Homeland Security Risk Research Articles

Surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy for on-site analysis: A review of recent developments.

On-site identification and quantification of chemicals is critical for promoting food safety, human health, homeland security risk assessment, and disease diagnosis. Surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS) has been widely considered as a promising method for on-site analysis due to the advantages of nondestructive, abundant molecular information, and outstanding sensitivity. However, SERS for on-site application has been restricted not only by the cost, performance, and portability of portable Raman instruments, but also by the sampling ability and signal enhancing performance of the SERS substrates. In recent years, the performance of SERS for on-site analysis has been improved through portable Raman instruments, SERS substrates, and other combined technologies. In this review, popular commercial portable Raman spectrometers and the related technologies for on-site analysis are compared. In addition, different types of SERS substrates for on-site application are summarized. SERS combined with other technologies, such as electrochemical and microfluidics are also presented. The future perspective of SERS for on-site analysis is also discussed.

Examining the effectiveness of risk elicitations: comparing a deliberative risk ranking to a nationally representative survey on homeland security risk

Comparing homeland security risks is a challenging example of comparative risk assessment. One methodology designed for comparing diverse risks of this sort is the Deliberative Method of Ranking Risks. Previous studies have evaluated the utility of the method in absolute terms, examining informed rankings at various stages of the process; this paper represents the first known approach to compare the method relative to another approach. As the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks is designed to engage deliberative System 2 thought, we compared the rankings from the method to those from a nationally representative survey (RAND’s American Life Panel) that engages experiential System 1 thought. We find evidence that the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks works as intended, developing more informed rankings with less evidence of bias. The Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks can be a useful improvement for ad hoc comparisons of risk in the homeland security domain.

Participatory Operational & Security Assessment on homeland security risks: an empirical research method for improving security beyond the borders through public/private partnerships

This paper proposes novel applications of Participatory Operational Assessment (POA), as a qualitative/empirical tool for bridging the research gap in our knowledge of Border Security, while supporting the mission of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security “to build in security, to ensure resilience, and to facilitate customs and exchange” (DHS 2017). Each year, global trade volume exceeds 10.3 billion tons of cargo, 90% of which is being carried by ships (UNCTAD 2017). U.S. transport networks alone import and export at least two billion metric tons of cargo, including 15 million sealed containers (CBP 2017a). The task of DHS/CBP in safeguarding the national borders and intermodal (sea, land & air) security becomes more crucial each year, as the flow of goods grows exponentially in positive correlation with the population growth, and trade agreements, such as the NAFTA agreement between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. This paper demonstrates the development of a “Participatory Operational Assessment” instrument, where homeland security officials and industry stakeholders form a think-tank for resolving security and operational challenges on both sides of the border. Specifically, this scholarly research funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security demonstrates the benefits of establishing a Public/Private Advisory Board in order to identify security threats on both sides of the border. This is a timely research, as border security risks impose serious threats for homeland security, with geopolitical, economic and trade hindrances. The DHS and its Agencies (CBP, USCG, TSA etc.) have introduced numerous noteworthy initiatives, platforms and programs, including CSI, C-TPAT, TWIC etc. A number of working groups are also affiliated with the DHS, in order to address security, trade and travel issues. Inspired by the capabilities of these initiatives, this research has created a project-specific team of experts aiming to evaluate quantitative findings on border security, and offer best industry practices.

Critical infrastructure asset identification: seemingly simple but frustratingly elusive

The attacks of 9/11 highlighted irrefutable vulnerabilities in the US critical infrastructure system and prompted necessary efforts to strengthen defence and resiliency of infrastructure against attack. As critical infrastructures become more dependent on cyber resources, the threat landscape continues to rapidly evolve exposing critical infrastructure to a heightened risk of cyber-attacks. The Department of Homeland Security's Risk Management Framework was developed to guide protection efforts and depends heavily on the ability of the department to effectively identify critical infrastructure assets. However, program audits have reported fundamental flaws in the US identification and prioritisation program. Specifically, there is a need for validation and verification that the right assets are being considered in order to ensure that scarce national resources are not wasted towards protection of the wrong assets. This paper summarises US critical infrastructure identification efforts, ongoing challenges to current programs, and recommendations for moving forward.

Critical infrastructure asset identification: seemingly simple but frustratingly elusive

The attacks of 9/11 highlighted irrefutable vulnerabilities in the US critical infrastructure system and prompted necessary efforts to strengthen defence and resiliency of infrastructure against attack. As critical infrastructures become more dependent on cyber resources, the threat landscape continues to rapidly evolve exposing critical infrastructure to a heightened risk of cyber-attacks. The Department of Homeland Security's Risk Management Framework was developed to guide protection efforts and depends heavily on the ability of the department to effectively identify critical infrastructure assets. However, program audits have reported fundamental flaws in the US identification and prioritisation program. Specifically, there is a need for validation and verification that the right assets are being considered in order to ensure that scarce national resources are not wasted towards protection of the wrong assets. This paper summarises US critical infrastructure identification efforts, ongoing challenges to current programs, and recommendations for moving forward.

A multi-attribute approach to assess homeland security risk

The United States Department of Homeland Security manages a wide spectrum of risks involving crime, terrorism, accidents, and natural disasters. This paper supports disaster management by identifying which attributes should be used to describe risks comprehensively and assessing the need to incorporate such multiattribute information into risk management processes. Attributes for describing homeland security risks were selected through a literature review. These attributes were then used in a risk assessment of homeland security hazards that informed risk ranking sessions conducted with members of the general public. The results taken together support the use of a range of attributes and perspectives. While aspects of life/health and economic damage were considered most important by both experts and the lay public, other attributes were of widespread importance, including attributes related to dread and uncertainty. These results demonstrate how to present risks in a deliberative risk management process and the importance of doing so using a complete set of attributes to describe the risks.

Deliberative Risk Ranking to Inform Homeland Security Strategic Planning

Abstract Reliably managing homeland security risks requires an understanding of which risks are more concerning than others. This paper applies a validated risk ranking methodology, the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks, to the homeland security domain. This method provides a structured approach to elicit risk rankings from participants based on deliberative consideration of science-based risk assessments. Steps in this effort include first identifying the set of attributes that must be covered when describing terrorism and disaster hazards in a comprehensive manner, then developing concise summaries of existing knowledge of a broad set of homeland security hazards. Using these materials, the study elicits relative concerns about the hazards that are being considered. The relative concerns about hazards provide a starting point for prioritizing solutions for reducing risks to homeland security. The consistency and agreement of the rankings, as well as the individual satisfaction with the process and results, suggest that the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks can be appropriately applied in the homeland security domain. The rankings themselves reflected greater concern over natural disasters than terrorist events. This research suggests that deliberative risk ranking methods could provide a valid and reliable description of individuals’ concerns about homeland security risks to inform strategic planning.

Homeland Security Risk and Preparedness in Police Agencies: The Insignificance of Actual Risk Factors

The connection between perceived risk of homeland security incidents and homeland security preparedness has received considerable support in policing literature. From a contingency theory perspective, organizations rationally respond to risks in their external environments by taking steps to prepare for homeland security incidents. In past studies examining homeland security preparedness levels, risk has typically been measured using agency executives’ perceived likelihood of specific homeland security incidents occurring within their jurisdiction within a specified time range, and has largely ignored objective risk factors. In other disciplines, researchers and government organizations consider three dimensions when assessing risk: threat, vulnerability, and consequences. In the present study, the objective risk factors of social vulnerability, experience with past hazards, and built environment vulnerability not only fail to predict risk perceptions but are also not associated with preparedness measures. However, consistent with prior research, subjective risk perceptions remain a significant predictor of preparedness levels.

Multi-hazard, multi-infrastructure, economic scenario analysis

Over the past 10 years, the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) has conducted over 150 detailed multi-hazard, multi-infrastructure scenario analyses of a wide range of man-made and natural disasters. Using a model-based implementation of the Department of Homeland Security risk management framework, NISAC analyzes scenarios ranging from extreme-event situational awareness to long-term strategic policy for improved homeland security and resilience to these events. This article describes the essential elements of the NISAC scenario analysis process, the toolkit of subject-matter expertise and models used, with a particular focus on the economics component. An example set of Hurricane Katrina economic-analysis results is used to illustrate basic elements of NISAC economics scenario analysis.

Interdiction Models and Homeland Security Risks

Interdiction Models and Homeland Security Risks