Hostile Purposes Research Articles

Lessons from the Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiations and Implementation for the Diplomatic Challenges of Negotiating ‘Irreversibility’

ABSTRACT Negotiating an international disarmament treaty that has as one of its core requirements the concept of “irreversibility” will be a major task, especially so if the aim is to ensure that nuclear weapons and the means of their production and maintenance are irreversibly destroyed. The task exists on several levels: the practical and technical – how to design and implement an effective verification regime, the legal – how to frame necessary treaty definitions, prohibitions and controls; and diplomatic – negotiating and agreeing on the treaty provisions and the temporal factors. The Chemical Weapons Convention’s main objective is the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, but an equally important objective is prevention of their re-emergence. At the heart of the matter is the concept of dual-use where materials and facilities have both legitimate peaceful purposes and actual or potential for hostile purposes, and the basic starting materials required exist in nature. The same applies in the nuclear context. So what can we learn from the CWC? A treaty with nuclear irreversibility as its goal will face multiple challenges. Setting and agreeing treaty language that is clear on scope and enables trouble-free implementation over many decades will not be easily achieved given the record of existing and previous arms control and disarmament treaties. However, there is likely to be one crucial difference: a treaty with nuclear irreversibility as its sole purpose will not be negotiated and implemented in the sort of conflicted world that we saw during the Cold War.

Proposed arrangements and cyber security challengesin nuclear domain: An explanatory study of India

The goal of cyber security is to protect the internet against online attacks. One of the most frequently usedterminologies in cybersecurity is “cyber-threats,” which refers to the use of information and communicationtechnology (ICT) for hostile purposes by a range of criminals. The complexity of cyber security architecture makeshigher safety measures necessary to guard against system flaws and potential global catastrophes. One of themost important security issues today is cyberattack. A cyber breach could make nuclear systems safety andsecurity safeguards ineffective, which is especially important for nuclear systems. India, which has a sizableand developing nuclear programme, has a similar situation. Over the past few decades, governments, includingIndia, have invested a significant amount of time and money in building effective physical safeguards for nuclearinstallations, which has raised the risk of a cyber or hybrid attack. The risk of hacking, disruption, or sabotage risesas nuclear infrastructure becomes more and more reliant on cyber technology. Any cyberattack’s antagonistic goalis to take advantage of a system’s weaknesses in order to take over, operate, and keep a presence on the targetsystem. Designing standards that can accommodate both immediate and long-term needs is crucial due to thesensitivity of nuclear materials and infrastructure. The study’s objective is to discuss the proposed arrangement ofcyber security in nuclear domain in India.

Proposed arrangements and cyber security challengesin nuclear domain: An explanatory study of India

The goal of cyber security is to protect the internet against online attacks. One of the most frequently use dterminologies in cybersecurity is “cyber-threats,” which refers to the use of information and communication technology (ICT) for hostile purposes by a range of criminals. The complexity of cyber security architecture make shigher safety measures necessary to guard against system flaws and potential global catastrophes. One of the most important security issues today is cyberattack. A cyber breach could make nuclear systems safety and security safeguards ineffective, which is especially important for nuclear systems. India, which has a sizable and developing nuclear programme, has a similar situation. Over the past few decades, governments, including India, have invested a significant amount of time and money in building effective physical safeguards for nuclear installations, which has raised the risk of a cyber or hybrid attack. The risk of hacking, disruption, or sabotage risesas nuclear infrastructure becomes more and more reliant on cyber technology. Any cyberattack’s antagonistic goalis to take advantage of a system’s weaknesses in order to take over, operate, and keep a presence on the target system. Designing standards that can accommodate both immediate and long-term needs is crucial due to the sensitivity of nuclear materials and infrastructure. The study’s objective is to discuss the proposed arrangement of cyber security in nuclear domain in India.

Biorisk assessment of genetic engineering — lessons learned from teaching interdisciplinary courses on responsible conduct in the life sciences

Genetic engineering is one of the ground-breaking technologies developed in the 20th century with great prospects for improving human, animal, and plant health, providing food security as well as environmental protection in times of climate change. From the early beginning on, scientists were debating about benefits and risks of genetic engineering and actively proposed measures for safe use of this technology. This led to the concept of biosafety which aims at protecting humans and the environment from unwanted consequences of the use of genetic engineering. Genetic engineering could be misapplied for even enhancing the threat potential of pathogens or toxins. The concept of biosecurity has been introduced to protect biomedicine and the life sciences of being misused for criminal or hostile purposes by malicious actors. The new WHO Guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences is the most recent example for improving awareness among partitioners in science to strengthening biorisk assessment strategies [1]. But still, there is the need for implementing any of such proposed biorisk assessment frameworks on national and institutional levels. Ideally, comprehensive training of students in the life sciences in biosafety and biosecurity should be mandatory worldwide and embedded in the curricula of their bachelor and master study programmes [2]. But how to engage students and improve their understanding for cross-disciplinary approaches in strengthening biosafety and biosecurity? Which teaching techniques are appropriate? Is there an opportunity for innovation? [3] The work presented here addresses these questions and provides insights in joint teaching activities of the last two years.

National Security and Higher Education : Challenges, Risks and Threats

Globalisation raises the risk of unwanted leaks of information from higher education institutions and the use of the scientific results of one country for hostile purposes by another one. The national interests to be protected have their dynamics so national security has to also be in permanent development. Networking as a part of HUMINT has a growing importance among students and the teaching staff as well. The protective measures need urgent upgrading in order to prevent any possible risk on behalf of state and non-state actors. As the students are the most exposed to different radical ideas, the preventive measures have to be focused on them. It is also important to keep an eye on the laboratories accessible at the higher education institutions where electronic, technical and chemical tools and devices can be illegally elaborated for illicit purposes.

Experience of foreign countries in implementing economic security within digitalization

In the modern conditions of the development of the world economy, countries are under the influence of many factors, having both external and internal natures of origin, which destabilize their functioning and actualize the issue of ensuring economic security. The problem of guaranteeing financial security is shared. Its essence and content have yet to be entirely determined. As world experience shows, providing economic security ensures the country's independence, a condition for the stability and efficiency of society and success. Along with strengthening economic security risks and challenges, competition for comprehensive national power between countries has turned from a relatively simple tool of economic competition into a highly complex new stage of total political and economic confrontation. Countries, accordingly, have moved away from the former view of economic power as a single component of national security relations. Information technology has improved most people's lives, but the possibilities of its use by states and individuals for hostile purposes are also becoming increasingly apparent. The level of security is changing rapidly. Many factors that contributed to successful development immediately become factors of vulnerability. Events taking place in the international arena recently led to increased demands on the ability of countries to ensure their security. It is imperative to develop an economic security framework driven by its own goals and interests, aiming to maximize the benefits of the traditional European economic openness that needs to be preserved while minimizing the risks arising from over-dependence and vulnerability. The experience of developed countries indicates the need to use modern methods of ensuring economic security. In foreign practice, it is customary to apply such approaches to the calculation of such indicators as the stability of the country, reliability, and risk. Profound technological changes increase the intensity of competition and complicate economic and security challenges. New geopolitical and technological realities require adaptation, preserving the most valuable economic ties while effectively addressing unknown risks. Keywords: economic security, digitalization, threats, risk, state.

Proposed Arrangements and Cyber Security Challenges in Nuclear Domain: An Explanatory study Of India

The goal of cyber security is to protect the internet against online attacks. One of the most frequently used terminologies in cybersecurity is “cyber-threats,” which refers to the use of information and communication technology (ICT) for hostile purposes by a range of criminals. The complexity of cyber security architecture makes higher safety measures necessary to guard against system flaws and potential global catastrophes. One of the most important security issues today is cyber attack. a cyber breach could make nuclear systems safety and securitysafeguards ineffective, which is especially important for nuclear systems. India, which has a sizable and developing nuclear programme, has a similar situation. Over the past few decades, governments, including India, have invested a significant amount of time and money in building effective physical safeguards for nuclear installations, which has raised the risk of a cyber or hybrid attack. The risk of hacking, disruption, or sabotage rises as nuclear infrastructure becomes more and more reliant on cyber technology. Any cyberattack’s antagonistic goal is to take advantage of a system’s weaknesses in order to take over, operate, and keep a presence on the target system. Designing standards that can accommodate both immediate and long-term needs is crucial due to the sensitivity of nuclear materials and infrastructure. The study’s objective is to discuss the proposed arrangement of cyber security in nuclear domain in India.

The notion of “acts harmful to the enemy” under international humanitarian law

AbstractThis article provides a legal analysis of the largely uncharted notion of “acts harmful to the enemy” under international humanitarian law, which reconciles the humanitarian need to grant special protection to medical services (medical personnel, units and transports) in the interests of the wounded and sick with the military necessity to remove it when acts are committed contrary to good faith and for hostile purposes or with effects which harm the adverse party. The meaning of the notion is clarified by primarily looking into the legality of an attack against land-based medical services by the aggrieved party to the conflict as a consequence of harmful acts. It concludes with specific recommendations on how to interpret the law governing such an attack, considered prima facie lawful, on a hospital.

SHARP POWER – НОВАЯ ТЕХНОЛОГИЯ ВЛИЯНИЯ В ГЛОБАЛЬНОМ МИРЕ

The “sharp power” is a new phenomenon of gaining influence in international politics in the era when information has become a weapon, a combination of information influence operations and methods of cyber-terrorism. J. Nye regards the “sharp power” as usage of falsified information for hostile purposes. It encompasses manipulation of information, formation of falsified content of the information flow, conduct of information operations and implementation of information projects. By diverting the audience’s attention and using manipulation technologies the “sharp power” promotes certain values, ideas and phobias to the outside world. Its purpose is interference in domestic political processes of the targeted country, violation of its stability and threatening its national security by influencing public consciousness and behavior of people. The subjects of the “sharp power” do not seek to “win hearts and minds” as those of the “soft power” do, but try to penetrate into and subjugate the political and media spheres of other countries by conducting information operations. The “sharp power” technologies include hacking into personal e-mail and theft of electronic correspondence, falsification of information flow, introduction of malicious software, defacing of websites, destruction of network services and the main computer networks. They are mainly associated with misinformation, fake news and manipulation of information; use the advantages of information openness of cyberspace and are virtually invulnerable – it is difficult to detect them and to identify the mechanism of their action. The “sharp power” has the following quality characteristics: high speed of transactions, their low cost, timing, clear strategy and tactics, flexibility, agility and efficiency. The efficiency factors of the “sharp power” are the openness of cyberspace, camouflage of their purposes, state control and state support of information operations. In conditions when any country can become a victim of the “sharp power”, and its technology represents a threat to the security of the world community, only common efforts of all interested parties and their joint action can tackle the problem and confront cyber threats. The article also reveals the western audience’s perception of the features of “sharp power” in China, Russia and Iran. In conclusion, the author formulates the possible measures and problem solutions.&nbsp

Syrian «Chemical War»

This article shows that the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) was doomed for destruction by the «collective West» at least since 2002 within the framework of the process of fragmentation of the states of the Greater Middle East and bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power in these countries. Later this process was called the Arab Spring. The analysis of the alleged «facts» of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Armed Forces made it possible to establish that they were nothing more than primitive artificial performances. No «chemical attack» in Syria, attributed to the Syrian army, pursued military objectives. The basic principles of the use of chemical weapons in combat were ignored. Not a single case of the use of factory-loaded chemical munitions has been recorded. Information attacks of the Western media and non-governmental organizations, as well as their claims about the «Asad's regime»'s «chemical war against its own people» were carried out to support the Syrian anti-governmental forces at the time of their offensive on the government-controlled territory, or when they were defeated by the Syrian army. Since 2013 the opposition has been practicing mass abductions and murders of children in order to obtain more convincing «pictures». But these crimes did not attract any attention of the Western governments or human rights organizations. The article also presents the evidence of systemic failures and shortcomings in the work of the OPCW - UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM), formed to establish the facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in Syria. Considering staged fake chemical attack in Syria within the context of modern geopolitics, we can assume that it is possible to talk about the new «crusade» on Russia and its allies, but with the use of weapons of mass destruction. After the retrospective analysis of the mechanisms of information warfare, we may also note the deep intellectual degradation of its organizers in comparison with the similar information operations of the 1990s. This circumstance poses a serious threat not only to Syria and Russia, but to other countries as well, because the organizers of these operations are unable to assess even the immediate impacts of their actions

Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU

AbstractThere have been relatively few serious incidents of chemical or biological terrorism in Europe; however, there is growing concern over how non-state groups might exploit chemistry and biology for hostile purposes in the future. This article uses the historical record of past incidents of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) adoption by non-state actors to inform understandings of the current and future risks. To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of such weapons; and the wider environmental context. Drawing from past cases of CBW adoption and the present European context, an analysis of these factors suggests that sophisticated CBW with gigantic effect are possible, but unlikely; however, the adoption and use of scruffy low-level chemical weapons is a distinct possibility. Accordingly, European public health agencies need to prepare for the possibility of a variety of CBW, not all of which are likely to be weapons of “mass destruction”.

E-commerce and biological weapons nonproliferation: Online marketplaces challenge export controls to reduce the risk that rogue states or terrorists could acquire the capacity to produce biological weapons.

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first international treaty that enjoins nations to outlaw an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The BWC's Article I bans the development, production, stockpiling, or other acquisition of “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes,” as well as “weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict” (http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/pdf/Text\_of\_the_Convention.pdf). Given that the treaty has 173 states parties and 9 signatories, most the world's countries are bound by its provisions. > Certain countries, notably the Soviet Union and Iraq, have abused the lack of verification mechanisms in the past to develop biological weapons in breach of their international obligations. In practice, however, the BWC lacks provisions for verifying that state parties comply with its strictures. Certain countries, notably the Soviet Union and Iraq, have abused the lack of verification mechanisms in the past to develop biological weapons in breach of their international obligations. Moreover, non‐state groups and individuals cannot be expected to follow the treaty's provisions. Therefore, it remains of utmost importance for all states to control the trade of sensitive equipment that can be misused to produce, process, test, and disseminate pathogens and toxins. By doing so, they are in compliance with the BWC's Article III, which forbids states parties to “transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I”. Since the BWC itself has no mechanism by which to …

The vital importance of providing sound scientific advice to policy makers in government

172 1. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Con ven tion (BTWC) was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. The Co-Depositaries for this Convention are the Russian Federation, the United King dom and the United States. This Convention was the first one to totally prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of a class of weapons of mass destruction — that involving the use of biological agents and toxins as weapons. The Ukraine was one of the original States Parties who signed the Convention on 10 April 1972 and for whom the Convention entered into force on 26 March 1975. The central prohibition is set out in Article I of the Convention [1] under which: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 2. In accordance with Article XII of the Convention, Review Conferences have been held at five year intervals — in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001/2, 2006 and 2011 — to UDK 608.3+623.458

THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING SOUND SCIENTIFIC ADVICE TO POLICY MAKERS IN GOVERNMENT

172 1. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Con ven tion (BTWC) was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. The Co-Depositaries for this Convention are the Russian Federation, the United King dom and the United States. This Convention was the first one to totally prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of a class of weapons of mass destruction — that involving the use of biological agents and toxins as weapons. The Ukraine was one of the original States Parties who signed the Convention on 10 April 1972 and for whom the Convention entered into force on 26 March 1975. The central prohibition is set out in Article I of the Convention [1] under which: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 2. In accordance with Article XII of the Convention, Review Conferences have been held at five year intervals — in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001/2, 2006 and 2011 — to UDK 608.3+623.458

Analysis of Introduced Species as a form of Biological Weapon: part 2- Strategies for Discernment of an Attack and Countermeasures

One key issue with biological weapons (BW) using Non-Indigenous Species (NIS) (aka invasive species) is to differentiate a deliberate attack from a natural outbreak or accidental introduction via commerce or other means. The methods to detect a Non-Indigenous Species based Biological Warfare (NIS BW) attack as well as discern accidental introductions from a deliberate attack are diverse and challenging. They include a multi-tiered analysis to rule out the following: possible routes of accidental releases from commercial trade; escapes from exotic breeders; releases of exotic pets; and release or dispersal of NIS from catastrophic storms, prevailing wind currents or animal migrations. Other keys to determine a deliberate NIS BW attack are detection of uncommon routes of entry; widespread dissemination of the NIS; extremely high rates of propagules found; or evidence of genetic alternation of NIS, especially to enhance invasiveness, reproduction, or colonization traits as well as human intelligence of a planned BW attack using the introduced organism; and evidence of culturing of the NIS organism by a nation state or terrorist facility. In all cases of NIS BW, it is a violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as the NIS is considered a biological agent used for hostile purposes. This paper also briefly explores other international treaties that would prohibit use of NIS BW. The recommendations for countermeasures (either as prevention or as remediation) to a NIS BW attack include the following tasks; expansion of NIS databases, improvements to the APHIS Port Information Network (PIN) data collection and database availability, and enhancements to NIS research in experimental controlled field trials. Another important counterstrategy is to expand research on potential NIS organisms including enhancements to Environmental Niche Modeling software. The enhancements on the software and data processing accuracy would improve the predictive potential of these tools. Next, although NIS genomic mapping is still in its infancy, expansion of genomic maps of NIS organisms would serve several purposes. First, it would expand understanding of the role that genetic variability plays in invasion survival and colonization in naive niches as well as locate specific genes necessary for successful invasion and colonization. Also, genomic maps would accelerate the development of gene-based diagnostics for NIS BW detection. Second, NIS genomic maps would help in the detection of genetically engineered NIS organisms. The detection of genetically altered NIS would strongly indicate that a NIS BW attack had occurred. Furthermore, regardless of whether the identity of the originator of the NIS BW attack was known or not, the revelation of a NIS BW attack with genetically engineered traits must be reported to the BTWC committee for follow up investigation.

Innovation, dual use, and security: managing the risks of emerging biological and chemical technologies

Recent advances in disciplines such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and neuropharmacology entail a dilemma because they promise benefits for human health and welfare yet pose the risk of misuse for hostile purposes. The emerging field of synthetic genomics, for example, can produce custom DNA molecules for life-saving drugs but also makes possible the creation of deadly viral agents for biological warfare or terrorism. The challenge for policymakers is to prevent the misuse of these new technologies without forgoing their benefits . Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a systematic approach for managing the dual-use dilemma. The book presents a decision for assessing the security risks of emerging technologies and fashioning governance strategies to manage those risks. This framework is applied to fourteen contemporary case studies, including synthetic genomics, DNA shuffling and directed evolution, combinatorial chemistry, protein engineering, immunological modulation, and aerosol vaccines. The book also draws useful lessons from two historical cases: the development of the V-series nerve agents in Britain and the use and misuse of LSD by the U.S. Army and the CIA. Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a comprehensive, multifaceted introduction to the challenges of governing dual-use technologies in an era of rapid innovation. The book will be of interest to government officials and other practitioners as well as to students and scholars in security studies, science and technology studies, biology, and chemistry.

‘Getting the biosecurity architecture right’ in the Asia-Pacific region

This paper offers insights to enhance biosecurity in the Asia-Pacific by asking three questions. What risks/threats are significant in the region? Which security measures should be prioritized? What kind of regional – institutionalized and ad-hoc – arrangements should be implemented? By doing so the paper specifically focuses on two important aspects of biosecurity. Firstly, the issue of immediate capacity-building in the context of disaster relief, public health preparedness and biodefence. Secondly, the long-term preventive aspect, namely education and awareness-raising activities to more broadly promote responsible conduct in life science research in terms of laboratory accidents as well as the intentional use of biological agents for hostile purposes. In order to promote both aspects of biosecurity within the policy process, the paper analyses the strategic value of the US–Japan partnership in its efforts to build a biosecurity architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

A (F)UTILE INTERSESSIONAL PROCESS?

During its thirty-five years, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has been scarred by treaty violations, failed compliance negotiations, and ambiguous treaty language. Essentially a bruised paper tiger, the BWC adds no clarification to its distinction between biological activities for peaceful versus hostile purposes and has amplified—rather than lessened—mistrust in states' biological research and development potential. For the past two decades, these circumstances have generated multilateral annual discussions on BWC issues. From 2003 to 2010, intersessional talks centered on less controversial topics in an attempt to save the treaty from spiraling political tensions. States generally agree that this intersessional process was not futile and that it cooled some of the negative effects of the failed negotiations over a compliance protocol. At the upcoming Seventh BWC Review Conference this December, treaty members will weigh the utility of extending the process and its accompanying administrative Implementation Support Unit. The challenge will be to stimulate the evolution of the BWC beyond its hollow characterization to strengthen and inspire confidence in the treaty regime. This article examines the BWC's ambiguous language and how it has affected diplomacy, reflects on intersessional discussions, acknowledges the (limited) scope of appropriate peaceful activities that can be identified under the BWC, and addresses ways in which to reinvigorate the treaty.

Ion spectrometric detection technologies for ultra‐traces of explosives: A review

In recent years, explosive materials have been widely employed for various military applications and civilian conflicts; their use for hostile purposes has increased considerably. The detection of different kind of explosive agents has become crucially important for protection of human lives, infrastructures, and properties. Moreover, both the environmental aspects such as the risk of soil and water contamination and health risks related to the release of explosive particles need to be taken into account. For these reasons, there is a growing need to develop analyzing methods which are faster and more sensitive for detecting explosives. The detection techniques of the explosive materials should ideally serve fast real-time analysis in high accuracy and resolution from a minimal quantity of explosive without involving complicated sample preparation. The performance of the in-field analysis of extremely hazardous material has to be user-friendly and safe for operators. The two closely related ion spectrometric methods used in explosive analyses include mass spectrometry (MS) and ion mobility spectrometry (IMS). The four requirements-speed, selectivity, sensitivity, and sampling-are fulfilled with both of these methods.

Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense - By Margaret E. Kosal

Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense - By Margaret E. Kosal