 incidence, secondary attack rates, and transmission patterns were determined from diary entries, self-reports to CCC directors, and case logs. Incidence rate ratios were measured using Poisson regression clustering on centers with a random intercept and unstructured matrix. From a total population of 1154 students and 402 CCPs who self-reported cases to center directors, 83 students (7.2%; mean [SD] age, 3.86 [1.64] years; 55 male [66%]), their 134 household contacts (118 adults [mean (SD) age, 38.39 (5.07) years; 62 female (53%)], 16 children [mean (SD) age, 4.73 (3.37) years; 8 female (50%)]), and 21 CCPs (5.2%; mean [SD] age, 38.5 [12.9] years; 18 female [86%]) participated in weekly active surveillance. There were 154 student cases (13%) and 87 CCP cases (22%), as defined by positive SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR or home antigen results. Surveillance students had a higher incidence rate than self-report students (incidence rate ratio, 1.9; 95% CI, 1.1-3.3; P = .01). Students were more likely than CCPs to have asymptomatic infection (34% vs 8%, P < .001). The CCC secondary attack rate was 2.7% to 3.0%, with the upper range representing possible but not definite secondary cases. Whether the index case was a student or CCP, transmission within the CCC was not significantly different. Household cumulative incidence was 20.5%, with no significant difference in incidence rate ratio between adults and children. Household secondary attack rates were 50% for children and 67% for adults. Of 30 household cases, only 5 (17%) represented secondary infections caused by 3 students who acquired SARS-CoV-2 from their CCC. Pre- and poststudy seroprevalence rates were 3% and 22%, respectively, with 90% concordance with antigen or RT-PCR results. In this study of SARS-CoV-2 incidence and transmission in CCCs and students' households, transmission within CCCs and from children infected at CCCs into households was low. These findings suggest that current testing and exclusion recommendations for SARS-CoV-2 in CCCs should be aligned with those for other respiratory viruses with similar morbidity and greater transmission to households.

Household secondary attack rates and risk factors during periods of SARS-CoV-2 Delta and Omicron variant predominance in the Republic of Korea.

The household secondary attack rate (SAR) of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is an important indicator for community transmission. This study aimed to characterize transmission by comparing household SARs and identifying risk factors during the periods of Delta and Omicron variant predominance in Republic of Korea. We defined the period of Delta variant predominance (Delta period) as July 25, 2021 to January 15, 2022, and the period of Omicron variant predominance (Omicron period) as February 7 to September 3, 2022. The number of index cases included was 214,229 for the Delta period and 5,521,393 for the Omicron period. To identify the household SARs and risk factors for each period, logistic regression was performed to determine the adjusted odds ratio (aOR). The SAR was 35.2% for the Delta period and 43.1% for the Omicron period. The aOR of infection was higher in 2 groups, those aged 0 to 18 years and ≥75 years, compared to those aged 19 to 49 years. Unvaccinated individuals (vs. vaccinated individuals) and individuals experiencing initial infection (vs. individuals experiencing a second or third infection) had an increased risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2. This study analyzed the household SARs and risk factors. We hope that the results can help develop age-specific immunization plans and responses to reduce the SAR in preparation for emerging infectious diseases or potential new variants of SARS-CoV-2.

Behavioral factors and SARS-CoV-2 transmission heterogeneity within a household cohort in Costa Rica

IntroductionVariability in household secondary attack rates and transmission risks factors of SARS-CoV-2 remain poorly understood.MethodsWe conducted a household transmission study of SARS-CoV-2 in Costa Rica, with SARS-CoV-2 index cases selected from a larger prospective cohort study and their household contacts were enrolled. A total of 719 household contacts of 304 household index cases were enrolled from November 21, 2020, through July 31, 2021. Blood specimens were collected from contacts within 30–60 days of index case diagnosis; and serum was tested for presence of spike and nucleocapsid SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibodies. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 prior infections among household contacts was defined based on the presence of both spike and nucleocapsid antibodies. We fitted a chain binomial model to the serologic data, to account for exogenous community infection risk and potential multi-generational transmissions within the household.ResultsOverall seroprevalence was 53% (95% confidence interval (CI) 48–58%) among household contacts. The estimated household secondary attack rate is 34% (95% CI 5–75%). Mask wearing by the index case is associated with the household transmission risk reduction by 67% (adjusted odds ratio = 0.33 with 95% CI: 0.09–0.75) and not sharing bedroom with the index case is associated with the risk reduction of household transmission by 78% (adjusted odds ratio = 0.22 with 95% CI 0.10–0.41). The estimated distribution of household secondary attack rates is highly heterogeneous across index cases, with 30% of index cases being the source for 80% of secondary cases.ConclusionsModeling analysis suggests that behavioral factors are important drivers of the observed SARS-CoV-2 transmission heterogeneity within the household.

Comparison of new and emerging SARS-CoV-2 variant transmissibility through active contact testing. A comparative cross-sectional household seroprevalence study.

Historically SARS-CoV-2 secondary attack rates (SAR) have been based on PCR positivity on screening symptomatic contacts; this misses transmission events and identifies only symptomatic contacts who are PCR positive at the time of sampling. We used serology to detect the relative transmissibility of Alpha Variant of Concern (VOC) to non-VOC SARS-CoV-2 to calculate household secondary attack rates. We identified index patients diagnosed with Alpha and non-VOC SARS-CoV-2 across two London Hospitals between November 2020 and January 2021 during a prolonged and well adhered national lockdown. We completed a household seroprevalence survey and found that 61.8% of non-VOC exposed household contacts were seropositive compared to 82.1% of Alpha exposed household contacts. The odds of infection doubled with exposure to an index diagnosed with Alpha. There was evidence of transmission events in almost all households. Our data strongly support that estimates of SAR should include serological data to improve accuracy and understanding.

Analysis on the household secondary attack rates of the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant and the associated factors

Objective: To evaluate the household secondary attack rates of the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant and the associated factors. Methods: A COVID-19 outbreak caused by the Delta variant occurred in Nanjing in July 2021. A total of 235 cases with current addresses in Nanjing were reported from 171 households. The subjects in this study were selected from household close contact(s) of infected cases. The information on household index cases and their contacts were collected, and the household secondary attack rate (HSAR) and the risk factors were analyzed by the multi-factor logistic regression model. Results: A total of 234 cases of household close contacts and 64 household secondary cases were reported from 103 households, and the HSAR was 27.4% (64/234, 95%CI:22.0% to 33.4%). The proportions of household size for 2 to 3, 4 to 5, and 6 to 9 were 64.1% (66), 26.2% (27) and 9.7% (10), respectively. A total of 35 cases of household cluster outbreaks were reported (35/103, 34.0%). The number of the first case in the household (FCH) was 103 and males accounted for 27.2% (28 cases), with the median age (Q1, Q3) of 49 (9, 56). The number of household close contacts was 234 and males accounted for 59.0% (138 cases), with the median age (Q1, Q3) of 42 (20, 55) and the median exposure period (Q1, Q3) of 3 (1, 3) days. The multi-factor logistic regression model showed that the higher HSAR was observed in the FCH with the features of airport staff (OR=2.913, 95%CI:1.469-5.774), detection from home quarantine screening (OR=6.795, 95%CI:1.761-26.219) and detection from mass screening (OR=4.239, 95%CI:1.098-16.368). Meanwhile, higher HSAR was observed in cases with longer household exposure (OR=1.221, 95%CI:1.040-1.432), non-vaccination (OR=2.963, 95%CI:1.288-6.813) and incomplete vaccinations (OR=2.842, 95%CI:0.925-8.731). Conclusion: The generation interval of the Delta variant is shortened, and the ability of transmission within the household is enhanced. In the outbreak in Nanjing, the associated factors of HSAR are occupation, detection route, vaccination and exposure period.

Household secondary attack rate in mild COVID-19.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has reached a staggering number of almost 280 million cases worldwide, with over 5.4 million deaths as of 29 December 2021. A further understanding of the factors related to the household spread of the infection might help to bring about specific protocols to curb such transmission. This study aims to find the secondary attack rate (SAR) and factors affecting SAR among the households of mild COVID-19 cases. An observational study was designed where data of patients admitted at All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi due to mild COVID-19 were collected, and outcome was noted after the discharge of the patient. Index cases who were the first in the household to have a positive infection only were included. Based on these data, the overall household SAR, factors related to the index case and contacts that affected transmissibility were noted. A total of 60 index cases having contacts with 184 household members were included in the present study. The household SAR was measured to be 41.85%. At least one positive case was present in 51.67% households. Children below 18 years old had lower odds of getting a secondary infection compared to adults and elderly [odds ratio (OR) = 0.46, 95%CI = 0.22-0.94, p = 0.0383). An exposure period of more than a week was significantly associated with a higher risk of infection (p = 0.029). The rate of transmissibility drastically declined with effective quarantine measures adopted by the index case (OR = 0.13, 95%CI = 0.06-0.26, p < 0.00001). Symptomatic index cases contributed more to the SAR than asymptomatic primaries (OR = 4.74, 95%CI = 1.03-21.82, P = 0.045). Healthcare worker index cases had lower rates of spread (OR = 0.29, 95%CI = 0.15-0.58, P = 0.0003). The high SAR shows the household is a potential high-risk unit for transmissibility of COVID-19. Proper quarantine measures of all those exposed to the index case can mitigate such spread and lead to reduction of risk of COVID-19 within a household.

SARS-CoV-2 infection among healthcare workers: the role of occupational and household exposures during the first three pandemic waves in Quebec, Canada.

We described the evolution of SARS-CoV-2 source of infection in a cohort of healthcare workers (HCWs) of Quebec, Canada, during the first three pandemic waves. We also estimated their household secondary attack rate (SAR) and its risk factors. Cross-sectional surveys. HCWs with a SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by polymerasa chain reaction and diagnosed between March 2020 and May 2021. We collected demographic, clinical, vaccination, and employment information, self-reported perceived source of infection, and transmission to household members during the first three pandemic waves. SAR was calculated for households with ≥2 members where the HCW was the index case. A Poisson regression model estimated the association between risk factors and SAR. Among the 11,670 HCWs completing the survey, 91%, perceived their workplace as the source of infection during the first wave (March-July 2020), 71% during the second wave (July 2020-March 2021), and 40% during the third wave (March-May 2021). Conversely, HCWs reported an increasing proportion of household-acquired infections with each wave from 4% to 14% and 33%, respectively. The overall household SAR of 7,990 HCWs living with ≥1 person was 30% (95%CI: 29-30). SAR increased with the presence of symptoms, older age, and during Alpha-variant predominant period. HCWs and their household members were largely affected during the first pandemic waves of COVID-19, but the relative importance of occupational exposure changed overtime. Pandemic preparedness in healthcare settings is essential to protect HCWs from emerging biological hazard exposures.

Vaccine Effect on Household Transmission of Omicron and Delta SARS-CoV-2 Variants.

We evaluated the household secondary attack rate (SAR) of the omicron and delta severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants, according to the vaccination status of the index case and household contacts; further, in vaccinated index cases, we evaluated the effect of the antibody levels on household transmission. A prospective cross-sectional study of 92 index cases and 197 quarantined household contacts was performed. Tests for SARS-CoV-2 variant type and antibody level were conducted in index cases, and results of polymerase chain reaction tests (during the quarantine period) were collected from contacts. Association of antibody levels in vaccinated index cases and SAR was evaluated by multivariate regression analysis. The SAR was higher in households exposed to omicron variant (42%) than in those exposed to delta variant (27%) (P = 0.040). SAR was 35% and 23% for unvaccinated and vaccinated delta variant exposed contacts, respectively. SAR was 44% and 41% for unvaccinated and vaccinated omicron exposed contacts, respectively. Booster dose immunisation of contacts or vaccination of index cases reduced SAR of vaccinated omicron variant exposed contacts. In a model with adjustment, anti-receptor-binding domain antibody levels in vaccinated index cases were inversely correlated with household transmission of both delta and omicron variants. Neutralising antibody levels had a similar relationship. Immunisation of household members may help to mitigate the current pandemic.

Association Between Population-Level Factors and Household Secondary Attack Rate of SARS-CoV-2: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis.

Accurate estimation of household secondary attack rate (SAR) is crucial to understand the transmissibility of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The impact of population-level factors, such as transmission intensity in the community, on SAR estimates is rarely explored. In this study, we included articles with original data to compute the household SAR. To determine the impact of transmission intensity in the community on household SAR estimates, we explored the association between SAR estimates and the incidence rate of cases by country during the study period. We identified 163 studies to extract data on SARs from 326 031 cases and 2 009 859 household contacts. The correlation between the incidence rate of cases during the study period and SAR estimates was 0.37 (95% CI, 0.24-0.49). We found that doubling the incidence rate of cases during the study period was associated with a 1.2% (95% CI, 0.5%-1.8%) higher household SAR. Our findings suggest that the incidence rate of cases during the study period is associated with higher SAR. Ignoring this factor may overestimate SARs, especially for regions with high incidences, which further impacts control policies and epidemiological characterization of emerging variants.

Household secondary attack rate of COVID 19 and its associated housing factors affecting transmission

: Overcrowding and household environments are high-risk settings for transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). To calculate the household secondary attack rate among household contacts of confirmed case of COVID-19. 2) To elicit the housing factors affecting the transmission of infection. 3) To know the sociodemographic of the discharge patients.A prospective study was conducted among the COVID 19 laboratory-confirmed discharged patients admitted at District Covid Hospital, Designated Covid health centre from period May 2020 to July 2020. Total 94 patients were able to contact telephonically. Sociodemographic details were taken after informed Verbal consent. Those who are not able to contact telephonically or didn't give consent are excluded. Household secondary attack rate is 14.5%. Mean rooms per person were 2.8 with a standard deviation of 1.38. The mean age of the patients was 39 years with a standard deviation of 14.9. A mild negative correlation between the number of positive COVID-19 cases and rooms per person (r= −0.045, p&amp;#62;0.05) and mild negative correlation was seen with the number of family members and proportion of family members (positive COVID-19 cases in family/total members in the family) being infected by COVID-19 (r= −0.20, p&amp;#62;0.05). Infection control and preventive strategies of household transmission such as good ventilation, isolation precautions of infected person at home, household disinfecting procedures, wearing of mask at home, hand hygiene needs to be encouraged at household level to lower the Secondary attack rate before recommendation of home isolation and home quarantine measures.

1978. Vaccine effect on household transmission of omicron and delta SARS-CoV-2 variants in South Korea

Abstract Background We aimed to evaluate household secondary attack rate (SAR) of SARS-CoV-2 variants, omicron and delta, based on index case and contact vaccination status, and antibody level effect of vaccinated index cases on household transmission. Methods A prospective study of 92 index cases and 197 quarantined household contacts was performed. Tests for SARS-CoV-2 variant type and antibody level were conducted in index cases, and results of PCR tests (during the quarantine period) were collected from contacts. Association of antibody levels in vaccinated index cases and SAR was evaluated by multivariate regression analysis. To evaluate the association between antibody levels in vaccinated index cases and household transmission, the probability of transmission was calculated using the logistic regression model. We refit the model for the probability of transmission using the variables that could affect the household transmission (meal with index, contact with index case ≥5/day, respiratory symptoms and immunocompromised status of index patients, and vaccination status of contacts). For this analysis, only vaccinated index cases who tested antibody levels within 7 days of symptom onset or diagnosis, whichever was earlier, were included. Figure 1. Study flow chart A total of 187 SARS-CoV-2 patients were recruited for this study. Of those, 155 patients and 262 of their household members were eligible for inclusion. After excluding unknown primary and reinfection cases, 77 household contacts of 41 index cases with delta variant infection and 120 household contacts of 51 index cases with omicron variant infection were included. Figure 2.The link between index cases and household contacts based on their vaccination status The link between index cases and household contacts according to their vaccination status is shown in Figure. A total of 40, 27, and 10 contacts were linked with 20 unvaccinated index cases, 14 booster-unvaccinated index cases, and 7 booster-vaccinated index cases with delta variant infection, respectively. Among the contacts of index cases with omicron variant infection, 20, 65, and 35 contacts were exposed to 7 unvaccinated, 25 booster-unvaccinated, and 9 booster-vaccinated index cases, respectively. Results SAR was higher in households exposed to omicron variant than those exposed to delta variant. SAR was 35% and 23% for unvaccinated and vaccinated delta variant exposed contacts, respectively. SAR was 44% and 41% for unvaccinated and vaccinated omicron exposed contacts, respectively. Booster dose immunisation of contacts or vaccination of index cases reduced SAR of vaccinated omicron variant exposed contacts. In a model with adjustment, anti-receptor binding domain antibody levels in vaccinated index cases were inversely correlated with household transmission of both delta and omicron variants. Neutralising antibody levels had a similar relationship. When we performed sensitivity analyses using 3 day and 5 day thresholds for the period of antibody test, the results did not differ from the main analyses. Table 1.The secondary attack rate among household contacts of index cases with delta and omicron variant infections according to vaccination status of contactsSAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence interval*P-value was calculated using the Fisher’s Exact Test.Table 2.The secondary attack rate according to vaccination status of household contacts linked to that of index casesSAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence intervalFigure 3.The association of antibody levels in vaccinated index cases and household transmission. In a model with adjustment for factors that could affect the household transmission, the estimated probabilities of SARS-CoV-2 infection among 132 contacts according to the level of anti-RBD antibodies (A) and neutralising antibodies (B) of 62 index cases. Serum samples for antibody tests were collected within 7 days of symptom onset or diagnosis, whichever was earlier, in vaccinated index cases. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. RBD, receptor-binding domain Conclusion Despite of decreased vaccine effectiveness on the transmission of the omicron variant in households, we suggest that enhancing the immunity of all household members through vaccination may help mitigate the current pandemic. Disclosures All Authors: No reported disclosures.

Dynamic characteristics of a COVID-19 outbreak in Nanjing, Jiangsu province, China.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) lineage B.1.617.2 (also named the Delta variant) was declared as a variant of concern by the World Health Organization (WHO). This study aimed to describe the outbreak that occurred in Nanjing city triggered by the Delta variant through the epidemiological parameters and to understand the evolving epidemiology of the Delta variant. We collected the data of all COVID-19 cases during the outbreak from 20 July 2021 to 24 August 2021 and estimated the distribution of serial interval, basic and time-dependent reproduction numbers (R0 and Rt), and household secondary attack rate (SAR). We also analyzed the cycle threshold (Ct) values of infections. A total of 235 cases have been confirmed. The mean value of serial interval was estimated to be 4.79 days with the Weibull distribution. The R0 was 3.73 [95% confidence interval (CI), 2.66-5.15] as estimated by the exponential growth (EG) method. The Rt decreased from 4.36 on 20 July 2021 to below 1 on 1 August 2021 as estimated by the Bayesian approach. We estimated the household SAR as 27.35% (95% CI, 22.04-33.39%), and the median Ct value of open reading frame 1ab (ORF1ab) genes and nucleocapsid protein (N) genes as 25.25 [interquartile range (IQR), 20.53-29.50] and 23.85 (IQR, 18.70-28.70), respectively. The Delta variant is more aggressive and transmissible than the original virus types, so continuous non-pharmaceutical interventions are still needed.

A four-generation family transmission chain of COVID-19 along the China-Myanmar border in October to November 2021.

Foreign imported patients and within-household transmission have been the focus and difficulty of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) prevention and control, which has also posed challenges to border areas' management. However, household transmission caused by foreign imported cases has not been reported in China's border areas. This study aimed to reveal a clear family clustering transmission chain of COVID-19 caused by contact with Myanmar refugees along the China-Myanmar border during an outbreak in October to November 2021. During the outbreak, detailed epidemiological investigations were conducted on confirmed patients with COVID-19 and their close contacts in daily activities. Patients were immediately transported to a designated hospital for treatment and quarantine, and their close contacts were quarantined at designated sites. Regular nucleic acid testing and SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing were provided to them. A clear four-generation family clustering transmission involving five patients with COVID-19 was found along the China-Myanmar border. The index case (Patient A) was infected by brief conversations with Myanmar refugees across border fences during work. His wife (Patient B) and 9-month-old daughter (Patient C) were second-generation cases infected by daily contact with him. His 2-year-old daughter (Patient D) was the third-generation case infected by her mother and sister during quarantine in the same room and then transmitted the virus to her grandmother (Patient E, the fourth-generation case) who looked after her after Patients B and C were diagnosed and transported to the hospital. The household secondary attack rate was 80.0%, the average latent period was 4 days, and the generation time was 3 days. Ten of 942 close contacts (1.1%) of this family had positive IgM antibody during the medical observation period. In total 73.9% (696/942) of them were positive for IgG antibody and 8.3% (58/696) had IgG levels over 20 S/CO (optical density of the sample/cut-off value of the reagent). This typical transmission chain indicated that it is essential to strengthen COVID-19 prevention and control in border areas, and explore more effective children care approaches in quarantine sites.