Group Of Governmental Experts Research Articles

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Ethical Dilemmas and Legal Compliance in the Era of Military Disruptive Technologies

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) have emerged as one of the most significant advancements in military technology, leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to execute missions without direct human control. As these systems become central to modern warfare, they raise critical questions about their compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). This paper delves into the legal and ethical debates surrounding LAWS with particular attention to the discussions within the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (GGE on LAWS). We analyze whether these technologies can adhere to fundamental human rights while maintaining their operational efficacy. Through the application of the Autonomy Spectrum Framework to real-world scenarios, the study highlights both the strategic advantages of LAWS and the risks of dehumanizing warfare. The need for robust legal frameworks to ensure accountability and human oversight remains paramount.

Putting algorithmic bias on top of the agenda in the discussions on autonomous weapons systems

Biases in artificial intelligence have been flagged in academic and policy literature for years. Autonomous weapons systems—defined as weapons that use sensors and algorithms to select, track, target, and engage targets without human intervention—have the potential to mirror systems of societal inequality which reproduce algorithmic bias. This article argues that the problem of engrained algorithmic bias poses a greater challenge to autonomous weapons systems developers than most other risks discussed in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS), which should be reflected in the outcome documents of these discussions. This is mainly because it takes longer to rectify a discriminatory algorithm than it does to issue an apology for a mistake that occurs occasionally. Highly militarised states have controlled both the discussions and their outcomes, which have focused on issues that are pertinent to them while ignoring what is existential for the rest of the world. Various calls from civil society, researchers, and smaller states for a legally binding instrument to regulate the development and use of autonomous weapons systems have always included the call for recognising algorithmic bias in autonomous weapons, which has not been reflected in discussion outcomes. This paper argues that any ethical framework developed for the regulation of autonomous weapons systems should, in detail, ensure that the development and use of autonomous weapons systems do not prejudice against vulnerable sections of (global) society.

Emergent Normativity: Communities of Practice, Technology, and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems

Abstract Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are the subject of considerable international debate turning around the extent to which humans remain in control over using force. But what is precisely at stake is less clear as stakeholders have different perspectives on the technologies that animate LAWS. Such differences matter because they shape the substance of the debate, which regulatory options are put on the table, and also normativity on LAWS in the sense of understandings of appropriateness. To understand this process, I draw on practice theories, science and technology studies (STS), and critical norm research. I argue that a constellation of communities of practice (CoPs) shapes the public debate about LAWS and focus on three of these CoPs: diplomats, weapon manufacturers, and journalists. Actors in these CoPs discursively perform practices of boundary-work, in the STS sense, to shape understandings of technologies at the heart of LAWS: automation, autonomy, and AI. I analyze these dynamics empirically in two steps: first, by offering a general-level analysis of practices of boundary-work performed by diplomats at the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS from 2017 to 2022; and second, through examining such practices performed by weapon manufacturers and journalists in relation to the use of loitering munitions, a particular type of LAWS, in the Second Libyan Civil War (2014–2020).

Examining Supply Chain Risks in Autonomous Weapon Systems and Artificial Intelligence

The development of increasingly AI-enabled autonomous systems and other military applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been recognised as emergent major military innovations. In the absence of an effective and enforceable ban on their development and/or usage arising from the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), it is likely that such systems will continue to be development. Amongst the legal, ethical, practical, and strategic concerns raised by the emergence of such systems, it is important not to lose sight of the risks involved in relying on a high-manufactured system in place of a human. This places additional strains and importance on securing diverse, com�plex, and over cross-jurisdictional supply chains. This article focuses on the vulnerability of and the risks to the integrity and security of the supply chains responsible for producing AI-enabled autonomous military systems.

Practice-based and public-deliberative normativity: retaining human control over the use of force

The debate about lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) characterises them as future problems in need of pre-emptive regulation, for example, through codifying meaningful human control. But autonomous technologies are already part of weapons and have shaped how states think about human control. To understand this normative space, I proceed in two steps: first, I theorise how practices of designing, of training personnel for, and of operating weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies have shaped normativity/normality on human control at sites unseen. Second, I trace how this normativity/normality interacts with public deliberations at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS by theorising potential dynamics of interaction. I find that the normativity/normality emerging from practices performed in relation to weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies assigns humans a reduced role in specific use of force decisions and understands this diminished decision-making capacity as ‘appropriate’ and ‘normal’. In the public-deliberative process, stakeholders have interacted with this normativity by ignoring it, engaging in distancing or positively acknowledging it – rather than scrutinising it. These arguments move beyond prioritising public deliberation in norm research towards exploring practices performed at sites outside of the public eye as productive of normativity. I theorise this process via international practice theories, critical security studies and Science and Technology scholarship to draw out how practices shape normativity, presenting ideas of oughtness and justice, and normality, making something appear normal via collective, repeated performances.

«ЗАКУЛИСЬЕ» ПРЕЗИДЕНТСКИХ ВЫБОРОВ В США 2016 Г. ПРОБЛЕМА ИНФОРМАЦИОННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

The article deals with accusations against Russia of unauthorized interference in the information system of the National Committee of the Democratic Party of the USA. The main attention in the article, for the first time in domestic and foreign historiography, is paid to the analysis of technical aspects of documents published by the prosecution. Thanks to the study of this problem, it is possible to reveal in more detail the tools and mechanisms of the information war that the United States is trying to wage against Russia, as well as to understand its logic and main directions. In this regard, the tools and mechanisms, technical capabilities and techniques used by various American political and military structures, which were willingly used by the media as part of the information war, are analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that from the very beginning of the investigation, the American side has been focused on solving two main problems: firstly, internal political issues related to the company against D. Trump; and secondly, the geopolitical confrontation with Russia. Such an approach by the United States to solving the problem does not contribute to the development of the Russian-American dialogue in the field of cybersecurity issues, and also casts doubt on the prospects for cooperation within the framework of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Achievements in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

Accountability for the Taking of Human Life with LAWS in War

AbstractAccountability for developing, deploying, and using any emerging weapons system is affirmed as a guiding principle by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Yet advances in emerging technologies present accountability challenges throughout the life cycle of a weapons system. Mindful of a lack of progress at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 2019, this essay argues for a mechanism capable of imputing accountability when individual agent accountability is exceeded, forensic accountability unreliable, and aspects of political accountability fail.

The Utility of Weapons Reviews in Addressing Concerns Raised by Autonomous Weapon Systems

Abstract The obligation to legally review weapons, means and methods of warfare has been identified by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems as one of its Guiding Principles. Despite calls to share practical measures and processes to undertake this review, national practice remains opaque and fragmented. This article describes the traditional weapons review process and explains why this process may need to be modified to adequately evaluate autonomous weapon systems (AWS). It uses three case studies of fictional AWS in various stages of development and acquisition to demonstrate how existing review processes can be adapted for the review of AWS. This article shows the utility of these reviews for ensuring compliance of AWS with existing legal requirements, thereby also demonstrating the suitability of existing law to regulate the use of this novel technology in warfare.

The risks of autonomous weapons: An analysis centred on the rights of persons with disabilities

AbstractAutonomous weapons systems have been the subject of heated debate since 2010, when Philip Alston, then Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, brought the issue to the international spotlight in his interim report to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 65th Session. Alston affirmed that “automated technologies are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and artificial intelligence reasoning and decision-making abilities are actively being researched and receive significant funding. States’ militaries and defence industry developers are working to develop ‘fully autonomous capability’, such that technological advances in artificial intelligence will enable unmanned aerial vehicles to make and execute complex decisions, including the identification of human targets and the ability to kill them.”1 Later, in 2013, Christof Heyns, who was Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions at the time, published a report that elaborated further on the issues raised by what he called “lethal autonomous robotics”.2 Following a recommendation by Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters at the UN General Assembly 68th Session, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as amended on 21 December 2021, started discussing autonomous weapons systems in 2014. Then, the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS)3 was created in 2016 to focus on this issue.4 While the group has kept meeting since then, no clear steps have been taken yet towards a normative framework on autonomous weapons as of September 2022.In all these years, persons with disabilities – including conflict survivors – have not been included in discussions, nor has the disability perspective been reflected in international debate on autonomous weapons. Only recently has there been any effort to consider the rights of persons with disabilities when examining ethical questions related to artificial intelligence (AI). In this article, we will examine how and why autonomous weapons have a disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities, because of the discrimination that results from a combination of factors such as bias in AI, bias in the military and the police, barriers to justice and humanitarian assistance in situations of armed conflict, and the lack of consultation and participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations on issues related to autonomy in weapons systems.

Autonomous Weapon Systems and Human Control

The deployment of autonomous weapon systems (‘aws’) in military operations is a major concern for the international community. While the military in particular argues that increased autonomy mitigates the risks of death and injury for civilians, scientists and civil society emphasise that humans still have to play a decisive role when increasingly outsourcing core competences to machines. In 2017, a Group of Governmental Experts (‘gge’) met for the first time to discuss legal and ethical issues of aws. The centrepiece of the debate was (and still is) the role humans play in an increasingly automated battlefield. In the past couple of years, consensus has been emerging on the necessity of maintaining human control. It will be argued in this contribution that human control (in abstracto) is not merely a political demand. It is also a legal obligation derived from international humanitarian law (‘ihl’). This contribution seeks to analyse relevant rules of ihl with a specific focus on the legal nature of the Martens Clause arguing that human control (in abstracto) is not only politically desired but that it is legally required. That being said, the various concepts aiming to implement and operationalise human control (in concreto) will be examined with a view to offering solutions for a potential regulatory framework on aws at the United Nations (‘UN’) in Geneva.

Cyber norms: technical extensions and technological challenges

ABSTRACT Since the late 1990s, the UN has been home to debates and negotiations on the rules, norms and principles of states' responsible behaviour in cyberspace. As these discussions matured over years, they have been taken further to different fora and have been embedded in various stakeholder initiatives. In early 2021, the Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the context of international security (OEWG) and the UN Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security (GGE) presented their respective consensus reports, the result of over two years work. It is not only the content of this work per se that is of interest - both in what has been achieved and which parts of these mandates were less successful. These processes, historically due to the two-decades-long GGE efforts, are shaping more than just the states' commitments around cyber strategies. They help build an overarching normative environment shifting priorities in cyber risk management and contribute to the development of voluntary tech-norms, while doing this out of sync with the implications of the emerging technologies for state as well as non-state actors' accountability in cyberspace.

The (im)possibilities of addressing election interference and the public core of the internet in the UN GGE and OEWG: a mid-process assessment

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how the twin UN processes of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) are willing and able to address two ‘below-the-threshold’ problems in their deliberations. The call for the protection of the public core of the internet and the call for the protection against foreign election interference have been flagged by many state and non-state parties for consideration by both processes. This paper analyses the threats that the vulnerability of the public core of the internet and foreign election interference pose for stability in cyberspace, as well as the legal and normative proposals that have been suggested to promote responsible state behaviour. On the basis of the public documents that states have submitted to the more transparent OEWG process, the contours are sketched of what the inclusion of these issues in possible consensus reports for both processes may look like. The OEWG concluded its deliberations with a consensus report that addresses some aspects of these issues, shifting the task of further elaboration and guidance firstly onto the ongoing UN GGE process, as well as onto the new OEWG 2021–2025 and other UN processes that are emerging.

Toward a Normative Model of Meaningful Human Control over Weapons Systems

AbstractThe notion of meaningful human control (MHC) has gathered overwhelming consensus and interest in the autonomous weapons systems (AWS) debate. By shifting the focus of this debate to MHC, one sidesteps recalcitrant definitional issues about the autonomy of weapons systems and profitably moves the normative discussion forward. Some delegations participating in discussions at the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems meetings endorsed the notion of MHC with the proviso that one size of human control does not fit all weapons systems and uses thereof. Building on this broad suggestion, we propose a “differentiated”—but also “principled” and “prudential”—framework for MHC over weapons systems. The need for a differentiated approach—namely, an approach acknowledging that the extent of normatively required human control depends on the kind of weapons systems used and contexts of their use—is supported by highlighting major drawbacks of proposed uniform solutions. Within the wide space of differentiated MHC profiles, distinctive ethical and legal reasons are offered for principled solutions that invariably assign to humans the following control roles: (1) “fail-safe actor,” contributing to preventing the weapon's action from resulting in indiscriminate attacks in breach of international humanitarian law; (2) “accountability attractor,” securing legal conditions for international criminal law (ICL) responsibility ascriptions; and (3) “moral agency enactor,” ensuring that decisions affecting the life, physical integrity, and property of people involved in armed conflicts be exclusively taken by moral agents, thereby alleviating the human dignity concerns associated with the autonomous performance of targeting decisions. And the prudential character of our framework is expressed by means of a rule, imposing by default the more stringent levels of human control on weapons targeting. The default rule is motivated by epistemic uncertainties about the behaviors of AWS. Designated exceptions to this rule are admitted only in the framework of an international agreement among states, which expresses the shared conviction that lower levels of human control suffice to preserve the fail-safe actor, accountability attractor, and moral agency enactor requirements on those explicitly listed exceptions. Finally, we maintain that this framework affords an appropriate normative basis for both national arms review policies and binding international regulations on human control of weapons systems.

Meaningful Human Control of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: The CCW-Debate and Its Implications for VSD

The debate on the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) as an emerging technology is of increasing importance, with discussions stalling and technological development progressing. Monitoring the progress of increasingly autonomous weapons systems in civilian and military use [1] as well as regulating possible autonomous systems early on is demanded by civil society actors, like the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), while nation states follow a variety of interests and strategies, showing little room for consensus on central terms and questions [2], [3]. This article therefore sheds light on the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The CCW, offering an arena for international cooperation, has dedicated itself to the purpose of finding common ground with respect to an understanding of LAWS, as well as to the necessary degree of human control. From an ethical perspective, the concept of Meaningful Human Control (MHC) supports a human-centric approach. Several IEEE projects, series and publications [4] are dedicated to this prioritization, especially regarding civilian use. As autonomous technology is increasingly at the center of contemporary military innovations, questions of (human) agency and responsibility in warfare have become even more pressing [5]. As stressed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the concept of MHC may prove useful in the context of development and use of (semi-) autonomous weaponry [6].

Filling Global Governance Gaps in Cybersecurity: International and European Legal Perspectives

The many recent cyber incidents have shown how cybersecurity has entered the realm of international relations. Several international organizations have taken cybersecurity policy initiatives, notably the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Both organizations aspire to a leading role in enhancing cybersecurity resilience. To date, however, these initiatives have not resulted in much regulation. This article examines which factors make lawmaking and the regulation of cybersecurity difficult at the international level, and whether some of these impediments are shared at the EU legislative level. Are difficulties in regulating cybersecurity embedded in the normative processes at the UN or the EU, or are they inherent to the high-tech phenomenon of cyber? As for the UN, the article looks at the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). While previous reports of the UN GGE seemed to point to an emerging international opinio juris, recent developments in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) show a strongly divided international community. At the EU level, the article discusses the two main legislative initiatives on cybersecurity that have seen the light of day: the 2016 Directive on Network and Information Security and the 2019 Regulation on the EU Cybersecurity Act.

Information and telecommunications diplomacy in the context of international security at the United Nations

PurposeThe development of technologies for the conduct of cyber operations represents an opportunity for states to defend their interests in international relations but also bears risks and challenges. Since the early 2000s, the United Nations “group of governmental experts (GGE) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” debates on this issue. This paper aims to investigate how states are challenged in the development of international cyber norms and where capacity to act is idle, i.e. to assess how much has been reached in the international community’s debate on cyber threats and malicious behaviors in the international security context and to identify directions to move GGE work further.Design/methodology/approachThe methodology uses an extensive text-based desk research and relies on a thorough collection, analysis and interpretation of the United Nations (UNs) documents. When specific substantial topics are addressed in the GGE, the content of the debate was confronted with issue-specific academic literature on those matters.FindingsThe results highlight that the GGE managed to gather consensus on a number of cooperation and normative measures in this politically highly sensitive topic and more deliverables are expected during this and next year. The paper identifies a weakness in terms of operational implementation though. The paper proposes a few examples of concrete headways that could complement existing consensus, especially on the implementation side.Originality/valueBecause of its political sensitivity, the GGE has worked with discretion and has attracted little academic attention. This paper is an original and timely attempt to assess the achievements and possible outlook of this endeavor of the international community, including the incipient work of a recently established open-ended working group. It also attempts to connect the subject matter discussed in the UN with related academic literature, including in respect of definitional and conceptual issues.

Проблема международной информационной безопасности в ООН

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have transformed society and the economy and expanded opportunities for international cooperation. However, the unique capabilities of ICTs are used not only for the common good of humanity. Today, we are talking about an accelerated increase in threats in the information and cyberspace. Many states consider them as additional, but often these are the main spaces for military-political confrontation. Thus, the issues of inadmissibility of application of ICTs with military and political purposes for realization of hostile actions and acts of aggression are critically urgent acute. For this reason, the task of ensuring international information security has become part of the agenda for one of the six main committees of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) – the First Committee, where states investigate threats to peace, seek for ways to promote global security and disarmament. Discussion on international information security issues within this Committee plays a crucial role and requires a deep analysis by the scientific and expert community. The article presents the results of this analysis, starting from 1998, when the problem of international information security was first discussed at the UN on the initiative of Russia. The study identifies and investigates the possibilities and prospects of implementing the main goal in the process of ensuring international information security: namely, the creation of an international legal regime to ban the development, production and use of information and cyber weapons. In addition, this paper includes the results of a study on the UN work and prospects for its success in maintaining international information security in a new format: within the framework of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) organized in 2019 at the suggestion of Russia, and the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) proposed by the United States. The output of both groups is going to have a significant impact on information security trends and policies on a global scale. Therefore, a timely scientific analysis of the issue, current challenges and threats, as well as the forecast of trends and prospects for enhancing international information security, presented in the article, are currently among the most relevant tasks.

Technological Innovations and the Changing Character of Warfare: the Significance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Seventy Years On

Seventy years after the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions on 12 August 1949 the changing character of warfare is influenced by, among other things, technological innovations such as artificial intelligence and robotics. States are integrating new technologies into the military sphere for both defensive and offensive capabilities. This impacts on military doctrines, weaponry, and operational strategies. Under the auspices of the 1980 UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems is currently deliberating on the legal and ethical issues regarding autonomous weapons, and whether new legally binding or non-legally binding rules should be established regarding their use, restriction, or prohibition. In this context, it is worth reviewing the role and significance of Geneva law provisions in relation to technological innovations in methods and means of warfare.

The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: A Wake-Up Call for the Global South

The militarization of artificial intelligence (AI) is well under way and leading military powers have been investing large resources in emerging technologies. Calls for AI governance at international level are expected to increase and the United Nations is well positioned to offer a commonly agreed platform for prevention, foresight, and cooperation among states and other stakeholders to address the impact of new technologies. A telling example for the area of strategic studies is the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems, under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the most important multilateral discussion on AI, peace and security today. The article makes the case for further engagement from scholars, policymakers, and practitioners of the Global South in the ongoing debate on AI policy and international relations to mitigate risks and adopt governance tools, including norms, principles, regimes, institutions, and political commitments.

Algorithms of Violence: Critical Social Perspectives on Autonomous Weapons

Algorithms of Violence:Critical Social Perspectives on Autonomous Weapons Peter Asaro (bio) INTRODUCTION For the past six years, a treaty body within the United Nations called the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) has held a series of informal Meetings of Experts, followed by an ongoing series of formal Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) meetings on the questions surrounding lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS): What are they, and should their development and use by militaries be prohibited or restricted in any way? These discussions have focused primarily on how existing law might, or might not, apply to such systems; where the technology is heading; and how modern militaries develop, evaluate, and deploy systems with high degrees of automation (United Nations Office at Geneva 2019). To a lesser extent, they have also explored the moral and ethical dimensions of such systems, including a presentation by myself in 2014 (Asaro 2014). Civil society has made clear its view that autonomous weapons pose numerous threats that are best addressed by prohibiting their development and use (www.stopkillerrobots.org). There has, however, been only limited discussion of the political implications of these systems, and almost no discussion of the socioeconomic implications. I have written elsewhere about the ethical [End Page 537] and legal implications of autonomous weapons, as well as the risks they pose to global security (Asaro 2012, 687–709). In this paper, I take a more critical long-term view and investigate how the development and widespread adoption and use of autonomous weapons might transform the politics and economics of our societies. Such a discussion is urgently needed and could further inform the general public about the consequences of failing to prohibit or regulate autonomous weapons. More broadly, there is rapidly growing public interest in the ways that algorithms shape our lives politically, socially, and economically. Small automated decisions, with a variety of built-in assumptions, and sometimes based on patterns learned from deeply biased datasets, are increasingly having more frequent, and more significant, impact on our lives. But if the cumulative effect of decisions that control access to healthcare, jobs, education, and loans has a disturbing power to shape society at large, surely automating decisions to use violent and lethal force against humans would have similar if not greater impacts on human social and political relationships. Yet there has been little consideration of the social and political implications of automating violence, apart from considerations of how such weapons might upset military balances of power and destabilize regional and global politics through arms races. This paper aims to fill that void. DEFINING AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND VIOLENT ALGORITHMS In the ongoing discussions at the United Nations, there has been some measure of confusion over the precise meaning of lethal autonomous weapons systems, as well as various alternative terms put forth. The alternatives attempt to address different aspects of the concept, such as fully autonomous weapons, or to include less-lethal weapons by dropping the "lethal" portion of the term. Attempting to define "autonomous" has proven a particular sticking point that raises questions about the fundamental nature of agency, self-determination, and [End Page 538] causality. Moreover, the term "autonomy" is used in different ways by philosophers, engineers, lawyers, and social scientists. Adding a modifier like "fully" further requires differentiating partial or semiautonomous systems from fully autonomous systems. Given the complex and debatable nature of autonomy, and the urgency of the concerns over autonomous weapons, it is advisable not to wait for a precise definition of autonomy and/or its degrees. Indeed, when we look to the kinds of systems that engineers have been calling "autonomous robotics," we find something very different from what philosophers have been calling "autonomous agents." Originally, engineers and roboticists used the term "autonomous robotics" to emphasize the fact that the robots could carry their own computer control systems rather than be tethered to them by large cables (Bekey 2005). With the advance of microelectronics, this form of autonomy is now trivial, though the term is still used to describe robots capable of navigating and manipulating in open or unstructured environments (as opposed to closed and structured environments like factories). Rather, what concerns us about the "autonomy" of weapons systems...