Hero Game Research Articles

Waste Education Game for 4th Grader of Elementary School

Indonesia is the second world largest sea waste producer after China, where waste can make a lot of problems, such as disease and flood, if not taken care properly. Waste is divided by 3 categories: organic waste, inorganic waste, and B3 waste. Learning about waste can be done through playing game. Trash Hero is one of education game that teaches the player, who is 4th grader of elementary school and above, to be able to distinguish the waste categories, how to recycle organic waste to become compost, and also be more aware of sea and land waste. Kids love Trash Hero game, after playing it several times kids become more understand problems about waste and also kids can distinguish waste by its categories.

Redefining Digital Library Boundaries: Being More than an Information Silo

This article is the final in a series of three publications that reflect on the boundaries and perceptions of what we think of when we hear the term Digital Libraries, with reference to our mainstream digital library systems. In this article we present three digital library examples that push the implementation envelope in terms of digital library systems functionality, thereby challenging expectations and assumptions about what our mainstream digital library systems are capable of delivering. The first example integrates a Digital Music Stand with a digital library environment, and in doing so extends the role of the digital library to include fine-grained interaction and access to document content. The second example is a digital library that supports musicological analysis, and shifts the boundaries of where and how the digital library operates. This second example is notable as it breaks out of the silo mindset prevalent in mainstream DLs software architecture designs. The trends of enhanced flexible and permissive capabilities continue through the third example, where we present a crowdsourced pop-trivia music video website with a Guitar Hero game challenge element. While this description might seem far removed from the notion of a digital library, it is in fact implemented using an off-the-shelf open source digital library solution, where all the additional functionality introduced is achieved through the inclusion of supplemental JavaScript and XSLT files—no change to the digital library architecture is needed. While the three chosen examples all happen to be musical in nature, this is really incidental to the main points being made, and the article concludes by generalising the discussion to other forms of digital library.

ACTIVITY MODEL OF PLAYING ‘MY HERO IS MY MOTHER’ TO IMPROVE BASIC MOVEMENT SKILLS OF MILD MENTAL RETARDED CHILDREN

Fundamental Movement Skills (FMS) of children with intellectual disabilities (ID) had a disruption experience and ID need help from others to develop their potential for movement maximally. The purpose of research and development of FMS through play activities in children with ID was expected to help improve FMS, cognitive abilities, pleasure and focus of attention of children with ID, so that children with ID had valuable experience in their lives, to be able to independently live their daily lives. The research method used was by research and development proposed by Borg and Gall. The subjects of small group trial used 9 children with ID and 4 teachers, and the stages of large group trial used 21 children with ID and 4 teachers in Primary School. The research instrument used rating scale. The data analysis technique was by using Content Validity Ratio (CVR) analysis to prove the validity level of the model of developing FMS through play activities, and used the difference test to prove the effectiveness of increasing the FMS results of children with ID in primary school. The results of the validity test model were high (CVR 0.475), so the mother was a hero game model fit the characteristics of children with ID and effective to increase FMS, cognitive, pleasure and focus of attention.

Promotion of cooperation through co-evolution of networks and strategy in a 2 [formula omitted] 2 game

A 2×2 game model implemented by co-evolution of both networks and strategies is established. An existing link between two agents is killed through network adaptation, which then establishes a new link to replace it. Strategy is defined as an offer of “cooperation” (C) or “defection” (D) by an agent. Both networks and strategies are synchronously renovated in each simulation time step. After killing the link with the most disadvantageous neighbor, we consider network adaptations that involve rewiring to (1) a randomly selected agent, (2) a proportionally selected agent (through a roulette selection process based on the degrees of respective agents), (3) an agent randomly selected among a set of neighbors of the neighbors, excluding the most disadvantageous neighbor. Several numerical experiments considering various 2×2 game classes, including Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Chicken, Leader, and Hero, reveal that the proposed co-evolution mechanism can solve dilemmas in the PD game class. The result of solving a dilemma is the development of mutual-cooperation reciprocity ( R reciprocity), which arises through the emergence of several cooperative hub agents, which have many links in a heterogeneous and assortative social network. However, the co-evolution mechanism seems counterproductive in the case of the Leader and Hero game classes, where alternating reciprocity ( ST reciprocity) is more demanding. It is also suggested that the assortative and cluster coefficients of a network affect the emergence of cooperation for R reciprocity.

Does a tag system effectively support emerging cooperation?

This paper investigates whether the so-called Tag Systems support emerging cooperation with respect to 2×2 games. The Tag System, initially proposed by Riolo et al. [2001. Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414, 441–443], gives each agent both a Tag and Tol defined by [0,1] real numbers. Tol is a tolerance for recognizing an opponent as a company. Both Tag and Tol are assumed to be evolving. Results show that the tag's effectiveness depends on whether the AllD strategy is allowed in the system. Allowing AllD implies that green beard effect does not work in the system. Thus, (1) the tag's effectiveness is more meager than that reported by Riolo et al., (2) the Tag System can use alternating reciprocity more effectively than the analytic solution in a Hero game; (3) a system using a 2D tag space supports cooperation more effectively than the usual Tag System.

環境問題への適用のためのジレンマゲームの基本構造に関する考察

We deduced that it is possible to define the Dilemma substance in the so-called dilemma games by the fact, a cooperative strategy cannot be dominant. This simple but clear definition can provide a firm way to a quantitative evaluation for the dilemma intensity in order to compare other types of dilemma games, for example, between Chicken and Leader Game. On the pathway of our deductive discussion, two important concepts concerning the Pareto Least and a parameterized expression procedure for the game structure were presented. In particular, the latter concept seems to be quite breakthrough to overview holistic 2×2 game world including Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunt, Leader and Hero Game. And a practical explanation going through 2×2 game was presented about what we defined as the dilemma substance seems to be plausible from the viewpoint of the Replicator Dynamics.

Self-organization in a simple model of adaptive agents playing 2 x 2 games with arbitrary payoff matrices.

We analyze, both analytically and numerically, the self-organization of a system of "selfish" adaptive agents playing an arbitrary iterated pairwise game (defined by a 2 x 2 payoff matrix). Examples of possible games to play are the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, the chicken game, the hero game, etc. The agents have no memory, use strategies not based on direct reciprocity nor "tags" and are chosen at random, i.e., geographical vicinity is neglected. They can play two possible strategies: cooperate (C) or defect (D). The players measure their success by comparing their utilities with an estimate for the expected benefits and update their strategy following a simple rule. Two versions of the model are studied: (1) the deterministic version (the agents are either in definite states C or D) and (2) the stochastic version (the agents have a probability c of playing C). Using a general master equation we compute the equilibrium states into which the system self-organizes, characterized by their average probability of cooperation c(eq). Depending on the payoff matrix, we show that c(eq) can take five different values. We also consider the mixing of agents using two different payoff matrices and show that any value of c(eq) can be reached by tuning the proportions of agents using each payoff matrix. In particular, this can be used as a way to simulate the effect of a fraction d of "antisocial" individuals--incapable of realizing any value to cooperation--on the cooperative regime hold by a population of neutral or "normal" agents.

A game analysis of reciprocal cooperation: Sequential food-sharing and sex role alternation

The evolution of reciprocal cooperation between non-relatives is studied. Food-sharing of vampire bats studied by Wilkinson (1984) and egg-trading of simultaneous hermaphroditic fish studied by Fisher (1980) are respectively considered as Thompson's reciprocal assistance and the iterated Hero game. Those models predicted the following: (1) Reciprocal assistance between adult bats is evolutionarily stable if they repeatedly interact for a long time. However, (2) the cost for an adult to assist a juvenile is too high to be compensated by the benefit from the juvenile. (3) A particular signal, which determines the sex role of each partner, is always displayed by a “heroic” partner which releases eggs with a larger cost. (4) If alternation of sex roles is established, then the evolutionarily stable frequency of displaying a signal of egg-release increases as the frequency of divorce decreases, and (5) a “cheating” strategy, which releases sperm on every spawning bout, is less advantageous than reciprocal cooperation.