Grand Jury Proceedings Research Articles

Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury Process, and Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh

Although scholars have theorized about systemic racialized police violence, less attention has been given to systemic practices in the investigations and grand jury proceedings surrounding cases of excessive police force and black bodies. This article, focusing on the shooting death of Michael Brown, emphasizes that it was not just the killing itself, but also the investigation and grand jury proceeding, which exemplify white heteropatriarchal performance on vulnerable bodies.

A Pumpkin Patch, a Typewriter, and Richard Nixon: The Hiss-Chambers Espionage Case

This is a history of one of the most famous trials in American history, as well as political scandal and a personal tragedy for the litigants. The article takes the reader through Congressional hearings in 1948, a libel suit, grand jury proceedings, two criminal jury trials, and appeals that ended only in the 1980s. The litigation strategies, evidence, legal rulings, and courtroom advocacy of both sides are examined in detail. Also described are what did not come out in the trials and the political impact of all these proceedings, as well as elite and public opinion about who was telling the truth.

Black Sox in the courtroom: the grand jury, criminal trial and civil litigation

A comprehensive, nonpartisan account of the judicial proceedings spawned by the corruption of the 1919 World Series is badly needed. This book does it. The narrative of events has been crafted from surviving fragments of the judicial record, contemporaneous newspaper accounts of the proceedings, museum archives and, occasionally, the literature of the Black Sox scandal. Preceding the account of judicial events are a brief overview of the baseball gambling problem, a summary of the 1919 Series, and post-Series events that presaged revelations of the Series fix. The grand jury proceedings, the criminal trial, and ensuing civil suits initiated by various of the banned players against the White Sox are then recounted in detail, accompanied by copious source citations. The book concludes with a survey of how Black Sox-related legal proceedings have been treated in scandal literature. The book does not purport to be the definitive account of the Black Sox scandal. Rather, it uniquely presents how the matter played out in court.

The Constitution, The Roberts Court & Business: The Significant Business Impact of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court Term

The 2011-2012 Supreme Court term created quite the media buzz. The Affordable Care Act cases and the controversial Arizona immigration law dominated the headlines. But the term also included other fascinating yet less sensationalized cases. The Court heard its fair share of criminal law controversies involving derelict defense attorneys and prosecutors as well as civil procedure disputes involving qualified immunity for witness in grand jury proceedings and private parties assisting the government in litigation. The justices also entertained arguments on a federal law allowing United States citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” stamped as their birthplace on a passport. The Secretary of State refused arguing that the practice would inflame tensions in an already volatile Middle East. Another case pitted the First Amendment right to lie about receiving military honors against the Stolen Valor Act prohibiting that type of dishonest speech. A case from Montana hearkened back to 1889 and implicated the Equal Footing Doctrine – a Constitutional provision granting territory to states upon entering the Union. Texas crafted new electoral maps based on the 2010 census and soon found them scrutinized under the Voting Rights Act. In all, the term was extraordinary because most of its cases revolved around topics ripped from the headlines and touched on areas of public policy relevant to Americans in 2012 and beyond. The term was also compelling because of its impact on the business arena. The justices granted certiorari in fourteen business cases, eight of which were cherry picked for this article. Each case chosen covered a classic business law topic, generated strong interest within the business community, contained predominately business-focused facts, and had a connection to a business-related constitutional provision/amendment or statute. These eight cases provide the best glimpse into the Roberts Court’s most recent stance on topics important to the business community. This article evaluates these cases in depth and proposes the following business impact theory of the term: (1) the Court’s opinion in each case had as strong pro-business slant with business interests receiving fifty out of fifty-two potential votes. This slant is significantly different from the previous term where the Court unanimously voted against business interests several times; (2) these pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run of the mill cases. Instead the impact of these decisions is magnified because they involved subjects critical to America’s economic recovery; (3) perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning justices voted with the Court’s conservatives in twenty out of a possible twenty-two opportunities. They did so in cases that presented compelling arguments from both a conservative and liberal perspective and where the facts allowed for a strong four-justice dissent; (4) perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court proved willing to narrow or expand Constitutional provisions or state/federal statutes to reach its desired result. There appeared to be no concerted effort to adhere to a minimalist or living Constitutionalist philosophy. In the end, the results in the business cases of the term could prove to be a fluke. Or, they could indicate a pivot at the Court towards supporting business interests to a greater extent. Time will tell because the next first Monday of October is right around the corner.

The People of Illinois v. Edward V. Cicotte, et al

Generally speaking, the judicial proceedings spawned by the corruption of the 1919 World Series are not accurately related or well understood in the Black Sox canon. In a forthcoming book to be published by McFarland, the writer will attempt to remedy this situation by offering a comprehensive, non-partisan factual account of Black Sox- related grand jury proceedings, the Black Sox criminal trial, and ensuing civil litigation involving scandal principals. Legal analysis will also be provided on certain aspects of these actions. This article is drawn from that work and recounts events attending late-September 1920 grand jury hearings, focusing on a four-day period when the simmering Black Sox scandal finally exploded. An introductory summary of preceding scandal developments is designed to place the article's narrative in perspective.Preceding Scandal DevelopmentsSuspicions about the bona fides of Chisox play were raised in post-1919 World Series columns by syndicated sportswriter Hugh F. Fullerton and a few other scribes.1 But for the most part, sportswriter concerns did not generate great public interest and the matter had become mostly forgotten by the time that the 1920 season commenced. Rather, the exposure of the Black Sox scandal was largely a byproduct of investigation of an altogether different Chicago baseball contretemps: the alleged fixing of a meaningless August 31, 1920 game between the Cubs and the Philadelphia Phillies. Shortly after the existence of an internal investigation of the contest was revealed by Cubs President William L. Veeck, Sr., the judiciary stepped in. On September 7, 1920, the suspect game was brought to the attention of a Cook County grand jury by Illinois Circuit Court Judge Charles A. McDonald, newly appointed chief justice of the local criminal courts and an avid Chicago baseball fan.2 In time, the scope of the grand jury's probe expanded into other matters: game-related skullduggery attributed to Hal Chase, the operation of baseball betting pools in the greater Chicago area, and the rumored fixing of the 1919 World Series.Early proceedings were slow-moving and unfocused but gathered steam following testimony about the alleged Series fix from White Sox owner Charles Comiskey, Chicago Tribune sportswriter James Crusinberry, and New York Giants pitcher and Chase teammate Rube Benton, all of which was immediately leaked to the press. Probe developments were also supplied by lead grand jury prosecutor Hartley Replogle and grand jury foreman Henry H. Brigham, both of whom spoke openly about matters revealed during the proceedings. All of this was highly irregular, if not unlawful. By statute and case law, grand jury proceedings are strictly confidential and proceeding principals, like the prosecutor and panel members, take an oath to keep grand jury testimony and other proof secret.3 Stranger still, this disregard of grand jury protocol appeared countenanced by Judge McDonald. According to one report, officials of Chief Justice Charles McDonald's court, desirous of giving the national game the benefit of publicity in its purging, lifted the curtain on the grand jury proceeding. 4 By September 25, the transparency of grand jury proceedings permitted press publication of the names of eight White Sox players believed targeted for indictment- Eddie Cicotte, Chick Gandil, Lefty Williams, Swede Risberg, Happy Felsch, Joe Jackson, Fred McMullin, and Buck Weaver-and the nature of the charge likely to be preferred against them: conspiracy to defraud.5 But details of the series fix as well as the roles of the accused players in it remained unsettled. That would change two days later, for in Philadelphia, a figure from baseball's margins was giving the interview that would blow open the corruption of the 1919 World Series.Publication of the Billy Maharg StoryOn September 27, 1920, sportswriter James Isaminger provided readers of the Philadelphia North American with the first insider's account of the abasement of the 1919 Series. …

Coming to America: the extraterritorial reach of US judicial process

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore situations in which US Federal Courts may impose severe fines and sanctions to compel the disclosure of information maintained outside the territorial limits of the USA by enforcing either a grand jury subpoena or an Internal Revenue Service administrative summons.Design/methodology/approachThe paper presents a memorandum of law summarizing and analyzing relevant US legal precedents, including In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), a case that has come to be eponymous for any US judicial process calling for the production of foreign records: “Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas.”FindingsThe paper finds that, in appropriate circumstances, US Federal Courts have been willing to impose coercive fines and sanctions on individuals or entities that have failed to produce records and other information that is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the USA.Research limitations/implicationsThe analysis is focused on two US legal precedents that exemplify the factors considered by US Federal Courts in arriving at a decision. Many other cases are cited but not examined in depth.Practical implicationsThe paper is of interest to anyone engaging in cross‐border activities with the USA, particularly multi‐national financial organizations.Originality/valueThe paper provides an insight into the US law enforcement tools that may be deployed against multi‐national organizations.

Charles Goodnight: Father of the Texas Panhandle (review)

Book Reviews Jesús F. de la Teja, Editor Charles Goodnight: Father of the Texas Panhandle. By William T. Hagan. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007. Pp. 162. Illustrations, maps, further reading, index. ISBN 9780806138275. $26.95, cloth.) The Texas Panhandle is independent by nature and colorful by design; therefore it is no wonder that the architect of the Panhandle life known today was a man among men —an example for all who followed. Charles Goodnight was an indomitable character who, through sheer determination , turned a hardscrabble land into a ranching empire. In this book (the first written about Goodnight in seventy years), author William T. Hagan examines this colorful subject in his roles from farmer to cattle baron, and also gives insight into the man within the man —one not readily revealed. To write a book about such a complex individual is a great undertaking. But the author has researched well. His book complements the works ofJ. Evetts Haley , Charles Goodnight: Cowman and Plainsman (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949) and Laura V. Hamner, The No-Gun Man of Texas (Amarillo, 1936), thus completing a trilogy about Goodnight—ß. man whose mind was in perpetual motion. Hagan begins with an account of Capt. Randolph B. Marcy's expedition in 1 849 into the dreaded "Laño Estacado" to discover the source of the Red River. In his final report, Marcy describes the area, The great Zahara of North America . It is a region almost as vast and trackless as the ocean—a land where no man, either savage or civilized, permanently abides ... a treeless, desolate waste of uninhabitable solitude, which always has been, and must continue uninhabited forever " (pp. 30-31). But Palo Duro Canyon was only lying in wait for someone like Charles Goodnight. Goodnight's analysis of die Texas Panhandle was quite different from Marcy 's. The author writes, "Litde wonder that Goodnight stated unequivocally, ? wanted that canyon.' The next ten years of his life would be devoted to acquiring as much of it as he could buy or preempt" (p. 33). With financial partners John and Cornelia Adair, Charles Goodnight would create not only a ranch, but an attitude that continues to permeate a twenty-six-county area. In a dispute about the lease of land for a school ("The Children's Grass"), Hagan follows the antics of Goodnight as he straps on a six-shooter, loads $100,000 into a wheelbarrow, and wheels it into the Land Office in Austin. He takes you inside grand jury proceedings as they return seventy-six true bills 8oSouthwestern Historical QuarterlyJuly against Goodnight and other ranchers. Who was the foreman of the grand jury? Charles Goodnight. The author also delves into the successes and failures of Goodnight's attempts at crossbreeding animal and plant life. The man within the man is the personal side of Charles Goodnight. He was a man subject to fears and doubts—uncomfortable with educated people. He was tough and stern in his business dealings, but soft and gentle with his wives. Deeply sympathetic to die Indians, he felt the ranchers had encroached upon their land. Goodnight was a man with so many ideas he would have required several lifetimes to pursue them all. With this book, William T. Hagan weaves a tale about the Panhandle during a time before law and order, when the only transportation was on horseback. He introduces a cast of characters more interesting than any found in fiction, and Col. Charles Goodnight shines in the leading role. Dallas, TexasLana Payne Barnett Murder on the White Sands: The Disappearance ofAlbert and Henry Fountain. By Corey Recko. (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2007. Pp. 244. Illustrations , notes, sources, index. ISBN 9781574412246. $24.95, cloth.) Corey Recko's Murder on the White Sands: The Disappearance ofAlbert and Henry Fountain examines the bizarre disappearance of lawyer AlbertJennings Fountain and his young son Henry on their 150-mile journey from Lincoln, New Mexico to their home in Mesillat. Fountain, a New Yorker who in the 1850s moved to northern California where he was introduced to journalism, served as a reporter for the Sacramento Union during filibuster William Walker's expedition to Nicaragua. It was during...

The Intent Behind the Cryptic Concurrence That Provided a Reporter's Privilege

Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes that, despite a majority opinion to the contrary, eventually provided room for journalists to claim a privilege against testifying in grand jury proceedings. For decades, scholars and judges have questioned what Justice Powell meant by his concurrence and whether he, in fact, supported a reporter's right to refuse to reveal confidential information. Justice Powell's personal papers and case files, as well as those of his fellow justices, observations of one of his former law clerks, and oral arguments shed light on the reasoning behind Justice Powell's enigmatic concurrence. This article concludes that Justice Powell supported a qualified reporter's privilege, applied on a case-by-case basis.

Did Clinton Lie?: Defining 'Sexual Relations'

With the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton now well behind us, we can step back and consider the matter somewhat more dispassionately. The focus of the impeachment hearings was that Clinton perjured himself and engaged in obstruction of justice. I limit my observations to the question of whether he committed perjury, and in particular whether he lied when he denied having a sexual relationship with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. When Clinton was first asked during a deposition whether he had ever had an affair or sexual relationship with Lewinsky, he quite explicitly denied it. He was asked about his denials during a second legal proceeding - his testimony before a grand jury - when he was again placed under oath. Clinton insisted that his denials were true based on the ordinary understanding of these terms. In other words, he appealed to usage of that phrase in the speech community. His lawyers during the impeachment made similar arguments on the basis of dictionary definitions. Because there seems to be a great deal of variation in how people use this phrase, I will argue that Clinton's defenders were largely correct on this point. The lawyers examining the president were obviously aware of the dangers of using such a slippery term, so they introduced a definition of sexual relations into evidence during the deposition and then asked Clinton whether, under that rather convoluted definition, he had engaged in sexual relations with Lewinsky. Clinton again denied having done so, but was later forced to admit to at least some sexual activity with the former intern. During the subsequent grand jury proceedings he was also interrogated on his denials of having sexual relations, as defined. His defense consisted of an extremely literalistic dissection of the words of the definition. I will suggest that a large part of the problem is that the definition had largely been textualized. A result of textualization is that the resulting text invites a very literal and sometimes even hypertechnical interpretation, and Clinton was only to happy to comply.

Promoting a Scholar's Privilege: Accelerating the Pace: [Commentary

As social scientists involved in issues of research ethics and science policy, we appreciate the position taken in the McLaughlin paper (1999). McLaughlin advocates for a limited social science research privilege and the importance of its recognition through common law. Both points are essentially sound. As we argue here and elsewhere (Levine 1994), a research privilege is necessary to produce critical knowledge without constraint or interference and to protect persons who provide confidential information. Further, scholars should be encouraged to use the courts when necessary to press for recognition of a researcher's privilege. The McLaughlin analysis is compatible with the reasoning advanced by the American Sociological Association (ASA) in amicus briefs submitted before the courts in Popkin (United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 [1st Cir. 1972]), Brajuha (In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 750 F.2d 223 [2d Cir. 1984]), and subsequently Scarce (In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 [9th Cir. 1993]). In the Scarce case, the ASA urged the court to recognize a qualified privilege for scholars to protect information received in confidence based on researchers' ethical obligations to their subjects and on the public's interest in fostering high-quality, accurate, and complete research. The ASA maintained that such a privilege should be recognized in criminal investigations and in civil discovery absent an overriding, compelling need to the contrary. The ASA further argued that a common law privilege for research information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality fosters important First Amendment interests. The Association buttressed its position by

Fifth Amendment: Substantial Exculpatory Evidence, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Grand Jury Proceedings: A Broadening of Prosecutorial Discretion

Fifth Amendment: Substantial Exculpatory Evidence, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Grand Jury Proceedings: A Broadening of Prosecutorial Discretion

Supervisory Power Meets the Harmless Error Rule in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings

Supervisory Power Meets the Harmless Error Rule in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings

The Newsperson's Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application

The Newsperson's Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application

Access by State Attorneys General to Federal Grand Jury Antitrust Investigative Materials

Section 4F(b) of the Clayton Act' requires the Attorney General of the United States to assist state enforcement of the antitrust laws by providing state attorneys general with federal investigative materials relevant to antitrust actions brought or being considered by the states. The Ninth Circuit recently became the first federal appellate court to consider the application of that provision to traditionally secret grand jury materials. In United States v. B.EF Goodrich Co.,2 the court ruled that section 4F(b) authorizes the release of such materials to state attorneys general without the ordinarily required showing of a compelling and particularized need for such access.3 B.F Goodrich was soon followed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp.4 Other courts, however, have reached contrary results.5 This Article addresses the issues raised by these conflicting decisions. Part I reviews the presumption of secrecy that attaches to grand jury proceedings and the extent to which disclosure has been permitted, principally for access under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 Part II explores the merits of the argument that section

Appealability of Orders Relating to Ongoing Grand Jury Proceedings: In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas (General Motors Corp. v. United States)

Appealability of Orders Relating to Ongoing Grand Jury Proceedings: In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas (General Motors Corp. v. United States)

Constitutional Rights of Witnesses in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings: Bursey v. United States

Constitutional Rights of Witnesses in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings: Bursey v. United States

Confidentiality of Social Science Research Sources and Data: The Popkin Case

On November 21, 1972 Samuel Lewis Popkin, an assistant professor of government at Harvard University, was imprisoned in the federal section of the Norfolk County jail in Dedham, Massachusetts, under a contempt order of the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts. He was imprisoned for contempt of court for refusal to answer several questions before a federal grand jury investigating the publication of the Pentagon Papers. In the course of the grand jury proceedings Popkin asserted a right under the First Amendment to refuse to answer questions concerning the identity of confidential sources and the content of his opinions and data developed in the course of research on and in Vietnam. He refused to answer the questions on the grounds that they violated his rights to freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly under the First Amendment in the absence of a showing by the government that the information sought was relevant and necessary to the government's investigation.On November 28, 1972, the grand jury was discharged at the government's request and Popkin was released from jail.In early January, 1973, Popkin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review the case. The petition was denied by the Court in April, 1973.The Popkin case is the first on record in American law in which the question of a scholar's right to the confidentiality of his sources and data has been raised and decided, at least in part, on the merits.

Confidentiality of Social Science Research Sources and Data: The Popkin Case

On November 21, 1972 Samuel Lewis Popkin, an assistant professor of government at Harvard University, was imprisoned in the federal section of the Norfolk County jail in Dedham, Massachusetts, under a contempt order of the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts. He was imprisoned for contempt of court for refusal to answer several questions before a federal grand jury investigating the publication of the Pentagon Papers. In the course of the grand jury proceedings Popkin asserted a right under the First Amendment to refuse to answer questions concerning the identity of confidential sources and the content of his opinions and data developed in the course of research on and in Vietnam. He refused to answer the questions on the grounds that they violated his rights to freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly under the First Amendment in the absence of a showing by the government that the information sought was relevant and necessary to the government's investigation.On November 28, 1972, the grand jury was discharged at the government's request and Popkin was released from jail.In early January, 1973, Popkin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review the case. The petition was denied by the Court in April, 1973.The Popkin case is the first on record in American law in which the question of a scholar's right to the confidentiality of his sources and data has been raised and decided, at least in part, on the merits.

Confidentiality of Social Science Research Sources and Data: The Popkin Case

On November 21, 1972 Samuel Lewis Popkin, an assistant professor of government at Harvard University, was imprisoned in the federal section of the Norfolk County jail in Dedham, Massachusetts, under a contempt order of the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts. He was imprisoned for contempt of court for refusal to answer several questions before a federal grand jury investigating the publication of the Pentagon Papers. In the course of the grand jury proceedings Popkin asserted a right under the First Amendment to refuse to answer questions concerning the identity of confidential sources and the content of his opinions and data developed in the course of research on and in Vietnam. He refused to answer the questions on the grounds that they violated his rights to freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly under the First Amendment in the absence of a showing by the government that the information sought was relevant and necessary to the government's investigation.On November 28, 1972, the grand jury was discharged at the government's request and Popkin was released from jail.In early January, 1973, Popkin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review the case. The petition was denied by the Court in April, 1973.The Popkin case is the first on record in American law in which the question of a scholar's right to the confidentiality of his sources and data has been raised and decided, at least in part, on the merits.

Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence

Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence