From what standpoint have the canonical philosophies of history looked at death? And, more particularly, at life and death, since these two “events” are intimately linked? According to what idea, norm and value, definition of human existence, have the philosophies of history comprehended historical events in their singularity? By relying on what signifiers has philosophical thinking sought to engage with singular catastrophes in human history? According to what signification have the philosophies of history grasped the singularity of the deaths occurring in historical catastrophes? According to what law have they provided a rationale for the mutilated lives in history, and in what manner have they sought to account for these in a general historical narrative? What meaning has determined the comprehension of death and informed the reconciliatory horizon of history (Hegel) beyond the “event” of death? What unified origin of the truth of history has death revealed thereby leading human existence to resolutely “free itself” (Heidegger)? While these questions already seek to demonstrate a contextualization of the manner in which philosophies of history have engaged with death – most notably, through readings of Hegel and Heidegger – they also attempt to furnish the background from which contemporary philosophy has undertaken a re-thinking of death in relation to history and to the singularity of historical events. Indeed, twentieth-century thinkers (we are here thinking principally of Levinas and Derrida, but could also add, despite the considerable differences of their philosophical thought: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Adorno, Anders, Blanchot, Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy) have brought about a profound transformation in the tradition of our philosophical appropriation of death, particularly through the formulation of a renewed form of responsibility towards alterity, through enquiries into the limits of democracy and a reflection on the dangers and perils emanating from what has been named the planetary deployment of technology. We shall concentrate on the development of technology and how it has considerably modified our manner of posing the question of death in philosophy, as well as, and consequently, altered the status of living and dying without relying on the kind of justification and eschatological rationalization commonly found in traditional philosophies of history.