Hearsay Rule Research Articles

아동 범죄피해자 진술의 증거능력과 헌법상 반대신문권 - 미국법원 판례의 비교법적 고찰

The defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses is established as a constitutional right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Our criminal procedure law also provides for the right to cross-examine, and the Constitutional Court has determined that this right forms a core part of the constitutional right to a fair trial. However, when the victim of a crime is a child, the issue arises of how to ensure the defendant's right to cross-examination in such cases. This presents a conflict between guaranteeing the defendant's right to cross-examine and protecting the interests of the child victim. It also touches on the issue of the strict application of the hearsay rule versus the recognition of reasonable exceptions. In the United States, various cases have raised issues concerning the protection of child crime victims and the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause under the Sixth Amendment. U.S. case law has addressed controversies in instances where child victims testified using one-way closed-circuit television, or where teachers testified in court about statements made by the child rather than the child testifying directly. Additionally, a recent case in Virginia brought into question the admissibility of forensic interview recordings of a child victim as evidence. In contrast, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled that a provision of the Sexual Violence Punishment Act, which recognized the admissibility of video statements by sexual violence victims under the age of 19, violated the Constitution by infringing on the defendant's right to cross-examination, which is a core component of the constitutional right to a fair trial. Following this decision, the Sexual Violence Punishment Act was amended to harmonize the defendant's right to cross-examination with the protection of child victims. This paper examines U.S. court rulings on the admissibility of child victim statements, the decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court, and recent amendments to the Sexual Violence Punishment Act. It explores the principles and exceptions concerning the application of the hearsay rule and the right to cross-examination in cases where the victim is a child, as well as rational approaches to the operation of these systems.

외국 소재의 전자적 증거 수집 방식과 증거능력 부여 방안에 관한 연구

In order for investigative agencies to acquire electronic evidence located in a foreign country, mutual legal assistance based on the International Criminal Justice Mutual Aid Act and Interpol Collaboration are used. In some investigations, legally obtained user account information is used to access overseas servers. The international community has already implemented the European Convention on Cybercrimey, which enables prompt preservation, provision, and submission of digital information for ISPs located in each jurisdiction through cooperation between the central authorities, so orders are also issued to ISPs under direct foreign jurisdiction. The system is being improved in such a way that this way is possible, and the same procedure is reflected in the administrative agreement based on the CLOUD Act and the European Electronic Evidence Regulation. However, Korea has not signed such a treaty or agreement.
 For foreign electronic evidence collected using these means, there is a possibility that the collection procedure of the requested country may violate the domestic law of the requesting country due to the different procedural laws between each country. In such a case, whether the content or degree of the violation violated the actual content of due process and whether the exclusion of evidence is in accordance with the constitutional idea and the criminal procedure law procedure for the realization of criminal justice can be judged individually. However, it is not reasonable to deny the admissibility of evidence based on a simple violation of the procedure on the basis of trust or reciprocity among judicial institutions in the international community.
 On the other hand, non-statement digital evidence is not the truth of the content, but the existence of textual information of the same content itself as evidence. Therefore, it is reasonable to regard such evidence as evidence and not to apply the hearsay rule. Even declarative digital evidence can correspond to business records, and it is possible to confirm and verify the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness from foreign institutions in the future. In the end, even for electronic evidence collected in foreign countries through cooperation or cooperation in investigations, it seems necessary to establish a separate exception to the recognition of Probative Force.

The Confrontation Clause & State Action

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause works in conjunction with the right to counsel and trial by jury to protect the people against the government’s abuse of its prosecutorial monopoly. However, the history of the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has not always focused on the Sixth Amendment’s goal of limiting government power and was treated as virtually synonymous with the hearsay rules. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court restored the Confrontation Clause to constitutional significance by correctly identifying it as a procedural guaranty that empowers the jury to evaluate the reliability of government witnesses through live testimony subject to cross-examination. Unfortunately, the Court’s exclusive focus on testimonial statements as a limitation on the right was misplaced from the beginning, and the multifactor “primary purpose” test for identifying a testimonial statement allows government actors to avoid having to produce live witnesses subject to cross-examination. This Article proposes to replace the testimonial statement and the “primary purpose” test with a “state action” test that focuses on the government’s role in the creation of the out-of-court statement and thereby prevents government efforts to avoid live testimony and cross-examination at trial. First, the Article explains that the Confrontation Clause must be understood within the context of the right to counsel and trial by jury to ensure that jurors—the people—evaluate the reliability of government witnesses through live testimony subject to cross-examination by the defense counsel. It then demonstrates that the “primary purpose” test results in too much judicial discretion and emboldens police and prosecutors to manipulate the creation of out of court statements that will not trigger the right of confrontation. As a result, it empowers judges, police, and prosecutors—the very government actors the Sixth Amendment seeks to control. Second, the Article describes the alternative “state action” test that focuseson the government’s role in the creation of the out-of-court statement. The “state action” test would simplify the Confrontation Clause analysis and improve the truth-finding function of criminal trials. Under this test, the analysis is focused on government involvement in the creation of the out of court statements and thereby prevents the “primary evil” at which it was originally directed—the government’s “use of ex-parte examination as evidence against the accused.” Finally, the Article applies the proposed state action test and demonstrates how it would eliminate judicial discretion in mixed-motive cases, prevent the admission of out-of-court statements made to undercover government agents, and require forensic experts working for the government to testify live subject to cross-examination. In short, it preserves the right of confrontation—the constitutionally mandated means of testing the reliability of government witnesses—in cases where the potential for government abuse exists.

영상녹화조사물의 지위 회복을 위한 소고

The video recording investigation, which began with the digital revolution as an innovation in documentary culture, brought present and former Defendant together in one court and made it possible to savor their statements. The separation of prosecution and trial adopted by the modern criminal law had the side effect of increasing the difficulty of discovering the substantive truth due to the time lag, but video recording investigations that maintain the freshness of statements like a refrigerator help overcome this. It is a gift brought by the development of science and technology. However, the reality of our law has fallen into the dogma of trials that have settled for the past, and has deprived the admissibility of evidence of video recording investigations through legislation and interpretation. It is regrettable that there has been a lack of consideration about whether it is possible to deprive certain types of evidence of the admissibility of evidence through legislation and whether the reasons are reasonable. The national punishment power, which is a means of realizing the rule of law, must be exercised correctly, appropriately, and impartially, which is a constitutional requirement. In particular, the power to punish as a judiciary must be fair and appear fair. To this end, all evidence, which is the data for finding the facts, must be allowed to enter the courtroom if it meets the general requirements for admissibility of evidence without being biased. Advanced criminal justice systems such as the UK, the US, Germany, and Japan all operate criminal justice systems with the possibility of using evidence open, and this is a global standard. In practice, video recordings such as CCTV and black boxes are recognized as evidence, and transcripts, which are hearsay evidence, are also recognized as evidence if they fall under the exception of the hearsay rule. There is no reason to treat it differently as a video recording investigation. Prohibiting the use of this certificate on the grounds that it is a video recording investigation is unconstitutional as it hinders the correct and fair exercise of The national punishment power. The speed of change in the world is dazzling. In order to prevent criminal justice from becoming an obstacle in a rapidly changing society, the status of video recording investigations must be restored as evidence. We should not be buried in exhausting debates anymore, but respond in time to new crimes emerging in a rapidly changing environment and crimes that are increasingly becoming more intelligent, organized, and internationalized. Now is the time for each of us to use our creativity for an effective future criminal justice system.

The Neglected Origins of the Hearsay Rule in American Slavery: Recovering Queen v. Hepburn

Previous article No AccessThe Neglected Origins of the Hearsay Rule in American Slavery: Recovering Queen v. HepburnDavid A. SklanskyDavid A. Sklansky Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Supreme Court Review Volume 20222022 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/724278 © 2023 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE: MEANING, KINDS, AND EXCEPTIONS IN COMMON LAW AND PAKISTANI LAW OF EVIDENCE

Hearsay evidence is an out of court statement which is presented in court to prove that the assertions made in it are true. The hearsay rule means that hearsay evidence will not be used in judicial proceedings except in exceptional cases. The definition, kinds and exceptions to hearsay rule have been explicitly discussed in various statutes and judicial decisions of common law countries. On the other hand, the definition and exceptions to hearsay evidence have not been explicitly discussed in Qanoon e Shahdat, 1984 (Pakistani law of evidence hereinafter QSO) which causes great difficulty in understanding the nature and scope of this concept. The present study, by deploying doctrinal research methods, intends to address these issues by analyzing the hearsay evidence and its exception in QSO. It is hoped that the present study will clarify the meaning and exceptions to hearsay rule in QSO. Keywords: Hearsay Evidence, Exceptions to Hearsay Evidence in Common Law, Direct Evidence, Kinds of Hearsay, Hearsay in Pakistan

개정 형사소송법 상 검사 작성 피의자신문조서의 탄핵증거로의 사용

Article 312 of the criminal procedure Act has been amended. Now the protocol concerning interrogation of a criminal suspect, prepared by a prosecutor is admissible as evidence only when the defendant agrees the contents of his own statement are truthful. However, even if the evidence is not admissible as evidence by the hearsay evidence rule, it can be used for impeachment. In this respect, this study examined whether the suspect-interrogation protocol by prosecutor, which is inadmissible by the hearsay rlue could be used as evidence of impeachment against the defendant's statement. It is stipulated in Article 318-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act that ‘A document or statement otherwise inadmissible as evidence under Articles 312 through 316, shall be admissible, if it is produced to challenge the admissibility of a statement of a criminal defendant or a person other than the criminal defendant at a preparatory hearing or a trial’. According to this, protocol concerning interrogation of a criminal suspect, prepared by prosecutor which is inadmissible by the article 312(1), can be used for impeachment. Also as stipulated in Article 318-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, not only the witness’s but also the defendant’s statement can be impeached. It may cause some issues about the defendant’s right to remain silent, but the debate over whether the defendant's statement can be impeached or not takes place from a completely different perspective. The defendant has a constitutional right to refuse to state. So, he can be silent. But also he can and should be asked about the statement he did in the courtroom. Impeaching the defedant's statement is helpful for fact-finders to find fact, and it is the way to go the principle of court-oriented procedure.

헌법상 반대신문권과 미성년 성폭력 피해자영상진술의 증거능력

The Constitutional Court of Korea decided that the provision of the Sexual Violence Punishment Act that allows the use of video statements of victims of child sexual violence as evidence without cross-examination is unconstitutional in the 2021 decision. The Constitutional Court held that the right to cross-examination was the core of the right to a fair trial. According to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, it was determined that the provisions the Sexual Violence Punishment Act did not guarantee the defendant's right to cross-examination, and consequently violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. The provision stipulated an exception to the hearsay rule to prevent secondary harm to victims of child sexual violence, and the Constitutional Court judged that the provision that recognized this exception was unconstitutional. Unlike the US Constitution, there is no right to confrontation clause in the Korean Constitution. It has not been empirically confirmed whether the right to cross-examination against child victims of sexual violence contributes to the discovery of the substantive truth. Therefore, although the Constitutional Court regards the right to cross-examination as equivalent to the fundamental right under the Constitution, it is questionable whether this judgment is correct. Rather, the decision of the Constitutional Court seems to be more in line with the American legal system, which has the right to confrontation clause in the Constitution, regarding the right to cross-examination as the most effective device for finding the truth. On the other hand, the hearsay rule and the right to cross-examination are clearly stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Act of Korea. The Criminal Procedure Act of Korea is oriented toward trial-centered system and adversarial trial system. Therefore, the right to cross-examination is an important device for correcting errors and discovering the substantive truth in the Korean legal system. Therefore, it is meaningful that the Constitutional Court recognized the right to cross-examination as a constitutional right and strictly interpreted the exception to the hearsay rule in the Sexual Violence Punishment Act. In the future, it will be urgent to come up with a plan to ensure the right of cross-examination of the accused without causing secondary harm to the victim by reconciling the two interests of guaranteeing the defendant's right to cross-examination and the protection of child victims of sexual violence.

Course Correction: A Proposal To Limit The Admissibility And Use of "Course Of Investigation" Testimony In Criminal Trials

Allowing agents to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus present juries damning information that is not subject to cross-examination, would largely abrogate the defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment and the hearsay rule.

The Neglected Origins of the Hearsay Rule in American Slavery: Recovering Queen v. Hepburn

The Neglected Origins of the Hearsay Rule in American Slavery: Recovering Queen v. Hepburn

2020년 신형사소송법상의 조사자증언제도에 대한 소고

2020년 개정형사소송법에 따라 검사작성 피의자신문조서의 증거능력 규정인 제312조 제1항이 사법경찰관작성 피의자신문조서의 증거능력 인정요건과 동일하게 규정하는 방식으로 개정되고, 피고인이 조서의 진정성립(authenticity)을 부인하는 경우 영상녹화물(the video recording of interrogation) 등 객관적인 방법을 통하여 그 조서의 실질적 진정성립을 증명하는 방법이었던 제312조 제2항이 삭제됨으로써 이제 수사기관에서 작성된 조서는 피고인의 내용부인만으로 증거의 세계에서 사라지게 되었다. 하지만 입법자는 한편으로 이로 이해 형사소추권(public prosecution)이 약화될 것을 우려하여 이를 보완하기 위한 방안으로 2007년 도입한 조사자증언제도를 존치시켰고, 따라서 2020년 개정형사소송법상에서도 조서는 간접적으로나마 증거의 세계에서 부활할 수 있는 기회를 여전히 가지고 있다. 학계에서는 수사단계에서의 투명성을 충분히 담보하는 장치가 확보되지 않은 상황에서 조사자증언에 독자적인 증거능력을 갖도록한 형사소송법 제316조 제1항은 제312조와의 관계에서 모순이기 때문에 증거능력을 허용해서는 안 된다고 하는 주장이 여전히 설득력 있게 제기되고 있다. 그러나 이러한 주장은 1954년 형사소송법 제정 당시의 수사현실에 근거한 입법취지에만 집착하여 진화하는 범죄 현실과 피의자의 인권보호 및 위법수사 방지를 위한 각종 제도가 마련된 현재의 수사현실을 도외시 하고 있고, 그러한 결과 이론의 논리적 귀결이 2007년 개정형사소송법 이전의 강학상의 해석론으로 회귀하고 있다. 조사자증언제도는 공판중심주의를 강조하면서 그 동안에 지속적으로 이어온 조서재판(statement trial)의 현실에 대한 비판적 의견을 반영하여 조서재판의 폐해를 극복할 수 있는 제도적 방안을 모색하고자 하는 의도 하에 검사작성 피의자신문조서의 증거능력을 배제시키면서도 증거능력을 전면적으로 배제할 경우에 형사소추권이 약화될 것을 우려하여 이를 보완하면서도 구두변론주의를 실현하기 위하여 도입되었다. 이러한 도입취지와 제도의 입법과정에 비추어 볼 때 제316조 제1항의 규정은 조사자의 증언을 제312조 제3항에도 불구하고 증거로 인정하겠다는 입법적 의지라는 점을 분명히 알 수 있다. 생각건대, 2007년 개정형사소송법의 입법취지에 비추어볼 때 제316조가 전문법칙(the hearsay rule)의 예외 규정으로서 조사자증언의 증거능력을 인정한 것에는 의문의 여지가 없다. 이러한 입법취지를 몰각하고 증거능력을 인정하는 제도가 이미 도입되었음에도 강학상의 해석론과 현상에 대한 진단과 전망만으로 조사자증언의 증거능력을 부정하는 견해는 타당하지 않다.

Hearsay evidence in Uganda: Understanding its meaning, admissibility and probative value

In Uganda legislation requires witnesses to adduce direct evidence in court. However, this may not be possible in all cases and the law provides for circumstances in which hearsay may be admissible. The Evidence Act is the main piece of legislation which governs the issue evidence. In this article, the author relied on 539 cases in which the Ugandan High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have dealt with hearsay evidence to establish the principles which these courts have developed on this issue. This case law shows, inter alia, that there are three major issues that Ugandan courts are still grappling with when it comes to hearsay evidence: the definition of hearsay; the admissibility of hearsay (exceptions to the hearsay rule) and the probative value of hearsay evidence. The author suggests ways in which courts can handle these issues.

Business and Public Records Hearsay Exceptions, Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) and (8); Multiple Level Hearsay, Fed.R.Evid. 805

Business Records: A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) if, (A) the records was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Fed.R.Evid. 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and (E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 101(b)(4) a “record” includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation which pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 101(b)(6) includes electronically stored information. The hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted business activities, widely referred to as the business records hearsay exception, rests upon considerations of both reliability and necessity. Records of regularly conducted activities cannot fulfill the function of aiding the proper transaction of business unless accurate. The motive for following a routine of accuracy is great and the motive to falsify largely non-existent. More specifically, the reliability of business records is supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, and/or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation. Given the nature of the reliability of business records, it makes no difference whether the records are those of a party or of a third person. Public Records: A record, which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation, or statement of a public office setting forth (A)(i) the office’s activities, or (A)(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law enforcement personnel, or (A)(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation, provided (B) that the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness is an exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 803(8). The exception is based upon the assumption that public officers will perform their duties, that they lack motive to falsify, and that public inspection to which many such records are subject will disclose inaccuracies. In addition, the disruptive effect of bringing public officials into court to testify about matters that have generally been accurately reported and recorded is avoided. Use of a certified copy of the record, see Fed.R.Evid. 902(4) and 1005, also serves the public convenience by saving time and the expenditure of public money. Moreover, the record is likely to be much more reliable than the official’s often hazy recollection. The absence of specific requirements of regular, regular, at, personal knowledge, at or near the time of the event, thus facilitating admission by certified copy of the public record, Fed.R.Evid. 902(4), when no question of trustworthiness has been raised, does not mean that the requirements of regularity, contemporaneousness, etc., should not be imposed in determining trustworthiness, i.e., “the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness,” Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(B), when a genuine question is raised. Multiple Level Hearsay: Hearsay within hearsay, often referred to as double level or multiple hearsay, is addressed in Fed.R.Evid. 805, which provides that if each of two or more statements falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, multiple hearsay is admissible. An illustration is the business record coming within the hearsay exception provided in Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), which includes within it information supplied by an informant not himself under a duty to provide such information. If the informant’s statement itself qualifies as a hearsay exception, for example, an excited utterance, Fed.R.Evid. 803(2), the record containing it is admissible provided among others that the person recording the excited utterance was under a business duty to do so. Similarly, if either the original statement or the statement within which the second level statement appears is admissible as not hearsay as defined in Fed.R.Evid. 801(d), provided that the remaining statement is so defined or qualifies as a hearsay exception, the two statements are admissible.

Exclusionary Rules of Evidence: Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions in Nigeria

Exclusionary Rules of Evidence: Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions in Nigeria

Admission by Party-Opponent, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2); Government Agent or Employee, Experts, Confrontation Clause

Admission by Party-Opponent, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2); Government Agent or Employee, Experts, Confrontation Clause

Implied assertions in criminal cases

The application of the hearsay rule to implied assertions has long been problematical. Prior to the decision in Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283, the balance of authority supported the view that the hearsay rule, while strict in its application, did not extend to implied assertions. In Walton v The Queen, the High Court moved to the position that the hearsay rule did extend to implied assertions, with a body of judicial opinion favouring a flexible, reliability based approach to the admissibility of implied hearsay. In Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR I, the High Court affirmed the applicability of the hearsay rule to implied assertions but returned to a strict approach to admissibility. In contrast, the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) restrict the application of the hearsay rule to express assertions, with admissibility being further extended by significant statutory exceptions to the rule. This approach is affirmed in the recent review of this uniform legislation carried out by the Australian, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions. It is submitted that when regard is had to the purposes which the hearsay rule is designed to serve, the rule should be treated as extending to implied oral and written assertions, but not to assertions to be implied from conduct. It is suggested that the hearsay rule is properly regarded as formalistic in nature, and that the rejection in Bannon v The Queen of a flexible approach to admissibility is correct in principle. Leeway should however exist, allowing for admissibility in appropriate cases. This is best achieved not by judicial flexibility, but rather by statutory provisions, such as those contained the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), which should be carefully construed having regard to the primary principle of exclusion.

Lost in Translation? The Difference Between the Hearsay Rule’s Historical Rationale and Practical Application

Lost in Translation? The Difference Between the Hearsay Rule’s Historical Rationale and Practical Application

Relationship between Hearsay Rule and Trial by Jury in US Evidentiary Rules- Management and Improvement of Hearsay Rule in Korea’s Citizen Participation Trials -

Relationship between Hearsay Rule and Trial by Jury in US Evidentiary Rules- Management and Improvement of Hearsay Rule in Korea’s Citizen Participation Trials -

Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence

The hearsay rule that excludes the reliable initial report of abuse by the domestic violence victim mocks the truth-finding process because victims’ false recantations or failure to appear at trial (hereinafter “no- show”) are the norm in domestic violence cases. Batterers pressure domestic violence victims to recant, which typically results in the failure of victims to appear or, alternatively, in testimony at trial that is less reliable than the victim’s initial report of the abuse. When a domestic violence victim fails to appear for trial because of a batterer’s coercion, fear of the batterer, or the potentially drastic consequences of leaving the batterer, the hearsay rule promotes the failure of the criminal case by excluding the initial report of abuse. As the hearsay rule excludes out of court statements of abuse, recantation or no-show by the victim results in no charge, dismissal, or acquittal. In most jurisdictions, the hearsay rule prohibits the use of domestic violence victims’ initial report of abuse as substantive evidence. Reform efforts within the criminal justice system designed to address the epidemic of domestic violence have failed to address hearsay problems and instead have focused on adoption of other informal and formal policy initiatives. This article argues that given that victims recant or fail to appear at trial in the majority of domestic violence cases, existing exceptions to the hearsay rule are inadequate to achieve truth-finding in these cases. The article proposes and analyses the constitutionality of two hearsay exceptions that provide solutions to the problem of the inadmissibility of the victim’s initial report. The proposed exceptions would greatly enhance truth-finding.

Forensics: Educating the Lawyers

The data shows that lawyers and judges are not adequately dealing with an important component of the job, that is, forensic science. They are inadequately educated. The data empirically demonstrates that this inadequate education has resulted in a crisis in the courts. Wrongful convictions have been documented at an alarming rate and a substantial number of those wrongful convictions, including condemnation of innocent people to death, are the result of substandard forensic expert testimony. In addition, controversies regarding civil judgments have continued to proliferate focusing on what is characterized as “junk science” invoked either for the plaintiffs or the defendants – or, sometimes, both. At the heart of this empirically verifiable crisis in forensic science, including wrongful convictions and unsupported civil judgments, is the fact that the end-users – the lawyers and judges – are under-educated on what should be admissible in court. Law school education, the Juris Doctor (J.D.) curriculum, does not have a sufficient component related to forensic science. As a result, lawyers and judges are not intellectually equipped to litigate and rule on the admissibility of forensic evidence and, where it is admissible, to fashion intelligent rulings regarding the scope of forensic opinions. This requires a paradigm shift in what constitutes a legal education. This is not to diminish the good work of a minority of judges and lawyers who have actively pursued an education in forensics but it is to state the empirically demonstrated fact that, in the majority of courtrooms, substandard science still appears and can be outcome determinative. These results occur with the participation of the many lawyers and judges who have no significant forensic education but who are, nevertheless, the end-users of forensic services. The education of these end-users should begin in law school. However, there is a lack of structure to the forensic education, if any, that is offered as a part of the J.D. curriculum. The typical evidence class in law school dedicates only a week or two to forensic evidence while spending several weeks on the hearsay rule. Electives in forensics are on the potential class list of many law schools but, even then, there is no regularity as to when they are offered and no structure for a forensic concentration as a part of the J.D. curriculum. This article recommends that the J.D. curriculum be revised to include more mandatory education relating to forensic evidence. Beyond that, this article recommends that there be concentrations or certificate programs offered in law and forensic science that can be accomplished while obtaining the J.D. degree. Finally, that organizations like the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and the Council of Forensic Science Educators, promote and encourage such programs.