Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Research Articles

Phylogeography and gene pool analysis of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses reported in India from 2006 to 2021.

India has reported highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus outbreaks since 2006, with the first human case reported in 2021. These included viruses belonging to the clades 2.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.2.1, 2.3.2.1a, and 2.3.2.1c. There are currently no data on the gene pool of HPAI H5N1 viruses in India. Molecular clock and phylogeography analysis of the HA and NA genes; and phylogenetic analysis of the internal genes of H5N1 viruses from India were carried out. Sequences reported from 2006 to 2015; and sequences from 2021 that were available in online databases were used in the analysis. Five separate introductions of H5N1 viruses into India were observed, via IndonesiaorKorea (2002), Bangladesh (2009), Bhutan (2010), and China (2013, 2018) (clades 2.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.2.1, 2.3.2.1a, 2.3.2.1c, and 2.3.4.4b). Phylogenetic analysis revealed eight reassortant genotypes. The H5N1 virus isolated from the human case showed a unique reassortant genotype. Amino acid markers associated with adaptation to mammals were also present. This is the first report of the spatio-temporal origins and gene pool analysis of H5N1 viruses from India, highlighting the need for increased molecular surveillance.

In Ovo Models to Predict Virulence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5-Viruses for Chickens and Ducks.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5-viruses are circulating in wild birds and are repeatedly introduced to poultry causing outbreaks in the Netherlands since 2014. The largest epizootic ever recorded in Europe was caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses in the period 2021-2022. The recent H5-clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were found to differ in their virulence for chickens and ducks. Viruses causing only mild disease may remain undetected, increasing the risk of virus spread to other farms, wild birds and mammals. We developed in ovo models to determine the virulence of HPAI viruses for chickens and ducks, which are fast and have low costs. The virulence of five contemporary H5-viruses was compared studying replication rate, average time to death and virus spread in the embryo. Remarkable differences in virulence were observed between H5-viruses and between poultry species. The H5N1-2021 virus was found to have a fast replication rate in both the chicken and duck in ovo models, but a slower systemic virus dissemination compared to three other H5-clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. The results show the potential of in ovo models to quickly determine the virulence of novel HPAI viruses, and study potential virulence factors which can help to better guide the surveillance in poultry.

Divergent Pathogenesis and Transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Swine.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have potential to cross species barriers and cause pandemics. Since 2022, HPAI A(H5N1) belonging to the goose/Guangdong 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin phylogenetic clade have infected poultry, wild birds, and mammals across North America. Continued circulation in birds and infection of multiple mammalian species with strains possessing adaptation mutations increase the risk for infection and subsequent reassortment with influenza A viruses endemic in swine. We assessed the susceptibility of swine to avian and mammalian HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains using a pathogenesis and transmission model. All strains replicated in the lung of pigs and caused lesions consistent with influenza A infection. However, viral replication in the nasal cavity and transmission was only observed with mammalian isolates. Mammalian adaptation and reassortment may increase the risk for incursion and transmission of HPAI viruses in feral, backyard, or commercial swine.

Evolutional dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 genotypes in wintering bird habitats: Insights from South Korea's 2020–2021 season

The winter of 2020–2021 in South Korea witnessed severe outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) viruses, specifically multiple genotypes of the H5N8 subtype. These outbreaks prompted an extensive investigation into the genetic characteristics and evolutionary dynamics of these viruses. Under the auspices of the National Institute of Wildlife Disease Control and Prevention (NIWDC), we conducted a nationwide surveillance program, collecting 7588 specimens from diverse wild bird habitats. Influenza A viruses were isolated at a rate of 5.0%, with HPAI H5N8 viruses accounting for 38.5% of isolates, predominantly found in wild bird carcasses (97.3%). Genetic analysis revealed the emergence of novel HPAI genotypes due to genetic reassortment events. G1 and G2 viruses were separately introduced into Korea, with G1 viruses displaying dynamic behavior, resulting in diverse sub-genotypes (G1–1 to G1–5) and mainly isolated from clinical specimens. Conversely, the G2 virus, introduced later, became the dominant strain consistently isolated mainly from bird carcasses (88.9%). These findings underscore the emergence of numerous novel HPAI genotypes shaped by multiple reassortment events in high-density wintering grounds of migratory birds. These sites act as hotspots for genetic exchanges, significantly influencing avian ecology, including resident bird species, and contributing to HPAI H5N8 evolution. The genetic diversity and ongoing evolution of these viruses highlight the need for vigilant surveillance and adaptive control measures. Recognizing the potential spillover to human populations, a One Health approach is essential to mitigate the evolving threats posed by avian influenza.

Natural Infection with H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Influenza (HPAI) Virus in 5- and 10-Day-Old Commercial Pekin Ducklings (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus).

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has resulted in catastrophic economic losses globally in poultry. This case report describes the diagnostic detection and pathology of HPAI H5N1 in 5-day-old commercial ducklings, which is an atypical age for detection of natural infection of HPAI in poultry. The pathology observed at 5 days of age was also compared to lesions observed in ducklings from the same flock evaluated at 10 days of age before depopulation. The California Animal Health and Food Safety (CAHFS) Laboratory, Tulare, received ten 5-day-old Pekin duckling (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus) carcasses for diagnostic evaluation due to mortality that started increasing at 3 days of age. The most common gross findings included bilateral pulmonary edema with congestion and enlarged, mottled livers and spleens. Microscopically, cerebral neuronophagia, pancreatic necrosis, and interstitial pneumonia with pulmonary edema were observed in the 5-day-old ducklings. Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were positive for avian influenza virus (AIV) by real-time reverse transcriptase PCR. The AIV was typed as HPAI, EA/AM 2.3.4.4b H5N1 goose/Guangdong clade lineage by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory. Ducks at the affected premises were depopulated 4 days after the 5-day-old ducklings were submitted to the CAHFS lab, at which time additional tissue samples were collected for comparison to 10-day-old ducklings on the same premises. Differences in microscopic lesions and AIV tissue distribution were observed between the 5-day and 10-day tissues collected. Notably, microscopic lesions were more severe in the brain and pancreas at 10 days of age. Findings in 10-day-old ducklings included cerebral lymphoplasmacytic perivascular cuffing, gliosis, neuronal degeneration, and pancreatic necrosis. AIV antigen distribution and intensity was greatest in the cerebral tissue of the brains at 10 days and in the lungs at 5 days of age. To the authors' knowledge, published studies are limited on AIV natural infection in domestic ducks less than 9 days of age.

Association of biosecurity and hygiene practices with avian influenza A/H5 and A/H9 virus infections in turkey farms.

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreaks pose a significant threat to the health of livestock, wildlife, and humans. Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are enzootic in poultry in many countries, including Bangladesh, necessitating improved farm biosecurity measures. However, the comprehension of biosecurity and hygiene practices, as well as the infection of AIV in turkey farms, are poorly understood in Bangladesh. Therefore, we conducted this study to determine the prevalence of AIV subtypes and their association with biosecurity and hygiene practices in turkey farms. We collected oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs from individual turkeys from 197 farms across 9 districts in Bangladesh from March to August 2019. We tested the swab samples for the AIV matrix gene (M gene) followed by H5, H7, and H9 subtypes using real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). We found 24.68% (95% CI:21.54-28.04) of turkey samples were AIV positive, followed by 5.95% (95% CI: 4.33-7.97) for H5, 6.81% (95% CI: 5.06-8.93) for H9 subtype and no A/H7 was found. Using a generalized linear mixed model, we determined 10 significant risk factors associated with AIV circulation in turkey farms. We found that the absence of sick turkeys, the presence of footbaths, the absence of nearby poultry farms, concrete flooring, and the avoidance of mixing newly purchased turkeys with existing stock can substantially reduce the risk of AIV circulation in turkey farms (odds ratio ranging from 0.02 to 0.08). Furthermore, the absence of nearby live bird markets, limiting wild bird access, no visitor access, improved floor cleaning frequency, and equipment disinfection practices also had a substantial impact on lowering the AIV risk in the farms (odds ratio ranging from 0.10 to 0.13). The results of our study underscore the importance of implementing feasible and cost-effective biosecurity measures aimed at reducing AIV transmission in turkey farms. Particularly in resource-constrained environments such as Bangladesh, such findings might assist governmental entities in enhancing biosecurity protocols within their poultry sector, hence mitigating and potentially averting the transmission of AIV and spillover to humans.

H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in migratory birds exhibiting low pathogenicity in mallards increases its risk of transmission and spread in poultry

In 2020, an H5N1 avian influenza virus of clade 2.3.4.4b was detected in Europe for the first time and was spread throughout the world by wild migratory birds, resulting in the culling of an unprecedented number of wild birds and poultry due to the epidemic. In February 2023, we isolated and identified a strain of H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus from a swab sample from a grey crane in Ningxia, China. Phylogenetic analysis of the Hemagglutinin (HA) gene showed that the virus belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, and several gene segments were closely related to H5N1 viruses infecting humans in China. Analysis of key amino acid sites revealed that the virus contained multiple amino acid substitutions that facilitate enhanced viral replication and mammalian pathogenicity. The results of animal challenge experiments showed that the virus is highly pathogenic to chickens, moderately pathogenic to BALB/c mice, and highly infectious but not lethal to mallards. Moreover, the virus exhibited minor antigenic drift compared with the H5-Re14 vaccine strain. To this end, we need to pay more attention to the monitoring of wild birds to prevent further spread of viruses to poultry and mammals, including humans.

First Case of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in Montenegro

Abstract Avian influenza, commonly known as bird flu, is a highly infectious viral disease that affects birds, including wild water birds and poultry. The emergence and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) strains, such as H5N1, have raised concerns due to their potential to cause severe outbreaks and cross the species barrier, leading to human infections and global public health emergencies. In this study, we report the first case of HPAI H5N1 detection in Montenegro. Twenty-six carcasses of dalmatian pelicans were found in Skadar Lake, Montenegro, and the H5N1 subtype was confirmed through molecular testing in the samples from pelicans. The whole influenza genome was sequenced and belonging to clade 2.3.4.4b was determined.

Genetics of H5N1 and H5N8 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Japan in Winter 2021-2022.

In winter 2021-2022, H5N1 and H5N8 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses (HPAIVs) caused serious outbreaks in Japan: 25 outbreaks of HPAI at poultry farms and 107 cases in wild birds or in the environment. Phylogenetic analyses divided H5 HPAIVs isolated in Japan in the winter of 2021-2022 into three groups-G2a, G2b, and G2d-which were disseminated at different locations and times. Full-genome sequencing analyses of these HPAIVs revealed a strong relationship of multiple genes between Japan and Siberia, suggesting that they arose from reassortment events with avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in Siberia. The results emphasize the complex of dissemination and reassortment events with the movement of migratory birds, and the importance of continual monitoring of AIVs in Japan and Siberia for early alerts to the intrusion of HPAIVs.

Spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 avian influenza viruses contributed to H5N1 emergence in 2021/2022 panzootic.

Since 2020, clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 and H5N1 viruses have swept through continents, posing serious threats to the world. Through comprehensive analyses of epidemiological, genetic, and bird migration data, we found that the dominant genotype replacement of the H5N8 viruses in 2020 contributed to the H5N1 outbreak in the 2021/2022 wave. The 2020 outbreak of the H5N8 G1 genotype instead of the G0 genotype produced reassortment opportunities and led to the emergence of a new H5N1 virus with G1's HA and MP genes. Despite extensive reassortments in the 2021/2022 wave, the H5N1 virus retained the HA and MP genes, causing a significant outbreak in Europe and North America. Furtherly, through the wild bird migration flyways investigation, we found that the temporal-spatial coincidence between the outbreak of the H5N8 G1 virus and the bird autumn migration may have expanded the H5 viral spread, which may be one of the main drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic.IMPORTANCESince 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 subtype variants of clade 2.3.4.4b have spread across continents, posing unprecedented threats globally. However, the factors promoting the genesis and spread of H5 HPAI viruses remain unclear. Here, we found that the spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 HPAI viruses contributed to the emergence of the H5N1 variant that caused the 2021/2022 panzootic, and the viral evolution in poultry of Egypt and surrounding area and autumn bird migration from the Russia-Kazakhstan region to Europe are important drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic. These findings provide important targets for early warning and could help control the current and future HPAI epidemics.

Enzootic Circulation, Massive Gull Mortality and Poultry Outbreaks during the 2022/2023 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 Season in the Czech Republic.

In 2022/2023, Europe experienced its third consecutive season of high-pathogenicity avian influenza. During this period, the Czech Republic was again severely affected. For the first time, the number of culled birds approached one million, which was three times higher than in previous seasons. In parallel to the outbreaks in poultry, mass die-offs of gulls were also observed. In the present study, we performed whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 137 H5N1 strains collected in the Czech Republic in 2022/2023 (94.6% of all outbreaks or locations). The analysis revealed four distinct genotypes: AB, CH, BB and AF. Phylogenetic analysis suggested that the AF genotype persisted from the previous H5N1 season without reassortment. In addition, the genotype BB, which was detected mainly in gulls, showed a noticeable strain diversity at the local level. This virus was also responsible for a single outbreak in commercially bred turkeys. Finally, an interesting spatio-temporal cluster with three co-circulating H5N1 genotypes, AB, CH and AF, was identified with no evidence of intrasubtype reassortment. Highly sensitive molecular surveillance and the timely sharing of genomic sequences and associated metadata could greatly assist in tracking the spread and detecting molecular changes associated with the increased virulence of this potentially zoonotic pathogen.

Transmission dynamics and pathogenesis differ between pheasants and partridges infected with clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 and H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses.

During the UK 2020-2021 epizootic of H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs), high mortality occurred during incursions in commercially farmed common pheasants (Phasianus colchicus). Two pheasant farms, affected separately by H5N8 and H5N1 subtypes, included adjacently housed red-legged partridges (Alectoris rufa), which appeared to be unaffected. Despite extensive ongoing epizootics, H5Nx HPAIV partridge outbreaks were not reported during 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 in the UK, so it is postulated that partridges are more resistant to HPAIV infection than other gamebirds. To assess this, pathogenesis and both intra- and inter-species transmission of UK pheasant-origin H5N8-2021 and H5N1-2021 HPAIVs were investigated. Onward transmission to chickens was also assessed to better understand the risk of spread from gamebirds to other commercial poultry sectors. A lower infectious dose was required to infect pheasants with H5N8-2021 compared to H5N1-2021. However, HPAIV systemic dissemination to multiple organs within pheasants was more rapid following infection with H5N1-2021 than H5N8-2021, with the former attaining generally higher viral RNA levels in tissues. Intraspecies transmission to contact pheasants was successful for both viruses and associated with viral environmental contamination, while interspecies transmission to a first chicken-contact group was also efficient. However, further onward transmission to additional chicken contacts was only achieved with H5N1-2021. Intra-partridge transmission was only successful when high-dose H5N1-2021 was administered, while partridges inoculated with H5N8-2021 failed to shed and transmit, although extensive tissue tropism was observed for both viruses. Mortalities among infected partridges featured a longer incubation period compared to that in pheasants, for both viruses. Therefore, the susceptibility of different gamebird species and pathogenicity outcomes to the ongoing H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIVs varies, but pheasants represent a greater likelihood of H5Nx HPAIV introduction into galliforme poultry settings. Consequently, viral maintenance within gamebird populations and risks to poultry species warrant enhanced investigation.

Genetic Analysis of H5N1 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus following a Mass Mortality Event in Wild Geese on the Solway Firth.

The United Kingdom (UK) and Europe have seen successive outbreaks of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) since 2020 peaking in the autumn/winter periods. During the 2021/22 season, a mass die-off event of Svalbard Barnacle Geese (Branta leucopsis) was observed on the Solway Firth, a body of water on the west coast border between England and Scotland. This area is used annually by Barnacle Geese to over-winter, before returning to Svalbard to breed. Following initial identification of HPAIV in a Barnacle Goose on 8 November 2021, up to 32% of the total Barnacle Goose population may have succumbed to disease by the end of March 2022, along with other wild bird species in the area. Potential adaptation of the HPAIV to the Barnacle Goose population within this event was evaluated. Whole-genome sequencing of thirty-three HPAIV isolates from wild bird species demonstrated that there had been two distinct incursions of the virus, but the two viruses had remained genetically stable within the population, whilst viruses from infected wild birds were closely related to those from poultry cases occurring in the same region. Analysis of sera from the following year demonstrated that a high percentage (76%) of returning birds had developed antibodies to H5 AIV. This study demonstrates genetic stability of this strain of HPAIV in wild Anseriformes, and that, at the population scale, whilst there is a significant impact on survival, a high proportion of birds recover following infection.

A case-control study of the infection risk of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza in Japan during the winter of 2020–2021

In Japan, outbreaks of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) were reported between November 2020 and March 2021 in 52 poultry farms. Understanding HPAI epidemiology would help poultry industries improve their awareness of the disease and enhance the immediate implementation of biosecurity measures. This study was a simulation-based matched case-control study to elucidate the risk factors associated with HPAI outbreaks in chicken farms in Japan. Data were collected from 42 HPAI-affected farms and 463 control farms that were within a 5-km radius of each case farm but remained uninfected. When infected farms were detected as clusters, one farm was randomly selected from each cluster, considering the possibility that the cluster was formed by farm-to-farm transmission within an epidemic area. For each case farm, up to three control farms were selected within a 5-km radius. Overall, 26 case farms (16 layer and 10 broiler farms) and 75 control farms (45 layer and 30 broiler farms) were resampled 1000 times for the conditional logistic regression model with explanatory variables comprising geographical factors and farm flock size. A larger flock size and shorter distance to water bodies from the farm were found to increase infection risk in layer farms. Similarly, in broiler farms, a shorter distance to water bodies increased infection risk. On larger farms, frequent access of farm staff and instrument carriages to premises could lead to increased infection risk. Waterfowl visiting water bodies around farms may also be associated with infection risk.

HA N193D substitution in the HPAI H5N1 virus alters receptor binding affinity and enhances virulence in mammalian hosts

ABSTRACT During the 2021/2022 winter season, we isolated highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses harbouring an amino acid substitution from Asparagine(N) to Aspartic acid (D) at residue 193 of the hemagglutinin (HA) receptor binding domain (RBD) from migratory birds in South Korea. Herein, we investigated the characteristics of the N193D HA-RBD substitution in the A/CommonTeal/Korea/W811/2021[CT/W811] virus by using recombinant viruses engineered via reverse genetics (RG). A receptor affinity assay revealed that the N193D HA-RBD substitution in CT/W811 increases α2,6 sialic acid receptor binding affinity. The rCT/W811-HA193N virus caused rapid lethality with high virus titres in chickens compared with the rCT/W811-HA193D virus, while the rCT/W811-HA193D virus exhibited enhanced virulence in mammalian hosts with multiple tissue tropism. Surprisingly, a ferret-to-ferret transmission assay revealed that rCT/W811-HA193D virus replicates well in the respiratory tract, at a rate about 10 times higher than that of rCT/W811-HA193N, and all rCT/W811-HA193D direct contact ferrets were seroconverted at 10 days post-contact. Further, competition transmission assay of the two viruses revealed that rCT/W811-HA193D has enhanced growth kinetics compared with the rCT/W811-HA193N, eventually becoming the dominant strain in nasal turbinates. Further, rCT/W811-HA193D exhibits high infectivity in primary human bronchial epithelial (HBE) cells, suggesting the potential for human infection. Taken together, the HA-193D containing HPAI H5N1 virus from migratory birds showed enhanced virulence in mammalian hosts, but not in avian hosts, with multi-organ replication and ferret-to-ferret transmission. Thus, this suggests that HA-193D change increases the probability of HPAI H5N1 infection and transmission in humans.

Field and laboratory investigation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 and H5N8 in Quang Ninh province, Vietnam, 2020 to 2021.

Avian influenza (AI) is a contagious disease that causes illness and death in poultry and humans. High pathogenicity AI (HPAI) H5N6 outbreaks commonly occur in Quang Ninh province bordering China. In June 2021, the first HPAI H5N8 outbreak occurred at a Quang Ninh chicken farm. This study examined the risk factors associated with HPAI H5N6 and H5N8 outbreaks in Quang Ninh. A retrospective case-control study was conducted in Quang Ninh from Nov 2021 to Jan 2022. The cases were households with susceptible poultry with two or more clinical signs and tested positive by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. The controls were households in the same village as the cases but did not show clinical symptoms of the disease. Logistic regression models were constructed to assess the risk factors associated with HPAI outbreaks at the household level. There were 38 cases with H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4h viruses (n = 35) and H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses (n = 3). Compared to the 112 controls, raising poultry in uncovered or partially covered ponds (odds ratio [OR], 7.52; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.44-39.27), poultry traders visiting the farm (OR, 8.66; 95% CI, 2.7-27.69), farms with 50-2,000 birds (OR, 3.00; 95% CI, 1.06-8-51), and farms with ≥ 2,000 birds (OR, 11.35; 95% CI, 3.07-41.94) were significantly associated with HPAI outbreaks. Combining biosecurity measures, such as restricting visitor entry and vaccination in farms with more than 50 birds, can enhance the control and prevention of HPAI in Quang Ninh and its spread across borders.

Prevalence of HPAI in passerines, woodpeckers and doves presented to the Center for Wild Bird Rehabilitation during the 2022 HPAI H5N1 epizootic

The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b epizootic affecting North America beginning in late 2021 has affected wild and domestic birds to an unprecedented scale. Mortalities have been documented mainly in raptors, aquatic birds (shorebirds, waterfowl), gulls and other scavenging birds, with rare reports of other species being affected. Passerines, woodpeckers, and doves are not thought to contribute significantly to the transmission of avian influenza, and thus are not regularly tested. Despite this, mortalities and even the possibility of asymptomatic carrier states in songbirds have been documented with HPAI H5N1 strains. This study focused on sampling and testing of species not typically included in HPAI surveillance, to help assess prevalence, symptoms of infection if detected and the possibility of asymptomatic carriers. Throughout two periods in 2022, 164 individuals of 38 species were sampled from Vermont and New Hampshire. None of these birds tested positive for any strain of avian influenza virus. While the scale of this study is small, it highlights the need for testing species that are not a part of regular HPAI surveillance, as well as the role rehabilitation centers may play in that goal.

The role of vaccination and environmental factors on outbreaks of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5N1 in Bangladesh

High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreaks continue to wreak havoc on the global poultry industry and threaten the health of wild bird populations, with sporadic spillover in humans and other mammals, resulting in widespread calls to vaccinate poultry. Bangladesh has been vaccinating poultry since 2012, presenting a prime opportunity to study the effects of vaccination on HPAI H5N1circulation in both poultry and wild birds. We investigated the efficacy of vaccinating commercial poultry against HPAI H5N1 along with climatic and socio-economic factors considered potential drivers of HPAI H5N1 outbreak risk in Bangladesh. Using a multivariate modeling approach, we estimated that the rate of outbreaks was 18 times higher before compared to after vaccination, with winter months having a three times higher chance of outbreaks than summer months. Variables resulting in small but significant increases in outbreak rate were relatively low ambient temperatures for the time of year, literacy rate, chicken and duck density, crop density, and presence of highways; this may be attributable to low temperatures supporting viral survival outside the host, higher literacy driving reporting rate, density of the host reservoir, and spread of the virus through increased connectivity. Despite the substantial impact of vaccination on outbreaks, we note that HPAI H5N1 is still enzootic in Bangladesh; vaccinated poultry flocks have high rates of H5N1 prevalence, and spillover to wild birds has increased. Vaccination in Bangladesh thus bears the risk of supporting “silent spread,” where the vaccine only provides protection against disease and not also infection. Our findings underscore that poultry vaccination can be part of holistic HPAI mitigation strategies when accompanied by monitoring to avoid silent spread.

Evolution and Current Status of Influenza A Virus in Chile: A Review.

The influenza A virus (IAV) poses a significant global threat to public health and food security. Particularly concerning is the avian influenza virus (AIV) subtype H5N1, which has spread from Europe to North and Central/South America. This review presents recent developments in IAV evolution in birds, mammals, and humans in Chile. Chile's encounter with IAV began in 2002, with the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N3 virus, derived from a unique South American low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus. In 2016-2017, LPAI H7N6 caused outbreaks in turkey, linked to wild birds in Chile and Bolivia. The pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 (H1N1pdm09) virus in 2009 decreased egg production in turkeys. Since 2012, diverse IAV subtypes have emerged in backyard poultry and pigs. Reassortant AIVs, incorporating genes from both North and South American isolates, have been found in wild birds since 2007. Notably, from December 2022, HPAI H5N1 was detected in wild birds, sea lions, and a human, along Chile's north coast. It was introduced through Atlantic migratory flyways from North America. These findings emphasize the need for enhanced biosecurity on poultry farms and ongoing genomic surveillance to understand and manage AIVs in both wild and domestic bird populations in Chile.

Wild bird origin Influenza A subtype diversity and reassortment events during the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in Chile, 2022-2023. Proceeding of The First International Avian Influenza Summit, University of Arkansas- October 16-17, 2023"

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses continue to pose a significant threat to animal and human health worldwide. Since the onset of the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in South America, our research group has been conducting environmental influenza A virus (IAV) surveillance in different wetlands throughout Chile to detect and characterize circulating IAV strains. Between November 2022 and June 2023, we collected and screened 3275 environmental samples for IAV by RT-qPCR targeting the M gene. Of these, 133 were IAV-positive (4.1\%). Further testing by H5-specific RT-qPCR revealed that 14 (10.5\%) of the positive samples corresponded to HPAI H5 2.3.4.4b, collected during the month of November (2), December (8 positives), January (1 positive), March (1 Positive) and June (1 positive). Samples obtained during spring (November and December) were obtained at the Lluta River estuary in the extreme north of Chile. Samples obtained during Summer (January and March) were obtained in Lluta and at Punta Arenas, located in the extreme South of Chile. The sample obtained in Winter (June) was obtained in Maipo, located in Central Chile. Sequence analysis of 6 fully sequenced H5N1 viruses revealed that all segments were closely related to other H5N1 2.3.4.4b viruses circulating at the time in South America. Interestingly, we also obtained several other subtypes of low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAI) during the sampling period: H13N9, H13N8, H12N5, H8N4, H6N8, H6N5, H5N7, H4N6, H2N8 and H2N2. Phylogenetic analysis of these viruses revealed that locally circulating LPAI H12N5, H6N8, and H5N7 subtype viruses, additionally to 4 more viruses without subtype information, had reassorted with HPAI viruses in at least one of the PA and NP segments. The role that these novel reassortant viruses play in the ecology of IAV in Chile and their pathogenic potential is unknown; however, in light of these reassortment events, further surveillance is warranted to detect potentially novel HPAI H5Nx viruses circulating in wild birds in Chile that could have unknown pathogenic and transmission potential.