Government Regulation Of Industry Research Articles

An interview with Professor Paul Joskow: On grid integration and decarbonization

Professor Paul Joskow is the Elizabeth & James Killian Professor of Economics and Management at MIT. He received a BA from Cornell University in 1968 and a PhD in Economics from Yale University in 1972. Professor Joskow was an active member of the MIT faculty from July 1, 1972 until August 31, 2010 and served as Head of the MIT Department of Economics from 1994 to 1998. He was Director of the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research from 1999 through 2007. He returned to MIT in 2018 after serving as the president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation from 2008 through 2017. At MIT, he is engaged in teaching and research in the areas of industrial organization, energy and environmental economics, competition policy, and government regulation of industry. Professor Joskow has published eight books as author, co-author, or editor and 150 articles and papers in these areas. In particular, his recent work has addressed transmission grid expansion to support efficient transition to decarbonized electricity sectors, focusing on the challenges associated with the development of large intra and inter-regional projects. His analysis of the New England Clean Energy Connect project appeared in his article, “Facilitating Transmission Expansion to Support Efficient Decarbonization of the Electricity Sector,” published in the September 2021 issue of Economics and Energy and Environmental Policy [1].

Impact of Digitalisation on Corporate Finance in the Agricultural Sector

The purpose of our paper is to examine the interrelation between digitalisation indicators of dairy industry government regulation and economic efficiency, using large corporations of Novosibirsk Region as an example. We propose to identify an integrated system approach to evaluating the influence of state programs related to digitalisation of the dairy industry on industry performance.
 A system-wide transition to digital technology in the infrastructure of dairy industry regulation is nearly totally absent from academic research. The existing literature considers the influence of state programs and policies on the industry and proposes various performance indicators. However, it is uncertain how industry digitalisation may affect these performance indicators.
 To address this gap in the literature, we propose a hypothesis of dependency between digitalisation indicators and performance indicators of dairy corporations. The basis of the methodology is the calculation of a digitalisation index used to assess the efficiency of government support of the industry corporations. In order to substantiate the hypothesis, we apply a correlation and regression analysis and established interrelations between the offered criteria (digitalisation index and share) and operating performance of dairy industry economic entities.
 Our results indicate general consistent patterns and interrelations between digitalisation of state regulatory programs and the performance of dairy industry corporations. Our statistical analysis reveals digital technology as a tool of government has a significant impact on business performance. The offered digitalisation criteria and patterns of performance efficiency are indicative of the possibility to manage the digitalisation process based upon preset parameters of business performance.
 Our research will be of interest to specialists developing state programs and policies applying digital technology, directors of dairy companies, and scientists who conduct research in related fields, who may use our approach for evaluating and forecasting performance in the dairy industry, accounting for the impact of government regulation.

Competing or Complementary? Government-Regulation and Self-Regulation in the Global Financial Sector

This study offers insights into the complex global regulatory environment by exploring the nature of the relationship between government-regulation and voluntary self-regulation within the context of the global financial sector. We specifically examine the extent to which financial sector government-regulation and self-regulation are complementary or substitutive, how they compare in their responses to a global financial crisis, and the extent to which changes in self-regulation may precede changes in government regulation (which is a widely held belief). Using a panel dataset of banking regulations across 71 countries during the years 2001-2015, we are able to reveal additional insights into the nature of the global financial regulatory system. Our empirical analysis indicates an overall substitutive relationship between industry government regulation and self-regulation. Additionally, we find that government regulation strengthens while self-regulation weakens in response to a financial crisis. Lastly, we find empirical support for the presumption that governments may take regulatory cues from private industry actors over time; however, government-regulation tends to respond in the opposite direction to changes in self-regulation.

A Study of Regulation: The Minnesota Liquor Case

Government regulation of industry is commonly justified by the existence of socially undesirable conditions and the necessity of their elimination or prevention. Regulatory commissions generally have the purpose of protecting consumers from exploitation by limiting the economic powers of cetrain firms having pervasive effects on the public interest [4, 151]. Due in part to the social implications of alcoholism, the liquor industry has not escaped regulation by state and local governments. A variety of statutes have existed in Minnesota governing the behavior of the liquor industry, including licensing restrictions and minimum resale-price maintenance. Resale-price maintenance (RPM) on liquor existed in Minnesota from 1951 to 1969, its stated purpose being:

Government Regulation of Industry

Government Regulation of Industry