Growth In Industrial Countries Research Articles

DOES FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT VOLATILITY AFFECT GROWTH VOLATILITY OF INDUSTRIES IN PAKISTAN?

This article investigates whether financial development volatility effect on growth volatility of industries? The findings of the study are based on panel data consisting of seven manufacturing industries listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) over the period of 1994-2013. The Results of this study reveal that financial development in banking sector diminishes growth volatilities of industries that highly depend upon external liquidity. Whereas, financial development volatility in banking sector increases growth volatility of industries. Further, combined effect of both volatilities, banking sector and stock market, also raise growth volatility of Industries. Policy implications that come out from this study that regulatory authority should closely observe the behavior of financial markets to ensure the stability in economic growth more precisely, industrial growth of country. In addition, this study also suggests that there should be further development in banking sector in order to sustain economic growth and stability in Pakistan.

The Economic Agenda: a View from the US

AbstractThe paper surveys the agenda needed to restore noninflationary growth in industrial countries. The role of fiscal policy as short‐run stimulus both on the spending side and on the tax side is discussed. The author comments on trade, specifically the new trade round, and international finance. Long‐run fiscal imbalances due to aging are analyzed. The role of fiscal institutions such as the European Growth and Stability Pact, the Japanese bad‐loan problem, and structural problems are put into the perspective that advanced economies should nurture their reforms globally so as to provide successful examples of reforms and prove helpful trading partners.

Impact of Structural Reforms on Productivity Growth in Industrial Countries

This paper investigates the impact of structural reforms on productivity growth. A panel analysis of 20 OECD countries finds that the impact of structural reforms on productivity growth may be weak or negative in the short run, possibly due to adjustment costs and the need for firms to learn how to operate in a less regulated and more competitive environment. In the long run, however, structural reforms are found to have significantly positive effects on productivity growth.

Impact of Structural Reformson Productivity Growth in Industrial Countries

This paper investigates the impact of structural reforms on productivity growth. A panel analysis of 20 OECD countries finds that the impact of structural reforms on productivity growth may be weak or negative in the short run, possibly due to adjustment costs and the need for firms to learn how to operate in a less regulated and more competitive environment. In the long run, however, structural reforms are found to have significantly positive effects on productivity growth.

Sharp reductions in current account deficits An empirical analysis

We study determinants and consequences of sharp reductions in current account imbalances (reversals) in low- and middle-income countries. We pose two questions: what triggers reversals, and what factors explain how costly reversals are? We find that both domestic variables, such as the current account balance, openness and the level of reserves, and external variables, such as terms of trade shocks, US real interest rates and growth in industrial countries, seem to play an important role in explaining reversals in current-account imbalances. We also find some evidence that countries with a less appreciated real exchange rate, higher investment and more openness prior to the reversal tend to grow faster after a reversal occurs.

An empirical analysis on the determinants of the real exchange rate in African countries

The study employs annual data over 1970–90, pooled across 38 African countries, to examine the effects of a wide range of macroeconomic policies, devaluation and fundamentals on real exchange rate behaviour. Our findings suggest that the following appreciate real exchange rate: fiscal deficits; domestic credit growth; total domestic absorption-GDP ratio; public consumption-GDP ratio; private consumption-GDP ratio; terms of trade improvement arising from falling import prices (but not rising export prices); per capita income; and black market exchange rate premium. On the other hand, devaluation; investment-GDP ratio; consumer-wholesale price ratio in trading-partner countries; and economic boom or growth in industrial countries are found to depreciate real exchange rate.

Sharp Reductions in Current Account Deficits: An Empirical Analysis

The paper studies determinants and consequences of sharp reductions in current account imbalances (reversals) in low- and middle-income countries. It poses two questions: what triggers reversals, and what factors explain how costly reversals are? It finds that both domestic variables, such as the current account balance, openness to trade, and the level of reserves, and external variables, such as terms of trade shocks, U.S. real interest rates, and growth in industrial countries, seem to play important roles in explaining reversals in current account imbalances. It also finds some evidence that countries with a less appreciated real exchange rate, higher investment, and more openness before the reversal tend to grow faster after a reversal occurs.

Sharp Reductions in Current Account Deficits: An Empirical Analysis

The paper studies determinants and consequences of sharp reductions in current account imbalances (reversals) in low- and middle-income countries. It poses two questions: what triggers reversals, and what factors explain how costly reversals are? It finds that both domestic variables, such as the current account balance, openness to trade, and the level of reserves, and external variables, such as terms of trade shocks, U.S. real interest rates, and growth in industrial countries, seem to play important roles in explaining reversals in current account imbalances. It also finds some evidence that countries with a less appreciated real exchange rate, higher investment, and more openness before the reversal tend to grow faster after a reversal occurs.

Foreign exchange constraints and developing countries

This paper presents a model of developing countries in which a foreign exchange constraint and imported intermediates are central features. The model is used to carry out different scenarios with respect to developing countries' economic performance in the 1990s. A baseline simulation shows that the real annual growth rate of per capita GDP for sub-Saharan Africa is zero or even negative during the 1990s; for the Asian and Latin American countries it will exceed 2.5%. Alternative scenarios assess the effects on developing countries' economic growth of higher economic growth in the industrial countries, an increase in total factor productivity growth in industrial countries, and an increase in ODA donations.

Une projection à moyen terme de la dette des pays en développement débiteurs de la France

A Medium-term Projection of the Debt of the Developing Countries Indebted to France Gérald Collange, François Guillaumat-Tailliet After the easing that followed the 1981-1982 debt crisis, the financial situation of indebted countries has again worsened. Among other indicators, the recent deterioration of the debt ratios reveals how critical the present situation is. French banks are particularly concerned, since their assets on developing countries amount to 400 billion francs. We develop a model which takes into account the determinants of trade between developing and OECD countries, as well as between developing countries themselves. Then we estimate the debt of the main countries indebted to French banks. Alternative simulations are computed according to hypotheses on the value taken by the key exogenous variables. The results allow us to derive some conclusions about the nature, magnitude and prospects of the developing countries indebtedness. The situation appears rather serious and not likely to be resolved by itself. However, the projection results tend to suggest that no fatality hangs over the debt problem. It is indeed possible to act efficiently in the interest of both debtors and creditors. More sustained growth in industrial countries could be the best answer to the debt problem. It would boost LDC exports, increase their activity and imports and therefore improve their development. Failing such sustained growth in industrial countries, a reduction in interest rates could alleviate financial constraint. In the less favorable case of a continued depressed international environment, resorting to adjustment policies (i.e. reduction in domestic expenditures, devaluation of their currency) turns out to be efficient in the medium-term, but costly. However, the benefits from such a policy (which is unfavorable to trade and to international cooperation) would be much less for both industrial and developing countries.

The ingredients of growth in industrial countries

Volume 6 of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe dealt with the industrial revolution and its aftermath, and especially with incomes, population and technological change. Volume 7, also in two substantial parts, tackles the question of growth along neo-classical lines. Neo-classical growth theory, as expounded in an introduction by Robert M. Solow and Peter Temin, presupposes a production function in which growth is the result of changes in the quantities of inputs land, labor, capital and enterprise plus a "residual" which presumably measures the shift of the production surface derived from isoquants toward the origin and is generally thought of as technical progress. Volume 7 of the Cambridge Economic History appears to take for granted that land is a fixed input in production though there is some basis for doubt on this score and seeks to measure the inputs of capital (including land-clearing), labor and enterprise, or if not to measure at least to discuss them fully as a way of understanding the economic growth of the major industrial countries, including three not properly-speaking European. It cannot be claimed that the total takes us very far in the direction of understanding growth. The editors of the Cambridge Economic History are notoriously permissive, allowing their distinguished authors, each to develop his or her subject in his or her own way, with no attempt made either to have separate authors on the same subject in different countries address their material in a consistent manner, to allow cross comparisons, or to coordinate the several authors on different inputs in the same country, so that one can effectively measure the national "residual." The papers cover different time periods, use different methods, exhibit different degrees of scholarly apparatus as indicated by the number and detail of footnotes and the length and variety of bibliography. There was a delay caused by the death in October

Chapter V. The World Overseas

Growth in industrial countries as a whole again amounted to nearly 5 per cent in 1966 (table 47) but the rate slowed down during the summer after moving ahead quite sharply in the first half of the year (table 34).Industrial production was more or less static in North America after August, and in Europe production has actually fallen slightly, reflecting the declines in Germany and the United Kingdom as well as in some of the smaller countries. The relatively favourable overall result in 1966 arose largely from the diversity of phasing as between different countries. France, Italy and Japan had found it necessary some two years ago to adopt the type of anti-inflationary restrictive policies now being applied in most other industrial countries. They therefore now have reserves of unused labour and capacity which enable them to expand without the inhibitions about wage and price inflation which are afflicting the other main industrial countries.