HUSSEINS CONSTRAINTS, JORDAN'S DILEMMA Arthur Day JCOR JORDAN, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS is more than a foreign-policy preoccupation; it deals with issues that lie at the heart of the country's domestic life. The line between external and internal issues is in any case a thin one for the kingdom, given its vulnerability to outside events and pressures. Where the Palestinian issue is concerned the line virtually disappears. Since 1948 the country has been an integral part of the Palestinian question. Even in East BankJordan itself, leaving aside the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Palestinians today constitute a majority of the population. In addition, Jordan still has responsibilities in and for the Palestinian territory of the West Bank, whose residents are also Jordanian citizens. The unfolding of the Palestinian problem will continue to affect domestic relationships and the future of theJordanian regime. In this area, King Hussein must play foreign and domestic policies carefully against one another, balancing crosscutting pressures from inside and outside his country. Beyond the practical considerations of policy, the Palestinian question stirs personal and dynastic responses that may be an equally important influence on Hussein's participation in the peace process. During World War II, his Hashemite great-grandfather, Hussein, King of the Hejaz, Grand Sharif, Ruler of Mecca and Guardian of the Holy Places, entertained the vision of an independent Arab world ruled by the Hashemites. This vision faded, but in the early 1920s Hashemites nonetheless governed the Hejaz, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and Arthur Day served for twenty-eight years in various posts with the Department of State and the Foreign Service, including consul general in Jerusalem and deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. He is the author of the recently published Council on Foreign Relations book, East BankWest Bank:Jordan and the Prospectsfor Peace, on which this article is based. 81 82 SAIS REVIEW the entities of Iraq and Transjordan, which were created under the postWorld War I British Mandates. Before long the Hejaz was lost to the Saudis, but in 1948 the acquisition by Transjordan of parts of Palestine, including the holy city ofJerusalem, nourished the sense of family destiny. Today Iraq and Jerusalem have been lost, and all that remains of the Hashemite vision is East Bank Jordan. It is clear that Hussein feels this diminution keenly and is sensible of a personal responsibility to his Hashemite forebears to play the part in Arab affairs that appeared to be predestined for the family. In particular, he seems oppressed by an obligation to redress his loss of Jerusalem, won for the Hashemites by Abdullah, King Hussein's grandfather, at the cost of his life. For all these reasons, Jordan cannot escape a major role in the Palestinian issue and efforts to resolve it. Jordan's relationship to the issue, however, has changed in important ways over the years as the Palestinian national movement has evolved. Jordan was founded, in a sense, by being excluded from Britain's Palestine Mandate. Nevertheless, its first ruler, Emir and later king Abdullah , always eager to expand his realm, came to covet the territory of Mandate Palestine. When British intentions to relinquish the Mandate became clear in 1947, and the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish sections was in the wind, he set out to acquire whatever portion fell to the Arabs. With the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1949, accordingly , he annexed the West Bank and Jerusalem. In taking these territories, Abdullah established two patterns that have persisted ever since. First, he incorporated the regional Palestinian problem into Jordan's domestic life. And second, he set Jordan at odds with the indigenous Palestinian leadership — at that time represented by the Mufti ofJerusalem, Haj Amin Husseini—that sought to rule Palestine itself and bitterly resented Jordanian interference. The claim of the Palestinian leadership to self-rule was also supported by the leading Arab governments. The effect of Abdullah's move on Jordan's internal structure was overwhelming. More than 850,000 Palestinians were added to a Jordanian population of a little over 400,0UO.1 A very reluctant West Bank— politically and economically...
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