Even though both and writers have in twentieth century moved a long way from Immanuel Kant's philosophy, it is clear that both major currents of contemporary philosophy are profoundly, though often only implicitly, post-Kantian ways of thinking and crucially indebted to Kant. These traditions must face continuous need to re-evaluate their relation to (or critical) project launched in Konigsberg more than two hundred years ago. Fortunately, novel contributions, both historical and systematic, to debate on nature of philosophy appear once in a while.1 Both analytic and Continental philosophers have been active in this regard. This review essay discusses David Carr's recent critical investigation of notion of subjectivity in tradition as well as some new work on structure of arguments collected in an anthology edited by Robert Stern.2 I do not mean to imply that these two books simply represent Continental and analytic approaches to philosophy, respectively. Carr's book, for example, aims at building bridges across these movements. Generally speaking, however, Continental philosophers seeking to understand (and often criticize) their Kantian heritage have-particularly after Martin Heidegger's famous critique of the metaphysics of subject- focused on concept of subjectivity, or ego, whereas analytic philosophers, at least since appearance of Peter Strawson's Individuals in 1959,' have attempted to analyze arguments as responses to skepticism. After having discussed these projects at some length, I shall suggest a way of synthesizing two approaches to philosophy. It seems to me that debates over subjectivity as well as analytic accounts of arguments leave room for a pragmatist reinterpretation of tradition. Such a reinterpretation might yield a fruitful way of reconciling certain basic Kantian ideas (perhaps even idealism) with a (non-reductively) naturalistic conception of world and our place in it. Needless to say, only a very preliminary suggestion toward further work on such a reconciliation can be made within a review essay like this. Since late 1950s and especially since 1960s, several leading analytic philosophers have tried to understand conceptual structure of arguments, standard model of which is Kant's notoriously difficult transcendental deduction of categories, that is, of pure concepts of understanding. Special emphasis has been directed to question of what, if anything, arguments can achieve in epistemology. Such arguments are typically designed to show how something (e.g., knowledge, experience, conscious thought, meaningful discourse, or some other given feature of human life)4 is possible. They are meant to demonstrate that certain things (e.g., Kantian categories or Wittgensteinian public, rule-governed language-games) will have to be in place as necessary conditions of possibility of what is assumed to be actual in premise. The most recent episode of analytic debate on such arguments can be found in Robert Stern's collection, Transcendental Arguments, which is a highly useful volume, containing fifteen chapters (including editor's introduction) and a good bibliography of books and articles on arguments up till 1998. Most of papers in TA are based on presentations and responses that took place at a conference in Sheffield in 1997. These include Ralph Walker's discussion of Kant and problem of induction, responded to by Graham Bird; Stern's paper, also dealing with Kant's answer to Hume, with a response by Mark Sacks; Paul Franks's historical treatment of post-Kantian idealism, with a response by Michael Rosen; Barry Stroud's analysis of goal of arguments, with a response by Christopher Hookway; and Anthony Brueckner's evaluation of possibility of basing arguments on content externalism, with a response by Gregory McCulloch. …