Higher Subjective Probabilities Research Articles

The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs

AbstractThere is a deep tension between logical and probabilistic norms of belief. This article illustrates the normative force that is associated with these frameworks by showing how rather unrestricted belief bases can be improved by undergoing logical and probabilistic reflection. It is argued that probabilistic reasoning accounts for the reliability of the conclusions one can draw from the beliefs. Most importantly, reliability commands us to care for the increasing uncertainty of conjunctions of beliefs. Deductive logic captures the agent's commitment towards all conclusions of her beliefs. In other words, it seems that commitment forces the agent to believe conclusions, which reliability tells her to view with scepticism. This conflict is resolved by arguing that commitment merely forces the agent to find the logical conclusions of her beliefs acceptable, not necessarily to believe them. This demands consistency but no deductive closure. Furthermore, it is shown that by restoring consistency, a straightforward connection between high subjective probability and full belief is undermined. Finally, the article delineates how this approach deals with the lottery paradox and the preface paradox.

Modeling cereal farmers’ intended and actual adoption of integrated crop management (ICM) practices

Integrated crop management (ICM) is a crop production system which conserves or even strengthens natural resources, taking into account potential interactions between biology, environment, and land management systems. However, little is known about what drives adoption of ICM among farmers. The purpose of this study was to analyze the intention and behavior of cereal farmers towards ICM practices, exploiting the theory of planned behavior (TPB) and information from a survey of 216 cereal farmers in Pars-Abad County of Ardabil Province in northwestern Iran. Common variables of the TPB, like attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, intention, and behavior were measured. On a scale from 1 to 5, the overall mean of farmers' behavior in applying ICM practices was 3.43, just above the average value of the scale (x = 3). The variable intention showed the highest mean score (3.62), indicating a relatively high subjective probability that farmers will adopt IPM practices, followed by perceived behavioral control (mean score 3.54), indicating a relatively high level of perceived ability of farmers to implement IPM practices. On the contrary, attitudes towards ICM showed the lowest mean score (3.20), indicating a rather neutral evaluation of ICM by farmers. Intention and perceived behavioral control accounted for 87% of the variability in farmers' behavior towards application of ICM. Subjective norms showed the greatest (direct and total) impact on farmers' intention to use ICM, while perceived behavioral control showed the greatest (direct and total) impact on farmers' behavior in ICM adoption. The study demonstrates for the first time the validity of the TPB in mapping farmers' behavior related to ICM adoption. In light of the main findings, promoting the adoption of ICM in the study area could be achieved by i) improving farmers' attitudes towards ICM technologies through demonstration farms and written material summarizing advantages of ICM, ii) promoting farmers’ subjective norms through group meetings with participation of those who experienced ICM and are trusted by farmers, and iii) promoting perceived behavioral control with training courses by ICM experts that can improve knowledge and skills of farmers to use ICM. • Farmers' intention and behavior towards ICM were analyzed with the theory of planned behavior (TPB). • The overall mean of farmers' behavior in applying ICM practices was 3.43, which was above average. • Intention showed the highest mean score, showing a high probability for adoption of IPM practices. • The study demonstrates the validity of the TPB in predicting farmers' behavior in ICM adoption.

The cost of capital in a prediction market

Prediction markets are financial markets that are crystalized by simplicity and rigor. We extend the analogy between capital markets and prediction markets by considering the “cost of capital” in a prediction market. A typical prediction market contract pays either $1 or zero at expiry, and a gambler-cum-investor attaches a subjective probability p to the contract expiring “in the money”. We consider how the gambler’s “discount rate”, or required rate of return, responds to changes in p. By applying utility theory or asset pricing theory, we find that risk-averse gamblers discount any contract with a high subjective probability of success (including the payoff from “shorting” a longshot) less heavily than a contract with a low probability, or longshot. This finding reveals a simple, rational explanation for the favorite-longshot bias.

The Effect of Myopic Behavior on Stock Market Risk Perception

We investigate whether myopic behavior influences respondents’ risk perception of future stock market returns. Using the 2012 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, we find that investors who are myopic (follow the stock market “very closely” or “somewhat closely”) are more likely to be in a higher subjective probability group that believes the market for blue chip stocks will drop by 20 percent or more next year. In addition, we find that older cohorts have a more accurate perception of future stock market returns compared to younger cohorts. Financial planning implications are provided.

Сила воображения и слабость датировки: о двух источниках искажений в автобиографической памяти

The article focuses on issues of autobiographical memory malleability which are of high relevance to forensic practice. Taking into account both single case report and mass studies we revealed that time is the weakest aspect of autobiographical recollection. Namely, dating of past event and ordering of event components are prone to memory distortion to the maximum extent. Paradoxically, it coincides with high confidence in accuracy of event recalled. Than we shifted to the most discussed in the relevant literature mechanism of memory transformation i.e. imagination inflation. This mechanism consists of mistaking just imagined event for a real one. We also noted that high subjective probability of imagined event and reliable source of misinformation make significant impact into memory transformation.

Creer que p. Consideraciones en torno a la creencia

Este artículo trata de profundizar en nuestra comprensión de la naturaleza de la creenciaen tanto que actitud proposicional. Tras contextualizar la cuestión, discutimos y rechazamosdiversas caracterizaciones de la creencia —como apuesta y como alta probabilidad subjetiva(cercana a 1)—, para acabar defendiendo que creer que p consiste meramente en atribuiruna mayor probabilidad subjetiva a p que a no-p —entendiendo no-p como cualquiera delas alternativas a p y a todas en su conjunto. Propondremos además que la pregunta a la quetrata de responder una creencia es fundamental para determinar el grado de creencia y lasrazones que cuentan a su favor.

Fear of Blushing: No Overestimation of Negative Anticipated Interpersonal Effects, But a High-Subjective Probability of Blushing

To explain blushing phobics’ fearful preoccupation with blushing, this study investigated the anticipated consequences of blushing when considering the interpersonal influences of displaying a blush. Using a vignette study approach, participants (N = 48, mean age 20.47, and SD 4.44) with variable levels of fear of blushing were instructed to imagine that they did or did not blush in several situations, and were asked to indicate their expectations of an observer’s judgment. Irrespective of their fear of blushing, participants generally attributed negative effects to their blush in these situations. This finding sustains the idea that people dislike blushing due to the anticipated influence of the blush on other’s judgments about the self, but does not support the idea that fear of blushing is fueled by an overestimation of these negative effects of blushing. Meanwhile, high-fearfuls did report a relatively high-subjective probability of displaying a blush in these situations. Expecting to blush in situations in which people generally anticipate that blushing elicits a negative observer’s judgment, may well contribute to blushing fearfuls’ preoccupation with blushing.

The effects of subjective survival on retirement and Social Security claiming

AbstractAccording to the life‐cycle model, mortality risk will influence both retirement and the desire to annuitize wealth. We estimate the effect of subjective survival probabilities on retirement and on the claiming of Social Security benefits because delayed claiming is equivalent to the purchase of additional Social Security annuities. We find that those with very low subjective probabilities of survival retire earlier and claim earlier than those with higher subjective probabilities, but the effects are not large. The great majority of workers claim as soon as they are eligible. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Effects of Subjective Survival on Retirement and Social Security Claiming

According to the life-cycle model, mortality risk will influence both retirement and the desire to annuitize wealth. We estimate the effect of subjective survival probabilities on retirement and on the claiming of Social Security benefits because delayed claiming is equivalent to the purchase of additional Social Security annuities. We find that those with very low subjective probabilities of survival retire earlier and claim earlier than those with higher subjective probabilities, but the effects are not large. The great majority of workers claim as soon as they are eligible.

The Disadvantages of Hindsight in the Perception of Suicide

Family, friends, and therapists of suicide victims often feel guilty because they think that they should have been able to predict, and possibly to prevent, the suicide. One possible explanation for this guilt is that, in hindsight, people often say that they would have assigned a higher subjective probability to an event than they actually would have before the event. To assess whether this cognitive distortion actually occurs in the instance of suicide, 131 subjects were asked to read a one-paragraph story that for half of the subjects included the fact that the heroine committed suicide, and then to complete a 20-item questionnaire that assessed their subjective assessment of the probability of the suicide and their reactions to the family Of the 20 items, 14 discriminated between the groups that either did or did not have knowledge of the suicide. As expected, “post hoc” subjects tended to overestimate the probability of suicide, and their reactions to the family were more negative. Dissemination of t...

On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals

T he circumstances in which it is natural to assert the ordinary indicative conditional If P then are those in which it is natural to assert Either not P or, P and and conversely. For instance, the circumstances in which it is natural to assert If it rains, the match will be cancelled are precisely those in which it is natural to assert Either it won't rain or, it will and the match will be cancelled. Similarly, the circumstances in which it is natural to assert Not both P and are precisely those in which it is natural to assert Either not P or not We explain the latter coincidence of assertion conditions by a coincidence of truth conditions. Why not do the same in the case of the conditional? Why that is, hold that If P then has the same truth conditions as Either not P or, P and Q? This hypothesis-given the standard and widely accepted truth functional treatments of not, or,5 and and-amounts to the Equivalence thesis: the thesis that (P Q) is equivalent to (P D Q). (I will use for the indicative conditional, reserving 0-* for the subjunctive or counterfactual conditional.) In this paper I defend a version of the Equivalence thesis. As a rule, our intuitive judgements of assertability match up with our intuitive judgements of probability, that is, S is assertable to the extent that it has high subjective probability for its assertor. Now it has been widely noted that when (P D Q) is highly probable but both and are not highly probable, it is proper to assert (P Q).1 The problem for the Equivalence thesis is to explain away the putative counter examples to -P e (P-Q)J and Q H (P -> the only too familiar cases where despite the high probability of or of Q. and so of (P D Q), (P -* Q) is

Dissonance, self-perception, and the perception of others: A study in Cognitive cognitive dissonance

Subjects were simultaneously involved participants in a dissonance experiment and observers of other participants. As involved subjects, those who expected to expend a great deal of effort preparing for a test which they might not have to take showed high subjective probability that they personally would take the test. As observer subjects answering the same question for the person seated three seats away, they showed no such respons veness to the manipulation of anticipated effort. The apparent demonstration of dissonance reduction by subjects who engaged in no overt behavior from which to infer their beliefs challanges Bem's (1965, 1967) self-perception interpretation of what others have regarded as dissonance reduction. The failure of observer subjects to duplicate the subjective probability responses of involved subjects under identical stimulus conditions poses further problems for Bem's self-perception model. The data suggest the subjective response to an aversive motivational state rather than simple selfperception.