House Of Councillors Research Articles

Measures to prepare for ratification of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention enacted

24 | International Union Rights | 28/3-4 FOCUS | FORCED LABOUR – THE WORLD TODAY AND THE LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM AND SLAVERY Measures to prepare for ratification of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention enacted On 9 June 2021, the National Diet (parliament) of Japan enacted a Bill to prepare legislative measures to pave the way for Japan’s ratification of the International Labour Organisation Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), following approval by a majority vote in the House of Councillors (the Diet’s Upper House). ILO Convention No. 105 is one of the eight core ILO Conventions, and Japan has been criticised internationally for failure to ratify it. Article 1 of the Convention requires every ratifying member State: to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labour— (a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system; (b) as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development; (c) as a means of labour discipline; (d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes ILO Convention No. 105 and the Asia-Pacific region Just 11 ILO member States have not ratified ILO Convention No. 105, and they are all in the Asia Pacific region. They are: Brunei Darussalam; China; Japan; Lao; Marshall Islands; Myanmar; Palau; South Korea; Timor-Leste; Tonga; and Tuvalu. Two further States ratified and then denounced the Convention: Malaysia and Singapore, also both ILO member States in the Asia-Pacific region. North Korea is not an ILO member State but is yet another country in the region outside of the Convention. But not all countries in the region have this approach: Australia (1960); New Zealand (1968); Philippines (1960); and Indonesia (1999) have all ratified the Convention. Recently signatories such as the Solomon Islands (2012), Cook Islands (2015), and Vietnam (2020). If they can adopt the instrument then it is certainly time for Japan to embrace the Convention. In 2021 the governments of both Japan and South Korea have been discussing this issue. South Korea took a big step this year with the ratification of Conventions No. 87, 98, and 29 (on freedom of association, collective bargaining and forced labour), but it has so far not approved ratification of Convention No. 105. Reform of hard labour punishment for public sector strikers Japan’s National Public Service Law (Act No. 120 of 1947) and the Local Civil Service Law (Act No. 261 of 1950) were in conflict with Article 1(a) and 1(d) because they restrict political rights and also prohibit central and local public employees from organising and participating in strike action (Article 98 of the National Public Service Law and Article 37 of the Local Civil Service Law). Disciplinary action is always taken against civil servants who engage in industrial action contrary to these provisions, but the conflict with ILO Convention 105 arose not just because of these restrictions but because the laws also established a basis to impose terms of imprisonment for up to 3 years with hard labour for those found guilty of inciting strike action (Article 110, National Public Service Law and Article 62 / 63 Local Civil Service Law). The Bill, enacted as the Law on the Development of Relevant Laws for the Conclusion of the Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105) (Act No. 75 of 2021), changes the penalties applicable in these circumstances. The Act contains provisions to amend the National Civil Service Law, the Local Public Service Law, and the Mail Law, and changes the penalty for public service employees participating in strikes or political activities from one of imprisonment with hard labour to imprisonment without hard labour. This changes the type of punishment for public service employees to remove barriers to Japan’s ratification. But punishment exists per se, and the Bill thus provides no solution to the fundamental problems. The Diet enacted the law so as to pave the way for the ratification of ILO Convention No. 105, and the measure was approved by a majority vote in the House of Councillors. However, while...

Japan’s 2019 upper house election: Solidifying Abe, the LDP, and return to a one-party dominant political system

Japan’s upper house, the House of Councillors, is a less powerful body than the House of Representatives, the lower house of the national Diet. Yet, electoral results of the upper house can have a significant impact on the government of the day, both for legislative purposes and for judging the credibility of the ruling party and its leader. This article analyses the July 2019 election and its likely impact on the Abe administration, and implications for Japan’s parliamentary democracy and party politics. The article argues that opposition forces are highly fragmented and weak, sustaining the LDP’s dominance in Japanese politics. Such a political landscape is welcomed by the ruling party and its leader, but continuing to entrench the hold on national governance by one dominant party is unhealthy for Japanese democracy.

Record Management in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, the National Diet of Japan

Record Management in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, the National Diet of Japan

立法過程における参議院再論 : 二〇〇七年「衆参ねじれ」発生前後における内閣の立法行動比較

立法過程における参議院再論 : 二〇〇七年「衆参ねじれ」発生前後における内閣の立法行動比較

The Japanese 2009 House of Representatives elections: the beginning of real change and the end of one-party dominance in Japan?

In the 2009 House of Representatives election in Japan, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took complete control of the government from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Formed in 1996, the DPJ had gradually grown and expanded, taking control of the Upper House, the House of Councillors, in July 2007. After two years of confrontational politics, the 2009 election win meant that, for the first time since 1955, the LDP have no control at all in Japan. This article examines the problems that faced the LDP and DPJ prior to the election, their manifestos and public opinion polls, before providing a detailed analysis of the election data and the way in which the DPJ managed to seize control of the Lower House with the largest majority ever seen in Japan. It assesses the first year of the DPJ government and how it has managed in taking over government problems, dealing with international issues and finding ways to enhance the budget for the future. Finally, it discusses the extent to which this could have a long-term impact on the party system in Japan.

Japan transformed: political change and economic restructuring

List of Tables and Figures vii Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii Abbreviations and Stylistic Conventions xv Chapter 1: Why Study Japanese Political Economy? 1 Chapter 2: Japanese History and Culture 15 Chapter 3: Japan's Political Experiments 32 Chapter 4: The Old Japanese Politics, 1955-1993 53 Chapter 5: Japan's Postwar Political Economy 72 Chapter 6: Japan's New Politics 95 Chapter 7: Japan's New Political Economy 123 Chapter 8: Japan's Place in the World 155 Chapter 9: Conclusions 174 Epilogue: The 2009 General Election and the LDP's Fall from Power 186 Appendix 1. Japanese Electoral Systems, 1947-Present 193 Appendix 2. Election Results, House of Representatives, 1986-2005 195 Appendix 3. Election Results, House of Councillors, 1986-2007 201 Bibliography 207 Index 233

Constitutional Problems on the Government Monitering of the Diet -the Administrative Monitoring Committee in the House of Councillors, the National Diet of Japan-

Constitutional Problems on the Government Monitering of the Diet -the Administrative Monitoring Committee in the House of Councillors, the National Diet of Japan-

Laughter and Tears: The Complex Narratives of Shōwa Gesaku Writer Nosaka Akiyuki

Nosaka Akiyuki, a writer, singer, lyricist, and former member of the House of Councillors, is now struggling with the effects of a stroke which he suffered in 2003. Nosaka early identified himself as a member of the yakeato yamiichi sedai (the generation brought up in the ruins and black markets of the post-war period). In his works Nosaka repeatedly depicts his firsthand experience of the fire bombings of major Japanese metropolitan areas during the Greater East Asian conflict. This paper examines two recent satirical works before proceeding to a discussion of Nosaka's seminal work Hotaru no haka [Grave of the Fireflies, 1967], which deserves to be remembered as ‘the most celebrated literary record of the yakeato generation’. Nosaka's original story has been overshadowed by the animated film version written and directed by Takahata Isao for Studio Ghibli. This paper describes and evaluates the unparalleled narrative style of Nosaka's original story, which covers an emotional spectrum ranging from the lighthearted depiction of the happy play of childhood, to the overwhelmingly dark and sorrowful portrayal of two children (brother and sister) dying from malnutrition in the dislocated society of post-war Japan.

Exploring the Low Levels of Women's Representation in Japanese Local Government

Although women have consistently outvoted men in elections in Japan since the 1970s, the country has a relatively poor record in terms of women being elected to representative bodies. In recent years, there have been increases, particularly in the number of women in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, but at the local level the rate of change has been slower.As in other states, a number of propositions have been put forward to explain the low numbers of women in local assemblies. Drawing upon a variety of sources, including the developing literature and interviews with women councillors and others, this article seeks to identify the variety of factors that have contributed to holding down levels of female representation in local government in Japan. It examines these in the context of recent changes and considers the extent to which there is the prospect for further change.

The Two-Party System Meets a House of Councillors Election

Elections to Japan's upper house, the House of Councillors, are ‘secondary’ elections, that is, elections that do not choose the government. Among the implications of this secondary status is that the party system is primarily determined elsewhere, by the system used in the general elections that do choose the government. From 1947 through 1993 the system used in general elections fostered a multiparty system that did not sit easily with the many single-member districts of the House of Councillors. Since 1996 general elections use a system based primarily on single-member districts, which is fostering a two-party system. As a two-party system emerges, we should expect the single-member districts of the upper house to become more and the multi-member districts to become less congruent with the party system. The 2004 House of Councillors election presented us with our first example of what two-party elections might look like in future upper house elections. The overall results do indeed indicate the advent of the two-party system with the major parties winning 96% of the seats in the district tier and 71% in the PR tier.

The present and future organisation of Veterinary Services in Asia: the examples of the Republic of Korea and Japan

The Veterinary Services of the Republic of Korea and Japan are reviewed and summarised. To cope with ever-increasing demands on Veterinary Services, both countries have made continued efforts to expand the services, which currently only have a limited number of government personnel. To overcome some of the problems associated with international trade, e.g. outbreaks of foot and mouth disease and classical swine fever (hog cholera), the authorities of the Republic of Korea are considering strengthening quarantine services by combining the National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service and the National Plant Quarantine Service of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). In the field of veterinary public health services, the Republic of Korea and Japan have different organisational structures. All Veterinary Services, including veterinary public health, are kept within the MAF in the Republic of Korea, whereas in Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) deals with general animal production and health services and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) deals with the safety of animal products, food poisoning and the prevention/control of zoonoses, such as rabies and Q fever. In Japan, after the occurrence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in 2001, the authorities undertook a thorough review of the Veterinary Services, focusing particularly on food safety. A reorganisation of the administrative structure was proposed, and will be completed by the end of 2003. Subject to the approval of the Diet (House of Councillors), an independent 'Food Safety Commission' will be created within the cabinet office which will undertake risk analyses related to foods, and risk management will be carried out by the relevant ministry, i.e. the MAFF or the MHLW. The Animal Health Division of the MAFF will also be moved from the Livestock Industry Department to a new 'Consumer Safety Department' of the MAFF, where additional responsibilities in fish health control and feed safety control will be assumed.

Time for a Change? Recent Elections in Japan

The most important election held in 2001 was that to the House of Councillors. Here, however, I will report on several surprising gubernatorial elections and the shocking LDP party presidential election. Each of these elections sent a similar message from the voters: ‘it is time for a change’. Powerful political machines using tried and true campaign techniques were repeatedly defeated by novices whose primary attraction was that they were not part of the political establishment.

Strategic Contexts of the Vote on Political Reform Bills

This article employs a simple model of sophisticated voting under incomplete information and explores the strategic contexts of the vote on political reform bills in Japan. The government-sponsored political reform bills were voted down by the defection of government coalition members in the House of Councillors before a final compromise was reached in the joint committee of both houses and passed subsequently. In contrast to the accepted view that the defectors were short-sighted sincere voters, I show that Japan's institutional arrangements created an uncertainty about the agenda in the legislative process and led to the sophisticated voting behavior of pivotal voters whose preferences were different from the party leadership. The analysis underscores the importance of sophisticated voting for the empirical study of Japanese legislative politics.

No Great Reversal in Japan: Elections for the House of Representatives in 1990

A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE of public life in Japan during recent decades of extraordinary economic growth and associated social change has been continuity in politics. Government power has been in the hands of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1955. While other democratic countries in the industrial world have experienced long periods of one-party domination, in none has the possibility of change in government seemed more unlikely.' Or at least it appeared so untilJuly 1989 when voters in the Upper House (House of Councillors) elections handed the ruling party its biggest defeat ever with the LDP's comfortable 142-seat majority in the 252-seat chamber being reduced to 109 seats. In a dramatic reversal of waning power, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) increased its strength from 43 to 68 seats. While other parties declined a bit, the newly formed Japan Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) went from 1 to 12 seats. Together, then, the nation's political opposition parties, invariably described as a permanent opposition, gained a majority, although in a body significantly inferior in constitutional power to the Lower House (House of Representatives) in which the LDP continued to command an absolute majority. Voters, upset by the LDP's four-point set of evils (introduction of a 3 percent consumption tax; the Recruit Cosmos influence-peddling affair that developed into the most far-reaching scandal in the postwar period; rejection of domestic agriculture's demands for continued protection from foreign imports; and alleged sexual peccadilloes of the incumbent prime minister)2 issued a sharp rebuke to the nation's conservatives. Many political commentators quickly pronounced that a long-awaited Great Reversal could very well take place when elections for the Lower House were held next. The LDP's days in power were in doubt, enfeebled it seemed by unpopular policy choices, discredited political leaders, dubious political ethics, and rejection at the polls. Speculation about a potential Great Reversal marked general political discussions for months just as it continued to haunt the LDP.3

Party Politics in Japan: The June 1980 Election

For many reasons the June election was unusual. To begin with, it was the first time in twenty-seven years that a general election was called due to the passage of a ‘vote of non-confidence’ in the House of Commons.Moreover, it was a ‘double election’ as the regular triennial election of the House of Councillors was scheduled for the same time. Most uniquely, it was also the first time in Japan's electoral history that an incumbent Prime Minister died in office while in the course of the campaign. Finally, it was seen as the first serious opportunity for the combined opposition forces to terminate the uninterruped one-party rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter referred to as the LDP) since 1955. Results of the election and the subsequent choice of Suzuki Zenko as the Prime Minister surprised not only observers but also the ‘insiders’ ofJapanese politics. This paper attempts to: (1) elaborate on the background that led to the election; (2) illustrate and analyze the electoral facts; and (3) examine their implications for Japan's party politics in the 1980s.

The 1975-76 Debate Over Ratification of the NPT in Japan

THIS PAPER HAS four purposes: to trace the course of the debate which surrounded the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ratification drive of 1975-76 in Japan; to examine by close review the actual Japanese decision-making process revealed in the unfolding interaction between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese government; to fill an information gap as to why Japan did not ratify the NPT in 1975 when even the EURATOM associated states of Europe including West Germany deposited articles of ratification for the May NPT Review Conference; and to discuss why, in 1976, six years after signing the NPT, Japan finally ratified it. The principal forum for the debate over the NPT was the Diet. The sessions which began on December 27, 1974, and ended on May 24, 1976, were particularly important. While not all the debates over this issue took place in the Diet-in fact very few did-the schedule around which the Diet was organized did establish the pace. The composition of the Diet over most of this period was particularly important to the fate of the NPT. In the lower house (House of Representatives), the ruling LDP had 279 members, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 117, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) 39, the Komeito 30, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 20, one independent, and five vacancies. A margin of 72 seats existed between the LDP and all opposition parties combined. Fairly comfortable, indeed. In the Upper House (House of Councillors), the situation differed considerably. The strength of the LDP stood at 128 while the JSP had

Okinawan Reversion in Retrospect

ANY PEOPLE in Okinawa wonder why they favored reversion IVI. now that the prices are higher under Japanese commented a member of Japan's House of Councillors, Kyan Shinei, after his re-election inJuly I974. There were always conflicting estimates of how strongly native Okinawans wanted to return to Japan, of how much they like the Japanese, or disliked the American military government which ruled them from I 945 to I 972. Disagreements of this type are best revealed in public opinion polls which are the basis of this article, but even they are not always clear. Anyone wishing to study the impact of reversion on Okinawan opinion should also consult Americans with long experience in the islands, Japanese officials and their Okinawan counterparts, and experts among the Okinawan academic and business communities. This article* is based mainly on the author's interviews in Tokyo and Naha in the summer of I974, and on poll data obtained over the years from the two main newspapers in Naha (the Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo). It deals first with the cultural self-perceptions and Okinawan expectations of Japan, then with the economic costs of return to Japanese control, and finally with the critical issue of American military bases and the presence of 5,500 Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in Okinawa. It is too early to reach firm conclusions about the impact of the 27 years of American rule, although Professor Mikio Higa of the University of the Ryukyus has noted that according to a study of this problem the task is badly needed, and that his own institution was engaged only in piecemeal studies of the American period.' Part of the problem

The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister

In early September, after the oppressive summer heat has passed, the political season starts in Japan. Each faction leader in the Liberal Democratic Party summons the Dietmen of his faction and together they head for the mountain resorts, either north to Karuizawa or south to Hakone, and open for four or five days' duration in the hotels there. Each faction has its own style and these schools reflect that style. The Maeo faction has many ex-bureaucrats and its school is not only well organized but strict. This year, faction members rose promptly at six-thirty. After exercising to the radio and eating breakfast, they rotated through one class after another, eleven men to one specialist, each session two hours long, until nine-thirty at night when they were expected to go to bed. Murakami, another faction leader, was less demanding. He believes personal friendships most important to politics. The fifteen Dietmen in his faction devoted more time to playing golf and Mah-jong together than to listening to lectures. Fujiyama is utterly serious about politics, and his school brought in lecturers the universities, issued a diploma, and promulgated school regulations which permitted no drinking until classes were over. Ostensibly, the schools convene to study national problems. Another purpose is to permit the faction leader to count the noses of his followers and receive anew assurances of fealty.' This year, Okinawa, Nixon, China and the price of rice received attention. But the dominant issue was whether .Sat6 Eisaku should continue to serve as Prime Minister or a new man be elected. The choice rested with the factions. They would make the decision later in the autumn. The Japanese Constitution states that the Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet.2 Since its inception in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has held a majority of the seats in the Diet. At present it has 274 of the 486 seats in the House of Representatives, and 137 of the 250 seats in the House of Councillors. The LDP, then, controls the selection of the Prime Minister. Since the birth of political parties in Japan about one hundred years ago, politicians have held that the principal purpose of a party president is to

Parliament and Parliamentarians in Japan

A CCORDING TO THE 1947 CONSTITUTION the Japanese Diet is the highest organ of state power. Yet most students of Japanese politics, indeed most of the Japanese people, do not believe this to be an accurate reflection of the power of the With this statement as an introduction, Diet members were asked by the writer to comment on their role in Japanese politics. Members of both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors were interviewed, and an effort was made to gather opinions from all points on the political spectrum. What follows is an amalgam of these views as well as certain impressions gained by the writer observing proceedings in the Diet.' Most frequently cited as the explanation for the Diet's weakness was the power of the bureaucracy. Many members of the Diet believe that they are prisoners of that vast organization upon which they must rely for information and over which they can exercise only lamentably limited control. This feeling of frustration is present even among the large group of Diet members who were themselves bureaucrats prior to their election.2 By the same token members of the bureaucracy, especially in the powerful Ministry of Finance, indicated that they have had to trim their sails in the face of growing expertise on the part of Diet members; indeed one member of this Ministry expressed the belief that there is altogether too much meddling by the Diet in the formulation of the Budget. Former Minister of Finance, Kiichi Aiichi (currently Minister of Education) also pointed out that in his view members of the Diet were spending too much time trying to match wits with the bureaucrats, thereby losing sight of their true function as legislators. A secondary theme that came up with considerable frequency was related to the origins of the Japanese Diet. In broad outline the argument runs as follows: The prewar Imperial Diet originally was patterned on the German

I. The Japanese Diet under The New Constitution

From the standpoint of the national legislature, the constitution of Japan which became effective on May 3, 1947, contains the following significant reforms: (1) popular sovereignty replaces the sovereignty of the emperor; (2) the Diet is the chief branch of government; (3) an elected House of Councillors supersedes the House of Peers; (4) the cabinet is responsible to the Diet; (5) the “invisible government” of crown agencies is abolished.The preamble to the new constitution begins: “We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet…, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people.” As for the once sacred and inviolable emperor, he does “not have powers related to government,” but functions merely as “the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power,” performing, “with the advice and approval of the cabinet,” only such acts as promulgating laws, convoking the Diet and dissolving the House of Representatives, proclaiming general elections, attesting the appointment of officials, and awarding honors.