Honneth's Critical Theory Research Articles

Recognition, ideology, and the case of “invisible suffering”

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to expose, and provide a possible solution to, an internal inconsistency in Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition. Honneth requires a way of making his claim that misrecognition causes subjective suffering, with the potential to cognitively disclose injustice, consistent with his account of ideological recognition as a form of misrecognition that engenders compliance with an oppressive social order. Only by reconciling these claims—that is, by showing how ideological recognition can engender an acceptance of domination whilst at the same time causing subjective suffering—can Honneth's theory of recognition retain the kind of critical capacities he desires. As a means of achieving this reconciliation, I propose the notion of “invisible suffering.” In the case of ideological recognition, I suggest that the suffering caused by misrecognition has its disclosive power blocked by the faux‐affirmation that the ideology discursively accords, and this renders the experience of suffering, qua painful indicator of social injustice, invisible to the subject. Drawing on insights from medical sociology, I show how the need to supplement Honneth's theory of recognition with the idea of invisible suffering is revelatory of the kind of critical theoretical stance demanded by his ontological commitments.

A Fourth Order of Recognition?

This paper argues for the inclusion of a fourth order of recognition, pertaining to self-recognition, in Axel Honneth's critical theory of social recognition. I argue for the significance of this on the basis of examining the critical potential of the social psychology he has developed across his career as it pertains to autonomy, authenticity and agency. However, incorporating a fourth order of recognition into Honneth's internally differentiated account of recognition will not be easy given the architecture of his theory. To remain consistent with Honneth's delineation between love, rights and solidarity, a fourth order of recognition would need to be capable of generating a practical relation to self and a normative attitude; it would require an institutional locale in which it could be articulated through social practices that admit conflict and thereby the possibility for further extension and/or reconstitution. Self-recognition fulfils three of these four criteria: it may lack for a specific institutional correlate, but this is not fatal for my argument.

Heidegger, Reification and Formal Indication

The paper seeks to show how Heidegger recasts the problem of reification in Being and Time, so as to address the methodological procedure of formal indication, outlined in his early writings, in order to carry out a deconstruction of ancient ontology. By revisiting Marx's and Lukács' critique of objectification in social relations, especially the former's critique of alienation, in light of Honneth's critical theory of recognition, it is shown how a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of sociality could be reconstructed out of the semantic correlation between reification and formal indication.

Of persons and peoples: Internationalizing the critical theory of recognition

Although Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition continues to resonate among political theorists, its relationship to the debate on political and moral cosmopolitanism remains unclear. The paper aims to fill this gap by defining a few guideposts to a ‘recognition-theoretical’ conception of the international. My argument is that Honneth's theory oscillates between a liberal-cosmopolitan model of the global spread of human rights and an alternative model that is closer to the anti-cosmopolitanism of the late Rawls. Both models reflect certain assumptions about the moral standing of political communities or ‘peoples’, even if those assumptions remain implicit and unexamined. I begin by discussing the premise that recognition theory is all about ‘natural’ persons instead of ‘artificial’ persons such as states or peoples. I proceed by comparing Rawls's notion of a distinct logic of the international to Honneth's more ambiguous gestures toward an international political theory. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the place of peoples and sovereign statehood in the theory of recognition.

Learning and recognition in health and care work: an inter‐subjective perspective

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of recognition in learning processes among female nurses, social and health care assistants and occupational therapists working with people with dementia and other age‐related illnesses.Design/methodology/approachThe paper highlights the need to experience recognizing learning spaces among social and health care workers dealing with elderly care. Such learning spaces are crucial/imperative in order to come to terms with emotionally stressing experiences from daily work, and in order to be prepared for future challenges, such as new tasks or patients with a complex diagnosis. Drawing on Nordic research into health and care work, it is argued that, particularly in work fields which are mentally loaded or which are not held in high esteem culturally, this condition seems to be important.FindingsThe main argument is that learning is related to recognition – especially when it comes to groups of professionals, who are low ranked in the workplace hierarchy and therefore seldom experience recognition in their daily work. According to interviews with members of the mentioned professional groups, learning spaces, in which the medical and professional hierarchies are suspended, promote learning processes.Originality/valueAxel Honneth's critical theory of recognition is used as the theoretical framework for understanding more generally the relational nature of human learning processes and the need for recognizing contexts. The paper concludes that this need is particularly imperative in health and care work for the elderly, but may also promote learning more generally.

From Critique to Reconstruction: On Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition and its Critical Potential

This paper aims to analyse Axel Honneth's theory of recognition by focusing on two distinct methodological approaches present in it, namely, critique and reconstruction. The critical moment in Honneth's theory of recognition is articulated around two concepts: world-disclosing critique, which is based on the attempt to suggest new and provocative points of view on social reality through the usage of rhetorical devices; and misrecognition, as the empirical starting-point for the theoretical model. These two notions, which can be traced back to Adorno and the so called "first generation" of the Frankfurt School, are interpreted as the mainlines of the diagnostic moment in Honneth's critical theory, as they provide an effective analytical insight into the reality of social suffering. Furthermore, they represent the basic fundament upon which the second level, reconstruction, is articulated. By bringing to light the core aspects of social interaction, they provide the initial clues for the development of the normative framework of recognition, the formal idea of a "good life". The final part of the paper argues that such an interpretation of Honneth's theory of recognition helps to overcome some of its most problematic aspects and thus to deepen its critical potential.

Work and the Struggle for Recognition

This article examines a neglected but crucial feature of Honneth's critical theory: its use of a concept of recognition to articulate the norms that are apposite for the contemporary world of work. The article shows that from his first writings on the structure of critical social theory in the early 1980s to the recent exchange with Nancy Fraser on recognition and redistribution, the problem of grounding a substantive critique of work under capitalism has been central to Honneth's enterprise. This answers the routine objection that the recognition paradigm fails to take into account economic or material realities. At the same time, Honneth's approach to the critique of work has undergone significant shifts, and it is yet to be fully developed. The article traces these changes in direction, and it proposes an expressivist conception of work that builds upon the `normative content' of the concept of work described by Honneth in his 1980 essay `Work and Instrumental Action'.

Conceptualising Child and Family Support: The Contribution of Honneth's Critical Theory of Recognition

The role of social support in child welfare policy and practice continues to engender widespread debate. Yet the moral and philosophical underpinnings of this topical area have received less attention in the literature. This is of concern, not least because academic debates on the ‘politics of identity’ have a significant contribution to make to our understanding of self‐development and social justice. In this article the authors show how Axel Honneth's account of the ‘struggle for recognition’ can be adapted to invigorate theories of social support. The result is a conceptual framework for reflective practice that can illuminate, and interrogate, the moral and operational dimensions of preventative work with children and families.

Realizing Honneth: redistribution, recognition, and global justice

The purpose of this article is to explore the potential contribution of Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition to empirical and normative debates on global justice. I first present, very briefly, an overview of recent theories of global distributive justice. I argue that theorists of distributive justice do not pay enough attention to sources of self-respect and conditions for identity formation, and that they are blind toward the danger of harming people's sense of self even by well-intentioned redistributive policies. Honneth's theory suffers from complementary shortcomings; it is anti-technocratic but largely oblivious to the global nature of many contemporary justice claims. Given this situation, I seek to broaden the theory's scope by outlining transnational extensions of the recognition principles of love, rights and solidarity identified by Honneth. In conclusion, I show how utilizing a broadened conceptualization of the struggle for recognition allows us to better understand the changing logic of justice-oriented foreign policies.

Transcending Ethnoreligious Identities in Northern Ireland: Social Work's Role in the Struggle for Recognition

It is axiomatic that recognition of the different categories of identity lies at the heart of social and political transmutation. This truism applies to Northern Ireland, where a history of sectarianism has led to an abnormal State and fractured civil society. Yet, sociopolitical structures in this most troubled of regions are now perched on a climactic edge with the reestablishment of a new, devolved political Assembly. At this historic moment, Northern Ireland is witnessing a new optimism as politicians from opposing ends of the political spectrum engage in open debate about local issues. Although progress may be slow, there now seems to be a greater opportunity to engage with the “politics of identity” in a purposeful way. In this new political dispensation, social work is faced with the challenge to move beyond its technocratic mindset to embrace social justice as a master discourse. However, the present paper argues that the starting point for this paradigm shift lies in an understanding of identity formation through the portal of critical social theory. In particular, it will be argued that Honneth's critical theory of recognition provides a means for reshaping social work intervention according to three perspectives: object–relations theory, citizenship rights, and communitarianism. Armed with these perspectives, social workers in Northern Ireland can rethink their role as activists committed to the recognition of all the different categories of identity formed by social class, gender, religion, and culture.

Contorno e limites do conceito do social em Axel Honneth

Em particular em seus textos anteriores a Luta por reconhecimento, Axel Honneth se vale com frequência do adjetivo substantivado "o social" (das Soziale), sem jamais explicitar diretamente o significado que lhe atribui. Todavia, este conceito, sempre pressuposto, tanto está na base de sua conhecida crítica do déficit sociológico da tradição crítica frankfurtiana quanto orienta clandestinamente todo o desenvolvimento de sua obra até o modelo maduro da reconstrução normativa. Trata-se, aqui, de um esforço de torná-lo explícito enquanto compromisso social-ontológico assumido pela teoria crítica honnethiana. Conclui-se que o social de Honneth é senão idêntico, ao menos coextensivo às normas se constituem a partir de interações de reconhecimento intersubjetivo, o que emprestará tanto a força relativa de seu modelo crítico quanto determinará seus limites.