Some things aren't what their names suggest. This is true of rubber ducks, stool pigeons, clay pigeons, hot dogs, and clothes horses. Is rule-consequentialism similar in that it isn't really a form of consequentialism? Frances Howard-Snyder's engaging 'Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck' [12] argues that rule-consequentialism isn't what its name suggests. Howard-Snyder thinks rule-consequentialism is a form of deontology, not a form of consequentialism. This thought is understandable. For, as I will explain, many recent definitions of consequentialism are such as to invite it. But I shall argue that we should hold on to a definition of consequentialism which recognises rule-consequentialism's family membership. Rule-consequentialism is the view that an act is morally permissible if and only if it is allowed by the code of rules whose general acceptance would (or could reasonably be expected to) produce the best consequences, judged impartially (or produce consequences at least as good as would result from the general acceptance of any other code of rules we can identify). In other contexts, I myself would want to insist upon the alternatives mentioned within the parentheses. But they are irrelevant within this paper. So I shall ignore them here. A number of people have defended rule-consequentialism recently.' Nevertheless, act-consequentialism has been far more popular over the last twenty-five years. Thinking rule-consequentialism inferior, many philosophers, when discussing consequentialism, have had act-consequentialism in mind. Having just one kind of consequentialism in mind has led them to use definitions of consequentialism that are really definitions of just actconsequentialism. Thus, for example, Derek Parfit ([14] p. 24) defines consequentialism as the view that 'What each of us ought to do is whatever would make the outcome best.'2 And Philip Pettit ([15], p. 231) writes that consequentialists say 'agents are required to produce whatever actions have the property of promoting a designated value'. In tying the rightness