AbstractExisting literature on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions disclosure has paid little attention to private firms, despite the fact that this type of firm is responsible for significant GHG emissions. This study empirically analyzes the GHG disclosure of German private firms. The results suggest that more pronounced information asymmetries due to a more dispersed ownership structure and/or multiple bank relationships are associated with more extensive GHG disclosure. This aligns with arguments from agency and stakeholder theory. While this result is not new for public firms, it is for private firms. Given the specific characteristics of this type of firms (no separation of ownership and control, private communication channels, close bank–borrower relationships), it is not a straightforward assumption that observations from public firms can be transferred to private firms one-to-one. Moreover, higher levels of actual GHG emissions are also associated with more GHG disclosure, indicating that legitimacy theory arguments hold for private firms as well.