History Of UN Research Articles

Sanctions and Nonviolent Protest Mobilization

This paper addresses the puzzle of why people join nonviolent anti-regime protests despite facing severe repressions from their governments. It inspects the role of international sanctions in the mobilization of nonviolent protests. Following previous research on sanctions, it theorizes that the imposition of sanctions can have an important signalling function and lend psychological support to protestors thereby positively impacting protest mobilization. The hypothesis that protest mobilization increases after the imposition of sanctions and the expectation that local media can help transmit this international moral boost by reporting about sanctions will be tested in a single case study format investigating one of the most prominent sanctioning regimes in UN history - South Africa.

Konsep Kependudukan Program KB di Indonesia dan Organisasi KB untuk Kesehatan

The objective of the research is to explain the history of UN in Indonesia, to overcome the factors that influence the development of UN, to explain UN organizations in Indonesia and UN programmes in Indonesia. To explain the concept of family planning. This method of research is a type of descriptive research, which means that this research describes an object, phenomenon, or social setting in the form of writing containing a quotation of data or facts or natural manifestations in the field. The results of the research are from the above description we conclude that the family planning program is an attempt to enhance the care and role as well as society through adult marriage age (PUP), birth arrangement, building family resilience, improving the well-being of small families, happiness and prosperity. The main objective of the National Commission's program is to fulfil the public's orders to provide quality reproductive health services, lower the levels of I.C.I. and I.B. as well as overcome reproductive-health problems in order to build quality small families.

The 20th anniversary of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: hard won progress amid evolving challenges

World No Tobacco Day on May 31, 2023, marks the 20th anniversary of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Adopted in May, 2003, member states committed to stem an alarming rise in tobacco-related deaths worldwide, predicted to rise from 5 million to 10 million deaths by 2020 if no action was taken. 1 WHOWorld Health Assembly adopts historic tobacco control pact. https://www.who.int/news/item/21-05-2003-world-health-assembly-adopts-historic-tobacco-control-pactDate: May 21, 2003 Date accessed: May 22, 2023 Google Scholar In 2021, about 8 million deaths were attributable to tobacco use. 2 Vital StrategiesTobacco atlas, 7th edition. https://tobaccoatlas.org/Date: 2021 Date accessed: May 22, 2023 Google Scholar Although still unacceptably high, despite a 1·7 billion rise in global population, this burden of tobacco deaths was a 40% lower increase than projected before the introduction of the FCTC. Proposed to WHO in 1995 by scholars Ruth Roemer, Allyn Taylor, 3 Roemer R Taylor A Lariviere J Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Am J Public Health. 2005; 95: 936-938 Crossref PubMed Scopus (130) Google Scholar and their colleagues, supported by civil society, underpinned by World Bank analysis, 4 Jha P Chaloupka F Curbing the epidemic, governments and the economics of tobacco control. World Bank, Washington, DC1999 Google Scholar legitimised by revelations from internal tobacco industry documents, 5 National Association of Attorneys GeneralThe Master Settlement Agreement. https://www.naag.org/our-work/naag-center-for-tobacco-and-public-health/the-master-settlement-agreement/#:~:text=Under%20the%20MSA%2C%20tobacco%20manufacturers,certain%20such%20payments%20are%20madeDate accessed: May 22, 2023 Google Scholar and championed by the WHO Director-General at the time Gro Harlem Brundtland, the FCTC is the first and only treaty to be negotiated to date under the auspices of WHO. It became one of the most widely embraced treaties in UN history: 182 states parties have acceded to the treaty, covering more than 90% of the world's population.

A coordenação do trabalho da UNMISS e das agências humanitárias na mitigação da crise humana no Sudão do Sul1

Objetiva-se analisar o trabalho conjunto entre a Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul (UNMISS) e as agências humanitárias, destacando os óbices logísticos. Foram utilizados, como metodologia, a revisão bibliográfica e a análise documental. Argumenta-se que a guerra civil, que eclodiu no Sudão do Sul no final de 2013, levou a UNMISS a criar os chamados Protection of Civilian sites (POC sites), que são campos de deslocados internos localizados, pela primeira vez na história da ONU, dentro das bases militares de uma missão de manutenção da paz. Esses campos, que possuíam condições precárias devido à restrição de espaço gerada pelo imenso afluxo de deslocados, necessitaram de considerável esforço logístico humanitário para suprir as demandas que cresciam vertiginosamente. Além disso, os POC sites demandaram elevado nível de cooperação e coordenação entre peacekeepers e diversos agentes humanitários, o que gerou lições que poderão ser utilizadas em missões de paz que passarem por crises semelhantes.

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL NORMATIVE CAPABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The present article studies the issue of the interrelation between the senior UN official - the Secretary-General and the main UN body - the Security Council. The nature of the Secretary-General role is ambiguous since the very creation of the UN. On one hand, the Secretary-General leads the Secretariat - the body that carries out technical and subsidiary functions in relation to other UN Main Bodies. This is the way the Secretary-General position was initially viewed by the UN authors. On the other hand, the UN Charter contains certain provisions that, with a certain representation, give the Secretary-General vigorous powers, including political ones. Since the very beginning of the UN operation the Secretary-Generals have tried to define the nature of these auxiliary powers, formalize the practice of their use. Special place among these powers have the provisions given in the Charter article 99. This article give to the Secretary-General the right to directly appeal to the Security Council and draw its attention to the situation that, in his (Secretary-General's) opinion may threaten the international peace and security. This right was used by some Secretary-Generals during different crises occurred after the creation of the UN. This article covers consecutively the crisis in Congo, Iran hostage crisis and the situation in Lebanon. These are three situations that forced Secretary-Generals Hammarskjold, Waldheim and de Cuellar to explicitly use their right to appeal to the Security Council. Other cases in UN history involving the Secretary-General appealing to the Security Council while mentioning article 99 cannot be considered as the use of the nature of this article in full sense of its spirit. Such cases were preceded by other appeals to the Council on the same situations by other subjects (notably, the UN member states) or other actions that made Secretary-General to merely perform its technical function. The main research problem here is the search for the UN instrument that could grant the Secretary-General with political powers I addition to existing administrative ones. The outcomes of the analysis show that the main instrument of such kind is the UN Charter Article 99. However, the degree of its usage activity is decreasing over time.

United Nations Management —An Oxymoron?

Our fifteen-year-old daughter and a friend have organized several bake sales to raise money for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). They trust that the $100 or so they take in each time will be put to good use, and I do not hesitate to reassure them. Unlike UNICEF, the UN Secretariat proper, headed by the Secretary-General, is financed only by assessed contributions from member states, and does not raise funds from teenagers. This is just as well since I could not give a similar assurance. Management problems at the Secretariat are stark and delivery is spotty, despite the good work its often brilliant, mostly dedicated, and sometimes heroic staff. Among the daunting challenges for Ban Ki-moon's successor, who will assume office on 1 January 2017, will be rebuilding the decrepit Secretariat: not the building--that has been done (1)--but what goes on inside. This essay, while not a comprehensive survey management challenges, will recount some recent scandals that have tarnished the organization and explore if these are random occurrences or, rather, systemic pathologies. The red thread running through the essay is the supposition that the choice the right Secretary-General is key to stanching future scandals and to reclaiming the UN's moral authority. The year 2016 offers a unique opportunity, with the General Assembly having asserted its role in the selection the Secretary-General by demanding a more transparent process. (2) Heretofore, the General nominally the appointing authority, simply confirmed the single choice offered by the Security Council. For the first time in the UN's history, all declared candidates appeared before the General Assembly in April and July this year to present their vision and to answer questions, including from civil society representatives, in public sessions. This refreshing departure from opacity might well produce an outcome previously unimaginable. At the time this article is written, the process is ongoing; by the time it is published, the results may be known. The previous eight Secretaries-General were chosen solely by the Security Council, which means in effect by the veto-wielding Permanent Five (P5). While some turned out winners (Dag Hammarskjold and Kofi Annan come to mind), the historical record is quite conclusive that the P5 prefer a weak and pliable, if respectable, Secretary-General over one with proven political leadership skills and strong managerial competence. Since it takes someone with a robust sense autonomy, decency, determination, and integrity to turn around the organization, the primary responsibility lies with the P5. However, regardless the P5's motives, the incoming Secretary-General could opt to treat her (hopefully) appointment as the pinnacle a successful career and use the position to leave a lasting legacy making the United Nations relevant again, respected and effective on its major normative mandates peace, development, human rights, and sustainable environmental stewardship. She or he should also appoint effective and powerful as well as empowered leaders to head the many departments, funds and programs, peace operations, and special political missions around the world. Systemic Pathologies A cascade revelations has recently focused the spotlight on egregious ethical and management glitches. In March 2016, the UN's Office Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) issued an audit of the management the trust fund in support the Office the President the General Assembly, which uncovered lapses, deficiencies, and due diligence failures. (3) The audit was requested by the Secretary-General after a former president the General Assembly was charged by the US attorney for the Southern District New York with tax evasion after corruptly receiving $1.3 million in bribes. The Secretary-General, but only after the former president had been arrested, convened a task force to review the functioning the Office the President the General Assembly. …

The International Civil Servant in Theory and Practice: Law, Morality, and Expertise

What is the place of international civil servants in international law? How much do they contribute to making the legal norms and institutions that govern states? To what extent does law sustain and constrain their authority? These important and difficult questions are raised, directly and indirectly, by several recent works that examine the life and legacy of Dag Hammarskjold, the second and arguably most influential Secretary-General of the United Nations. While serving in that capacity during the crucial years of 1953-1961, at the height of the Cold War and decolonization and perhaps the most formative period of UN history, Hammarskjold was intimately involved in the formulation of several legal innovations that have since become staples of UN activity, including preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. Yet he has also been accused, both during his lifetime and more recently, of expanding the authority of his own office to the detriment of democratic government. Reflecting on these works, this review essay argues that the authority of international civil servants should be understood and analysed as operating through three distinct yet interconnected modalities of discourse and practice: legal, moral, and expert. By giving due attention to all three modalities, a more accurate picture may be formed of the conditions under which international civil servants are able to govern, and their relationship to international law. Moreover, a comprehensive account of the authority exercised by international civil servants must take account of how they respond to any tensions that may arise between their bases of authority, as well as their shifting relations with other ‘global governors.’

Promoting the Image of the United Nations

In 1997, the new secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, announced that he would reform the world's largest organization to play a lead role in maintaining world peace and promoting human rights. As a result, Annan placed communication at the center of the reform process. In order for the UN to become an influential organization, Annan believed that the UN first needed to receive global public support; he organized and orchestrated a handful of public relations campaigns as part of the UN's communication performances. This article examines two public relations campaigns conducted by the United Nations under Annan between 1997 and 2006: the Goodwill Ambassador/Messenger of Peace program and the 2005 World Summit. Annan aimed to improve the UN image with the public in general and to raise the organization's profile as an active problem solver on the world stage in particular with the two most significant public relations campaigns in UN history.

Democratizing Canadian foreign policy? NGO participation for the Copenhagen summit for social development and the Beijing conference on women

In 1995 the UN convened two major international meetings: the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development – the first ever global summit on poverty – and the Beijing Conference on Women – the largest conference in UN history. In keeping with the Liberal Government's 1993 campaign promise to democratize the Canadian foreign policy‐making process, government‐sponsored mechanisms were established to facilitate NGO preparations for both the Summit and the Conference. The article compares and contrasts these two sets of mechanisms and assesses the extent to which they facilitated meaningful NGO participation that was taken seriously by government decision‐makers, and offered real opportunities for influencing policy outcomes. It concludes that each set of mechanisms facilitated extensive NGO participation by diverse groups from across Canada and benefited both the Canadian government and the NGOs. The mechanisms did not enable NGOs to affect Canada's broad objectives or the guidelines for its official negotiators. There were, nonetheless, differences in the degree to which the NGOs in each case were able to affect outcomes. Whereas the mechanisms established for the Copenhagen Summit enabled the NGOs to influence the precise wording proposed by the Canadian government negotiators at the Preparatory Commission meetings, the Beijing mechanisms did not result in NGO influence over either the direction or substance of Canada's official policies. Both cases illustrate the need to situate studies in the context of more macro‐level trends in Canadian policy‐making.

The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping

In 1960 it was suggested that the word ``intelligence’’ should be banned from the lexicon of the United Nations. . Indeed, the UN continues to shy away from of¢cial use of the term because of its association with illegal or undercover activities, such as spying, theft, and distortion, with which the UN would not (and should not) be involved. Nevertheless, intelligence, in its pure sense of processed information, both open and secret, relating to security, is an essential part of UN peacekeeping, and is recognized as such by UN staff, both civilian and military. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have sometimes included ``information units’’ or ``Military Information Branches’’ (MIBs) in their structures. Thus, the UN has of¢cially sidestepped the term ``intelligence,’’ though some staff members of these units unof¢cially called themselves intelligence of¢cers, and many have been drawn from the ranks of various professional military and police intelligence organizations. Many failures in the history of UN ¢eld operations might have been avoided had the UN taken a more forthright approach to intelligence and possessed a stronger mandate to gather information and improve its information-gathering systems. The list includes outbreaks from the distant past, such as the Korean War of 1950 (witnessed but not foreseen by the UN Commission on Korea), and more recent ones, such as the incursion of SWAPO guerrillas into Namibia (1989), the Iraqi attack on

Soldiers of diplomacy: the United Nations, peacekeeping, and the new world order

United Nations peacekeeping troops, or 'Blue Helmets,' were first deployed in 1956 to oversee the withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli forces from the Suez Canal. Canadian Lester B. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the following year for proposing this solution to the Suez crisis. Now forty years later, United Nations peacekeepers play a very different role from that of Pearson's lightly armed 'soldier-diplomats.' In June 1997, there were only seven UN missions in which the Blue Helmets were acting as true peacekeepers; another ten missions placed the Blue Helmets in civil conflicts where their roles ranged from evacuating threatened groups to organizing elections, and their tasks were much more dangerous. Jocelyn Coulon draws his experiences visiting nine peacekeeping missions, including Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia, at a pivotal point in UN history, when the UN troops were increasingly acting as warriors of a new world order. He raises important questions: How can the UN distinguish its objectives from the interests of the great powers? Could - and should - the UN maintain an independent army? How can the pitfalls encountered by the peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia be avoided? Finally, Coulon urges a return to the original, though less spectacular, role of the UN soldiers: keeping the peace where peace is really the goal of the parties involved. Soldiers of Diplomacy was first published in French in 1994; this new English edition has been updated to reflect recent events. The result of interviews with dozens of soldiers, officers, and officials involved in peacekeeping activities, it is a unique and thought-provoking investigation of UN peacekeeping.

The Development of the United Nations Law Concerning Peace-Keeping Operations

Especially as a consequence of the termination of the Cold War, the détente in the relations between East en West (Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy matters) and, finally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the number of UN peace-keeping operations substantially increased in recent years. One could even speak of a ‘proliferation’. Until 1988 the number of operations was twelve (seven peace-keeping forces: UNEF ‘I’ and ‘II’, ONUC, UNHCYP, UNSF (West New Guinea), UNDOF AND UNIFIL; and five military observer missions: UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM and UNIPOM). Now, three forces and seven observer missions can be added. The forces are MINURSO (West Sahara), UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia); the observer groups: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan), UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’ (Angola), ONUCA (Central America), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) and ONUSAL (El Salvador). UNTAG (Namibia), which was established in 1978, could not become operational until 1989 as a result of the new political circumstances in the world. So, a total of twenty-three operations have been undertaken, of which almost fifty percent was established in the last five years, whereas the other half was the result of decisions taken by the United Nations in the preceding forty years (UNTSO dates back to 1949). In the meantime, some ‘classic’ operations are being continued (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), whereas some ‘modern’ operations already have been terminated as planned (UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’, and ONUCA). At the moment (July 1992) eleven operations are in action – the greatest number in the UN history ever.

The future development of the United Nations: some suggestions for research

While it seems likely that Dag Hammarskjold will bear up under recent Soviet attacks and will serve out the remaining two years of his term, the pattern of broad political initiatives recently undertaken by the Secretary-General is almost certainly due for a substantial change. The third chapter in the life of the United Nations, the Period of the Secretary-General, is being interrupted, if not transformed, by the Soviet assault. The nature of the Soviet attack suggests that the next period in UN's history will be characterized by a basic struggle for control of the organization. The tactics are certain to be rougher than in previous years. The competition will be for keeps-for the dominant voice in a political and administrative instrument now believed by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to be of major diplomatic importance. It will, I believe, be the most significant period to date in the life of the United Nations. It is likely to usher in several mutations in the development of international organization. The growth of an institution never fits a neat pattern of classification. But for purposes of general analysis we can refer to a first chapter in UN's life, extending from its founding in 1945 to the beginning of the Korean War, as the Period of the Security Council. It was characterized by an effort to make the United Nations work as it was originally conceived. The second period, from 1950 to Mr. Hammarskjold's visit to the Middle East in April, 1956, can be called the Period of the General Assembly. It was symbolized by the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The West still retained a safe working majority in the Assembly. The admission of 16 new states into mem-