Goodwill Impairment Decisions Research Articles

The role of large shareholders in goodwill impairment decisions – Evidence from China

Our paper examines how large shareholders manage goodwill impairment to inflate earnings as well as the role of audit functions in this setting. The influence of large shareholders on corporate decisions is well documented, however, overlooked in goodwill literature. Using data from China, we find that a higher ownership percentage held by large shareholders associates with a lower likelihood of recording goodwill impairment as well as a reduced impairment amount, suggesting that goodwill impairment is intentionally avoided or decreased by large shareholders. We further find that the presence of big4 auditors mitigates such relationship.

The Effect of Time Orientation in Languages on the Recognition of Goodwill Impairment Losses

Synopsis The research problem In this study, we investigated the relationship between future-time reference (FTR) in languages and goodwill impairment. Motivation Previous studies on goodwill have focused mainly on firms’ economic and reporting incentives in single-country settings using economic theories. There have been recent calls for more research on goodwill accounting across countries (d’Arcy and Tarca, 2018), and greater use of behavioral theories in goodwill accounting studies (Amel-Zadeh et al., 2021). In response, we applied the linguistic relativity hypothesis to a new and highly significant area of future-oriented behavior (impairment decision) to explain cross-country variations in goodwill impairment reporting. The test hypotheses We hypothesized that firms in countries that use weak-FTR languages have higher levels of (and greater quality) goodwill impairment than those in countries that use strong-FTR languages. Target population We used a sample of 15,179 firm-year observations taken from firms reporting under IFRS across 21 countries for the fiscal years 2005–2018. Adopted methodology We used Tobit regressions, logit regressions, mixed-effects modeling, and propensity score-matching analyses for robustness. Analyses We tested the relationship between FTR in languages and (a) goodwill impairment decisions, (b) goodwill impairment amounts, and (c) abnormal goodwill impairments. We repeated our main analyses using several subsamples, different measures of FTR, and alternative regression specifications. Findings In line with the linguistic relativity hypothesis, our findings indicate that managers who speak weak-FTR languages are more willing to bear the costs of their impairment decisions in the present and are less motivated to shift current impairment into future accounting periods. In contrast, speakers of strong-FTR languages tend to delay the recognition of current impairments to future periods to reduce their anxiety about the negative effects of current impairment decisions. Findings from further analyses indicate that firms in weak-FTR countries report lower abnormal goodwill impairment, thereby bringing impairment levels closer to their normal optimal levels. Our inferences are robust to alternative samples, different measures of FTR, and alternative model specifications.

Does Tax Deductibility Affect Goodwill Impairment Decisions?

ABSTRACT Using a setting with tax-deductible goodwill impairments, we examine how tax deductibility affects impairment decisions. Goodwill impairments are costly to firms, and managers generally attempt to avoid recording impairments. However, we propose that tax deductibility reduces the net cost of impairment, increasing the likelihood of impairment. Results indicate that tax deductibility increases impairment likelihood, especially when capital market pressure is high, consistent with tax deductibility reducing the net cost of impairments (i.e., partially offsetting high costs of impairment). We rule out known plausible nontax explanations for these effects. Overall, results suggest that taxation is an important, previously overlooked determinant of economically important goodwill impairments. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: F23; G32; H20; M41.

Who has the Power? Examining the Power Dynamic between CFOs and Audit Partners in Goodwill Impairment Decisions

Who has the Power? Examining the Power Dynamic between CFOs and Audit Partners in Goodwill Impairment Decisions

Ownership Structure and Goodwill Impairment in Listed Nigeria Financial Institutions

The broad objective of this study is to examine the effect of ownership structure on goodwill impairment in listed financial institutions in Nigeria. Ownership structure is proxies using director’s shareholdings, ownership concentration, institutional ownership and chief executive officers shareholdings. The study used a purposive sampling technique and filter out financial institutions that do not satisfy the criteria set out for inclusion thereby arriving at the sample size of twenty five (25) financial institutions. Secondary source of data was used which was extracted from the annual financial statement of the sampled financial institutions from year 2011 to 2014. Logit multiple regression was adopted in this study. The findings reveal that ownership concentration and institutional ownership were both positive and statistically significantly related to goodwill impairment while chief executive officers shareholdings were positive but statistically insignificant to goodwill impairment decisions of listed financial institutions in Nigeria. It can be inferred to some extent that ownership structure and chief executive officers may not necessarily influence the goodwill impairment decision of managements in listed financial institution in Nigeria It is recommended among others that listed financial institutions should give more attention to their ownership concentration and institutional shareholdings in other to ensure the timely recognition of goodwill impairment so as to present their financial statement in its true and fair nature so that investor’s interest will be protected.

Do controlling shareholders share pledging affect goodwill impairment? Evidence from China

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the impact of controlling shareholders’ share pledging on goodwill impairment.Design/methodology/approachThis study empirically investigates the effect of controlling shareholders’ share pledging on both the decision and amount of goodwill impairment for Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2017.FindingsThis study finds that the proportion of controlling shareholders’ share pledging is negatively related to both impairment decisions and amounts; these negative relationships are intensified when firms face high stock price crash risks. In addition, the empirical results show that firms with larger share pledging are less likely to recognize goodwill impairment or are likely to record relatively smaller impairment amounts when they are followed by fewer financial analysts.Originality/valueMost of the relevant literature has focused on managers’ behaviors toward goodwill impairments, while less attention has been given to goodwill impairments from the perspective of controlling shareholders. In fact, controlling shareholders may have strong incentives to protect their control rights when they exercise disproportionate control rights, especially in China. Given the high ownership concentration, prior studies may not have adequately explained the agency problem of controlling shareholders in goodwill impairment. This study uses share pledging as a case to fill this gap. Specifically, it investigates whether both goodwill impairment decisions and amounts are affected by controlling shareholders’ share pledging.

Accounting discretion in family firms: The case of goodwill write-off. Evidence from US firms

This paper investigates whether family ownership affects decisions to take a writeoff of the goodwill and the amount written off. This study is based on a panel of public United States firms. Consistent with predictions based on agency theory and socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory, the findings demonstrate accounting discretion in goodwill impairment is lower in family firms than non-family firms. The results also show that first-generation family firms are more likely to exploit accounting discretion in goodwill impairment decisions than second or later generation family firms, due to greater concerns associated with the negative consequences of the write-off. This paper contributes to previous research on accounting in the context of family firms. Family firms cannot be considered a homogeneous group with the same propensity to exploit the discretion allowed by accounting rules in highly subjective fair value measurements. Generational change significantly influences firms' accounting choices, leading to more credible earnings and asset values for second or later generation family firms. This study also suggests the earnings management literature would benefit from additional in-depth investigation into how the generational stage of family businesses affects accounting discretion.

Do Firms Respond to Auditors’ Red Flags? Evidence from the Expanded Audit Report

We investigate the impact of the expanded audit report on firm disclosure, focusing on auditors’ mentions of goodwill impairment as a risk of material misstatement. Using a sample of U.K. Premium listed companies with goodwill on their balance sheets, we identify instances where goodwill impairment is (versus is not) flagged as a risk and contrast firms’ disclosure level on goodwill impairment. We find that managers increase goodwill impairment disclosure when auditors initiate the mention of this risk but do not react to the elimination of the mention. The increase in disclosure is stronger when firms are perceived to be riskier, and firms make more timely goodwill impairment decisions when auditors mention goodwill impairment as a risk. Overall, this paper establishes the role of the expanded audit report as a credible channel for revealing corporate financial reporting risks to financial statement users, as well as a trigger of enhanced corporate disclosure.

Board ethnic diversity and goodwill impairment decisions: longitudinal analysis of energy firms in Malaysia

The present study investigates whether ethnic diversity among firms’ directors influences the decision to take goodwill write-offs, after considering the economic factors of impairment (measured in terms of the market capitalization indicator), reporting incentives, and firms’ internal governance. The analysis focuses on energy firms in Malaysia from 2006 to 2018. The regressions results based on binary logistics show that energy firms are less likely to take goodwill write-offs even when the market indicates the possibility for the write-offs. The results also show the absence of the direct relationship between goodwill impairment decisions and ethnic diversity of the board of directors. Nevertheless, the results reveal that board ethnicity moderates the relationship between firms’ goodwill impairment decisions and the market capitalization indicator, suggesting that as firms encounter increasing market indicator of impairment losses, the board with diverse ethnicity positively influences firms in taking goodwill write-offs. The results of the present study add to the literature on board diversity and firms’ decisions with regard to goodwill impairment by highlighting the beneficial roles of having ethnically diverse board of directors, in that they use the market indicator that goodwill may be impaired in their monitoring role on the goodwill impairment decisions. The results offer input to the policymakers by suggesting that to strengthen the monitoring roles of the board of directors, they need to be diverse and equipped with indicators that would assist them in their monitoring decisions. AcknowledgementThe author acknowledges’ the research funding (i.e., FRGS grant 13591 provided via Universiti Utara Malaysia) from the Ministry of Higher Education in Malaysia.

Goodwill Impairment: The Effects of Public Enforcement and Monitoring by Institutional Investors

ABSTRACTThis study investigates the determinants of goodwill impairment decisions by firms applying IFRS based on a comprehensive sample of stock-listed firms from 21 countries. Multivariate logistical regression findings indicate that goodwill impairment incidence is negatively associated with economic performance, but also related to proxies for managerial and firm-level incentives. In addition, whereas goodwill impairment tends to be timely for firms in high enforcement countries, firms in low enforcement countries tend to be less responsive to declines in the economic value of goodwill; CEO compensation concerns affect the impairment decision for firms in low enforcement; and CEO reputation concerns and management preference for smooth earnings influence goodwill impairment decisions in high, as well as low, enforcement countries. We also find that private monitoring through institutional investors substitutes for public enforcement in the context of goodwill impairment when a country's enforcement regime is relatively weak.

The role of corporate governance in accounting discretion under IFRS: Goodwill impairment in Australia

A major concern with the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is the accounting discretion allowed under the IFRS, and its potential opportunistic use by managers. We examine the role of corporate governance in the accounting discretion inherent in goodwill impairment decisions under the IFRS. More specifically, we investigate whether, in Australia, stronger governance strengthens associations between economic factors and goodwill impairment loss but weakens associations between contracting incentives and goodwill impairment loss. Using data from 2007 to 2012, we find evidence consistent with the notion that stronger governance enhances the associations between economic factors and goodwill impairment loss. However, we find that strong governance cannot completely eliminate the opportunistic use of discretion in an impairment decision, especially when pre-impairment income is negative, and when the impairment occurs in the first year of a CEO's tenure. Our results are robust with regard to alternative measures of the dependent variable, firm performance variables, and the governance variable, even after controlling for potential self-selection biases.

Management discretion and the role of the stock market in goodwill impairment decisions - evidence from Finland

IAS 36 provides latitude to management in the impairment testing of goodwill assets, which may intensify agency conflict. In this study, we carry out an empirical analysis on goodwill impairment losses recognised by Finnish listed companies between 2005 and 2009. We document evidence that a change of CEO is associated with a goodwill write-off. Further, our results indicate that the size of a goodwill impairment loss is larger when the company's reported earnings would have been negative in the absence of the impairment charge, which points towards behaviour associated with earnings bath. However, we also report evidence that the monitoring function of the stock market may reduce asymmetric information concerning the carrying value of goodwill. These results suggest that regulators could benefit from focusing on monitoring compliance with the current goodwill accounting standards in firms which exhibit high levels of information asymmetry between investors and management.

How Ethical are Managers’ Goodwill Impairment Decisions in Spanish-Listed Firms?

This article provides an analysis of the ethical behavior of managers making goodwill impairment decisions following the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 on Business Combinations. Replacing the systematic amortization of goodwill with the impairment-only approach has been a highly controversial step. Although the aim of IFRS 3 was to provide users with more value-relevant information regarding the underlying economics of the business, it has been criticized for the potential earnings management inherent in impairment testing. This study is based on a sample of Spanish-listed companies between 2005 and 2011, a period that embraces the economic crisis. After controlling for the underlying economic factors of the firms, the results suggest that managers are exercising discretion in the reporting of goodwill impairment losses, and big bath and smoothing strategies are influencing the decisions, whether or not to impair goodwill and about the magnitude of the impairment. Firm size is an attribute that appears significant in the analysis, suggesting that the cost and complexity of running the impairment test affect managers’ decisions. Additional analyses suggest that the macroeconomic environment influences opportunistic and unethical behaviors.

Better Late than Never, the Timing of Goodwill Impairment Testing in Australia

The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) goodwill impairment testing regime has been in place in Australia for almost a decade. One of the burning issues arising from the adoption of the IFRS regime is whether firms have impaired goodwill in a timely manner. This study examines the timing of goodwill impairment decisions in the Australian context during the period 2007 to 2009. It is evident that a non‐trivial number of firms did not impair goodwill as called for under the standard governing asset impairment.

Audit Committee Member Contextual Experiences and Financial Reporting Outcomes

Audit committee independence rules reduce potential firm-specific information for audit committees and self-interest may bias manager-provided information. Given these considerable limitations, it is important to understand how audit committee members (ACMs) obtain information for their monitoring activities. I investigate how a firm’s (focal firm) financial reporting monitoring outcomes are affected by its ACMs’ contextual experiences, either as managers or monitors, with other firms (interlocks). Specifically, I estimate whether contextual experiences with goodwill impairment decisions, measured as interlocks with firms that likely performed extensive impairment analyses in the prior year, affect the likelihood of focal firm goodwill write-off, other things equal. Overall results suggest that ACM contextual experiences increase the likelihood of goodwill write-off and are most influential when contextual experience is obtained as a manager, rather than a monitor. However, for large firms, contextual experience does not affect reporting when managerial equity-based incentives are strong.

Auditors’ Perceptions of Goodwill Write-Offs Under IFRS

In this paper, we explore auditors’ perceptions of goodwill accounting under IFRS with a survey of Finnish KHT-certified auditors in 2011. Exploratory factor analysis indicates that auditors are divided in two distinct groups: one group has a favorable attitude towards the IFRS procedures of goodwill accounting, while the other group sees that managerial interests affect goodwill impairment decisions. A binary choice model shows that Big 4 auditors are more likely to belong to the favorable group.

Goodwill impairments and chief executive officer tenure

The purpose of this paper is to examine the tenure of the chief executive officers of publicly held companies and their corresponding goodwill impairment decisions. An opportunity for managers to manage earnings exists via the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) goodwill accounting rules. It is hypothesized that CEOs will recognize this impairment in the early years of their tenure because blame can be placed on prior management's acquisition decisions, expensing goodwill early will make future earnings look better, or an objective evaluation of the reporting unit increases impairments.