Higher-order Thought Research Articles

A Legion of Lesions: The Neuroscientific Rout of Higher-Order Thought Theory

A Legion of Lesions: The Neuroscientific Rout of Higher-Order Thought Theory

A HOROR Theory for Introspective Consciousness

Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.

Consciousness as the Temporal Propagation of Information.

Our ability to understand the mind and its relation to the body is highly dependent on the way we define consciousness and the lens through which we study it. We argue that looking at conscious experience from an information-theory perspective can help obtain a unified and parsimonious account of the mind. Today’s dominant models consider consciousness to be a specialized function of the brain characterized by a discrete neural event. Against this background, we consider subjective experience through information theory, presenting consciousness as the propagation of information from the past to the future. We examine through this perspective major characteristics of consciousness. We demonstrate that without any additional assumptions, temporal continuity in perception can explain the emergence of volition, subjectivity, higher order thoughts, and body boundaries. Finally, we discuss the broader implications for the mind-body question and the appeal of embodied cognition.

Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental

While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness, this suggestion is notably rejected by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) of consciousness that posits non-conscious inner awareness, which isn’t an object of inner awareness, and yet is mental. I examine an objection against the HOTT, according to which inner awareness is phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess the objection, I investigate arguments of Chalmers and Montague in favor of this phenomenal presence. I argue that while these arguments may show that experience is not transparent, they crucially fail to demonstrate that ‘inner transparency’ must be false too, i.e. that inner awareness is phenomenally present. I conclude that non-conscious inner awareness is an open possibility and Brentano’s posit of inner awareness as a mark of the mental thus looks unpromising.

The learning-consciousness connection

This is a response to the nine commentaries on our target article “Unlimited Associative Learning: A primer and some predictions”. Our responses are organized by theme rather than by author. We present a minimal functional architecture for Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) that aims to tie to together the list of capacities presented in the target article. We explain why we discount higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness. We respond to the criticism that we have overplayed the importance of learning and underplayed the importance of spatial modelling. We decline the invitation to add a negative marker to our proposed positive marker so as to rule out consciousness in plants, but we nonetheless maintain that there is no positive evidence of consciousness in plants. We close by discussing how UAL relates to development and to its material substrate.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness.

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

What Might Interoceptive Inference Reveal about Consciousness?

The mainstream science of consciousness offers a few predominate views of how the brain gives rise to awareness. Chief among these are the Higher-Order Thought Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and hybrids thereof. In parallel, rapid development in predictive processing approaches have begun to outline concrete mechanisms by which interoceptive inference shapes selfhood, affect, and exteroceptive perception. Here, we consider these new approaches in terms of what they might offer our empirical, phenomenological, and philosophical understanding of consciousness and its neurobiological roots.

The extra ingredient

Birch et al. see their model as incompatible with higher-order-thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, on which a state is conscious if one is in some suitable way aware of that state. They see higher-order (HO) awareness as an “extra ingredient”. But since Birch et al. go on to say that “[t]his is not the place for a detailed discussion of HOT theories,” they don’t address why they take HO awareness to be an extra ingredient or why HOT theorists are convinced that it’s needed. In this commentary we argue that higher-order theories are a crucial for understanding consciousness.

The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness

ABSTRACT I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character—the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that the relevant higher-order representations have a cartographic format.

Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory.

Problems are raised with the global workspace hypothesis of consciousness, for example about exactly how global the workspace needs to be for consciousness to suddenly be present. Problems are also raised with Carruthers’s (2019) version that excludes conceptual (categorical or discrete) representations, and in which phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to physical processes, with instead a different levels of explanation approach to the relation between the brain and the mind advocated. A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described, in which there is a particular computational system involved in which Higher Order Syntactic Thoughts are used to perform credit assignment on first order thoughts of multiple step plans to correct them by manipulating symbols in a syntactic type of working memory. This provides a good evolutionary reason for the evolution of this kind of computational module, with which, it is proposed, phenomenal consciousness is associated. Some advantages of this HOST approach to phenomenal consciousness are then described with reference not only to the global workspace approach, but also to Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories. It is hypothesized that the HOST system which requires the ability to manipulate first order symbols in working memory might utilize parts of the prefrontal cortex implicated in working memory, and especially the left inferior frontal gyrus, which is involved in language and probably syntactical processing. Overall, the approach advocated is to identify the computations that are linked to consciousness, and to analyze the neural bases of those computations.

Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts

Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases. I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states.

The Consciousness Unit (CU) Model

The present paper attempts to handle the question how an unconscious mental state (MS) is transformed into a conscious-MS, by developing an outline of a new model, the conscious unit (CU) model. The essential assumption of this model is as follows. In the cognitive system there is an inborn, special linking-mechanism that links to a MS a CU, i.e., a unit of consciousness (or a stream of such units when the represented by the MS is complex). As a result, the individual becomes aware (conscious) of the represented by the MS. This model was applied successfully to certain empirical observations and to several problems, which were directed toward the higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness [especially the higher-order thought (HOT) theory].

Higher–Order Thought and the Problem of Shifting Subjectivity

In this paper, we argue that the two versions of the higher–order thought theory of consciousness, viz. Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought and Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought, fail to explain the subjective character of a conscious mental state. Both these theories face what we call the problem of shifting subjectivity. Since these theories explain the consciousness of mental states in terms of a representational relation between two unconscious mental states with the help of a two–tiered representational structure divided into a higher–order thought and a lower–order mental state (which is the target of the higher–order thought), they fail to explain the subjective character of conscious mental states, which is intrinsic to them. In their account, the subjective character intrinsic to conscious mental states seems to shift from the target state to the higher–order mental state, which is separate from the target state. The objection is strong against Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought theory, which clearly makes a distinction between a world–directed mental state and the higher–order thought representing it. However, although Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought theory is an attempt to preserve the intuition that consciousness is intrinsic to conscious mental states, it faces the problem of shifting subjectivity in the case of introspective consciousness.

Some Comments on Josh Weisberg’s ‘Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Heidelberg Problem’

Josh Weisberg discusses what he calls the “Heidelberg Problem” (named after Dieter Henrich’s Heidelberg School). However, he mischaracterizes this problem and believes he is able so resolve the problem, as mischaracterized, as well as meet the de se constraint, in the theoretical frame of reference of the Higher-Order Thought Monitoring theory of consciousness. This commentary highlights the fundamental flaw in his approach, while encouraging further philosophical exchange with our American philosophical colleagues about the “Heidelberg Problem”.

Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought

ABSTRACTWhile much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.

Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories

Higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal (in: Liu, Perry (eds) Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness.

Higher-Order Thought, Self-Identification, and Delusions of Disownership

David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory says that for a mental state to be conscious, it must be accompanied by a higher-order thought about that state. One objection to Rosenthal’s account is that HOTs do not secure what Sydney Shoemaker has called ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ (IEM). I will argue that Rosenthal’s discussion of dissociative identity order fails to salvage his account from this objection and that his thin immunity principle is in tension with cases of somatoparaphrenia. Rather than showing that self-awareness consists in identification, an examination of the delusions of disownership found in dissociative identity disorder and somatoparaphrenia lends support to IEM and highlights an important distinction between perspectival ownership and personal ownership.

How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists

According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.

The Solution to the Mind-body Problem: The Complete Reduction of the Human Mind to Matter, Namely to the Brain

The mind-body problem asks about the specifics of the human mind and its interaction with the body. We will show that what makes the human mind unique is the advanced human language. We will illustrate that some mutations in Homo sapiens enabled us to develop a sophisticated language, which was the basis for the development of advanced abstract thinking. We will show how language and thinking are realized in the brain by neural connections. That leads to the conclusion that the human mind is our language-representing neural network, and can indeed be completely reduced to matter. Materialism and reductionism are true. Actually, the solution of the mind-body problem also explains human consciousness. Human consciousness is the ability of humans to include verbal thinking in conscious processing. A comparison shows that prominent theories of consciousness such as Global Workspace Theory (GWS), Higher Order Thought Theories (HOT) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) are a subset of our explanation. But all other theories are also applicable to animals with brain, miss the specifics of human consciousness and do not deliver an explanation on a neural level.

Unconscious higher-order thoughts (HOTs) as pre-reflective self-awareness?

Unconscious higher-order thoughts (HOTs) as pre-reflective self-awareness?