Hitler's Foreign Policy Research Articles

See No Evil, Speak No Evil? Morality, Evolutionary Psychology, and the Nature of International Relations

AbstractA central theme in the study of international relations is that anarchy requires states to set aside moral concerns to attain security, rendering IR an autonomous sphere devoid of ethical considerations. Evolutionary and moral psychology, however, suggest that morality emerged to promote human success under such conditions. It is not despite anarchy but because of anarchy that humans have an ethical sense. Our argument has three empirical implications. First, it is almost impossible to talk about threat and harm without invoking morality. Second, state leaders and the public will use moral judgments as a basis, indeed the most important factor, for assessing international threat, just as research shows they do at the interpersonal level. Third, foreign policy driven by a conception of international relations as an amoral sphere will be quite rare. Word embeddings applied to large political and nonpolitical corpora, a survey experiment in Russia, and an in-depth analysis of Hitler's foreign policy thought suggest that individuals both condemn aggressive behavior by others and screen for threats on the basis of morality. The findings erode notions of IR as an autonomous sphere and upset traditional materialist–ideational dichotomies.

Reasons and Incentives for Hitler's Foreign Policy

The paper will discuss three aims and objectives of Hitler's foreign policy. Those aims were: to destroy the treaty of Versailles, to implement the New Economic Order and to expand German territory. Furthermore, the paper will focus on the third aim, Hitler's intention to expand eastward towards Russia rather than anywhere else. Four reasons behind this aim will be discussed; looking for Lebensraum (living space), inferiority of the Eastern race, superiority of the Western race and his need for broad territories.

Using Natural Sciences for Cultural Expansion: The National Socialist Agenda for the Balkans

<p>This article highlights the political merit natural sciences were awarded under the totalitarian regime of Nazi Germany and their propagandistic role in Hitler's foreign policy agenda for the Balkans, a region which was expected to replace Germany's colonies lost in World War I. It accounts further for the policies and strategies National Socialists used to exert cultural influence on the countries of South-East Europe, namely through a number of institutions with which natural sciences were in one way or another involved in order to promote German culture abroad. The promotion of the German language and, to a certain degree, the Nazi ideology was a precondition for familiarising the Balkan countries with German scientific achievements, which would pave the way for an economic and political infiltration in that region. Therefore, natural sciences, as part of the German intellect, acquired political and economic connotations hidden behind the euphemistic term of cultural policy, designed for this region of geopolitical importance. The article is based almost exclusively on unpublished German records.</p><p> </p><p> </p>

Nazi Germany and the Luso-Hispanic World

In a recent collection of essays on Germany's relations with Latin America Natalja Karthaus argued that ‘Latin America was never a priority area for German foreign policy’.Natalja Karthaus, ‘Lateinamerika als Bezugsfeld der (bundes-) deutschen Ausenpolitik’, in Manfred Mols and Christoph Wagner, eds., Deutschland-Lateinamerika: Geschichte, Gegenwart und Perspektiven (Frankfurt/Main: Vervuert, 1994), 53. Karthaus's verdict can, in fact, be extended to the Luso-Hispanic world as a whole, thus including Portugal and also, for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Spain.On aspects of the history of German – Spanish relations see now Conrad Kent, Thomas K. Wolber and Cameron M. K. Hewitt, eds., The Lion and the Eagle; Interdisciplinary Essays on German – Spanish Relations over the Centuries (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2000). Even Hitler's foreign policy, despite its global aspirations, is included in Karthaus's assessment.The focus of this article is largely on Brazil, Argentina, Spain and Portugal. These four countries were of comparatively greater importance to the Nazi regime than the other Latin American countries. On the latter see, inter alia, Jobst-H. Floto, Die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Venezuela 1933 bis 1958 (Frankfurt/Main, Vervuert, 1991); Maria M. Camou, Los vaivenes de la politica exterior uruguaya ante la pugna de las potencias; las relaciones con el Tercer Reich (1933–1942) (Montevideo: Fundacion de Cultura Universitaria, 1990); Klaus Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko. Studien zur Entwicklung des deutsch-mexikanischen Verhaltnisses 1933–1942 unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Olpolitik (Frankfurt/Main, Berr: Peter Lang, 1976). To Hitler, both Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula (with the exception of Spain during the first year of that country's civil war and again in 1940/41) were of marginal relevance to his foreign policy objectives. This verdict notwithstanding Nazi Germany maintained regular, indeed in some areas close, relations to the countries of Latin America and the Iberian peninsula which warrant closer examination.

Social Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the 'National Community'

This book analyzes the attitudes and policies of the Nazi leadership towards the German working class. The author argues that the regime did not securely integrate the working class and was thus less successful in imposing mass economic sacrifices in the interests of forced rearmament. With a growing labour shortage in the late 1930s, industrial conflict re emerged. These two factors slowed down military preparations for war and may well, it is argued, have influenced Hitler's foreign policy in 1938/39.The author has added a substantial epilogue to this edition in which he responds to the main criticisms, aroused by the German original, and assesses the relevance of more recent research to the arguments put forward.

Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945

Lumans studies the relations between Nazi Germany and the German minority populations of other European countries, examining these ties within the context of Hitler's foreign policy and the racial policies of SS Chief Heinrich Himmler. He shows how the Reich's racial and political interests in these German minorities between 1933 and 1945 helped determine its behavior toward neighboring states. Originally published in 1993. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

Nazism and German Nationals in the Netherlands, 1933—40

The degree of enthusiasm or opposition shown by the population of Germany towards nazism, both before and after 1933, has been the subject of continued debate not least because of its relevance to the overall question of the German resistance to Hitler. Although major studies of specific regions as well as those on Germany as a whole have provided a clear picture on attitudes inside the Third Reich,' very little information has emerged on the reaction to nazism and the Hitler regime of German citizens living abroad, the Auslandsdeutsche. Studies of nazi organizations abroad have tended to concentrate on the structure and functions of the different groups, rather than on the appeal of nazism to the A uslandsdeutsche.2 Given this lack of knowledge about such a large number of German citizens, including 335,496 in Europe alone,3 it seems appropriate to examine nazism in its ideological and organizational forms as it affected one particular group of A uslandsdeutsche in Europe. In countries where the Germans formed a distinct national minority and established their own 'National Socialist' parties, the scope of the NSDAP for organization and activity was somewhat limited. Whereas the Germans living in the Sudetenland and Danzig proved to be far more important to Hitler's foreign policy aims, the political background in these two areas tends to complicate the issue. Western Europe, therefore, provides a more suitable area for research and the Netherlands, with a German population of up to 100,000, provides an example large enough to allow for some tentative conclusions.

Hitler's ‘Programme’ and the Genesis of Operation ‘Barbarossa’

Hitler's foreign policy is still an area of widespread interest - particularly the question of its inner coherence. The present consensus goes back to the early 1950s and 1960s, when the German attack upon Russia was viewed as one stage in Hitler's quest for European hegemony or even world domination. While Alan Bullock viewed Hitler as an opportunist, Hugh Trevor-Roper in his essay on Hitler's war aims interpreted Hitler's invasion of Russia as a systematic step in Hitler's programme. Since then this model has been highly refined and systematized, notably by Andreas Hillgruber, who argues that Hitler's foreign policy programme had already been formulated long before he came to power, particularly inMein Kampfand Hitler'sSecond book. On this model National Socialist foreign policy was programmatically fixed and Hillgruber goes as far to say that Hitler's programme ‘alone determined the great line of German policy in general’ and that he devoted all the energies available to him to realizing it. Yet even before Hillgruber had formulated his model, case studies were available which appeared to contradict its inner coherence and logic. Serious objections have also been raised by Martin Broszat, who describes Hitler's idea of an eastern empire as a ‘metaphor and Utopian figure of speech’.

Hitler's War Aims

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview ArticlesHitler's War AimsKlaus HilderbrandKlaus Hilderbrand Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 48, Number 3Sep., 1976 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/241465 Views: 24Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1976 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Iman Ayish Reasons and Incentives for Hitler's Foreign Policy, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1882246John P. Fox The Final Solution: Intended or Contingent? The Stuttgart Conference of May 1984 and the Historical Debate, Patterns of Prejudice 18, no.33 (May 2010): 27–39.https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.1984.9969769

The Confessing Church and Hitler's Foreign Policy: The Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1938

The Confessing Church did not address itself to Hitler's foreign policy until war seemed imminent during the Czechoslovakian crisis of September, 1938. On the day of the Munich Agreement (September 30) liturgies of thanksgiving were held instead of a prayer service of confession and intercession written and circulated a few days earlier by three members of the Provisional Administration of the Confessing Church, Albertz, Bohm, and Miller. A controversy was touched off the following October 27 when the S.S. newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps, printed the prayer service and accused its authors of treason. Confessing Church moderates, led by Bishops Marahrens, Wurm, and Meiser, made no accusations of treason, but publicly disassociated themselves from the authors. Confession and intercession were unsuitable for the occasion, said the critics, and the failure to mention explicitly Hitler and the Sudeten Germans was a grievous error. On both counts Confessing Church radicals defended the prayer service and accused the bishops of yielding to pressure from Nazi authorities. The authors denied that either what the prayer service contained or omitted constituted a criticism of Hitler's foreign policy. Even though the Confessing Church did not question the morality of Hitler's foreign policy or consider whether it could in good conscience support a Hitler war effort, the prayer service set a precedent, followed by many Confessing Church clergymen thereafter: instead of proclaiming the righteousness of Germany's cause and praying for victory, Albertz, B6hm, and MUiller confessed Germany's sins, interceded for all peoples, and prayed for peace.

The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich

In this short outline history of Hitler's foreign policy, Professor Hildebrand contends that the National Socialist Party achieved popularity largely because it integrated all the political, economic and socio-political expectations prevailing in Germany since Bismarck. Thus, foreign policy under Hitler was a logical extension of the aims of the newly created German nation - state of 1871. Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics - backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase - European hegemony - was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third phases: American intervention and 'racial purification'. The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.

England's place in Hitler's plans for world dominion

The place occupied by England' in Hitler's foreign policy is closely linked to the wider issue of whether, as Fiihrer of the German Reich from 1933 to 1945, he can be said to have had any consistent plan determining the outlines of his foreign policy. If he had, the elements of which it was composed have to be identified power politics (in the conventional sense of the term), his subjective views (i.e. derived from his actual or imagined war experience), geopolitics, military economics and strategy, as well as the degree to which they were modified by his underlying racial doctrines, and the manner in which these ingredients combined to influence the formulation of a foreign policy programme. Finally, there is the question of the ultimate scope of Hitler's plans. In examining the conclusions to which research has come respecting these questions, in particular on the role England played in Hitler's plans, it can be seen that the many possibilities, modifications and subtle distinctions postulated can in fact be reduced to three basic theories.

Hitler's Foreign Policy Apparat

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Unconditional Acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles by the German Government, June 22-28, 1919

Previous articleNext article No AccessDocumentsUnconditional Acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles by the German Government, June 22-28, 1919Alma LuckauAlma Luckau Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 17, Number 3Sep., 1945 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/236936 Views: 47Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1945 The University of Chicago PressPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Iman Ayish Reasons and Incentives for Hitler's Foreign Policy, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1882246

National Socialistic Economics: The Contradictions of the New Order

Next article No AccessNational Socialistic Economics: The Contradictions of the New OrderStefan T. PossonyStefan T. Possony Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 4, Number 2May, 1942 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2125769 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Iman Ayish Reasons and Incentives for Hitler's Foreign Policy, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1882246