Government Punishment Research Articles

Research on distribution strategy of logistics enterprise alliance based on three-party evolution game

Currently, collaborative distribution models have not reached the optimal state of carbon emissions. The cost of additional low-carbon expenditures and the problem of carbon data verification have led to the lack of motivation for reducing emissions among collaborative distribution enterprises. Therefore, how to incentivize them to adopt the low-carbon model is crucial for achieving low-carbon goal. By relying on a government-led digital platform, this paper designs a dual low-carbon incentive strategy to encourage enterprise-alliance to adopt a low-carbon distribution model. In this paper, we first construct an evolutionary game model of the government, enterprise-alliance and end-users; then we explore the conditions of the three-party equilibrium evolution strategy by solving the model and analyzing the stability; and finally, we conduct simulation validation and results analysis with the help of MATLAB. In summary, we found that government punishment is more effective at regulating enterprise-alliance than reward. End-users’ behavior is affected by the costs they need to bear, and they no longer support enterprise-alliance to carry out collaborative low-carbon distribution above a certain threshold.

A stochastic and time-delay evolutionary game of food safety regulation under central government punishment mechanism

Food safety is a pressing issue affecting public health, and strengthening food safety regulation has become a widespread consensus. This study addresses the three-party game involving food production enterprises, third-party testing agencies, and government regulatory authorities. Considering the influence of random disturbances and time delays on the strategy-choosing and behavioral evolution of game players, a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model for food safety regulation with time delays is established. The stability of the model is analyzed by using Lyapunov's method, and the strategy evolution of the game players is investigated while combining numerical simulations. The study shows that the net benefit of the players' expected strategies is key in determining whether the overall game system can reach the optimal equilibrium. The level of penalties imposed by the central government on local government regulators is key to food safety. The main factors influencing the strategy-choosing of game players are the level of penalties imposed by the local government regulators on third-party testing agencies, together with the supervision costs of the local government regulators. Random disturbances have a certain impact on strategy-choosing of the game players, with a greater impact on testing agencies, followed by food production enterprises, and a weaker impact on government regulatory authorities. The time delay factors exhibit a certain delay effect on the evolutionary path of strategy-choosing among the game players, which aligns with the actual situation. The findings of the study have implications for food safety regulation.

An agent-based evolutionary system model of the transformation from building material industry (BMI) to green intelligent BMI under supply chain management

The building materials industry ranks first in terms of carbon emissions and energy consumption within the industrial sector. To achieve the goal of reducing carbon emissions, the development of the green intelligent building materials (GIBMs) industry has become a strategic priority and major demand for the country. Government support plays a vital role in promoting the growth of the GIBMs industry. This paper utilizes evolutionary game theory and Matlab software to analyze the impact of government regulations on the development of the GIBMs industry. The research findings indicate the following. i) Appropriate government control over building materials enterprises is beneficial for the advancement of the GIBMs industry. A balance is necessary, as both excessive control and weak control hinder the industry’s development. ii) Increased financial assistance from the government to enterprises producing GIBMs has a positive influence. This support enables building materials enterprises to overcome technical barriers, drive technological innovation, and encourage construction developers to actively purchase these materials. iii) Stronger government punishment for pollutant emissions by building materials enterprises serves as a catalyst for the production of GIBMs. Stricter penalties motivate these enterprises to adopt more environmentally friendly practices. iv) Moderate to strong government investment in infrastructure has a significant impact. It prompts construction developers to actively choose and purchase GIBMs. In response to government regulations and market demand, building materials enterprises are inclined to produce these environmentally friendly materials. This study emphasizes the importance of government regulations and support in promoting the growth of the GIBMs industry. By implementing appropriate control measures, providing financial assistance, imposing punishments for pollution, and investing in infrastructure, the government can effectively encourage the development of the GIBMs industry. These measures contribute to achieving the double carbon goals and fostering a more sustainable built environment.

Price Mechanism, Government Constraints and Carbon Trading Pilot Policy for Emission Reduction

ABSTRACT Based on the data of 247 cities at the prefecture level in China from 2007 to 2019, this paper analyzes the impact of the carbon emissions trading CET pilot policy on carbon emission reduction from the perspective of the price mechanism and government constraints. The results show that the carbon emissions and carbon intensity in the pilot areas are significantly reduced by adjusting the industrial structure and promoting green technology innovation. In terms of regions, the emission reduction effect of the pilot policy in regions with a high proportion of industry is obviously weaker than that in other regions. The aim of the carbon emission trading policy in China that achieve carbon emission reduction is by coordinating the carbon emission trading price that fail to fulfill this aim independently and the degree of government punishment for enterprises.

Influential factors and interventions for repeated production violations in food enterprises - Empirical evidence from China

The increasing burden of government spending on food safety regulation has been acknowledged as a common challenge faced by regulatory agencies in a multitude of countries. The Chinese government has significantly invested in food safety regulations in recent years. However, the food safety situation has not been effectively optimized, and a high proportion of food enterprises continue to have repeated food quality issues. Achieving sustainable food safety governance necessitates the attainment of dual goals: enhancing regulatory efficiency and reducing regulatory burdens. These issues have not been thoroughly investigated in the academic literature. This study aims to identify the key factors that contribute to the repeated production violations by food enterprises amid stricter regulations and to explore methods to address this issue. The study employs a Logit model to examine the pivotal factors influencing repeated production violations of food enterprises and utilizes a DID model to assess the impact of food safety regulatory information interventions on the recurrence of these violations. The study has found that: (1) The cognitive bias of food enterprises regarding the stringency of food safety inspections is a significant factor in the repeated production violation of food enterprises. Additionally, government punishment positively moderates the relationship between this cognitive bias and the occurrence of violations. (2) Interventions involving the dissemination of food safety regulatory information can effectively mitigate the recurrence of violation behaviors in food production. For each additional target of information intervention, the rate of repeated production violations by food enterprises decreases by 11.9 percentage points. The study provides theoretical substantiation and practical insights to support the Chinese government's twin objectives of improving the efficiency of food safety regulation and reducing the associated regulatory burdens.

Game-theoretical study of military–civilian collaborative innovation in the context of four-party participation

PurposeIn the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.Design/methodology/approachTo explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.FindingsThe research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.Originality/valueMost of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation

This study analyzes the impact of public participation on the choice of third-party evaluators' behavior strategies during the service quality supervision process of China's pension public–private partnership project. An evolutionary game model between third-party evaluators and government regulators is developed, wherein the evolution rule of the two sides and public participation’s influence on their behavior under the two different conditions are analyzed, and a numerical simulation is carried out using MATLAB 2016a. It is found that third-party evaluators may choose the false evaluation strategy without public participation because of the inducement of rent-seeking or insufficient government punishment when the regulatory revenue of the government regulatory agencies is less than the regulatory cost. In contrast, in the case of public participation, the true evaluation strategy is chosen with an improvement in the level of public participation or an increase in reputation incentive. This suggests the construction and improvement of a third-party evaluation system, which shows that the construction of the service quality supervision system in China’s pension PPP project has a large operating space.

Simulation analysis of the three-party evolutionary game of green building market players under carbon trading policy.

Previous studies mainly focus on the game analysis of green building development under carbon tax policy, while carbon trading, as one of the important means to promote low-carbon development, is rarely mentioned in promoting the development of the green building market. Based on this, to study the impact of carbon trading policy on the development of the green building market, this study combines prospect theory for carbon trading to build a three-way evolutionary game model of developer-government-consumer. It studies the influencing causes of green building market development under the carbon trading mechanism from the whole perspective. The study shows the existence of a carbon trading policy helps the development of the green building market. In the presence of a carbon trading market, the government's punishment, subsidies, and the setting of carbon prices influence the development of the green building market. In addition, the percentage of carbon emissions bought, the potential benefits, and the selling price also affect the chance of consumers buying green buildings to a greater or lesser extent. This study introduces prospect theory into the developer-government-consumer three-way evolutionary game model, which enriches the research perspective of each subject's behavior in the green building market. It provides theoretical support for developers, governments, and consumers to collaborate to promote the coordination and development of the green building market. It has policy implications for promoting the green and high-quality development of the construction industry.

Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders in Villages-in-City reconstruction: Pazhou village as an example

Villages-in-City reconstruction involves many stakeholders, and how to coordinate the interests of participating parties and achieve a balanced and accepted cooperation is the key to successful reconstruction. Previous studies have mainly considered the relationship between stakeholders in urban villages from a static perspective without the irrational behavior of stakeholders. This study’s objective is to construct a three-party evolutionary game model of government, villagers, and developers to address the limited rational behavior of stakeholders’ strategy choices. In this study, the reconstruction of Pazhou village in Guangzhou is used as an empirical analysis example to verify the evolutionary model’s validity in MATLAB. Results show that: the Evolutionary Stable State or Strategy is influenced by the severity of government punishment and subsidies, incentive policies, regulatory costs and the participation of all parties. Thus, the government should strengthen publicity and guidance at the early stage of the project to enhance the willingness of village collectives to participate and cooperate through appropriate interest guarantees. Meanwhile, it can appropriately increase the support for developers to increase their enthusiasm. While the project is launched, the government should regulate and supervise the project and weaken the support until it fades out to achieve a win-win situation. This study provides a theoretical basis for governments to formulate urban renewal and reconstruction policies, in addition to providing decision-making guidance for enterprises.

Anti-monopoly on Platform economy of the Internet -- Case Description on Alibaba abusing its dominant market position

This thesis explains and demonstrates anti-monopoly on platform economics of the internet with the case description of Alibaba abusing its dominant market position. The thesis starts with the introduction of the market classification in the western economy and the definition, causes, and main resources of monopoly, along with accompanying negative consequences brought by monopoly, including welfare loss to the demanders in the market and welfare loss to the overall society. Analysis of abusing big data, price discrimination and exclusive transaction are delivered to demonstrate the main forms of platform monopoly of the internet. After that, the thesis introduces the background of the Alibaba monopoly event and the government's punishment. Through the case, the author shows the present management regulations on standardizing the monopoly in the platform economy of the internet. Based on the case, the author makes suggestions, such as monitoring big data, protecting personal information, and establishing the enterprise reputation mechanism, on the improvement of relevant management strategies.

Evolutionary game analysis of polluting NIMBY facilities reconstruction based on public participation behavior.

With the advancement of urbanization and the expansion of urban areas, NIMBY (not in my back yard) environmental public facilities are increasing day by day. It is meaningful to incorporate public participation into the regulatory process for the existing pollution NIMBY facility enterprises. Through the establishment of the tripartite game model of local government, polluting NIMBY facility enterprises and the public, the evolution stability analysis and simulation analysis of their strategies are carried out, and the Pareto optimal solution is obtained. The results show that: The strategy choices of the players of the three-party game are different under different stability conditions. The system can be broken out of the bad state by increasing government punishment, local governments strictly controlling the potential profits, the potential losses of polluting enterprises not rebuilding, the long-term public benefits and reducing the cost of public participation, etc., and the three-party common governance mode can be formed. The strategy evolution speed of a player in a three-party game is affected by his own strategy choice proportion and the strategy choice proportion of the other two players, but no matter how the strategy choice proportion of the player in a three-party game changes, it will not change the final game result. On the basis of comprehensive analysis, a series of relevant suggestions are put forward from the three aspects of government, enterprises and the public, so as to provide certain reference for the design of the public participation system of polluting NIMBY facilities.

Research on Supervision Mechanism of Big Data Discriminatory Pricing on the Asymmetric Service Platform—Based on SD Evolutionary Game Model

Big data discriminatory pricing behavior of service platforms frequently occurs, which affects the legitimate rights and interests of consumers as well as the healthy development of the platform economy. The SD (System Dynamics) evolutionary game model characterizing the game relationship of a big platform, small platform, and government is constructed together with its equilibrium solutions in order to analyze the regulatory dilemma and governance mechanism against big data discriminatory pricing of service platforms. This paper finds that government punishment on the behavior of big data discriminatory pricing plays a decisive role. When the government punishment is large enough, both platforms tend towards fair pricing; when the government punishment is insufficient, the big platform always tends towards discriminatory pricing. The supply chain of the service platform falls into the regulatory dilemma of big data discriminatory pricing behavior. Due to the hidden characteristics of big data discriminatory pricing and technical challenges in authentication and proof, a third party is introduced for supervision, and an SD evolutionary game model with a collaborative supervision mechanism of the government and the third party is constructed. The results show that positive supervision of the third party can effectively regulate the big data discriminatory pricing behavior of the big platform, which has specific implications for the design of the supervision mechanism against big data discriminatory pricing of service platforms.

The energy management and economic optimization scheduling of microgrid based on Colored Petri net and Quantum-PSO algorithm

Optimal energy scheduling is an essential part for microgrid to obtain higher efficiency no matter from technology or economy. However, the flexibility and reconfigurability of the dispatching strategies could not be achieved as the structurally complexity of the microgrid increases. To resolve this issue, a novel hierarchical model of Colored Petri Net (CPN) based dynamic scheduling scheme is first proposed for a class of wind-photovoltaic-storage microgrid, which can be better monitored from the top for the flow of information and thus facilitates energy management. Firstly, the two-layers information flow model of microgrid is established in the platform of CPN Tools, and different layers interact with each other through selected agents. Corresponding parameters of equipment are also derived under the premise of stable operation in the meanwhile. Secondly, the economic objective function is established and solved by Quantum Particle Swarm Optimization (QPSO) algorithm, which fully considers the punishment of government and reward measures for new energy generation and the consumption of electric vehicles (EV) and battery. Finally, the illustrative example on the isolated island mode is implemented by combining the CPN Tools and MATLAB platform. Note that the input data in objective function can be obtained according to the analysis of the state space in CPN tools. The results show that this management method can improve the economical efficiency, which is in line with the enterprise benefits pursued by power companies.

The evolutionary game and simulation of key players in the green supply chain of construction industry

PurposeThis research studies the behavior choice of key actors in the construction supply chain and constructs a model which includes the benefit function of the government, contractors and owners, aiming at improving the coverage of green buildings.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, tripartite dynamic game is studied and simulated based on duplicate dynamic equation. The tripartite game under government intervention is rarely considered, and government punishment measures are seldom introduced into the research.FindingsAccording to the simulation results, the practical insights in line with the development of green supply chain are put forward. Rewards and punishments affect the development of the supply chain. New technologies and new materials accelerate the development of green supply chain and then improve the coverage of green buildings.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper constructs a dynamic model based on complete information rationality, which is difficult to realize in practice, for information is incomplete and human rationality is limited.Originality/valueIn fact, the government has not issued a punishment document to introduce a new variable adjustment model.

Evolutionary Game Study on the Supervision Strategy in the Operation Phase of Green Public Buildings Based on System Dynamics Simulation

In the energy performance contracting (EPC) mode, an effective way to achieve green public buildings, the information asymmetry among stakeholders in the operation phase is critically adverse to the energy-saving effect of green public buildings. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between energy users and energy-saving companies (ESCOs) in the operation phase of green public buildings under the premise of limited rationality. Vensim PLE software is used to build the corresponding simulation model to simulate the strategy evolution of players under different initial strategies. Typical scenarios with different government punishment, penalties from energy users, and opportunistic gains of ESCOs, respectively, are set up to conduct sensitivity analysis. The results show that dynamic alternation exists in the strategy evolution of players during the operation phase of green public buildings under the EPC mode, and it is influenced by the simulation period and players’ initial strategies. And the evolution in different typical scenarios is influenced by the aforementioned parameters with different significance. This study can provide a basis for the supervision strategy of ESCOs in the operation phase of green public buildings by local governments and energy users thus promoting the energy-saving operation of green public buildings for final carbon reduction.

Evolutionary game analysis of opportunistic behavior of Sponge City PPP projects: a perceived value perspective

Sponge City Public Private Partnership (PPP) project is a significant step to promote the construction of resilient city and sustainable development. Private companies take advantage of information asymmetry and regulatory loopholes to take opportunistic behavior, which affects the project delivery quality and public interests. In order to reveal the decision-making mechanism of the main stakeholders, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of private companies, citizens and the government from a fresh perspective of perceived value. First, the traditional payoff matrix is modified by combining Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting. Next, this paper analyzes the strategic evolution law and stability conditions of game players by replicated dynamic equation. Finally, Nanganqu project is used for empirical simulation to verify the effectiveness of this model. Results indicate that, (1) due to the complexity of the project and the bounded rationality of the participants, there is no evolutionary stable strategy in this game system. (2) The behavioral decision of participants is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs. (3) Government punishment and reputation loss can effectively curb the opportunistic behavior. All above studies are expected to improve the management of Sponge City PPP projects, providing theoretical guidance for the government to make scientific decisions.

Mathematical Problems in Engineering Pharmaceutical Cold Chain Transportation Decision Making under the Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the cold chain transportation of medicines is becoming more and more critical to the quality and safety of drugs. In order to better motivate the logistics service providers to adopt the cold chain transportation strategy, this paper constructs a multiparty evolutionary game model composed of the government, logistics service providers, and medical institutions, and models behavioral strategies. The interaction is simulated and analyzed. Focusing on the contradictions between cost and service level in cold chain transportation, the revenue-sharing coefficient between medical institutions and logistics service providers and the government's reward and punishment mechanism are introduced. The results show the following: (1) a reasonable revenue sharing contract between the medical institution and logistics service provider will prompt the logistics service provider to use cold chain transportation. (2) With the government's penalties and rewards being further increased, the logistics service provider will tend to use noncold chain transportation. Therefore, the government must set a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure drug safety. (3) With the increasing revenue of the medical institution, the probability of the logistics service provider using noncold chain transportation decreases. In order to avoid medical malpractice related to noncold chain transportation, the government should appropriately adjust drug price restrictions to increase drug sales revenue. (4) With the rate of medical malpractice being increased, the evolution of each stakeholder to the equilibrium point of the game is accelerated.

Opportunism or symbiosis? A case study on contractors’ unsustainable highway construction in China

Highway construction generates considerable adverse effects on the natural environment, which has attracted closer attention from both government and the public. Although contractors are stimulated to engage in sustainable construction, contractors incline to select unsustainable practices. This research aims to investigate the reason why contractors adopt unsustainable practices. A semi-structured interview and content analysis were employed to explore environmental changes and contractors thought on making a decision. The research findings indicate that contractors use environmental restoration to escape environmental responsibility and government punishment. Governments have a tolerance for the environment which reduces environmental management. This study offers a new perspective to investigate contractors’ unsustainable construction and provide clues to improve sustainable construction.

A tripartite evolutionary game study on green governance in China's coating industry.

As a polluting industry, the green transformation of coatings is highly concerned by the Chinese government. In order to explore the role of government in the process of green transformation of coating industry, this paper constructs a green governance evolutionary game model of "government-manufacturing companies-application companies," and the complex interaction mechanism among the three parties is studied. Then, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the asymptotic stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies of the equilibrium point of the tripartite game in the three stages of green governance in the coating industry (traditional technology-green transformation-collaborative governance). Finally, the model was verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of the changes of subjective parameters on the evolutionary game was discussed. The results show that (1) the intensity of government governance is related to the frequency of spot checks and punishment coefficients, and the evolution tends to be balanced when the intensity of governance is moderate. (2) The evolutionary trend of the game's main players' strategy selection also depends on the government's punishment. There is greater probability of green transition of manufacturing companies under punishment. (3) The green subsidy coefficient and the green degree of the product also have a greater impact on the strategic choice of the game player.

Will nuclear polluted seafood stop selling in the blockchain-enabled market? Lessons from government punishment and social cognition for retailer's selling

In April 2021, Japan's decision to dump nuclear wastewater into the ocean has raised worldwide attention. Therefore, to focus on seafood safety from firm and government in this event, we construct a game model to explore the technology-enabled ways to resolve conflict from domestic product and polluted product. Our analysis reveals the potential equilibrium strategy for the domestic product only and two types of products, respectively. Moreover, from the perspective of government punishment, the result shows the existing motivation of polluted product in the market. Finally, we also investigate the five aspects to find the changes of market share for domestic product, including customer choice, product freshness, market uncertainty, geographical distance, and shoddy product, respectively. In summary, this research provides management implications to resolve conflict between two types of products and to realize the multi-party balance of interests and technology-enabled value.