Heterodox Economist Research Articles

Modelling in the Case of a Heterodox Economist: Success and Failure of Michał Kalecki

The author proposes to look at the work of M. Kalecki through the lens of the history of economic thought informed by the methodology of economics, by applying to this aim a meta-economic model suggested by U. Mäki, enhanced with additional features. On the basis of the review of the main works of Kalecki, he finds that we cannot ascribe to his works virtually any of the factors proposed by Mäki as explanation of orthodox economic modelling failure. If it is so, the question may be asked why a more correct economic modelling based on the Kalecki’s theory and post-Keynesian theories has not been recognized as successful. It seems that the mainstream economics is an informal institution, yet strengthened by formal rules, which is unforgiving to heterodox economists. Kalecki seems to have been a paradigmatic case of a successful academic heterodox economist, author of significant innovations in the analyses of capitalism, socialism, and the intermediate regimes, all of which were ultimately rejected by the dominant social forces of the day, signalling ‘modelling failure’ in all academic and policy-institutional contexts. If that is indeed the case, then Mäki’s model fails to provide an explanation of modelling failure in economics.

Alternatives

Internationally known economist Dr. John Loxley passed away suddenly on July 28, 2020. In this article, we pay tribute to him, a proud heterodox economist and a rare scholar who believed in the importance of sharing his knowledge and talents with people working on the ground to build a more equitable world. John, a faculty member in the University of Manitoba Department of Economics for 43 years, was the recipient of many awards and is known for building a bridge between academia and community.

Joan Robinson Was the First Bastard Keynesian: There Is No ‘Perhaps’

Joan Robinson Was the First Bastard Keynesian: There Is No ‘Perhaps’

One Hundred Years After Keynes Published His a Treatise on Probability in 1921, Edgeworth’s Two Reviews Still Stand Out As Being Vastly Superior to the Assessments Made by Any Other Economist: All Heterodox Economists Reject the Unanimous Conclusion, Made by All Philosophers, That Keynes Hinted at or Suggested or Had a Notion About an Interval Valued Theory of Probability in

F Y Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability, as presented in his A Treatise on Probability, among economists in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I. The major problem confronting any economist, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability ,is the unfortunate fact that there is no economist, with the one exception of Edgeworth, who has read beyond chapters 1-4, plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This includes practically every heterodox economist who has written on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, such as R. Skidelsky, D. Moggridge, R.O’Donnell, A. Carabelli , V. Chick, S.Dow, G.Meeks, J.B.Davis, A. Fitzgibbons, E.R Weintraub, J . Runde, T. Winslow, C. McCann, Jr., T .Lawson ,G. Fioretti, P. Davidson, D. Dequech,and many more. The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one path currently available to economists who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. Such a reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. The economists’ claim that Keynes’s discussions in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability were only about Keynes’s alleged ordinal theory of probability directly clash with the conclusions of every philosopher who has written on the A Treatise on Probability, since all philosophers support the conclusion that Keynes was suggesting or hinting at the use of an interval theory of probability in Chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability.

A Study of the Many, Many Conflicting ‘Tower of Babel’-Like Interpretations of Part I of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Made by Heterodox Economists: None of These ‘Interpretations’ Deal With Parts II-V of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability

The failure of all heterodox economists to read Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability, especially Part II, since Part III depends on Part II and Part V depends on Part III, explains the many, many different and conflicting types of probabilities that are climes to exist in the A Treatise on Probability, as well as the many, many different definitions of uncertainty concocted by ignorant heterodox economists whose work directly contradicts and conflicts with Keynes’s explicit definitions of uncertainty in the A Treatise on Probability on pp.309-315 and in the General Theory on pages 148 and 240, definitions which Keynes himself reemphasized and reinforced to H. Townshend in their correspondence in 1937 and 1938. A reading of this correspondence leads directly to the rejection of all current claims made about so called different types of probabilities (non comparable, non numerical, non measurable, incommensurable, unknown, ordinal, comparative, qualitative, rank ordered, etc.) and uncertainty (fundamental uncertainty, irreducible uncertainty, reducible uncertainty, strong uncertainty, weak uncertainty, genuine uncertainty, deep uncertainty, radical uncertainty, nonergodic, etc.) by any and all heterodox economists, whose different, differing and conflicting discussions lead to a rambling, incoherent and incomprehensible chaos of babble that makes even the possibility of rational discussion an impossibility. What accounts for this baffling, bewildering, befuddling and puzzling situation? There are three answers. The first answer is the reliance of all heterodox economists on the many, many false claims made by Richard B. Braithwaite that were published by D. Moggridge and Elizabeth Johnson as the Introduction to CWJMK, Volume 8, edition of the A treatise on Probability. This edition has been required reading for any and all undergraduate and graduate students in the departments of economics and philosophy at Cambridge University, who express an interest in working on Keynes’s theory of probability or economics, since its appearance in 1973. The second answer is that no heterodox economist has ever read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. The third is the queer, bizarre belief that an 18 year old teenage boy genius, Frank Ramsey, showed up at Cambridge University in 1921 and convinced Keynes to acknowledge that his logical theory of probability was riddled with error and conflicts by 1922, which Keynes formally acknowledged in 1931. All three reasons are self reinforcing. In early January, 1981, one of my dissertation supervisors, who had actually worked with and under Keynes in 1944 and 1945, asked me to deal with Braithwaite’s introduction as a preliminary defense of my dissertation topic for him alone. I agreed and xeroxed chapters 15-17 of Keynes’s book,as well as the two Edgeworth reviews, Bertrand Russell review, CD Broad’s review and the crushing Edwin Bidwell Wilson paper, published in 1934 in JASA, acknowledging that Keynes's book was built on interval valued probability using two numbers, a lower bound and an upper bound, and that this was what Keynes meant by uncertainty, although Wilson stated that he did not understand how there could be missing data or information and why uncertainty would matter or be important. The upshot was that this supervisor agreed to allow my dissertation to proceed now that he could see, but not follow or understand the mathematical analysis, that Keynes’s theory was based on inexact measurement and approximation. He also told me that he would write to Braithwaite , send him the materials that I had given him for comment, and pass those comments on to me for use in my dissertation. No reply or comments were ever passed on to me during the time I was doing my dissertation. Of course, I knew that Braithwaite would not comment in any letter on the materials sent to him for comment because they completely demolished and destroyed the entire intellectual foundation and edifice for his introduction to the 1973 CWJMK ‘s edition of A Treatise on Probability. The materials also demonstrated that Ramsey had never understood Keynes’s theory, and showed that neither Braithwaite nor Ramsey had ever read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. All that I was told was that there were two students at Cambridge also pursuing dissertations on Keynes and the A treatise on Probability. It will be quite impossible for any heterodox economist to ever grasp Keynes’s theory until Part II of the A treatise on Probability is read and it is recognized that Keynes’s “mysterious, mystical nonnumerical non comparable probabilities, nonmeasurable probabilities and incommensurable probabilities are just interval valued probabilities.

Structural change and financial instability in the US economy

The international financial crisis triggered by the 2007 subprime loan crisis in the US continues to casts a shadow over the world economy and has prompted renewed attention to the financial instability hypothesis proposed by the heterodox economist Hyman P. Minsky. This study presents a macrodynamic model that examines the structural changes and the instability of confidence affecting a dynamic system. We demonstrate that an unstable economic structure and a high instability of confidence make the system unstable. In addition, we conduct a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to examine structural changes in the US economy, particularly in the late 1990s. Our analysis strongly indicates that the US economic structure has been transubstantiated since the late 1990s. The instability of confidence was very high after the subprime loan crisis and has directly affected investment since then.

Heterodox economics as seen by Geoffrey Hodgson: an assessment*

Geoffrey Hodgson has recently published a book where he wonders why heterodox economics seems to thrive while at the same time losing ground within the most prestigious universities. Although Hodgson considers himself to be a heterodox economist, he complains about the way heterodoxy has been defined by some of its most active thinkers, in particular Frederic Lee and Tony Lawson. Hodgson believes that heterodox economics should be defined neither by a left-leaning ideology nor by critical realism. He argues that too much energy has been devoted to the study of macroeconomics by the Marxist and post-Keynesian brands of heterodox economics, as they left aside what he believes to be the crucial issue of microeconomic behaviour which can be found in behavioural and evolutionary economics. Hodgson further argues that what he considers to be the decline in the impact of heterodox economics is partly due to a lack of quality control. The paper outlines and comments on these various assertions.

Comparing Orthodox (N. G. Mankiw) and Heterodox (M. Zafirovski) Economist Views of Adam Smith, the Invisible Hand of the Market, and Laissez Faire: Both Views Completely Overlook the Very Severe Detrimental Impacts on the Macro Economy Created by Smith’s Upper Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors

The degree to which Adam Smith’s view, that the opulence of any nation at the macro level was the result of, and was determined by, large numbers of “sober” people practicing the Virtue of Prudence, which Smith demonstrated in Part VI of the Sixth Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790 was connected to the practice of the other Virtues of Self Command( a combination of Temperance and Courage combined), Justice and Benevolence, was ever understood by any economist was severely questioned by Gavin Kennedy in the 21st century. Kennedy argued, in his books, journal articles, and Blog, titled “Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy”, that practically no living economist understood Smith’s approach. This can be confirmed by analyzing the assessment of Adam Smith made by a highly recognized Orthodox economist, N. Gregory Mankiw, and the assessment made by a highly recognized Heterodox economist, Milan Zafirovski. Both authors agree completely that Smith’s views of the economic process were based on some kind of rational economic man concept, which resulted in Smith’s promulgation of his doctrine of The Invisible Hand of the Market leading to the need for Laissez Faire policies, which, with a few exceptions, would result in private self(ish) interest being turned into a social maximum that benefited all. Kennedy simply pointed out that Smith’s extensive and detailed discussions of the economic damages done by Upper-Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors required the government to impose preventive measures, laws, sanctions, and penalties against this category of powerful private citizens in order to prevent severe detrimental impacts such as depressions and inflations from hurting the sober people. Needless to say, there are no discussions about such a group of people in either Mankiw’s account or Zafirovski’s account. The conclusion reached is the same as the conclusion reached by G. Kennedy-there is no current economist who understands what it was that Adam Smith was stating led to the wealth and opulence of nations.

Trespassing for mobilities. Operational directions for addressing mobile lives

Transport geography and mobilities studies share the same object of study – mobility - which nonetheless has been differently conceptualized by the two disciplinary fields. This difference impacts their analytical, interpretative and operational approaches as well as their actual contribution to transport planning, so that despite their proximity, mobility studies and transport geography still appear as bordering disciplinary fields. To deal with concerns that affect the way we address urban mobility issues, the paper suggests putting into practice what the heterodox economist Albert Hirschman famously called trespassing, as a tactic to cross disciplinary boundaries and progress with some puzzles through detours and forays into other fields. In doing so, the paper aims at exploring how trespassing enhances the way mobilities studies and transport geography may usefully cross-fertilize each other and enhance operational responses to mobility issues, by analysing the conceptual and operational innovations that could benefit from such a reciprocal interchange. To discuss forms of significant trespassing for mobilities, the paper proposes to detect and address emerging forms of everyday mobility, taking long distance commuters (LDC) in the Milan Urban Region as an example. Here, trespassing allows the merging of quantitative and qualitative datasets to understand the articulated nature of this and other forms of contemporary mobilities. Working on the interpretative and operational challenges posed by these emerging mobilities that question key principles of the traditional ‘utilitarian approach’ to transport planning, the paper discusses the conceptual, analytical and operational directions along which trespassing may be developed.

Keynes’s Method Has Nothing to Do With a Common Discourse or Ordinary Language Logic: Keynes’s Method, Which Involved the Use of Inexact Measurement in Probability and Statistics, Based on Approximation, Was Based Directly on Boole’s Mathematical Logic and Algebra

It is impossible to correctly grasp Keynes’s method of analysis in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 if the work of G Boole is ignored. Unfortunately, all Post Keynesian, Institutionalist and Heterodox economists , who have published work on Keynes in the 20th and 21st centuries, have done just that. George Boole, and not J M Keynes in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability, put forth the first technically advanced mathematical and logical treatment of a logical theory of probability in 1854 in his The Laws of Thought that was based on a logic of propositions about events or outcomes and not the events or outcomes themselves. This logic is a mathematical logic and has absolutely nothing to do with an ordinary discourse human logic, which involves the use of a common sense language between humans. Given that Keynes built his A Treatise on Probability directly on the mathematical and logical approach and foundation of G Boole’s Boolean algebra and logic, it is simply impossible for Keynes’s approach in his A Treatise on Probability to have been based on a logic of ordinary language as claimed by Carabelli (1985, 1988, 2003), Chick (1998), and Chick and Dow (2001). Keynes is supposed to have had some kind of unique, unclear and peculiar approach to analysis based on intuition that can’t be discerned, according to Anna Carabelli (1985, 1988, 2003) and other heterodox economists. Carabelli argues that Keynes was anti-logicist, anti-empiricist, anti-positivist, anti-rationalist, and anti-formalist in his method, as well as being anti-mathematical. It is quite impossible for Keynes to have opposed all of these positions and still write Parts II and V of the A Treatise on Probability, which provide formal, mathematical, and logicist underpinnings to his approach of Inexact measurement and Approximation that leads directly to Keynes’s specification of lower and upper bounds on all probabilities and outcomes except for areas of application involving his Principle of Indifference and relative frequencies that have passed an application of the Lexis-Q test (exploratory data analysis and /or goodness of fit tests). Keynes’s inductive logic of Part III of the A Treatise on Probability is built directly on the method of inexact measurement and approximation of Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. This involves Keynes’s use of a modified version of Boole’s Problem X that he solved on pp.192-194 of the A Treatise on Probability and used on pp.234-237 and 254-257. Keynes’s development of the concept of finite probability, applicable to both numerical and non numerical probabilities, was a necessary prerequisite for understanding Keynes’s work in Part III on induction and analogy. Given Keynes’s work on the relationship between probability and induction in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability it is impossible for Keynes to have been a rationalist, as claimed by R.O.Donnell. Keynes’s work in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability is then a prerequisite for his work in Part V of the A Treatise on Probability. We can now see that it is impossible to grasp Keynes’s work in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability unless Part II of the A Treatise on Probability is understood and it is not possible to grasp Part V unless Part III of the A Treatise on Probability has been digested. Heterodox economists, in general, study only chapter III of Part I of the A Treatise on Probability. No Heterodox economist has ever studied Part II of the A Treatise on Probability.

Ontology and the history of economic thought: the case of anti-reductionism in the work of Friedrich Hayek

Tony Lawson has long advocated an ‘ontological turn’ in the history of economic thought. This essay aims to contribute towards that goal by considering how one aspect of the methodology adopted by a prominent heterodox economist was informed by ontological considerations. The economist is Friedrich Hayek, the aspect of his methodology concerns the possibility of reductionism, while the ontological category that informs his anti-reductionist methodology—though not, as we shall see, in a wholly consistent way—is that of ‘emergence’. The account presented below suggests that the notion of emergence played an increasingly important, and also increasingly explicit, role in the arguments Hayek mounts against reductionism in his postwar work on theoretical psychology and social theory. In the case of his theoretical psychology, notwithstanding the fact that he had access to a set of concepts that afforded him the opportunity to mount an emergentist case against reductionism, Hayek’s most prominent argument against reductionism was, and remained, computational—rather than emergentist—in nature. In the case of his mature, post-1960 social theory, however, Hayek explicitly advanced a consistently ‘emergentist’ case against reductionism, based on the importance of organising relations for the generation of higher-level structural properties such as the coordinative powers of the liberal market economy. The implications of this ontologically informed discussion of Hayek’s arguments against reductionism for existing interpretations of Hayek’s work are considered.

Fred Lee, the Industrial Workers of the World, and Heterodox Economics

A relationship exists between the political orientation and program of the Industrial Workers of the World and the attempt to forge a “heterodox economics.” In past years, such a relationship was best exemplified by the work of Thorstein Veblen. In the current period, the individual best representing this relationship is Fred Lee, a member of the IWW and a leading heterodox economist.

Frederic S. Lee and His Fight for the Future of Heterodox Economics

Frederic S. Lee (1949-2014) was a dedicated captain of the heterodox economics movement over the past thirty years. In the course of his unfaltering fight for the future of heterodox economics, Lee contributed to both the development of heterodox microeconomic theory and the establishment of a global community of heterodox economists. This short tribute delineates Lee’s unique and important contribution, which should be remembered and renewed. As a heterodox microeconomist, Lee challenged the neoclassical price mechanism that is theoretically incoherent and empirically invalid. At the same time, he was critical of any heterodox theory that does not add to our understanding of how the capitalist economy actually works. He urged heterodox economists to build a better theory, which goes beyond the conventional micro-macro divide, to question the status quo of capitalism by examining underlying causal mechanisms and agency, and to communicate with others in different theoretical traditions in order to make heterodox economics more pluralistic and integrative. At the same time, he fought tirelessly to build institutions under the conviction that the future of heterodox economics lies in the strategic (and unselfish) actions of present heterodox economist. JEL: B50, D01, D40

Ontology and the History of Economic Thought: The Case of Anti-Reductionism in the Work of Friedrich Hayek

Tony Lawson has long advocated an ‘ontological turn’ in the history of economic thought. This essay aims to contribute towards that goal by considering how one aspect of the methodology adopted of a prominent heterodox economist was informed by ontological considerations. The economist is Friedrich Hayek, the aspect of his methodology concerns the possibility of reductionism, while the ontological category that informs his anti-reductionist methodology — though not, as we shall see, in a wholly consistent way — is that of ‘emergence.’ The account presented above suggests that the notion of emergence played an increasingly important, and also increasingly explicit, role in the arguments Hayek mounts against reductionism in his postwar work on theoretical psychology and social theory. In the case of his theoretical psychology, notwithstanding the fact that he had access to a set of concepts that afforded him the opportunity to mount an emergentist case against reductionism Hayek’s most prominent argument against reductionism was, and remained, computational — rather than emergentist — in nature. In the case of his mature, post-1960 social theory, however, Hayek explicitly advanced a consistently ‘emergentist’ case against reductionism, based on the importance of organising relations for the generation of higher-level structural properties such as the coordinative powers of the liberal market economy. The implications of this ontologically-informed discussion of Hayek’s arguments against reductionism for existing interpretations of Hayek’s work are considered.

Time Time Time

If you were a neoclassical economist, the most dominant strategy to maximize your life would be to know or control you point of death and spend your last penny the minute before exodus, according to the standard neoclassical rules. However, if you are human and heterodox economist, you realize, the world does not function this way. If it were efficient to know your point of death, evolution would have found a biological way to program a conscientious knowledge of the point of death in human. It is the miracle of life that our last day remains unknown and this unknown point of cessation creates opportunity to care beyond one’s own life span. Life is not a zero-sum game discounted from your point of death, but also the length of time having lived, so the past, shapes our discounting. The following paper argues that general discounting theory is always forward looking but never considers how your past experiences, call it learning, as well as the length of your life passed, may stretch the focus of discounting. Adopting a theory that explains discounting beyond one’s prospective time of death and integrating the notion of past time of being stretching the focus of social care may help explaining why young people, who have a rather narrow past time horizon, are more prone to engage in myopic behavior (e.g., take drugs, save less), whereas older people whose discounting may draw on a long history of past experiences, tend to engage in discounting beyond their prospective natural existence and embrace long-term social care (e.g., for climate stability, charity for future generations). Overall, finding the miracle of life in an unknown point of death is a novel heterodox strategy to explain discounting behavior in a real-world relevant way. Pointing at the necessity to include one’s own history and experience into standard neoclassical economic discounting theory, spearheads heterodox economics by opening a detected black box of forward-looking discounting behavioral economics’ decision making fallibility predicaments. Shedding light on the importance of integrating backward looking aspects in discounting and the temporal locus determining a diversified range of experiences setting the stage for future social care beyond one’s own existence will grant opportunities to imbue intergenerational equity in mankind.

Michel Foucault and the history of economic thought

Michel Foucault dedicated a significant part of his works to the study of political economy. In the late 1980s, these analyses attracted the interest of historians of economic thought (Amariglio, 1988, 1900; Birken, 1990). The primary purpose of this article is to provide a review survey of Foucault’s reception among historians of economic thought. Reading and interpreting Foucault is not straightforward. In reflecting on his work, Foucault refused to consider himself an “author” who could be characterized by a single, consistent framework. However, he elaborated a coherent historiographical method which we characterize as politically engaged journalism. The principles of that method allow us to identify two common confusions in interpretations of Foucault’s work. First, advocates of Foucault in the history of economic thought literature consider him a “heterodox economist” who would be opposed to “mainstream economics”. However, Foucault did not intend to criticize economic theories in this particular sense. The second source of confusion involves interpreting Foucault as a sociologist interested in the analysis of power, or a social historian, although he rejected context-based historiographical approaches. We would suggest that Foucault she be considered more a “postmodernist philosopher” than a historian of economic thought per se. In this respect, the association of “Foucauldian theory” with postmodernism is a major distortion in his reception by historians of economic thought.

The southern question in the Graziani's thought

This paper shows that there is a unitary aspects in Graziani’s works on Southern question: the idea that is necessary to supplement the economics aspects that in different period have determined the policies toward Mezzogiorno with an analysis that explains the dynamic of Southern Italian social structure. The conclusion of Graziani is that the dominance in the South of social groups which are not interested in the process of industrialization is the main factor which prevents the Mezzogiorno from making further progress on the way of development. This paper examines also if there is an empirical evidence in the period 1951-2005 to support the Graziani dependent economy model. The paper shows that such evidence exists only from the period 1951-75. The conclusion of the paper is that the approach to Southern question made after 1980, Graziani an heterodox economist relative dominant thought but that his ideas has always aroused lively interest also from people that disagree with him.

J. A. Hobson and the Machinery Question

AbstractThe effects of industrialization on British life were the subject of a broad and intelligible set of debates during the early nineteenth century, often described as the “machinery question.” This question, concerning what today is called “technology,” was framed to include its effects on the whole of human life—an approach rarely seen by the late nineteenth century, a period marked instead by disciplinary specialization. An exception to this trend can be found in the work of the social critic and heterodox economist J. A. Hobson (1858–1940), better known for his critique of imperialism. From the 1890s, Hobson reopened the machinery question by offering anethicalanalysis of mechanization which was both holistic and sustained. In addition to proposing this new lens for viewing Hobson, this article explores the challenges—as well as the opportunities—facing those returning to the machinery question more generally.

Review of the New Textbook Series in Modern Political Economics

REVIEW OF THE NEW TEXTBOOK SERIES IN MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMICSNew Textbook Series in Modern Political edited by Enfu cheng et al.:1. Modern Political 2nd ed., edited by Enfu Cheng, Jinhua Feng, and Yan Ma, Shanghai, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics Press, 2012, x + 589 pp., 60 (paperback), ISBN 97875642126672. Intermediate Modern Political 1st ed., edited by Enfu Cheng, Bin Yu, Yan Ma, Leming Hu, and Ganqiang He, Shanghai, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics Press, 2012, VII + 690 pp., 88 (paperback), ISBN 97875642147393. Advanced Modern Political 1st ed., edited by Enfu Cheng and Yan Ma, Shanghai, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics Press, 2012, x + 692 pp., 95 (paperback), ISBN 9787564214722Steve cohn, an American heterodox economist, has been researching competing economic paradigms in china. He argues that economics has replaced marxist economics as dominant economic paradigm in china (cohn 2011). Here neoclassical in its broadest sense, refers to mainstream economics in West.Cohn's argument has been confirmed by Haiping Qiu, a marxist economist at renmin University of china in Beijing. According to Qiu (2014), economics education and research in china have been westernizing gradually since mid-1990s. In fact, Western economics, especially Western mainstream economics, now has dethroned marxist economics as dominant economic methodology in china, marginalizing marxist economics severely.Of course, there are many complicated domestic and international factors behind shift. But one direct factor, I think, may be textbooks. cohn (2011) mentions,Some of Marxist economists I interviewed criticized their Marxist colleagues for failing to innovate or update Marxist thinking. They lamented lack of attention to mathematical techniques and continued use of old textbooks. They implied that this gave students impression that Marxism was dated and had been superseded by more modern theories.The publication of textbook Series in modern Political Economics (hereinafter referred to as the Series), edited by Enfu cheng et al., in 2012, may be first meaningful attempt to change situation. Enfu cheng is a marxist economist at chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. As cohn (2011) observed, While retaining a fairly orthodox viewpoint, Professor cheng has tried to open marxist discourse in china to interactions with other heterodox paradigms. He has also tried to welcome more mathematical analysis alongside qualitative analysis. this point has also been incarnated in Series, especially in Advanced Modern Political Economics (hereinafter referred to as the textbook), which was designed basically for doctoral students in chinese universities. other two books of Series, Modern Political Economics and Intermediate Modern Political are basically for undergraduates and for master's degree students, respectively.While retaining an orthodox viewpoint and discourse of classical marxism, textbook gives a fairly large space to an introduction of relevant economic theories of various schools of marxism (most of which were labeled as revisionism, a pejorative term, in chinese academia for decades after 1949) and other heterodox schools. these schools of thought include leninism, trotskyism, Western marxism, Post-Keynesian Neo-ricardianism, Japanese marxian mathematical Neo-marxian and Analytical marxism, among others. textbook also gives enough space to comments on and/or counterarguments against these theories.The textbook implies that some concepts or principles in classical marxism, where necessary, could be improved or even revised. for example, New Presumption about Value-creating living one of what textbook calls four theoretical Presumptions in modern marxist Political Economics, given at very beginning of book, is that productive labor, which creates value, not only includes labor that produces material commodities, which marx expounded, and labor that displaces tangible or intangible commodities, which marx basically expounded, but also includes labor that produces tangible or intangible cultural commodities, labor that provides services for production and reproduction of labor commodities, and managerial activities undertaken by owners of private, productive enterprises (cheng and ma 2012, 4-5). …

Gospodarka planowa w ujęciu Michała Kaleckiego

This article attempts to present the question of ideas of Polish heterodox economist Michał Kalecki on the planned economies and general problems with capitalist and post-capitalist systems. To analyze the problem I start with Kalecki’s theory of capitalist crisis, question of effective demand and full employment, and then describe the quasi-model of democratic planned economy. Next, I focus on relations of workers’ self-management with central planning and motivation problems under state-run economy. I also put on agenda the so-called shortage problem, analyzed by the Kalecki’s supporter, Andrea Szego, in opposition to neo-classical approach of Hungarian economist Janos Kornai.