When the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws opened its doors in the United States in 1969, the claim that abortion was a “right” was directed only at the repeal of laws against the procedure, so that women would be free to seek abortions and, as the Globe and Mail put it, so that physicians would be able “to perform their duties according to their conscience and their calling.” At that time, Canadians were repeatedly assured that “nobody would be forcing abortion procedures on anyone else.”Current rights claims must be distinguished from this early period. Contrary to early activist promises, current rights claims are meant to force health care workers and institutions to provide or at least facilitate abortion, contraception, and artificial reproduction, all of which remain morally controversial. A major “mover and shaker” in this project is the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR), The ultimate goal of the CRR is to establish what it calls “hard norms” - treaty-based international laws - that recognize access to abortion as a fundamental human right. It plans to develop a “culture of enforcement” that will compel governments to respect this right and enforce it against physicians and other health care workers. Even as it works toward this end, it is cultivating “soft norms” in the form of statements by international, regional, and intergovernmental bodies.Canadian Professor Bernard M. Dickens appears to follow this strategy in a standard text, Canadian Health Law and Policy, in his chapter on Informed Consent, addressing the topic of conscientious objection and disclosure of relevant information to a patient. He very selectively borrows terms from the Treaty of Rome and arranges his material to make it appear that conscientious objection that delays access to the morning after pill or abortion is actually or very nearly a crime against humanity analogous to torture, or, at least, an egregious violation of human rights. He also leaves out everything necessary for a proper understanding of the Treaty of Rome, which, incidentally, includes everything that might cause a reader to question his claims. Professor Dickens’ polemic seamlessly weaves the agenda of the Center for Reproductive Rights into a standard Canadian reference work. There is no doubt that this is advantageous to the Center and its allies, but it brings into question the reliability of Canadian Health Law and Policy. Perhaps it is time for a third and more carefully revised edition of the book.