Government Policy Incentives Research Articles

Analysis of low-carbon technology transfer strategies based on a quadrilateral evolutionary game

Promoting low-carbon technology transfer is crucial for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, combating climate change, and fostering sustainable development. Based on the “efficient market” and “active government” concepts, a “government-intermediary-receiver-sender” game model was constructed, identifying evolutionary stable strategies and key factors affecting strategy selection. It was found that (1) receiver and sender needs and government policy incentives increase intermediaries' willingness to participate, reducing input costs and shifting government support from incentives to compensatory regulations; (2) optimal strategies emerge when incentives for low-carbon technology senders, receivers, and intermediaries, and penalties for serious defaults by senders and receivers exceed a threshold, fostering high participation willingness and leading to government implementation of compensatory regulations; (3) differentiated penalties are necessary to avoid a sender-receiver prisoner's dilemma but only ensure one side's willingness to participate, while government incentive-based regulation can overcome negative constraints and promote active participation from both sender and receiver. Compensatory regulations encourage sustained technology transfer costs and reduce incentive costs, with optimization focusing on lowering government publicity costs and increasing economic benefits for intermediaries.

The impact of new energy industry on environmental and economic benefits: Evidence from China

The aggravation of the global warming crisis, due to excessive consumption of traditional energy, urgently calls for the strategic goal of sustainable development. This study addresses endogeneity concerns by employing panel fixed effect and DID models, employing panel data from China's provincial green finance index spanning from 2016 to 2021. The empirical findings indicate that: (1) the impact of the new energy industry on environmental and economic benefits is more pronounced in inland areas characterized by lower GDP and smaller population size; (2) this effect is driven by green technological innovation, government incentive policies, and job creation. Drawing upon these results, this paper offers a range of pertinent recommendations at governmental, industrial, and societal levels to foster sustainable development, thereby enhancing social welfare.

Multi‐agent behavioral strategy game and synergy evolution path of the retired power battery recycling system

AbstractIn the era of transitioning to a low‐carbon economy, China's electric vehicle market is experiencing exponential growth, a trend that is mirrored by the burgeoning market for the recycling of used power batteries. This rapid expansion underscores the urgency of enhancing the power battery recycling system. However, the lack of sufficient engagement from consumers and recyclers in the recycling system currently impedes the formation of a cohesive recycling effort. To tackle this issue, we introduce a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery recyclers, and consumers. By analyzing the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) and their stability conditions, we delineate the synergetic development paths of them. Numerical examples illustrate the model's effectiveness and explore how government incentive policies can affect the strategic decisions of other participants. Our findings suggest that establishing incentive policies by the government in the early stage of the power battery industry is crucial for fostering a synergetic recycling system that is led by the government, involved by the community, and driven by the market.

A review and outlook on the influence factors for High-quality development of enterprises

Introdution: The high-quality development of the economy depends on the parallel progress of enterprises, it is particularly urgent to strengthen the research on the high-quality development of enterprises. Existing studies have conducted comprehensive analyses of the internal and external influencing factors of high-quality development of enterprises from different aspects. The study has mainly reviewed the literature about the high-quality development of enterprises from the historical evolution and current situation, definition, measurement and explored the influencing factors from four aspects: ESG, government incentive policies, green innovation, and innovation organization culture and to explore possible influence and path and relationship among different factors for further empirical research. The study found that (1) high-quality enterprise development has replaced rapid expansion as one of China's economic priorities. Sustainable and equitable growth is prioritized over rapid economic expansion. (2) ESG, green innovation, and innovation organization culture can have a positive impact on High-quality of enterprises, the influence of government incentive policy is ambiguity. Objective: The objective of this study is to investigate influence factors of high-quality development of enterprise and to analysis ESG, government incentive policies, green innovation, and innovation organization culture influence path and relationship among different factors. Theoretical Framework: The theory used is behavior change support from Robertson (1993). It refers to the behavior that employees willingly adopt and actively engage in in organizational management activities. This factor is crucial for the success of any organizational change. Results and Discussion: The study found that ESG, green innovation, and innovation organization culture can have an impact on High-quality of enterprises, the influence of government incentive policy is ambiguity. Future studies can explore technology innovation and corporate social responsibility, so as to help firms understand how their ESG performance affects their high-quality development and lead sustainable practices and innovation decisions. Research Implications: The study intends to expand the range of ESG-related academic views and suggest meaningful managerial implications for companies that want to practice ESG.

How can the policy combination promote the development of green buildings? ---Analysis based on stage perspective

The development of green buildings (GBs) relies on the incentives and penalty provided by government policies. Firstly, different development stages of GBs are identified in this study, and an evolutionary game approach is used to explore the stage characteristics and behavioral strategies of key stakeholders at different stages. Thereafter, considering the multidimensional synergistic effects of government incentive and penalty policies at different stages, this study investigates how to set and match incentive and penalty combinations at different development stages of GBs. Research indicates that the “incentive and penalty combinations” in policies is a core element for the benign development of the GBs. In the preliminary stage, the level of green technology innovation significantly influences the direction of the system. The “light incentive and light penalty” policy of government is preferable as it can guide developers and consumers to understand GBs, thus opening up the green building market. In the growth stage, the maturity of green technology plays a significant role. The “heavy incentive and heavy penalty” policy of government is effective, which helps developers compensate for construction costs, actively develop GBs, and effectively avoid deviant behavior. Meanwhile, consumers also change their purchasing preferences based on the benefits of GBs. In the mature stage, the role of industry associations becomes more prominent after the government withdraws from the market. The supervision strategy of “strong supervision and light penalty” effectively manages the green building market. Consumers continue to trust the quality of GBs from developers, and the synergy among the government, developers, and consumers collectively promotes the maturity of the green building market.

Investigating the Moderating Role of Government Incentive Policy on Consumer Adoption of Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) in Malaysia

Investigating the Moderating Role of Government Incentive Policy on Consumer Adoption of Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) in Malaysia

The government subsidy design considering the reference price effect in a green supply chain.

This paper constructs a green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. Taking into account the reference price effect of consumers based on the mental accounting theory, we investigate the following government incentive policies: R&D (research and development) subsidy, consumption subsidy, and dual subsidy. For manufacturer-led (M-led) and retailer-led (R-led) supply chains, we evaluate the optimal wholesale price, sales price, green degree of product, and the optimal subsidy of the government aiming to improve the environmental benefit or social welfare. We find that the government goal, power structure and reference price effect impact the design of subsidy mechanisms significantly. First, for M-led supply chain, the government concerned with the environmental benefit goal should only provide R&D subsidy for the manufacturer when the reference price effect is low; otherwise, the government would offer subsidy both for the manufacturer and consumers. However, the government will only offer R&D subsidy when the social welfare goal is adopted. Second, for R-led supply chain, the government aiming to improve the environmental benefit prefers dual subsidy when the reference price effect is low; otherwise, consumption subsidy is preferable. Surprisingly, under the social welfare goal, no subsidy for R-led supply chain tends to be the best option. Intriguingly, embracing the social welfare goal can result in more economic and environmental benefits for M-led supply chain, although the subsidy strategy is less effective than the environmental benefit goal. Our research can provide inspirations and references for designing government subsidy mechanisms in practice.

Incentive policy for the comprehensive development of young medical talents: an evolutionary game study.

Currently in China, there is a lack of well-defined and viable incentive mechanisms at the governmental and hospital levels to support the development of young medical talents, thereby hindering their growth Existing studies primarily investigate the current state and trajectory of incentives, yet they inadequately address the distinctive characteristics of various stakeholders involved in medical talent incentive processes, particularly the lack of research on incentive mechanisms with Chinese attributes. This study adopts evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of replication and the strategies for achieving evolutionary stability in the comprehensive development of young medical talents, considering both scenarios with and without supportive policies. In the absence of any supportive policy measures, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) point is O(0,0), the unstable equilibrium point is C(1,1), and the saddle points are A(0,1), B(1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point C(1,1), which means that the young medical talents and medical institutions adopt a combination of strategies (actively seeking comprehensive development and taking incentive measures). Under the scenario with supportive policies, the ESS point is C(1,1), the unstable equilibrium point is O(0,0), and the saddle points are A(0,1), B(1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point O(0,0), which means that young medical talents and medical institutions adopt (N,N) strategy combinations (inactively seeking comprehensive development, implementing no incentive measure). (1) Government incentives play a crucial role in motivating young medical talents to seek comprehensive development. (2) The level of government incentive support for young medical talents should exceed the cost increment of individual efforts. Additionally, the policy support provided by the government to medical institutions should surpass the incentive support offered by these institutions to young medical talents. This will enhance the motivation and encouragement efforts of medical institutions in actively promoting comprehensive development among young medical talents. (3) With the backing of certain government incentive policies, medical institutions implementing incentive measures and young medical talents actively seeking comprehensive development will establish a virtuous cycle of mutual promotion.

Research on the impact of government fiscal subsidies and tax incentive mechanism on the output of green patents in enterprises

This paper investigates the impact of two different incentive mechanisms, government fiscal subsidies and tax incentives, on the level of green patent output by Chinese companies. It analyzes the effectiveness, direction, and preference categories of government incentive policies. This paper examines the differences in the mechanisms of tax incentives and fiscal subsidies, and then studys the sensitivity of clean energy and traditional energy companies’ green patent output to policy incentives based on the type of enterprise. The results show that fiscal subsidies have a more significant incentive effect, and clean energy companies are more sensitive to policy incentives.

Commitment or rent-seeking? Government incentive policies for ESG reporting in sustainable e-commerce logistics

In the sphere of e-commerce logistics industry, the credibility of Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) reports by e-commerce logistics service providers (ELSPs) is critical for accurately conveying sustainability initiatives with transparency. Nonetheless, the actions of ESG rating stakeholders can significantly affect the truthfulness and authenticity of these ESG reports. Therefore, it becomes essential to develop comprehensive analytical methods and incentives policies to forestall any rent-seeking behavior that might emerge from potential collusion between ELSPs and ESG rating agencies (ERAs). This study presents a tripartite evolutionary game model to inspect the enduring strategic interplay among ELSPs, ERAs, and government regulators. The model illuminates the collective supervision outcomes molded by these stakeholder interactions. Choices available include ELSPs' decision to offer ESG-committed or basic services, ERAs' consideration to accept or decline rent-seeking requests from ELSPs, and regulators' options for either stringent or lenient supervision. The analysis also explores the influence of government incentives, such as rewards or penalties, in promoting ELSPs' provision of ESG-committed transportation services. Evolutionary stable strategies and conditions are then derived to capture the feature of incentive policies. The findings show that high ESG commitment transportation costs often deter ELSPs due to unpredictable future revenues, leading them to prefer a conservative strategy of providing basic services. Government regulations and incentives, however, can encourage in ESG transport, especially when ERAs’ rent-seeking charges are high. Despite the potential for relaxed supervision as ESG transport services become more widespread, strict government regulation remains crucial in motivating ELSPs to enhance their ESG commitment and adopt ESG transportation services.

Ecodevelopment strategy selection and case simulation of marine ranching enterprises based on evolutionary games

In the context of China’s “dual carbon” goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, the ecodevelopment of marine ranching enterprises (MREs) can provide new opportunities for economic growth and environmental protection. MRE ecodevelopment not only enhances the value of enterprise products but also helps restore the marine environment and protect fishery resources, thus promoting the sustainable marine economy development. Since marine ranch development is guided by the government, government regulation and incentives play an important role in MRE ecodevelopment. Based on the principle of participating subjects’ limited rationality, this study constructs an ecodevelopment game payment matrix involving central government regulation, local governments, and MREs and analyzes their decision-making processes. Using MATLAB, parametric analysis and numerical simulation are conducted to reveal the development behaviors of the government and MREs and their influencing factors. The results are as follows: Initial willingness to participate has different influences on the two participating subjects. Government incentive policy has a greater influence on MREs, and the punishment by the central government and monitoring positively contribute to the behavioral choices of the MREs and the government. These findings can help governments formulate mechanisms to promote MRE ecodevelopment. Specifically, we recommended that the governments promote MRE ecodevelopment by establishing hierarchical supervision and management organizational systems, improving policy, and formulating reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

Towards sustainable commercial-office buildings: Harnessing the power of solar panels, electric vehicles, and smart charging for enhanced energy efficiency and environmental responsibility

The value of reducing energy consumption in buildings has increased worldwide. This is because the consumption of fossil fuels in a building is as much as in other industries, also among buildings, the consumption of commercial-office buildings has a higher energy consumption; Therefore, the adoption of energy efficiency techniques in the construction and operation of buildings will play an essential role in creating sustainable cities in the future, and for this reason, green building standards such as IgCC, ASHRAE 189.1 and LEED are expanding. At the same time the advancement of technologies such as electric cars and solar cells, incredibly transparent solar cells for generating electricity are being witnessed. In this research, based on building energy simulation techniques, a commercial-office building has been investigated based on green building standards, considering the presence of electric cars and transparent solar cells. This research shows that the building with two scenarios of solar panels on the roof will be reduced by 9% and with transparent panels for electricity production by 18%. Also, the return rate of the first scenario is five years and nine months. The return rate of the second scenario is approximately six years and two months, which will decrease to 2 months and 20 days for the first scenario and three years and three months for the second scenario with the implementation of government incentive policies. Another finding was obtained through the intelligentization of electric car charging costs. It showed that if electric car charging stations are used in the building in three different states, including buildings without solar panels, building with the presence of solar panels only on the roof, and building with solar panels on the roof and transparent solar panels on the windows is 10%, 20% and 30% less than the cheapest commercial electric car charging station.

The Interactive Effect of Covid-19 Pandemic, Political Cost, and Executive Compensation on Earnings Management

This study investigates whether the COVID-19 pandemic, government Covid aids and incentive policies, and executive compensation affected the quality of the reported earnings in the leisure and hospitality industry. The pattern of changes in the Discretionary Accrual, DACC, was used as a proxy for the quality of reported earnings. It was examined whether this pattern changed during COVID-19 and was affected by government aid policies and executive compensation. An empirical analysis of 324 American leisure and travel industry data was conducted using multiple regression analysis for the pre-Pandemic period of 2018-2019 and the Pandemic period of 2020-2021. The results indicate that the pattern of DACC changed during the Pandemic period, and firms engaged in income-decreasing earnings management (EM). Furthermore, the change in the pattern was significantly affected by government aid and incentives policies and executive compensation.

Promoting Construction Labor Professionalization: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

A shortage of skilled laborers has constrained the new development path called Construction 4.0, which is proposed to improve the construction industry with advanced technologies. It should be noted that the mismatch between labor skills and technological progress will harm the sustainable development of the construction sector. In China, a three-tier management structure consisting of contractors, labor subcontractors, and laborers is widespread in the labor market. Considering the relationship between laborers and construction firms, promoting construction labor professionalization depends on the cooperation of general contractors and labor subcontractors. Previous studies have focused on training techniques and methods, but have neglected to investigate whether stakeholders are willing to cooperate in training labor. Considering that the standard workforce is more likely to receive human resource investment, this paper aims to analyze the strategic choice of related stakeholders in cultivating the standard workforce. Since evolutionary game theory has proven to be an effective method to study the symbiotic evolution between stakeholders, this paper will apply it to develop an evolutionary game model and conduct analysis. Moreover, this research examines how government incentive policy affects the dynamic evolution process of cultivating a standard workforce. The results suggest that without government incentives, general contractors and labor subcontractors tend to choose a contingent workforce. When the government subsidy reaches a certain level, general contractors and labor subcontractors are willing to cooperate in cultivating a standard workforce. Additionally, it is worth noting that compensation for labor subcontractors is relatively more effective than that for general contractors in promoting construction labor professionalization. Furthermore, some suggestions and countermeasures are proposed to help to cultivate a standard workforce in China.

Corporate social network and corporate social responsibility: A perspective of interlocking directorates

This study aims to analyze the role of the corporate social network (CSN) derived from interlocking directors on a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) and further investigate the moderating role of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in the institutional background of China. Empirical results show that an advantageous network position in a CSN can significantly encourage firms to undertake CSR. However, this effect is a nonlinear one. The increase in CSR is at a decreasing rate as CSN increases. Furthermore, the effect of CSN on CSR is less salient when EPU is high. This research guides managers on using the advantages of firms in CSNs and actively undertaking CSR to improve social and environmental sustainability substantially. In addition, this study also helps the government issue reasonable CSR evaluation standards and incentive policies and stabilize macroeconomic policies.

Extend theory of planned behaviour model to explain rooftop solar energy adoption in emerging market. Moderating mechanism of personal innovativeness

Switching to eco-friendly electrical equipment is a solution promoted by many countries toward the goal of sustainable development. This study develops the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) model to evaluate the influence of several factors on customers' adoption intention for rooftop solar energy products in emerging markets. i.e., Vietnam. The results of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis have shown that government incentive policies and environmental knowledge positively affect attitude towards adoption. In addition, adoption intention is motivated by subjective norms, environmental knowledge and attitude towards adoption. In contrast, the perceived monetary barrier significantly impedes adoption intention, but it can be alleviated by the factor of environmental knowledge. Among all independent factors, government incentive policies is found not to leave significant impact on customer intention adoption. In particular, the study also demonstrated the moderating role of personal innovativeness on the relationship between attitude and intention as well as perceived monetary barriers and intention adoption. These findings help to increase understanding of sustainable consumption behaviour in emerging countries and allow authors to suggest some implications for policy-makers and rooftop solar energy technology providers.

Subsidy or not? How much government subsidy can improve performance level of energy-saving service company?

Contract energy management model is a new energy-saving mode based on single market mechanism. Due to its externality, the energy efficiency market cannot realize the optimal allocation of resources. Government energy-saving subsidy can solve the market failure of energy-saving service market and improve the performance level of energy-saving service company. However, due to the unbalanced support fields and single incentive tools in the government incentive policy, the incentive effect of the government subsidy policies for contract energy management projects is not satisfactory. Based on a two-stage dynamic decision-making model, this article analyzes the impact of different forms of government subsidy policies on the performance-level decision-making of energy service company, and draws the following conclusions: (1) The effect of the government's variable subsidy policy with payment conditions is better than the fixed subsidy policy without payment conditions. (2) Government incentive policy for contract energy management needs to be directed against different energy-saving fields. (3) The government should adopt different forms of incentive policies for energy-saving service companies with different energy-saving levels in the same energy-saving field. (4) When the government implements the variable subsidy policy with preset energy-saving target, each within a reasonable range, with the increase of which, the incentive effect on energy-saving service companies with lower energy-saving level decreases. When the subsidy policy has no incentive effect, it is more unfavorable for the energy-saving service companies which are below the average level of the industry.

Blockchain-Based Design of a Government Incentive Mechanism for Manufacturing Supply Chain Data Governance

In the context of “double carbon”, constructing green supply chains is the only way to implement sustainable development strategies in the manufacturing industry. This paper, therefore, examines the manufacturing supply chain for low-carbon products. More recently, the lack of technical information flow due to data barriers up and down the supply chain has led to high energy consumption, the serious waste of raw materials, and the substandard production of green products. Therefore, the level of supply chain data governance must be improved to enhance the sustainability of the supply chain. By studying blockchain-based data governance and government policy incentives for manufacturing supply chains, this study constructed an evolutionary game model based on prospect theory for the tripartite relation of government, manufacturers, and retailers. The difference between the perceived and actual value was introduced into a three-way evolutionary game model based on prospect theory to optimize the practical implications of the model. The model was then simulated using system dynamics. Through the simulation, it could be concluded that the ability of the three-way evolutionary game to reach the optimal stability point is only related to the sensitivity of the retailer’s perceived value. Additionally, the outcome of the three-way evolutionary game can be unstable, with changes in perceived value sensitivity. Finally, relevant policy recommendations are made. The innovation of this study is establishing a data governance platform that uses data governance to build green supply chains. Additionally, the government was added to the subjects of the game to explore the role of government policy in data governance and sustainable development. In addition, the evolutionary game model was incorporated with prospect theory and traditional expected utility theory, and the rational deficits and preferences of decision makers were taken into account, which brings the results closer to the reality of the situation.

Critical factors to influence the illegal dumping behavior of construction and demolition waste: An ISM-DEMATEL analysis

Illegal dumping behavior widely exists in the construction industry and is difficult to manage. What factors and how they influence the illegal dumping behavior of construction and demolition waste remains to be clarified. Specifically, this study employs an ISM-DEMATEL approach to investigate the critical factors that influence the illegal dumping behavior. It is found that the factors, ‘capital investment of enterprises’ and “stakeholders' willingness and attitude”, are vital to tackle the illegal dumping behavior of construction and demolition waste. Yet, compared with business-level factors, the macro-level factors such as ‘social norms and culture’ and ‘government incentive policies’ tend to be less influential. Moreover, enhancing the industry-wise administration system and practitioners' dedication to the issue can be an option to avoid illegal construction waste dumping. The results of this study serve to elucidate the influential factors and offer practical implications for addressing the issue of illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste.

Halo effect of university: the reputation and technology cross-regional commercialisation in China

ABSTRACT The relationship between halo effect and cross-regional commercialisation of technology in universities is a very important issue that has not been answered theoretically. Based on signal theory and information asymmetry theory, universities with different reputations have their scope of influence and competitive advantages, and studying the cross-regional commercialisation of technology under the political border effect is worthwhile. Given the panel data of universities directly under the Ministry of Education, the relationship between the cross-regional commercialisation of universities and their reputation is non-linear, that is, the reputation mechanism plays a prominent role after breaking the province boundary. Specifically, high-reputation universities have higher technology transfer advantages in interprovince commercialisation, whereas relatively low-reputation ones perform better in intraprovince commercialisation. Moreover, improving research quality can compensate for the disadvantage of low-reputation universities in cross-regional technology transfer, whereas government incentive policies can retain more research results from high-reputation universities locally. Our study provides theoretical guidance for the optimization and adjustment of science and technology achievement transfer policies in China, especially for promoting science and technology achievement transfer, as well as providing practical references for retaining high-quality science and technology achievements in the region.