Government Support For Science Research Articles

Government Support of Science and the Impact of the Crisis: The Case of the EU Countries

Government Support of Science and the Impact of the Crisis: The Case of the EU Countries

Government Support of Science and the Impact of the Crisis: The Case of the EU Countries

Government Support of Science and the Impact of the Crisis: The Case of the EU Countries

Editorial

Editorial

Crowding in and crowding out within a contribution good model of research

In standard economic theory, government support of science is expected to confer external benefits and ‘crowd-in’ additional private sector research. However, higher rates of economic growth from this effect are not easily discerned from the long run data, and government and business financed R&D have moved in opposite directions (as a proportion of GDP) since the early 1960s in the US and elsewhere. This paper looks at potential sources of ‘crowding out’ as well as ‘crowding in,’ and compares standard analysis with a ‘contribution good’ model of science. Two different policy issues are identified – the assembly of ‘critical mass’ for the ‘kick starting’ of commercial science, and the expansion of commercial science beyond its ‘private equilibrium’. We analyse the allocation of scarce business as well as scientific skills between sectors. The model produces regions of both crowding in and out. The latter dominates for very high wages in the public sector as the government deprives the private sector of the means to exploit new knowledge.

The social purpose of Rev. Richard Dawes who taught the philosophy of common things

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to consider why Richard Dawes (1793-1867) academic, college business manager and Church of England priest developed a curriculum in a nineteenth century English village school with which he sought to modify differences in social class and achieved outstanding results in student engagement and educational attainment.Design/methodology/approach– The approach is documentary. It uses books and internet scans of original documents. It locates Dawes's work in the social movements of early nineteenth century Britain and associates Dawes's activities with those of Kay-Shuttleworth who was administrator of the British government's first move to provide education for poor children.Findings– Dawes emphasised tolerance and secular teaching within a school system devoted to instilling Church of England doctrine. He based classroom teaching on things familiar to children and integrated subject content. He used science to encourage parents of “that class immediately above that of labourers” to send their children to his school to overcome class differences. For his system to be widely adopted he needed science teachers trained in his practical teaching methods. Initial government support for science in elementary schools was eroded by Church of England opposition to state intervention in education.Originality/value– Dawes's pedagogic achievements are well known in the history of science education; his secular teaching in a church school and his valiant attempt to use science as an instrument of social change, perhaps less so.

From citadels to clusters: the evolution of regional innovation policies in Australia

In Australia, the federal (central) and State (regional) governments share constitutional responsibility for aspects of science and innovation policy. In practice, the federal government has tended to overshadow the States both in funding and policy for research and innovation. It can be argued that we are now seeing the strong rebirth of regionalism (at least at the State level) as far as government support for science, technology and knowledge‐based industries is concerned. The paper traces the growth of regional innovation policies through examples of initiatives from South Australia and other regions and examines the respective contributions of the State and federal governments. The character of State government support has evolved over the last 15 years, from sponsoring grand ‘technology citadels’ to today's strategies that take a more bottom‐up approach to building intense innovation environments, local clusters and knowledge hubs. Some of these trends reflect the influence of the global knowledge economy on regional industries, while others (notably the relative decline of the federal government as an R&D performer) are peculiarities of the Australian innovation system. The outcome is a significant evolution in Australia's innovation system, one which parallels responses to globalisation in other countries and suggests a different – but not diminished – role for public sector innovation policy.

The Road to Stiff Competition

In an editorial almost exactly 30 years ago ( Science , 15 July 1966, p. 253), Philip H. Abelson (now Editor Emeritus) noted that the relation between humans and computers had entered a new era. Improvements in capabilities and ease of use portended a great expansion of computers' role in science and society. As highlighted in this Special Issue on Computers (organized by editors Tim Appenzeller and Gilbert J. Chin), Abelson's predictions have been well borne out. Every aspect of scientific research is now facilitated by computers, from e-mail and World Wide Web-based distribution of information to data collection, analysis, and sharing; and from the graphical portrayal and simulation of data to reference searching and management, grant accounting, and maintenance of supplies and equipment. No scientist or academic scholar today could maintain a competitive position without computer assistance. Indeed, as noted in the Council on Competitiveness' recent report Endless Frontier, Limited Resources [*][1] (available on the World Wide Web at; also see [ Science , 5 April 1996, p. 25)][2], the extraordinary advances made in computer, information, and communication technologies have become a major driver of the global R&D enterprise. Unfortunately, this report, although endorsed by Senator Mark Hatfield, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and by John Gibbons, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, has received almost no attention from the scientific community and even less from policy-makers. The council finds that R&D is being transformed by three factors: “the end of the cold war, the globalization of the world economy, and the drive to eliminate the federal deficit.” As a result, under current budget plans, the United States would drop from its 1986 status as the world's most R&D-intensive country into the second rank of industrialized nations. Reducing the amount of U.S. gross domestic product invested in R&D from 2.8% (from government and private sources combined) in 1986 to 2.2% by the turn of the century will allow other countries to become much stiffer competitors. The Japanese government in particular (see [ Science , 14 June 1996, p. 1567][3]) has authorized a Science and Technology Basic Plan that will increase government investment in R&D by as much as 17 trillion yen (approximately $150 billion) over the next 5 years. As a step toward lessening the limitations on support for scientific research in the United States, the Council on Competitiveness recommends that government, industry, and academia form cooperative partnerships to pursue shared R&D objectives, which would optimize these sectors' limited but important resource pools. One potential source of such new resource pools has been suggested by Hal Berghel, professor of computer sciences at the University of Arkansas.![Graphic][4] Berghel recognizes that largely irreconcilable cultural differences now separate research in industry (where knowledge is proprietary and informally documented) from that in academia (where knowledge is public and disseminated through the peer-reviewed literature). To bypass the forced choice between basic and applied research, Berghel advocates “strategic research” (a term that has been under scrutiny for some time), in which applications are anticipated before research begins. Strategic research would be peer-reviewed like basic research but would be judged (an aspect deemed problematic) by how well it innovates to produce applications. In Berghel's view, strategic research could conform to the highest standards of science and yet focus on solving real problems that are worthy of business investment. The Council on Competitiveness concludes that the main objective of federal support for R&D is to stimulate civilian research. Government support of science is then neither a subsidy to a financially strapped industry nor a contract to procure specific items, but an investment with important economic and social multipliers. Adding a new pool of funds from government-university-corporate partnerships for the solution of the small body of problems that are ready for strategic research efforts could help move both science and society ahead in this time of constraint. To some scientists, such cooperation with industry will be too radical a departure from the present system, and will perhaps be seen as a first step toward diminished long-term federal support. Science encourages comprehensive national debate on these crucial questions and welcomes the views of its readers. [1]: #fn-1 [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.273.5271.25b [3]: /lookup/volpage/273/1567 [4]: /embed/inline-graphic-1.gif

Beyond History of Science: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Schofield ed. by Elizabeth Garber

192 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE theme, which draws on Smith’s experience at the State Department, seldom appears in this sort of discussion. The themes might therefore have provided insight through juxtaposition, but they are not closely integrated in Smith’s treatment. The final chapter, “The Unfinished Agenda,” unveils an unstated but unmistakable agenda of the book, to counter proposals for a combined Department of Science and Technology with a reaffirma­ tion of the accomplishments of the current pluralistic funding system. It also includes such startling recommendations as setting priorities for research, paying government scientists more, strengthening uni­ versities, modernizing industry, keeping the peer review system, and solving environmental problems through more research and devel­ opment. No analytical thread ties these pronouncements to the preceding descriptive chapters. The book is short on discussion of biomedicine, a glaring omission given that about half of U.S. government support for science goes to that endeavor. The list of other items not treated is equally puzzling. There is no recognition of the growth of world science around the U.S. scientific enterprise, and thus no discussion of competition from Japan or Europe for technical leadership. Fraud is just barely mentioned, and animal rights controversies do not appear at all. Despite the extensive treatment of the 1980s, controversy over university-industry relations does not play any major role in the discussion. Indeed, although Smith is well known for his part in a landmark study of the state of academic science in the 1970s, he reveals no concept of the educational mission of universities at all and therefore does not grasp the possible conflicts between pressures toward commercialization and a university-based research system. Indeed, it is difficult to picture the perfect audience for this book. It is clearly not intended for historians, who will want more detail and primary documentation. Students will find the reading dull, and science policy analysts will find nothing new here. In the end, Smith has produced a reference work, which will function as an introduction for those who know nothing about science/government relations and point them to other sources for stimulation. Susan E. Cozzens Dr. Cozzens teaches in the Department of Science and Technology Studies at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Beyond History ofScience: Essays in Honor ofRobert E. Schofield. Edited by Elizabeth Garber. Bethlehem, Pa., and Cranbury, N.J.: Lehigh University Press and Associated University Presses, 1990. Pp. 325; notes, index. $48.50. This volume was designed as both a festschrift for Robert Schofield and an attempt to review and illustrate current problems in the histori­ TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 193 ography of the history of science and technology. The authors— Schofield’s colleagues or students—range from well-known senior scholars—Edwin Layton, Martin Klein, Russell McCormmach—to one ofSchofield’s current graduate students. All ofthe seventeen essays were commissioned for this volume. Complementing the essays are a short, sprighdy, and insightful personal tribute by Melvin Kranzberg, an introduction by Elizabeth Garber, and a bibliography of Schofield’s publications. Garber has divided the book into four sections: “Biography,” “The Disciplines of Science,” “Science and Technology,” and “Science, Technology, and Culture.” The contents of the first two sections will probably hold little interest for most historians of technology. All of the eight essays focus on the lives, work, and disciplines of late-18th-, 19th-, and early-20th-century scientists. However, historians of tech­ nology may be interested in the first three essays, by McCormmach, Klein, and Michael Sokal, as illustrative of the range of approaches biographers may take. Readers of Technology and Culture will be much more interested in the final nine essays, which explore the relationship—or lack of one—among science, technology, and the larger culture. Of these nine, I recommend three most highly: Layton’s examination of the impact of Isaac Newton on American millwrights, Edward Jay Pershey ’s use of a large telescope to explore the relationship between science and technology in late-19th-century America, and Darwin Stapleton’s overview of industrial research in Cleveland from 1870 through 1930. My chief complaint about the second half of the book is the brevity of tbe essays. The amount of text is on the...

American Science Policy since World War II by Bruce L. R. Smith

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 191 remains essentially political. We would do well to acknowledge that fact and turn our attention to broadening and deepening participa­ tion of the public at the beginning of the process. It may not be the easiest course to follow, but for the sake of participatory democracy, it is probably the only course open to us. Such a solution requires, however, that a program in general educa­ tion of the sort that James B. Conant originally conceived for the Harvard undergraduate (his leaders of tomorrow) be revitalized and transformed into standard fare for each and every one of us. Else, rising public alienation and the growing cynicism and lack of confidence in public policy processes are destined to engulf and destroy the very framework on which our unique political strength is built. Stanley Goldberg Dr. Goldberg is preparing a biography of General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project. American 'Science Policy since World War II. By Bruce L. R. Smith. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990. Pp. ix + 230; fig­ ures, tables, notes, index. $34.95 (cloth); $14.95 (paper). The time is right to examine the development of U.S. science policy since the Second World War. Nearly a half century of growth and change are available for inspection, and many say that the present moment is a watershed, when the implicit social contract between science and government is up for renegotiation. Bruce Smith’s timing could therefore have been superb for providing what he describes as a “re­ statement of core concepts” (p. 5) in postwar science policy. His task, he writes, is both to describe how the nation has used its technical resources and “to cast some light on ways it can do so more effectively” (p. 15). Unfortunately, the light cast is less a beacon showing the way than soft background illumination for a well-known display. Smith’s treat­ ment of science policy is thoroughly conventional, strangely unbal­ anced, and myopic. After a platitude-filled introductory chapter, the body of the book is organized in a matrix. Chapters 2—5 each deal with a period of science-government relations. Chapter 2 reviews prewar develop­ ments, chapter 3 takes the story to 1965, and chapter 4 carries it to 1980. Chapter 5 focuses entirely on the Reagan era, a treatment that is much too long (one-fourth of the book’s length), contains much undigested information, and is already dated. Within each chapter, the matrix is created by crosscutting themes: basic research, applied research, commercialization, regulation, and international issues. These elements cut across the conventional cat­ egories of “science” and “technology” policies, and the international 192 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE theme, which draws on Smith’s experience at the State Department, seldom appears in this sort of discussion. The themes might therefore have provided insight through juxtaposition, but they are not closely integrated in Smith’s treatment. The final chapter, “The Unfinished Agenda,” unveils an unstated but unmistakable agenda of the book, to counter proposals for a combined Department of Science and Technology with a reaffirma­ tion of the accomplishments of the current pluralistic funding system. It also includes such startling recommendations as setting priorities for research, paying government scientists more, strengthening uni­ versities, modernizing industry, keeping the peer review system, and solving environmental problems through more research and devel­ opment. No analytical thread ties these pronouncements to the preceding descriptive chapters. The book is short on discussion of biomedicine, a glaring omission given that about half of U.S. government support for science goes to that endeavor. The list of other items not treated is equally puzzling. There is no recognition of the growth of world science around the U.S. scientific enterprise, and thus no discussion of competition from Japan or Europe for technical leadership. Fraud is just barely mentioned, and animal rights controversies do not appear at all. Despite the extensive treatment of the 1980s, controversy over university-industry relations does not play any major role in the discussion. Indeed, although Smith is well known for his part in a landmark study of the state of academic science in the 1970s, he reveals no concept...

Bridging the gulf

Scientists and politicians have to work together in two different fields: (a) where a scientific input is required for sensible decision making by government (“science in policy”). (b) government support for science (“policy for science”). The very different background of scientists and of politicians makes cooperation difficult, particularly perhaps because of the very different time horizons of the two partners and the circumstance that, at least in academic life, scientists select their problems, whereas politicians inevitably have to deal with the problems that actually arise. To make the cooperation effective and fruitful, it is essential that the senior scientists involved should enjoy the confidence of the scientific community in general, should be able to convey the scientific knowledge, and especially the scientific uncertainties and doubts, with great lucidity to the politicians concerned, who although highly intelligent will only rarely have a scientific education, and that the scientific staff should be full members of the politician's team, conversant with what is politically feasible and what is not. As regards policy for science, it is important to be aware of the different reasons for public support of science: the cultural, the utilitarian and the educational.

Chinese government support for science and technology

Chinese government support for science and technology

US Technology and Economic Development Strategies

The article points out that prior to 1980 most US government support of science and technology projects was carried out at the federal level. However, during the 1980s initiatives have come increasingly from the state level. Selected federal and national schemes are described, including the NIST, the National Science Foundation and the Small Business Innovation Research Program. Various state level activities are then outlined, attention being paid to incubators and science parks, seed capital programmes and centre of excellence programmes.

The American Society of Zoologists, 1889–1989: A Century of Integrating the Biological Sciences

The growth and development of the American Society of Zoologists (ASZ) came in an era of rapid expansion among the life sciences, as well as during a period when biologists were seeking to provide themselves with a united and effective voice. In ASZ's early years it usually remained subsidiary, overshadowed by larger organizations like the American Society of Naturalists or the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and constrained by its small enrollment to hold meetings in conjunction with these larger societies. As ASZ's numbers increased, however, new members entered from many specialized fields, and it became a focal organization for associations dedicated to such studies as ecology, genetics, animal behavior, or systematic zoology. Much of ASZ's success in achieving its integrative status can be attributed to the formation of divisions within the Society, each dedicating itself to the specialized interests of its own members under the larger umbrella of zoology. This development, of course, paralleled the interaction between ASZ and the larger social issues that have arisen during the century of the Society's history. ASZ has consistently concerned itself with just treatment for all, regardless of race or sex; with government support of science; with the education of science teachers and of young and talented biologists; and with all those issues that improve the productivity of zoologists and enhance their capacity for reaching an ever deeper understanding of animal biology.

MARKET FAILURE AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: ECONOMIC THEORY VERSUS POLITICAL PRACTICE

The economic justification for government support for science and technology has been commonly based on the concept of market failure. The general theoretical argument is that governments should intervene in cases where the free market fails to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. In this paper, the inadequacies of the concepts of market failure as they apply to policy are outlined. Its use in the political process, given these restrictive shortcomings, is also considered. Examples are drawn from Australian experience in science and technology policy over the past few years to support the claim that the concept is neither a sufficient basis nor an adequate guide for government intervention. Rather it has been used to justify politically determined decisions. Special reference is made to the Australian Industrial Research and Development Incentives Scheme.

Cleveland Abbe and a view of science in mid-nineteenth-century America

Summary By the middle of the nineteenth century science was developing into a profession demanding advanced training and devotion to research. American institutions, however, were still better suited to an earlier stage of popular science. Many of the difficulties and frustrations for would-be scientists created by the time lag in institutional change are illustrated in the career of Cleveland Abbe. In the fifteen years between 1856 and 1871 his attempts to become an astronomer touched upon many significant aspects of American science as a profession, including the American observatory movement, the creation of graduate education, government support for science, and the tension between the joint goals of the increase and the diffusion of knowledge.

Federal support of basic research: Some economic issues

There is no necessary connection between leadership in basic science and leadership in the applications of science, because scientific progress is a cooperative endeavour and not a competitive game; indeed, there may be a conflict between basic research and applied science. The notion of “a position of leadership”; in science raises questions of what leadership consists in and what its value is to the nation. The two main arguments for government support of science are cultural-social, and economic. The cultural-social argument stresses scientific activity as a form of social consumption of wealth and raises the question of whether other uses of the resources employed would contribute more to the greatness of the society. The economic argument stresses basic scientific research as a form of investment for the future, and raises the questions of what the rate of return on such investment is and whether and to what extent government support is called for. Relevant economic research results bearing on this problem are scarce. Economic theory suggests that competition in the market will supply less than the optimal amount of basic research; but our society substantially supplements the market through private contributions to and government support of science, and the question is whether this supplementation is deficient or excessive. Here difficult problems arise, on which more economic research is needed; one of these concerns the relative merits of government and private support of science. The rule-of-thumb procedures generally recommended for determining the volume and allocation of government support to basic scientific research generally ignore these problems, and amount to endorsing the present level of government support or recommending that it be increased. Allocation of federal support of science should take account of the possibility of stimulating the economic development of poor regions of the country by locating scientific research facilities in them.

Isaac Newton

Scientists and politicians have to work together in two different fields: (a) where a scientific input is required for sensible decision making by government (“science in policy”). (b) government support for science (“policy for science”). The very different background of scientists and of politicians makes cooperation difficult, particularly perhaps because of the very different time horizons of the two partners and the circumstance that, at least in academic life, scientists select their problems, whereas politicians inevitably have to deal with the problems that actually arise. To make the cooperation effective and fruitful, it is essential that the senior scientists involved should enjoy the confidence of the scientific community in general, should be able to convey the scientific knowledge, and especially the scientific uncertainties and doubts, with great lucidity to the politicians concerned, who although highly intelligent will only rarely have a scientific education, and that the scientific staff should be full members of the politician's team, conversant with what is politically feasible and what is not. As regards policy for science, it is important to be aware of the different reasons for public support of science: the cultural, the utilitarian and the educational.