Great Power Status Research Articles

Russia vs America cyber war: space technology mastery competition

Mastery of computers and information systems in international relations is one of the elements of a country's new power. In the context of cyber warfare, Russia and the United States are trying to modernize their technology to secure their countries in the event of an attack from the opposing party. This research aims to analyze the space technology competition carried out by two major countries, namely Russia and the United States, to achieve Great Power status in the international world. This research focuses on the technological achievements of Russia and the United States in the field of space and their implementation in the form of cyber warfare. A qualitative case study is the research method chosen by the researcher. The research stages used by researchers are divided into data collection stages and data reduction, and the next stage is that researchers conduct analysis using data reduction techniques, namely summarizing, selecting, and focusing on the things needed in this study. The results of this study show that national security priorities are number one, and especially defense priorities for the United States are no longer terrorism but great power competition. NATO is an alliance or political tool that the US relies on to achieve great power.

The Religious Component in Contemporary Russian Imperialism

Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, various voices in the Russian public sphere have been trying to make sense of Russia’s new place in the world, its geopolitical horizons, and the identity of its people. One of the dominant trends that have emerged is Orthodox imperialism, which combines religious symbols and narratives with a geopolitical vision of Russian expansion and “reunification”. This article provides an overview of the Russian Orthodox imperialist voices, analysing the political norms and identities they have enabled. Our investigation shows that by advancing a programme that combines geopolitical restoration and eschatological religious mission, Orthodox imperialism offers an ideological solution to the problem of Russia’s lost great-power status. This solution, however, does not envisage a bright future for Russia or the world. On the contrary, it remains firmly fixated on the past, foretelling of an apocalyptic disaster if Moscow does not regain its former imperial glory and exercise its divine role as a “restrainer” to any global domination.

China’s Economic, Military, Science and Technological Emergence in International Politics: Implications for United States’ Hegemony

This study examined China’s emergence in international politics using the economic, military, science and technological pointers and its implications for United States’ hegemony. This topic was of interest because the struggle by states to assume the position of global political headman ship has been a constant decimal in international relations history. The contemporary international system elevates the United States as the triumphant superpower. The continued growth of China’s economy and the current modernization and buildup of its military has become a source of open concern for some scholars and statesmen both in the west and in the regions adjacent to China. The increasing influence of China in international affairs and her gradual move towards great power status have caused anxiety to the extent that how to deal with China is the puzzle of this new millennium. The questions that were of interest included; To what extent does China’s economic expansion, military modernization programme and advancement in science and technology threaten US hegemony in the International system? Neorealism theory was adopted for this study because its basic concepts of anarchy, structure, capability, distribution of power, polarity and national interest boosted the analytical strength of this study and enhanced understanding of the subject matter. In seeking answers to the questions raised, the study adopted the documentary research method and trend research design. Data was sourced from mainly secondary sources and analysed through a survey of the documents collected. Findings revealed that beside the aspect of China’s military modernization, its economic expansion and advancement in science and technology poses a real threat to US hegemony in those areas. It was recommended that both countries should increase investment in the other and also that a dialogue-based approach should be adopted to help each country consider how best to maximize cooperation whilst minimizing tension and conflict.

Why the quad is not squaring off in the South China Sea: evaluating interests, objectives and capacity

ABSTRACT The Quad has formulated repeated statements confirming their shared interests and common commitment to maritime issues and highlighting the South China Sea as an area of strategic priority. However, beyond diplomatic declarations, the Quad has taken few actions in the maritime domain and none to influence the dynamics of the South China Sea disputes. Why words have not been translated into action is the central question of this article. Comparative analysis involving three variables – interests, stakes and power projection capacity – shows that the members’ primary divergence is related to India’s deemphasising the preservation of the status quo rules-based maritime order. India is also the member preventing the Quad from moving into coordinated activities, as can be seen by the regularly coordinated diplomatic stances and naval actions conducted trilaterally among the others in the South China Sea. This will sustain the Quad as a secondary actor in the South China Sea disputes. Furthermore, it suggests that whereas Australia and Japan are responding to the evolving geopolitical structure by finding common cause with the United States-led order, India is behaving as a rising power seeking to manage the challenge posed by China while growing into its own great power status.

India's Quest for Status and Neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War: BRICS, a Case Study

Employing BRICS as a case study, this paper argues that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its quest for status via BRICS because a souring of the India-Russia bilateral relationship will not affect India's quest for status through the BRICS. First, India and Russia have joined and co-developed BRICS to achieve their national and foreign policy goals such as great power status, challenging US hegemony and achieving a multipolar world order, reform of the liberal international order and Bretton Woods institutions and other objectives. Both countries have much to lose by allowing their problematic bilateral relationship to adversely impact the BRICS. Second, the BRICS is structured in such a way that its operating procedures/principles including consensus-based decision making and intentionally omitting controversial issues implies that bilateral problems between member states are not tabled and they do not make the group dysfunctional.

Back to the Moon ... to stay?

Despite a lack of public enthusiasm, NASA’s Artemis program will endure because human spaceflight has strong congressional support and signals great-power status.

No Great Russia without Greater Russia

This paper argues that to understand the invasion of Ukraine, we need to have better insights into the Kremlin’s particular world view and Russia’s place within it. This view is based on a sense of entitlement to great power status, going hand in hand with an identity of itself as a country that extends beyond the actual borders of the Russian Federation. What makes the position unique is that the geopolitical and identity arguments are inseparable: in the Kremlin’s world view, Russia can only be a great power if it also exists as greater Russia. This structural factor is labelled the geopolitics-identity nexus. To explain why the invasion happened in 2022, three additional process factors are outlined: a radicalisation of the view of Ukraine as Russian lands, driven by the feeling of existential crisis when tensions over Ukraine escalated in 2014; an escalation of policy options resulting from consecutive failures in Russia’s Ukraine policy; and a reversal of the argument that Russia has to be a great power to exist within its 1991 borders into an argument that Russia has to expand its territory to be a great power.

From Condemnation to Cooperation: The Evolution of China’s Position toward UN Peacekeeping Operations

In its capacity as a great power, China has assumed greater responsibilities regarding the provision of global public goods. Therefore, it has become the UN Security Council’s permanent member which contributes the largest amount of troops to peacekeeping operations. Consequently, China has steadily increased its financial contributions and registered an 8.000 peacekeeping stand-by force. Nonetheless, China’s current leadership in the field of peacekeeping operations differs radically from its initial rejection for missions which it regarded as imperialist instruments destined to undermine the progress of revolutionary movements and weaken the principle of sovereignty. Therefore, in this article, I will explain the evolution of China’s stance toward UN PKOs from an outright rejection to a moderate opposition, and from a limited support to an active participation. Furthermore, I will explain how PKOs enable China to protect its national interests in conflict zones and upgrade its military capabilities through military operations other than war. (MOOTW). Finally, I will explain that this stance is the reflection of evolving national conception roles and of a more ambitious Chinese foreign policy; through which Beijing seeks to strengthen international cooperation, safeguard its interests and nationals overseas, redefine international norms and global governance schemes and reaffirm its great power status.

The AUKUS Anvil: Promise and Peril

The nascent Australia–United Kingdom–United States security partnership, known as AUKUS, aims to secure for the Royal Australian Navy from the US and the UK a capability in nuclear-powered submarines to bolster allied deterrence in the Pacific. The partnership’s strategic loft and immense ambition have already afforded it almost mythical status. But its pathway is hardly free of potential obstacles, which include limited defence-industrial capacities, production delays, personnel shortfalls, cost overruns and geopolitical change. If AUKUS is seen as strengthening the strategic linkage between the US and Australia, as an American endorsement of a close ally, and as Britain’s claim to great-power status, unravelling it would likely have the reverse effect. As the project unfolds, and particularly as divisive issues become more urgent, maintaining political and strategic alignments among the three capitals will inevitably become more challenging.

Race, nation, empire? Historicising outward and inward-facing British nationalism

Brexit has continued to capture the attention of International Relations (IR) scholars, where it has been linked to the burgeoning debate on race and postcolonialism. This article adds to this scholarship by historicising the question of imperial nostalgia, which has been central to these intersecting literatures. It re-examines how influential theorists Hall and Gilroy linked the peculiarities of British national consciousness to traumas issuing from the loss of great power status. It emphasises two themes often lacking in recent accounts of Brexit nationalism: namely, the centrality of military mobilisation to national consciousness; and the unevenness between popular and elite sentiment with regards to the imperial dimension. In historicising themes of extroversion and introversion, it reconsiders the significant metamorphoses in post-Thatcherite British nationalism, which had centred on proclaiming a national renaissance founded in foreign policy successes, international moral leadership and a state-led consensus for rolling out globalisation worldwide. The research shows that revisionism about the British Empire played a significant role in foreign policy discourse across this period, as did pro-EU sentiment among the governing and ruling elite. It highlights the mechanisms which allowed UK foreign policy intellectuals to link the military roll-out of ‘postmodern’ social norms with the European project’s end goals. These findings help historically situate Brexit amid a succession of crises for the liberal global order. The research finds that, whereas Brexit appeared initially as a retreat or break from the UK’s post-Thatcherite ‘globalising’ nationalism, subsequent developments highlight significant continuities.

Rethinking ‘middle powers’ as a category of practice: stratification, ambiguity, and power

AbstractScholars have attempted to theorise the social structure of the international system from the perspective of the ‘middle powers’ for decades. However, scholars have struggled to agree on the essential dispositional characteristics of this category of actors, stunting theoretical progress. Drawing on sociological and literary approaches to the rhetoric of the ‘middle class’ in domestic societies, this article shifts the terms of this debate away from asking who the ‘middle powers’ are or what their ‘essence’ is, to ask what actors do with the term in practice. Combining this with and contributing to scholarship on hierarchy in international relations, I recast ‘middle powers’ as a category of practice and argue that one of the term's main uses is to differentiate certain status-anxious states – that hold no real prospect of achieving great power status – from ‘small states’ that occupy the lowest stratum of stratification within the ‘grading of powers’. Following an illustrative case study of Australian and Canadian attempts to establish the ‘middle power’ category in the 1940s, the article then outlines the contributions of the argument for the study of status and hierarchy in world politics.

‘Sovereign Democracy’: Russian Response to Western Democracy Promotion in the Post-Soviet Space

Russia became apprehensive after the outbreak of Colour Revolutions in three former Soviet republics. Post-revolution, Russia’s foreign policy in general and its outlook toward the West in particular transformed significantly. Russian response to Western democracy promotion became more pronounced. Against this backdrop, the concept of Sovereign Democracy has to be understood. It aims to not only defend the Russian regime from Western meddling but also undertake a vigorous international campaign to assert its great power status. This article deals with the meaning and rationale of Sovereign Democracy as a response to Western democracy promotion in a nuanced way. The study attempts to deal with the following research questions: How does Russia perceive and react to Colour Revolutions? How Sovereign Democracy enables Russia to restructure its foreign policy to challenge the Western democracy-promotion agenda in the post-Soviet space? How do the political institutions and historical narratives of anti-Westernism allow Russia to respond to Colour Revolutions? Lastly, whether Putin is able to reshape public opinion in Russia not only in favor of having an alternative model of democracy against the dominant Western one but also a favorable public opinion to justify Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria.

Exercising status recognition sensibility: the empathic de-escalation of the Sino-Indian 1998 status dilemma

Uncertain processes of status recognition might generate status dilemmas in world politics. While existing accounts are limited to the fatalist assumption that status dilemmas inevitably lead to dangerous international conflicts, I argue that status dilemma dynamics can be mitigated if one or both sides in a dyad are able to exercise a form of empathy that I call ‘status recognition sensibility’. This is the capacity and intention to understand that the actions of the adversary might be driven by erroneous perceptions of status misrecognition and to reassure them that their status is not under threat. The article investigates the case study of Sino-Indian competition in the aftermath of the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, where each side perceived the other to be challenging its claim to great power status. It concludes that the status recognition sensibility was key for ensuring diplomatic rapprochement and de-escalate tensions between the two countries.

Despondence, dependence and dignity: on the dilemmas of being an object of international charity in Western Europe – a Weimar German case study

ABSTRACT The history of international humanitarianism is usually told from the perspective of donors and aid providers. Throughout the twentieth century, large humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross societies and a range of United Nations agencies have been the main channels of international aid and, as a result, a major focus of historical attention. In contrast, we know little about the feelings and thoughts of the ‘recipients’ of aid, who are often portrayed, partly for lack of sources, as innocent, passive and grateful. This paper challenges this narrative, using post-First World War Germany as a case study. It shows how difficult it was for many Germans to accept and ask for ‘charity’ from the international community, especially from former enemies. As a defeated and humiliated nation, accepting foreign charity could be deeply embarrassing for Germany: a reminder of defeat, poverty and déclassement. As a result, German officials spent a great deal of time and effort restricting German fundraising abroad, seeking to allow only such international aid as they deemed compatible with German honour and Great Power status. In the emotional environment of the post-war years, being the object of international charity raised much larger questions for Germany about international dependence and national dignity. Like many recipients in the twentieth century, Germany was far from a passive recipient.

The Role of theEuropean Continent and Its Central Region in Power Politics of theUnited States of America

Based on historical accounts, it is argued that within theundergoing transition of theworld order from aunipolar to amultipolar system, theEuropean continent will assume amore decisive balancing position for theUS. Focusing on aparticular region, Central Europe, it proves that it may contribute afocal point that theUS may need to exercise atheory of containment dwarfing other great powers advancing their interests on theEuropean continent. Theaim of this article is to analyse thesignificance of theEuropean continent in theforeign policy of United States of America (US). Theemphases are highlighted in thecontext of developments that have taken place in theclose partnership between theUS and theEuropean continent since theend of theSecond World War. Furthermore, historical accounts summarise that thecontinent is internally inconsistent and destined to succumb to theobjectives of other great powers regardless of its geostrategic potential. Theconclusions of thereview point out that, if theUS decides to disengage from theEuropean continent, it will also have to disengage from other parts of theworld. Under such circumstances, theUS great power status could decline to anirreparable status, at least for thenear future.

Strategic Culture and the Russian Federation’s Engagement in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Abstract The paper examines Russia’s strategic culture and its behaviour in Russia Ukraine conflict between February 2014 and February 2023. It identifies and examines traditional elements of Russian strategic culture, such as territorial expansionism, a tendency towards offensive military action, the perception of the use of military force as an appropriate means to achieve political goals, a paranoid threat perception - the image of the besieged fortress and distrust of the West, fear of coloured revolutions, and the idea of Russia’s greatness and pursuit of international great power status. As the article shows, traditional elements of Russian strategic culture are reflected in and explain Russian Federation’s behaviour in the Russia Ukraine conflict. This pattern confirms the continuity within Russian strategic culture, as its traditional elements are still present and define the contemporary strategic culture of the Russian Federation.

Still a great power? Russia’s status dilemmas post-Ukraine war

ABSTRACT This article examines the impact the war in Ukraine has had on Russia’s great power status. Post-Soviet Russia has been one of the most active status-seekers and sought to re-establish its rank among the existing great power status community. In its claim to high status, Russia has historically relied on traditional status markers, including its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, diplomatic prominence at the summits with other great powers, and the strength of its military. However, as this paper shows, Moscow’s fateful choice to launch a war against Ukraine has led to considerable slippage of its status. Russia now struggles to get things done at international fora and has also faced increased diplomatic isolation. Moreover, the war – especially the struggles of the Russian armed forces – challenged Russia’s claim of great military power and an exclusive security provider in the former Soviet space.

Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order by Kathryn E. Stoner

Russia’s horrific war in Ukraine has left scores of analysts wondering how we got here. Published just prior to the invasion, Kathryn Stoner’s Russia Resurrected deftly shows that this assertiveness has long been a trademark of Putin's regime. Her central thesis is a simple one: over the past two decades, Russia has become resurgent, not just economically and politically, but through the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy designed to return it to great power status. With foreboding words read in retrospect, Stoner traces how Russia has amassed just enough economic resources and sharp power instruments “to disrupt the prevailing international order and to define a new one” (18). Russia Resurrected covers a lot of ground and emerges as one of the most comprehensive books on both Russian foreign policy and its determinants over the last two decades. The strongest sections thoroughly detail Russia's multipronged efforts to project power around the world, something many in the West are only now fully coming to appreciate. Part of Russia's great coup has been to convince numerous countries and companies to tie their economic fate to its abundant reserves of oil and gas. Stoner deftly unpacks the strategic logic behind Russia cultivating these dependencies, showing how Putin can hold entire states hostage to Russian energy supplies. The European Union has achieved only varying success unwinding this leverage in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, but decades of Russia courting politicians and building pipelines have shown to be more durable than anticipated. The same holds true for the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and especially East Asia, where Putin's regime has been developing relationships and strengthening its push for a new global order where Russia sits further towards the top. Stoner makes the provocative, but ultimately correct, point that contemporary Russia cannot be merely written off as a regional power. Putin's ambitions stretch much further.

China’s changing engagement in global peace building and conflict resolution: drivers and trends

The study aims at providing an in-depth analysis of the drivers of China’s peace building engagement and examining the interactive nature of the various drivers and factors that played remarkable role in increasing China’s economic rise and leadership in the international system. To approach the study goals, descriptive-analytical method has been employed along with Hudson’s foreign policy analysis through which China’s aims and motivations of engaging in peace building are illustrated. The paper concludes that China seeks to shape its great power leadership and identity where the case studies revealed that China’s economic engagement as part of its peace building efforts is increasingly being driven by Chinese great power status and geostrategic security interests. Simultaneously, as seen in the Darfur War, Myanmar, Mali, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, China’s policy towards conflict zones has undergone a tangible and salient transition from one of avoidance to one of increasing interest and engagement

Russia's Policy Goals after Two Decades after the American Invasion of Iraq

ABSTRACT: This article examines Russia's policy goals in the Middle East (ME) and the former Soviet space (FSS) after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its impact on Moscow's broader foreign relations. Russia did not support the invasion of Iraq because Moscow was against the unilateral use of force without special authorization by the UN Security Council (SC). After losing Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, both former Soviet client states, Russia used its military power to prevent externally imposed regime change in Ukraine and Syria and positioned itself as a major player in the wider ME and beyond. We use the concept of positional goods to analyse not only Russia's behaviour on the basis of Iraq's case, but also the implications of US hegemony. We argue that Russia as a revisionist power and through its efforts to assume regional dominance wanted to achieve great power status. Russia also sought multilateralism to change the liberal international order and proposed multi-regional cooperation within the framework of international institutions. Still, the Russian leadership has advocated a multipolar world order in which Russia would hold a special role as a great power and would contribute to global stability.