ABSTRACT: North Korea's hereditary rulers have been under a watch for decades, with many pundits regularly predicting the demise of the Family Recent scenarios are predicated on the sudden death of Kim Jong-un, the 32-year-old Supreme Leader, and an ensuing succession struggle ranging from an internal-faction winner-takes-all fight to a more chaotic transition where factions clash with assistance from outside powers. Offering China a ballistic missile defense ban on the peninsula might persuade the Chinese to acquiesce to eventual Korean unification and denuclearization. ********** North Korea's hereditary rulers have been under a watch for almost 30 years, with pundits regularly predicting the demise of the Kim Family Regime. At present, Kim Jong-un, the 32-year-old Supreme Leader (so far without an heir apparent) appears to be effectively consolidating his power through a combination of brutal acts, tentative economic reforms, and beneficent giveaways. He executed his uncle, National Defense Commission Vice Chairman Jang Sungtaek, and 70 other senior officials and generals since assuming power in December 2011. (1) Concomitantly, Kim opened glitzy amusement parks (including a water park, a dolphinarium, and a ski resort) for use by the rising, increasingly affluent entrepreneurial class mainly located in Pyonghattan and other privileged enclaves of Pyongyang. These emerging Donju (masters of money) are relatively well-off, a result of leveraging government ties, Chinese connections, and tacit market-based reforms introduced over the last 15 years that permit them to earn private incomes primarily in trade and agriculture. (2) Internal Collapse Despite Kim's carefully calibrated moves to cement his rule, the of his regime remains possible, plausible, and predictable due to its reliance on a single point of potential failure, namely, the Kim bloodline. Without another male Kim in the wings, Kim's sudden assassination or death is likely to precipitate a succession struggle ranging from an internal-faction winner-takes-all fight to a more chaotic, uncertain transition where factions clash over time with help from major outside powers. North Korea's remains a question of if, not when, chiefly because Kim seems to be in good health despite a persistent weight problem. In addition, roughly one-third of North Koreans appear to be bolstering his regime, mainly in return for food security and other privileges. One-tenth of North Koreans have officially registered cell phones, and another tenth may have unregistered ones. (3) The rest of society constitutes a silent, hard-to-assess majority, increasingly exposed to foreign criticism of its leader, but voicing no opposition as a result of their isolation, deprivation, powerlessness, or imprisonment. The imprisonment of dissidents applies not only to offenders, but often to their extended families--with up to 120,000 currently interned in hard-labor camps. (4) On balance, the Kim Family Regime appears to be ruthless in protecting its survival as the most prominent authoritarian dynasty in the world, except for Cuba's single-generation Castro leadership. Recent scenarios conjure two potentially interrelated events: first, the sudden death or assassination of Kim Jong-un, and second, the emergence of alternative power centers within the secretive Kim Family clan itself and among key security organizations. These power elites, failing to accommodate each other in North Korea's highly authoritarian system, could clash and break up the brittle, centralized regime. Given this worst-case scenario, the internal collapse school anticipates a new territorial partition if groups align strongly along diverging Chinese and South Korean/Western interests. (5) The formal demarcation between North and South Korea might then be redrawn north of the Demilitarized Zone, where it has existed since 1953. …