Governance Of Contractual Relations Research Articles

Examining sharing economy operations: A process perspective

<scp>Examining sharing economy operations</scp>: A <scp>process perspective</scp>

Publishing in the Academy of Management Journals

Publishing in the Academy of Management Journals

Implications of Open Innovation for Organizational Boundaries and the Governance of Contractual Relations

To create value in an open innovation context, firms need to increase the permeability of their organizational boundaries to enable knowledge exchange with a broad set of partners. Yet to capture v...

China's Legal Response to the Global Financial Crisis: Increasing Certainty in Contractual Disputes to Boost Market Confidence

The recent global financial crisis has compelled China to make significant changes to its legal system, not least in the area of contract law. In 2009, China's Supreme People's Court issued a Judicial Interpretation and Guiding Opinion modifying the uniform contract law passed in 1999. These deal with issues such as the validity, performance and breach of contracts, and were issued in direct response to the economic downturn. This article focuses on the modifications the new Interpretation and Opinion have made to the governance of contractual relations in China, as well as considering what their impact will be for businesses operating in China. By addressing these issues, this article offers a clear overview of the current state of contract law in China and considers whether there will now be more certainty in the outcome of contractual disputes as a result of the recent changes and a consequent rise in market confidence.

Contract Governance – A Draft Research Agenda

While the concept of governance had originally been developed in Williamson's seminal article with a view to the “governance of contractual relations”, it has ironically not received much attention in general contract law theory so far. This paper aims at developing potential perspectives that might arise from governance research in the field of contract law. Contract governance appears to be an important and indeed necessary complement to corporate governance. Contract and organisation are distinct forms of cooperation, yet, they are complementary and, in some cases, contract and organisation can be alternative instruments for the same goals. Moreover, the market mechanism as such requires an organisational framework which may exert an influence on market results and which is open to a governance analysis. Contract governance opens up the perspective for its various incentives and regulatory mechanisms. In that respect, governance research goes beyond traditional contract law theory: It contributes to “better” regulation, for example by helping to avoid misdirected regulation and counter-intentional effects. Contract governance may thus help preserving individual freedom as it may contribute to less intrusive regulation.

Institutional analysis of evolution of joint forest management in India: A new institutional economics approach

Abstract This paper analyzes the evolution of the Joint Forest Management (JFM) institution in India in the light of the New Institutional Economics. To structure the analysis and shed light on different sources of persistent problems related to JFM, the paper uses the ‘four levels of institutional analysis’ framework developed by Williamson. In this paper we focus particularly on level 2 and 3. The second level of institutional analysis refers to the institutional environment (‘formal rules of the game’). We argue that the shift from state to co-management is a step in the right direction given the realities encountered in India. The insecure, incomplete and often incoherent transfer of specific rights from the state to local communities is, however, an important source of incentive problems on the part of communities. The third level of institutional analysis deals with the governance of contractual relations (‘play of the game’). Here, the interactions between forest departments and communities are discussed at a more disaggregate level. It is shown that information asymmetries and lack of accountability lead to a prevalence of enforcement problems and rent-seeking activities, putting into question the efficiency of the current system. We conclude with policy recommendations and issues for future research.

The Mechanisms of Governance.

This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance. Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing. Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law.