High-level Personal Protective Equipment Research Articles

A bacteriophage-based validation of a personal protective equipment doffing procedure to be used with high-consequence pathogens.

To determine if the high-level personal protective equipment used in the treatment of high-consequence infectious diseases is effective at stopping the spread of pathogens to healthcare personnel (HCP) while doffing. Personal protective equipment (PPE) is fundamental to the safety of HCPs. HCPs treating patients with high-consequence infectious diseases use several layers of PPE, forming complex protective ensembles. With high-containment PPE, step-by-step procedures are often used for donning and doffing to minimize contamination risk to the HCP, but these procedures are rarely empirically validated and instead rely on following infection prevention best practices. A doffing protocol video for a high-containment PPE ensemble was evaluated to determine potential contamination pathways. These potential pathways were tested using fluorescence and genetically marked bacteriophages. The experiments revealed existing protocols permit contamination pathways allowing for transmission of bacteriophages to HCPs. Updates to the doffing protocols were generated based on the discovered contamination pathways. This updated doffing protocol eliminated the movement of viable bacteriophages from the outside of the PPE to the skin of the HCP. Our results illustrate the need for quantitative, scientific investigations of infection prevention practices, such as doffing PPE.

Multidisciplinary Simulation Training for Surgical Tracheostomy in Patients Mechanically Ventilated Secondary to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2.

A proportion of patients with coronavirus disease (COVID) and severe respiratory manifestations of disease will require admission to intensive care for intubation and ventilation. When anticipating prolonged ventilation, the patient may proceed to surgical tracheostomy to afford safe respiratory wean. As surgical tracheostomy is an aerosol-generating procedure, it poses a high risk of viral transmission and ultimately may prompt anxiety and caution in participating staff members. We aimed to mitigate these risks by providing staff with appropriate training and experience, to improve their confidence as well as practical ability. We developed a multidisciplinary simulation training experience and checklist in order to optimize team performance during the high-stakes procedure. We evaluated staff confidence before and after the training with questionnaires. Post-simulation, surgeons were more confident with donning the high level personal protective equipment, and nurses were more confident in performing their role. Simulation allows the multidisciplinary team an opportunity to practice high-risk procedures and prompts the team to assess staff knowledge base, troubleshoot queries, and teach roles and responsibilities in a safe environment. In the context of COVID-19, simulation encourages staff sense of preparedness and protection for true participation during a high-risk procedure.

A mixed-methods analysis of personal protective equipment used in Lassa fever treatment centres in Nigeria

SummaryBackgroundLassa fever (LF) is a viral haemorrhagic fever endemic in West Africa. Lassa virus is maintained in and spread to humans from rodents, with occasional secondary human-to-human transmission. Present recommendations for personal protective equipment (PPE) for care of patients with LF generally follow those for filovirus diseases. However, the need for such high-level PPE for LF, which is thought to be considerably less transmissible between humans than filoviruses, is unclear.AimIn Nigerian Lassa Treatment Centres (LTCs) we aimed to describe current PPE practices, identify barriers and facilitators to implementation of existing guidance, and assess healthcare workers' understanding. This would inform the development of future PPE guidelines for LF.MethodsWe performed a mixed-methods study, including short cross-sectional surveys of PPE used in LTCs, observations of practice, and in-depth interviews with key informants. We described the quantitative data and we conducted a thematic analysis of qualitative data.FindingsOur survey of 74 HCWs found that approximately half reported problems with recommended PPE. In three LTCs PPE was used highly variably. Full PPE, as recommended in Nigeria CDC guidelines, was used in less than a quarter (21%) of interactions. In-depth interviews suggested this was based on availability and HCWs' own risk assessments.ConclusionWithout specific guidance on Lassa, the current approach is both resource and labour-intensive, where these are both limited. This has led to low adherence by health care workers, whose own experience indicates lower risk. The evidence-base to inform PPE required for LF must be improved to inform a more tailored approach.

COVID-19 Is Altering the Landscape of Hospital-Acquired Infections

Providing inpatient care for patients with COVID-19 has required many operational adjustments (e.g., high-level personal protective equipment,

Association between personal protective equipment and SARS-CoV-2 infection risk in emergency department healthcare workers.

Background and importanceHealthcare personnel working in the emergency department (ED) is at risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-Cov-2). So far, it is unknown if the reported variety in infection rates among healthcare personnel is related to the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) or other factors.ObjectiveThe aim of this study was to investigate the association between PPE use and SARS-CoV-2 infections among ED personnel in the Netherlands.Design, setting and participantsA nationwide survey, consisting of 42 questions about PPE-usage, ED layout - and workflow and SARS-CoV-2 infection rates of permanent ED staff, was sent to members of the Dutch Society of Emergency Physicians. Members were asked to fill out one survey on behalf of the ED of their hospital. The association between PPE use and the infection rate was investigated using univariable and multivariable regression analyses, adjusting for potential confounders.Outcome measuresPrimary outcome was the incidence of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections among permanent ED staff between 1 March and 15 May 2020.ResultsSurveys were sent to 64 EDs of which 45 responded (70.3%). In total, 164 ED staff workers [5.1 (3.2–7.0)%] tested positive for COVID-19 during the study period compared to 0.087% of the general population. There was significant clustering of infected ED staff in some hospitals (range: 0–23 infection). In 13 hospitals, an FFP2 (filtering facepiece particles >94% aerosol filtration) mask or equivalent and eye protection was worn for all contacts with patients with suspected or confirmed SARS-CoV-2 during the whole study period. The unadjusted staff infection rate was higher in these hospitals [7.3 (3.4–11.1) vs. 4.0 (1.9–6.1)%, absolute difference + 3.3%]. Hospital staff testing policy was identified as a potential confounder of the relation between PPE use and confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections (collinearity statistic 0.95). After adjusting for hospital testing policy, type of PPE was not associated with incidence of COVID 19 infections among ED staff (P = 0.40).ConclusionIn this cross-sectional study, the use of high-level PPE (FFP2 or equivalent and eye protection) by ED personnel during all contacts with patients with suspected or confirmed SARS-CoV-2 does not seem to be associated with a lower infection rate of ED staff compared to lower level PPE use. Attention should be paid to ED layout and social distancing to prevent cross-contamination of ED personnel.

Factors affecting the mortality of patients with COVID-19 undergoing surgery and the safety of medical staff: A systematic review and meta-analysis.

BackgroundThe 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) can complicate the perioperative course to increase postoperative mortality in operative patients, and also is a serious threat to medical staff. However, studies summarizing the impact of COVID-19 on the perioperative mortality of patients and on the safety of medical staff are lacking.MethodsWe searched PubMed, Cochrane Library, Embase and Chinese database National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) with the search terms “COVID-19″ or “SARS-CoV-2″ and “Surgery” or “Operation” for all published articles on COVID-19 from December 1, 2019 to October 5, 2020.FindingsA total of 269 patients from 47 studies were included in our meta-analysis. The mean age of operative patients with COVID-19 was 50.91 years, and 49% were female. A total of 28 patients were deceased, with the overall mortality of 6%. All deceased patients had postoperative complications associated with operation or COVID-19, including respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), short of breath, dyspnea, fever, cough, fatigue or myalgia, cardiopulmonary system, shock/infection, acute kidney injury and severe lymphopenia. Patients who presented any or more of the symptoms of respiratory failure, ARDS, short of breath and dyspnea after operation were associated with significantly higher mortality (r = 0.891, p < 0.001), while patients whose symptoms were presented as fever, cough, fatigue or myalgia only demonstrated marginally significant association with postoperative mortality (r = 0.675, p = 0.023). Twenty studies reported the information of medical staff infection, and a total of 38 medical staff were infected, and medical staff who used biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) protective equipment did not get infected.InterpretationCOVID-19 patients, in particular those with severe respiratory complications, may have high postoperative mortality. Medical staff in close contact with infected patients is suggested to take high level personal protective equipment (PPE).FundingHeilongjiang postdoctoral scientific research developmental fund and the National Natural Science Foundation of China.

Self-Contamination and Failure Modes During PPE Doffing: A Comparison of Two Powered Air-Purifying Respirator Hoods

Background: High-level personal protective equipment (PPE) protects healthcare workers (HCWs) during the care of patients with serious communicable diseases. Doffing body fluid–contaminated PPE presents a risk of self-contamination. A study assessing HCW failure modes and self-contamination with viruses during PPE doffing found that, of all PPE items, the highest number of doffing failure modes and highest self-contamination risk occurred during removal of the 1-layer powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) hood. Hood type may affect contamination risk; however, no experimental evidence exists comparing hood types. Objective: We quantified and compared the risk of self-contamination with viruses during doffing of a 1e-layer versus a 2-layer PAPR hood. Methods: In this study, 8 HCWs with experience using high-level PPE donned PPE contaminated on 4 prespecified areas with 2 surrogate human viruses, bacteriophage MS2 (a nonenvelope virus) and Φ6 (an enveloped virus). They completed a clinical task then doffed PPE according to a standard protocol. Following doffing, inner gloves, hands, face, and scrubs were sampled for viral contamination using infectivity assays. HCWs performed the entire sequence twice, first with a 1-layer hood with 1 shroud then with a 2-layer hood with 2 shrouds. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used to compare viral contamination between the 2 hood types. HCWs were video-recorded to identify failure modes in their doffing process using a failure modes and effects analysis to identify ways that individual actions deviated from optimal behavior. Results: Φ6 transfer to hands, inner gloves, and scrubs were observed for 1 HCW using the 1-layer hood versus scrubs only for 1 HCW using the 2-layer hood. MS2 transfer to hands was observed for 2 HCWs using the 1-layer hood versus none using the 2-layer hood. Inner glove contamination was observed for 6 of 8 HCWs using the 1-layer hood versus 2 of 8 using the 2-layer hood. Conclusions: A significantly higher number of MS2 virus was recovered on the inner gloves of HCWs using the 1-layer versus the 2-layer hood (median difference, 2.27×104; P = .03). In addition, 31 failure modes were identified during removal of the 2-layer hood versus 13 failure modes for the 1-layer hood. The magnitude of self-contamination depends on the type of PAPR hood used. The 2-layer hood resulted in significantly less inner glove contamination than the 1-layer hood. However, more failure modes were identified during the doffing process for the 2-layer hood. In conclusion, the failure modes identified during the use of the 2-layer hood were less likely to result in self-contamination compared to the failure modes identified during use of the 1-layer hood.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Safety of aerosol‐generating procedures in COVID‐19 negative patients: binomial probability modelling of intubateCOVID registry data

A central response to the COVID-19 pandemic was to create NHS capacity in part by suspension of elective services, as has been described elsewhere [1]. Now that the pandemic's peak appears to have passed, attention has focused on restoring these services. Common to most hospital plans is the separation of patient pathways into COVID-19 test-positive (red) and test-negative (green) cohorts; patients in the latter also as a precaution having been in isolation for 14 days.

Legal Implications of Personal Protective Equipment Use When Treating Patients for COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2)

Front-line health care personnel, including anaesthetists, otolaryngologists, and other health professionals dealing with acute cases of coronavirus, face a high risk of infection and thus mortality. The scientific evidence establishes that to protect them, hospital protocols should require that wearing of the highest levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) be available for doctors and nurses performing aerosol-generating procedures, such as intubation, sputum induction, open suctioning of airways, bronchoscopy, etc. of COVID-19 patients. Although several international bodies have issued recommendations for a very high-level PPE to be used when these procedures are undertaken, the current PPE guidelines in Australia have tended to be more relaxed, and hospital authorities relying on them might not comply with legal obligations to their employee health care workers. Failure to provide high-level PPE in many hospitals is of concern for a large number of health care workers; this article examines the scientific literature on the topic and provides a legal perspective on hospital authorities' possible liability in negligence.

Legal Implications of Personal Protective Equipment Use When Treating Patients for COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2)

Front-line health care personnel, including anaesthetists, otolaryngologists, and other health professionals dealing with acute cases of coronavirus, face a high risk of infection and thus mortality. The scientific evidence establishes that to protect them, hospital protocols should require that wearing of the highest levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) be available for doctors and nurses performing aerosol-generating procedures, such as intubation, sputum induction, open suctioning of airways, bronchoscopy, etc. of COVID-19 patients. Although several international bodies have issued recommendations for a very high-level PPE to be used when these procedures are undertaken, the current PPE guidelines in Australia have tended to be more relaxed, and hospital authorities relying on them might not comply with legal obligations to their employee health care workers. Failure to provide high-level PPE in many hospitals is of concern for a large number of health care workers; this article examines the scientific literature on the topic and provides a legal perspective on hospital authorities’ possible liability in negligence.

Preparedness of personal protective equipment and implementation of new CPR strategies for patients with out-of-hospital cardiac arrest in the COVID-19 era

BackgroundIn February and March 2020, healthcare providers and citizens in Daegu, South Korea, experienced the onslaught of a large-scale community epidemic of COVID-19. This had a profound impact on patients who experienced out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA). MethodsWe conducted a retrospective observational study of 171 OHCA patients based on the multicenter WinCOVID registry. Demographic and clinical characteristics, overall survival, COVID-19 related data, as well as personal protective equipment (PPE) and resuscitation techniques used during the COVID-19 outbreak were evaluated and compared with outcomes from a 2018 historical cohort (n ​= ​158). ResultsAmong the interventions, high-level PPE was introduced and standard cardiopulmonary resuscitation was changed to chest compressions using mechanical devices. All OHCA patients were treated as confirmed or suspicious for COVID-19 regardless of symptoms. Furthermore, complete or partial closures of emergency centers and the number of medical personnel requiring self-isolation decreased in response to the introduction of isolated resuscitation units. However, the adjusted odds ratio and 95% confidence intervals for survival discharge and favorable neurologic outcome were 0.51 (0.25–0.97) and 0.45 (0.21–1.07) compared with those in the 2018 historical cohort. ConclusionsResponses to the COVID-19 pandemic included changes to current PPE strategies and introduction of isolated resuscitation units; the latter intervention reduced the number of unexpected closures and quarantines of emergency resources early on during the COVID-19 outbreak. Given the possibility of future outbreaks, we need to have revised resuscitation strategies and the capacity to commandeer emergency resources for OHCA patients.

Design Strategies for Biocontainment Units to Reduce Risk During Doffing of High-level Personal Protective Equipment.

BackgroundFew data exist to guide the physical design of biocontainment units, particularly the doffing area. This can impact the contamination risk of healthcare workers (HCWs) during doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE).MethodsIn phase I of our study, we analyzed simulations of a standard patient care task with 56 trained HCWs focusing on doffing of high-level PPE. In phase II, using a rapid cycle improvement approach, we tested different balance aids and redesigned doffing area layouts with 38 students. In phase III, we tested 1 redesigned layout with an additional 10 trained HCWs. We assessed the effectiveness of design changes on improving the HCW performance (measured by occurrence and number of risky behaviors) and reducing the physical and cognitive load by comparing the results from phase I and phase III.ResultsThe physical load was highest when participants were removing their shoe covers without any balance aid; the use of a chair required the lowest physical effort, followed by horizontal and vertical grab bars. In the revised design (phase III), the overall performance of participants improved. There was a significant decrease in the number of HCW risky behaviors (P = .004); 5 risky behaviors were eliminated and 2 others increased. There was a significant decrease in physical load when removing disposable shoe covers (P = .04), and participants reported a similar workload in the redesigned doffing layout (P = .43).ConclusionsThrough optimizing the design and layout of the doffing space, we reduced risky behaviors of HCWs during doffing of high-level PPE.

Common Behaviors and Faults When Doffing Personal Protective Equipment for Patients With Serious Communicable Diseases.

BackgroundThe safe removal of personal protective equipment (PPE) can limit transmission of serious communicable diseases, but this process poses challenges to healthcare workers (HCWs).MethodsWe observed 41 HCWs across 4 Ebola treatment centers in Georgia doffing PPE for simulated patients with serious communicable diseases. Using human factors methodologies, we obtained the details, sequences, and durations of doffing steps; identified the ways each step can fail (failure modes [FMs]); quantified the riskiness of FMs; and characterized the workload of doffing steps.ResultsEight doffing steps were common to all hospitals—removal of boot covers, gloves (outer and inner pairs), the outermost garment, the powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) hood, and the PAPR helmet assembly; repeated hand hygiene (eg, with hand sanitizer); and a final handwashing with soap and water. Across hospitals, we identified 256 FMs during the common doffing steps, 61 of which comprised 19 common FMs. Most of these common FMs were above average in their riskiness at each hospital. At all hospitals, hand hygiene, removal of the outermost garment, and removal of boot covers were above average in their overall riskiness. Measurements of workload revealed that doffing steps were often mentally demanding, and this facet of workload correlated most strongly with the effortfulness of a doffing step.ConclusionsWe systematically identified common points of concern in protocols for doffing high-level PPE. Addressing FMs related to hand hygiene and the removal of the outermost garment, boot covers, and PAPR hood could improve HCW safety when doffing high-level PPE.We identified ways that doffing protocols for high-level personal protective equipment may fail to protect healthcare workers. Hand hygiene, removing the outermost garment, boot covers, and respirator hood harbored the greatest risk and failed in similar ways across different hospitals.

A State of Biopreparedness

Introduction:Westmead Hospital (WMH) recognized gaps in its preparedness to respond to the Ebola 2014 outbreak in West Africa. A fragmented system was identified. A ‘State of Bio-preparedness’ project team convened to discuss all healthcare services in the planning, training, and implementation of a biopreparedness response.Methods:A survey targeting the staff’s competence and confidence in biologically hazardous infection management was conducted. Semi-structured interviews explored staff members’ experiences and perspectives of biopreparedness response. The collaborative team called “State of Biopreparedness” (SOB) was assembled and a clinical practice improvement project was undertaken. To assess readiness, nine simulated Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF) exercises involving staff and consumers were conducted. These exercises were debriefed by the multidisciplinary committee and themes and issues were identified. These nine simulation drills then assessed readiness and evaluated performance.Results:A number of consistent issues continue to emerge including: 1.A standard communication pathway for notification was needed - use of the incident paging system (111 pages) to notify the hospital’s incident management team.2.A consistent and coordinated approach to the training and maintenance of standardized and high-level Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) protocols for frontline clinical and clinical staff was required.3.Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities and supporting these roles by translating the VHF Control Guideline and policy into task cards and checklists.4.Strengthening intra- and interdepartmental staff collaboration and communication.5.Infection control measures to be taken by staff after identifying a patient with possible VHF to reduce the risk of transmission of disease to staff, other patients, and visitors.Discussion:Integrating disaster management processes with clinical protocols had a positive impact on the hospital’s biopreparedness response. Simulation exercises were a vital and practical way for staff to feel confident and competent to perform their roles.

Proactive Risk Assessment for Ebola-Infected Patients: A Systematic Approach to Identifying and Minimizing Risk to Healthcare Personnel.

Performing patient care while wearing high-level personal protective equipment presents risks to healthcare providers. Our failure mode effects analysis identified 81 overall risks associated with providing hygienic care and linen change to a patient with continuous watery stool. Implementation of checklists and scheduled pauses could potentially mitigate 76.5% of all risks. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2016;37:867-871.

Beyond Traditional Biosafety

Beyond Traditional Biosafety

Insufficient preparedness of primary care practices for pandemic influenza and the effect of a preparedness plan in Japan: a prefecture-wide cross-sectional study

BackgroundCases of emerging infectious diseases, including H5N1 influenza, H7N9 influenza, and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, have been reported in recent years, and the threat of pandemic outbreaks persists. In Japan, primary care is the frontline against emerging infectious diseases in communities. Although the importance of pandemic preparedness in primary care has been highlighted previously, few studies have thus far investigated the preparedness among primary care practices (PCPs) or differences in the preparedness of different institutional settings. We examined PCP preparedness and response to the 2009 influenza pandemic in Japan, and explored the role of a pandemic preparedness plan during the pandemic.MethodsWe used a survey questionnaire to assess how well individual PCPs in Okinawa, Japan, were prepared for the 2009 influenza pandemic. The questionnaire was mailed to all eligible PCPs (N = 465) in Okinawa, regardless of their institutional setting. In addition, we assessed the differences in the preparedness of clinics and hospitals and determined whether the national preparedness plan affected individual preparedness and response. Data were analyzed using descriptive and logistic regression analyses.ResultsA total of 174 (37.4%) PCPs responded to our survey. In general, high-level personal protective equipment (PPE) such as N95 masks (45.4%), gowns (30.5%), and eye protection (21.3%) was stocked at a low rate. Clinic-based PCPs were significantly less prepared than hospital-based PCPs to provide N95 masks (OR 0.34), gowns (OR 0.15), and eye protection (OR 0.18). In addition, only 32.8% of PCPs adopted an adequate business continuity plan (BCP). After controlling for institutional setting, reading the national preparedness plan was significantly associated with establishment of a BCP (OR 5.86), and with knowledge of how to transfer a swab specimen to a local medical laboratory (OR 5.60).ConclusionsWith regard to PPE availability, PCPs (especially clinic-based PCPs) were not adequately prepared for the influenza pandemic. Awareness of the national pandemic preparedness plan is likely to promote prefecture-wide implementation of BCPs and surveillance activity.

Personal Protective Equipment Management and Policies: European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases Data from 48 Isolation Facilities in 16 European Countries

To collect data about personal protective equipment (PPE) management and to provide indications for improving PPE policies in Europe. Descriptive, cross-sectional survey. Data were collected in 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries nominated by National Health Authorities for the management of highly infectious diseases (HIDs). Data were collected through standardized checklists at on-site visits during February-November 2009. Indications for adequate PPE policies were developed on the basis of a literature review, partners' expert opinions, and the collected data. All facilities have procedures for the selection of PPE in case of HID, and 44 have procedures for the removal of PPE. In 40 facilities, different levels of PPE are used according to a risk assessment process, and in 8 facilities, high-level PPE (e.g., positive-pressure complete suits or Trexler units) is always used. A fit test is performed at 25 of the 40 facilities at which it is applicable, a seal check is recommended at 25, and both procedures are used at 17. Strategies for promoting and monitoring the correct use of PPE are available at 42 facilities. In case of a sudden increase in demand, 44 facilities have procedures for rapid supply of PPE, whereas 14 facilities have procedures for decontamination and reuse of some PPE. Most isolation facilities devote an acceptable level of attention to PPE selection and removal, strategies for the promotion of the correct use of PPE, and ensuring adequate supplies of PPE. Fit test and seal check procedures are still not widely practiced. Moreover, policies vary widely between and within European countries, and the development of common practice procedures is advisable.

Virus shedding and environmental deposition of novel A (H1N1) pandemic influenza virus: interim findings

Background The relative importance of different routes of influenza transmission, including the role of bioaerosols, and ability of masks and/or hand hygiene to prevent transmission, remains poorly understood. Current evidence suggests that infectious virus is not typically released from adults after 5 days of illness, however, little is known about the extent to which virus is deposited by infected individuals into the environment and whether deposited virus has the ability to infect new hosts. Further information about the deposition of viable influenza virus in the immediate vicinity of patients with pandemic influenza is fundamental to our understanding of the routes and mechanisms of transmission. Objectives To collect data on patients infected with pandemic H1N1 2009 (swine flu). Primary objectives were to correlate the amount of virus detected in a patient’s nose with that recovered from his/her immediate environment, and with symptom duration and severity. Secondary objectives were to describe virus shedding and duration according to major patient characteristics: adults versus children, and those with mild illness (community patients) versus those with more severe disease (hospitalised patients). Methods Adults and children, both in hospital and from the community, who had symptoms of pandemic H1N1 infection, were enrolled and visited every day during follow-up for a maximum of 12 days. Symptom data was collected and samples were taken, including nose swabs and swabs from surfaces and objects around patients. Samples of air were obtained using validated sampling equipment. The samples were tested for the presence of pandemic H1N1 virus, using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to detect virus genome and an immunofluorescence technique to detect viable virus. Results Forty-three subjects were followed up, and 19 of them were subsequently proven to be infected with pandemic H1N1 virus. The median duration of virus shedding from the 19 infected cases was 6 days when detection was performed by PCR, and 3 days when detection was performed by a culture technique. Over 30% of cases remained potentially infectious for at least 5 days. Only 0.5% of all community and none of the hospital swabs taken revealed virus on surfaces. Five subjects had samples of the air around them collected and virus was detected by PCR from four; some of the air particles in which virus was detected were small enough to be inhaled and deposited deep in the lungs. Limitation Small number of subjects recruited. Conclusions The finding that over 30% of infected individuals have infectious virus in their noses for 5 days or more has infection control implications. The data suggest that contact transmission of pandemic influenza via fomites may be less important than previously thought, but transmission via bioaerosols at short range may be possible, meaning that high-level personal protective equipment may be needed by health-care workers when attending patients with pandemic influenza. Further work is being undertaken to consolidate these findings, as they have important potential implications for the protection of health-care workers and the formulation of advice to households, nationally and internationally.

Personal protective equipment in an influenza pandemic: a UK simulation exercise

There is limited experience of both operational and financial impacts that adoption of UK pandemic influenza infection control guidance will have on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), patients and staff. We attempted to assess these issues from a live exercise in a hospital in north-west England. During this 24h exercise, all staff on an acute general medical ward wore PPE and adopted the procedures described in the UK pandemic influenza infection control guidance. Teams of infection control nurses observed and recorded staff behaviour and practice throughout the exercise, including staff attitudes towards the use of PPE. Although World Health Organization recommendations on the likely use of high-level PPE (FFP3 respirators) proved to be excessive, more gloves and surgical masks were used than expected. Despite pre-exercise training, many staff lacked confidence in using PPE and following infection control measures. They found PPE uncomfortable, with even basic tasks taking longer than usual. Large quantities of clinical waste were generated: an additional 12 bags (570 L) per day. The estimates of PPE usage within this exercise challenge assumptions that large amounts of high-level PPE are required, with significant implications for healthcare budgets. A programme of ongoing infection control education is needed. Healthcare in a pandemic situation is not simply a case of applying pandemic influenza infection control guidance to current practice; hospitals need to consider changing the way care and services are delivered.