Heidegger's Critique Research Articles

Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology and Feminist Philosophy: Issues of Sexual Difference and Neutralization

ABSTRACT This study reviews the controversy surrounding Dasein’s neutrality in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. First, I reiterate the problem and examine Derrida’s assertion that the early Heidegger ignored sexual difference as well as how feminist philosophers accepted the case after that. Next, I analyse whether the neutrality of Dasein is justified at the essential and factual levels. I discuss whether (1) phenomenological neutralization is a male-biased outlook and (2) Heidegger’s thoughts according to such method were successful in neutralizing it. With regard to (1), neutralization is not inherently androcentric. To address (2), I first argue that Heidegger’s philosophical project at the time was fundamental ontology, but he completed the task with the development of existential philosophical ideas in terms of the existential analytic. Finally, I demonstrate that the criticism of Heidegger’s covert generalization of masculinity, while almost unfair to fundamental ontological work, makes limited sense to existential philosophical work.

Brokenness of Being and Errancy of Ontological Untruth: Susan Taubes’s Criticism of Heidegger’s Seinsdenken

Abstract In this study, I examine Susan Taubes’s criticism of Heidegger’s Seinsdenken that pivots around her contention that he absolutized the nothingness of being in a manner that is analogous to but yet significantly different than the role assigned to the Godhead on the part of many mystical visionaries. The common denominator is in Heidegger’s insistence on being to the neglect of fully engaging with the rhythms of life. As a consequence, there is no purchase on the chaotic, which falls outside the purview of what can be signified, and in the absence of the unsignifiable, there can be no signification. Every attempt to reconstruct the broken world into a totality contains the flaw of an ontological untruth. The effort at totalization is not only the methodological weakness of tragedy and mysticism, but it is also the nihilistic basis of the role accorded to the nothingness of being in Heidegger’s Seinsdenken. The erroneous nature of the world is not denied by Susan, but she struggled to uphold the ontological untruth that what is most wrong in our existence is what is most precious. The paradoxical retrieval of the truth of this untruth affords the poetic soul the opportunity to confront the limit by breaking it, an infringement of boundary that is redolent equally with the enduring transience of love and the transient endurance of death.

The Incalculability of the Generated Text

In this paper, I explore Derrida’s concept of exteriorization in relation to texts generated by machine learning. I first discuss Heidegger’s view of machine creation and then present Derrida’s criticism of Heidegger. I explain the concept of iterability, which is the central notion on which Derrida’s criticism is based. The thesis defended in the paper is that Derrida’s account of iterability provides a helpful framework for understanding the phenomenon of machine learning–generated literature. His account of textuality highlights the incalculability and mechanical elements characteristic of all texts, including machine-generated texts. By applying Derrida’s concept to the phenomenon of machine creation, we can deconstruct the distinction between human and non-human creation. As I propose in the conclusion to this paper, this provides a basis on which to consider potential positive uses of machine learning.

Technē: Christian Visions of Technology

Technē: Christian Visions of Technology

Трансформация мышления в контексте преодоления метафизики в философии Мартина Хайдеггера

Criticism of metaphysics in the philosophy of M. Heidegger occupies a central place in his attempt to re-pose the question of being. In this work, such criticism is considered by the philosopher through the relationship between metaphysics and thinking. This involves revealing the intimate connection that, according to Heidegger, exists between philosophy and metaphysics. An analysis of Heidegger's criticism of this connection is carried out and his main idea is discussed that philosophy was so damaged by its connection with metaphysics that it should be replaced by meditative thinking. However, it is not entirely clear how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking should take place, especially given that Heidegger insists that relying on the human will to bring about changes in thinking simply reasserts the metaphysical perspective that needs to be overcome. And to overcome means to open an alternative way for thought and human being. This revelation, according to the thinker, will overcome the limitations inherent in metaphysics, and will open thought and human being to being, and this discovery will be comprehensively creative, since it will lead thought to previously hidden aspects of being. History has shown that while many claim to know what philosophy is, Heidegger argued, these thinkers did not really think through the subject properly, resulting in their statements being either superficial or based on unexplored assumptions.

인공지능시대의 도덕교육 연구

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the ultimate difference and limitations between humans and machines while addressing the most heated controversy in the era of artificial intelligence, particularly the question of “Can machines think?”, which is considered a critical issue in moral education in the age of artificial intelligence. Methods: To this end, the direction of moral education in the AI era is sought through analysis and reflective discourse on literature materials related to digital technologies such as the Fourth Industrial Revolution, artificial intelligence (AI), big data and machine learning. Results: From the perspective of moral education in the era of artificial intelligence, this study discusses the classification of Artificial Moral Agents (AMA) and the application of ethics, focusing on reflective discourse on science and technological civilization. In other words, it examines three principles of machine construction based on Stuart Russell’s belief in “beneficial machines” from the perspective of “preference”, presents Moors four stages of AMAs, and addresses the concept of explicit ethical agents in the third stage. Additionally, it explores Heidegger's critique of technological civilization and discusses creativity in relation to the controversies surrounding artificial intelligence. Conclusion: Based on this, the present study explored the potential application of moral education in artificial intelligence through the question “Can machines think?”, which can be a core topic in the field of artificial intelligence.

Scientific thought and its influence for the oblivion of metaphysical thought

This article aims to support Martin Heidegger's criticism of science and metaphysics that is developing in modern times. Although these criticisms revolve around different topics, what will be studied in this work is how both have the same purpose; the end of reason. The project for science was one of emancipation, of leading the human being to a new place, which was made so that he could be the master and lord; however, the only thing he achieved is massive destruction, at the level of two world wars, for which science became at the service of barbarism and death. In turn, the human being lost the meaning of his life and techno-science played a role of satisfaction for those gaps, Heidegger is aware of this and blames to a great extent that everything happened due to the forgetfulness of being, that not only was present in modern times, but throughout the history of philosophy.

Thomistic Existentialism and Cosmological Reasoning, John F. X.Knasas, The Catholic University of America Press, 2019 (ISBN 978‐0‐8132‐3185‐3), xiv + 330 pp., hb $65

Thomistic Existentialism and Cosmological Reasoning, John F. X.Knasas, The Catholic University of America Press, 2019 (ISBN 978‐0‐8132‐3185‐3), xiv + 330 pp., hb $65

Becoming anonymous: how strict COVID-19 isolation protocols impacted ICU patients.

In this article, I provide phenomenological reflections on patients' experiences of undergoing extreme isolation protocols while admitted to Intensive Care Units [ICU] during the first wave of COVID-19. Based on observation studies from within the patient isolation rooms and retrospective, in-depth phenomenological interviews with patients, I characterize this exceptional experience as one of becoming anonymous. To illustrate this, I start by establishing a perspective on embodied existence as constituted on a scale between anonymous embodiment and being enrooted into a personal niche. Against the backdrop of this framework, I illustrate how being admitted to the ICU under strict isolation protocols produced extraordinary experiences of becoming anonymous. Sources of the anonymization were: (1) Mechanical expropriation, pacification and disownership of the visceral-kinaesthetic body; (2) Objectification; (3) Spatial and intercorporeal anonymity (4) Surrealism: the intermingling of objective impressions and dream-like interpretations. Finally, I illustrate how anonymization induced an experience of embodiment as raw materiality, confronting the patient with what Martin Heidegger called the facticity of naked existence. This experience is discussed against Levinas' critique of Heidegger, while I propose that insights from this exceptional case may substantiate Heidegger's account.

Проблема техники и технологизации современных процессов сквозь призму методологии Мартина Хайдеггера

In this article, on the basis of the philosophical method of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), an attempt is made to show how the distance separating the world of philosophy from the world of high technology can be overcome. The purpose of the study is to extrapolate Heidegger’s way of thinking onto the modern processes of technologization and digitalization as well as to demonstrate how Heideggerian philosophy can be used in practice today. Thus, we need to take a step back and reconsider Heidegger’s attempts to develop a new way of questioning and thinking. This article is relevant due to the increasing technologization and digitalization of all spheres of human life, including education, culture and philosophy. To identify the weaknesses and shortcomings of the concept of digitalization, it is contrasted with the Heideggerian critique of technological thinking in general and its digital component in particular. The paper demonstrates the way to bridge the gap between technology and the true being of humans. Further, the article considers the evolution of Heidegger’s analysis and attitude to technology during the development of his philosophical thought: from analysing Dasein (human existence as being) in the early period to shifting the focus to language, poetry and language of poets in the later period. In Heidegger’s philosophy, such poetry is the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). The concept of Machenschaft (machination) as a justification of the manufacturability of the processes of human life is considered. The main signs of machination are presented: transformation of the social sphere into a huge mechanism – “machine” – controlled by technology; digitalization as an equalization of individuals; recognition of the omnipotence of technologies implemented as “programmes of action”. In the era of machination, a person cannot yet recognize himself as a machine and considers himself a living being with his own experiences. It is concluded that philosophy should take on a leading role in determining and critically evaluating the new human worldview on a global scale.

Mou Zongsan’s Critique of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant and his Solution: A Transcultural Discourse on Human Finitude and Infinitude

Abstract Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) extols Heidegger’s interpretation of human Dasein as “being-capable” and admits that he was inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in many ways; however, although he, like Heidegger, emphasizes that human finitude is the basic premise of Kantian philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. He argues, for Kant, “human beings are finite but can be infinite.” Moreover, he, on the one hand, criticizes Heidegger for withdrawing the dimension of absolute spontaneity, infinitude, supersensibility and supratemporality from morality and, on the other hand, criticizes Kant for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By the general insight of Chinese philosophy, which positively recognize the intellectual intuition, Mou believes that one can change the downside of Kantian philosophy and organically combine Western and Asian philosophy.

Gerhard Krüger's Platonic critique of Martin Heidegger

AbstractThis paper examines Gerhard Krüger's interpretation of Plato in light of Martin Heidegger's Destruktion of the Greeks and critique of Platonism. I argue that Krüger's new reading of Plato should be understood as a critique of Heidegger's understanding of Platonism, and thereby as a broader critique of Heidegger's thoughts on Western metaphysics and the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte). The force and originality of Krüger's response to Heidegger consist in the fact that Krüger's Plato anticipates Heidegger's critique of Platonism. Krüger thus contends that Plato (1) does not allow the understanding of truth as correctness (Übereinstimmung) to supplant the understanding of truth as disclosedness (Unverborgenheit), (2) understands and displays philosophy's dependence upon prereflexive attunements (Stimmungen); (3) appreciates the intricate relation between Being and temporality. In sum, Krüger's Plato is not guilty of Seinsvergessenheit, and rather opens up new ways for an authentic meditation on Being and on the human way toward an understanding of Being.

Josef Pieper on Medieval Truth and Martin Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff

Josef Pieper’s critique of Martin Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff (concept of truth) has been virtually ignored in both Pieper and Heidegger scholarship; however, Pieper’s critique of Heidegger is both lethal and affirmative. On the one hand, Pieper makes a strong case against Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” and yet on the other he affirms his thesis that “the essence of truth is freedom.” This paper attempts to mend this gap in the literature by first presenting Heidegger’s “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” the essay in which Heidegger explicates his concept of truth. Second, I exegete the critique of Josef Pieper found in his “Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff.” Third, I conclude the paper by contextualizing Pieper’s critique within Pieper’s Werke, and make a note of the philosophical insights derivative from Pieper’s less than simple relationship to Heidegger.

Fundamental Ontology, Saturated Phenomena and Transcendental Dilemma

ABSTRACT In this article, I will argue that while Marion’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is in many ways sound, Marion remains bound to the conceptual opposition that existential phenomenology has successfully overcome. Namely, I will argue that Marion remains dependent upon the transcendental dilemma according to which we must rely on the strict differentiation between explanans and explanandum. Marion sees no way of departing from Heidegger’s project other than reversing the order of explanation and switching the places of the explanans and explanandum, which means that phenomena start appearing as explanans. I will demonstrate how existential phenomenology has overcome this conceptual dilemma, and then I will argue that we could make a much better account of saturated phenomena, if we ground our insights in the idea of being-in-the-world.

The Body and the Completion of Metaphysics: A Critical Analysis of Heidegger’s Nietzsche

Abstract In this essay, I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, focusing centrally on his understanding of the Nietzschean “body.” Nietzsche’s status as the culminating figure of Western metaphysics depends on the notion that the body, in Nietzsche’s thought, is the last Western subject. I confirm Heidegger’s sense of the importance of the Nietzschean body, and, in particular, the centrality of the word “incorporation” (Einverleibung), to a proper understanding of Nietzsche. I argue, however, through a critique of Heidegger’s own understanding of “incorporation” in Nietzsche’s work, that an investigation of the body in Nietzsche does not reveal him to be an unwilling participant in the metaphysical tradition beyond which Heidegger seeks to move; rather, we should see in the Nietzschean body a human finitude that has more resonances in Heidegger’s own thought than Heidegger would care to admit. Ultimately, I show, an investigation of the actual dynamics of the Nietzschean body, as read through the careful tracing of the word “incorporation” to which Heidegger invites us, yields a fundamentally delimited body that operates according to what we might call a kind of physiological asceticism.

Re-thinking Truth: Assessing Heidegger's critique of Aquinas in light of Vallicella's critique of Heidegger

AbstractIn this paper I argue that Heidegger's critique of Aquinas on truth must be seen in light of Vallicella's critique of Heidegger. Heidegger criticized Aquinas for allegedly placing truth in the ‘subjectivity’ of the human mind via correspondence (adequatio). While the accuracy of this reading of Aquinas is highly contested, the criticism itself has sometimes been turned back upon Heidegger. In three forgotten articles in the 1980s, William Vallicella contended that Heidegger reduces Being to truth, and truth to the alleged ‘subjectivity’ of Dasein. Though Vallicella garnered some minimal attention at the time, his argument was soon forgotten, along with its potential implications for Heidegger's criticism of Aquinas. This paper will first establish the nature of Heidegger's critique of Aquinas, followed by Vallicella's critique of Heidegger, evaluating the former in light of the latter. It will be shown that Heidegger critiques Thomas for a mistake he does not make, then makes that same mistake himself, only to retreat to a position similar to what Thomas actually holds, but in a way that solves nothing, for he lacks Thomas’ anchor in a divine mind. These points will coalesce in the ultimate conclusion that Vallicella can be used to both undermine Heidegger's critique and undergird the value of Aquinas’ position on truth.

Digging at the Roots: A Reply to Naoko Saito's American Philosophy in Translation

Digging at the Roots: A Reply to Naoko Saito's <i>American Philosophy in Translation</i>

Being, Presence, and Implication in Heidegger's Critique of Hegel

AbstractFor Heidegger, Hegel understands being, ‘the highest actuality’, as the categories which pervade and thereby form all objects and events. Since, Heidegger argues, the categories are, in Hegel, present-at-hand, Hegel conceives of being as presence-at-hand. This is a problem, for Heidegger, because it entails the full transparency and knowability of being, whereas, in his view, being is partially hidden and unknowable. I consider the objection to this Heideggerian critique of Hegel that Hegelian logic understands being not only as the list of categories but also as their derivation and movement from pure being to the absolute idea, which (derivation and movement) establish being not only as presence but also as implication. Since being-as-implication is (a) not presence-at-hand and (b) necessary to being, it cannot be said that Hegel's account of being turns it into full transparency and knowability. Heidegger's critique should, therefore, be rejected. I argue that this objection is unsuccessful because there is strong evidence in the Logic that Hegel ‘subordinates’ being-as-implication to presence-at-hand. Implication's way of being is, in Hegel, only a collapse into presence-at-hand and hence ‘merely a modification of presence’. Consequently, Heidegger's critique of Hegel should not be rejected based on the objection. I conclude the article with a remark on the relation between language and being-as-implication. I argue that Hegel's account of being-as-implication in language disrespects the autonomy of being-as-implication therein and that Haas's argument for such an autonomy based on the phenomenon of the syntactic ellipsis of ‘is’ fails to undermine Hegel's account.

A New Look at Being and Time: Heidegger's Self-criticism in On My Own Publications

In 2018 On My Own Publications was published as volume 82 of Heidegger's collected works. Its content includes roughly 400 pages in which Heidegger himself reflects on Being and Time. A central theme in these pages, and the one to which this article is devoted, is Heidegger's criticism of the way that the question of Being (Seinsfrage) is conceived there as the question of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnisfrage). More specifically, the author aims to demonstrate the importance of these criticisms –which include matters of both style and content –for understanding Being and Time itself and the general development of Heidegger's thought. Though many critics already seized on what they took to be the inadequacy of starting with the understanding of Being, we can now see in detail how Heidegger himself conceived its inadequacy and how he specifically sought to address it in his later thought.

Humanizing the It: Martin Buber on Technology and the Ethics of Things

Martin Buber’s writings on technology are scarce and seemingly subordinated to what he described in I and Thou as the “tyranny of the It”. But a closer look at his writings reveals, in fact, a life-long reflection on the dialogical potentiality of things—whether artworks, buildings, or machines—that echoed broader discourses on technology at the time. Beginning with Julius Goldstein’s Die Technik (1912), which Buber edited for his series Die Gesellschaft, and concluding with Buber’s reception and critique of Heidegger, especially during the 1950s, we can see that Buber critically engaged with the question of technology with respect to labor and community, art and artisanship, and the ethics of thinghood. The essay contextualizes Buber’s repeated call to “humanize technology” in early 20th-century debates on technology and in the post-1945 crisis of humanism. What it argues is that Buber framed technology not only through its aesthetic potential, as Werk, but also as another form of solidarity and care without which community and respect for our environment would not be possible.