Global Routing System Research Articles

ВДОСКОНАЛЕННЯ ТОПОЛОГІЇ МІЖМЕРЕЖЕВИХ ЗВ’ЯЗКІВ ШЛЯХОМ ОЦІНКИ РИЗИКУ

The Internet operates and is constantly growing due to global routing system, the scalability of which is indisputable. But this system has certain information security flaws, due to which there are threats of deliberate distortion of packet transmission paths in order to violate the integrity, accessibility and confidentiality of information. Such actions are called "route hijacks". The mechanisms of the mentioned cyberattacks are aimed at imposing on misconception or, in other words spoofing the network topology derived from routing tables, while mechanisms for validation of this information in the global routing protocol BGP-4 are absent. This vulnerability cannot be completely addressed without replacing the BGP-4 protocol, which could take another decade.Reducing the potential impact of cyber attacks on global routing requires a new methodology for assessing the effectiveness of interconnections and improving the network topology. Thus, the paper studies usage of a modern risk-oriented approach, when the risk owner uses the value of risk as a measure of information security. The proposed methodology is based on the analysis of the topology of the Internet, subjects, objects and processes of global routing. The owner of the risk is determined, the risks themselves are identified.New metrics have been introduced to assess the risk of route interception - a trust metric and a significance metric. The trust metric characterizes the probability of a route hijack at a certain node and depends on the metric distance between the risk owner and the target node. The concept of subject of trust and object of trust is introduced. Significance metrics characterizes the level of maximum damage associated with the area of the expected spread of the spoofed route. It is complex and takes into account the number of network prefixes routed through the target node, the weight of the prefix according to its length, and the distance between the source of the prefix and the target node. Risk assessment based on these metrics serves as a measure of the effectiveness of the topology in protecting against interception of routes, and provides an opportunity to make decisions on improving interconnections, using risk to measure the information security.

A Data-Driven Approach to Understanding the State of Internet Routing Security

This paper is concerned with the global routing system of the Internet, its serious and persistent vulnerabilities, the multi-disciplinary considerations shaping this space, and recent trends that finally improve its security. We report real-world evidence of the state of routing security with the goal of discussing possible options for better security. We offer two high-level conclusions. First, in designing an approach it is all-important to understand complexities and incentives for deployment. Second, any scheme that is picked for deployment will take time to have an effect, so having a realistic view of how quickly change can be accomplished is essential.

Поєднання традиційних методів і метричного підходу до оцінки ризиків від кібератак на глобальну маршрутизацію

One of the most significant Internet-related problems of cybersecurity is route hijacking counteraction in the Internet global routing system. Attacking global routing is capable of harming millions of network devices (and also users) with much less effort than the well-known DDoS or Ransomware attacks. The problem defined by Internet Engineering Task force (IETF, in RFC 7908) as «the propagation of routing announcement(s) beyond their intended scope. That is, an announcement from an Autonomous System (AS) of a learned BGP route to another AS is in violation of the intended policies of the receiver, the sender, and/or one of the ASes along the preceding AS path». In other words, some Internet provider could announce a route to some network prefixes which don’t belong to him. Then, a new fake route can compete with true route, and can win using BGP selection criteria. As a result, traffic to victimized networks is redirected improper way where it can be dropped, monitored, diversed. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) itself has no mechanisms to defend routes. There are many improvements, including cryptographical approaches (electronic signatures, certificates, routing registries), are still either computationally complex, or hard to implement and control worldwide, or both. Avoiding or minimizing this risk is an actual problem.Relying on world practices of risk management, we‘ve made theoretical approaches to identification and evaluation of route hijacking risk by exploring topology — links and relations between the ASes. On a first step, we have proceeded through ISO Guide 73:2009 «Risk Management – Vocabulary» to tie-up to the commonly used methodical approach for risk management. Then, we used a classic STRIDE approach to routing security threats classification, and DREAD model to assess each threat of STRIDE acronym. Using such two-dimensional measuring, we achieved a numerically expressed impact of each threat on aggregated risk evaluation.Further we used offered earlier metric function of the Internet so we can see and specify clear relation between distance between two nodes and risk of route hijacking. The more distance between two autonomous systems, the more is risk of successful intrusion in global routing for their mutual traffic distortion. The same way we can measure the distance (i.e. evaluate the risk of route hijacking) between one node and a group of some other nodes. In the conclusion we emphasize that such approach opens a way to further formulation of route hijacking risk management problem in terms of topology tasks. Fig.: 3. Refs: 11 titles.

Scaling The Internet Routing System: An Interim Report

The 12 papers in this special issue are grouped into three sections: 1) assessments of today's global routing system; 2) techniques to improve the performance of the existing routing system; and 3) new solutions that are designed to address the routing scalability problem by changing the basic model of the Internet routing architecture.

Identifying BGP routing table transfers

BGP routing updates collected by monitoring projects such as RouteViews and RIPE have been a vital source to our understanding of the global routing system. However the collected BGP data contains both the updates generated by actual route changes, and the updates of BGP routing table transfers resulted from BGP session resets between operational routers and the data collection stations. Since the latter is caused by measurement artifact, it is important to accurately separate out the latter from the former. In this paper, we present the design and evaluation of the minimum collection time (MCT) algorithm. Given a BGP update stream, MCT can identify the start and duration of each routing table transfer in the stream with high accuracy. We evaluated MCT performance by using three months of BGP data from all RIPE collectors. Our results show that out of the total 1664 BGP resets with 166 monitors, MCT can identify BGP routing table transfers with over 95% accuracy, and pinpoint the exact starting time of the detected table transfers in 83% of such cases. Accurate detection of BGP table transfers enables users to separate out real BGP routing changes and measurement artifacts, and can be used to measure and diagnose the BGP session failures.

The Shim6 architecture for IPv6 multihoming

The Shim6 architecture enables IPv6 multihoming without compromising the scalability of the global routing system by using provider aggregatable addresses. To do so, hosts use different addresses as locators for data packet transmission, but present the same source and destination identifier pair to transport and upper layers. The components of this architecture are the Shim6 entity, which maps and translates upper-layer identifiers and locators for remote hosts; the Shim6 protocol, which exchanges mapping information between two hosts that communicate; and the REAP protocol, which monitors the existing unidirectional paths and finds new valid locator combinations in case of failure. To protect against new vulnerabilities this architecture may introduce compared to IPv6, Shim6 hosts use either cryptographically generated addresses or hash-based addresses.

Internet expansion, refinement and churn

AbstractWe analyze the evolution of the global Internet interdomain routing system on AS, prefix and IP address level granularities, using snapshots of Route Views BGP tables from 1997 to 2001. We introduce the notion of semiglob‐ally routed prefixes, those present in the majority of backbone tables, and classify them into standalone ‐ those which have no subsets, no supersets; root — have subsets, but no supersets; and subset, or more specific, which are subsets of other blocks. Using these distinctions we find that from 1999 to 2001 many measures of routing system complexity demonstrated stability in the form of slow growth, dynamic equilibrium, and occasional contraction. We find that many net change measures reflect contributions of opposite sign, and that true measure of variation, or chum, is the sum of their absolute magnitudes rather than the difference. Appearance and disappearance of prefixes, ASes and Route Views peers, as well as status changes (an AS changing from transit to non‐transit, or a prefix shifting from a standalone prefix to a root prefix) are instances of routing system churn. One advantage of using our notion of semiglobal prefixes is that they exhibit less chum than global prefixes (those prefixes common to all backbone tables) and as such allow for derivation of more robust macroscopic statistics about the routing system. We study route prefix instability at a medium time granularity for late 2001 using 2‐hour snapshots of BGP tables, and find that half of all prefix reannouncements (flips) are contributed by 1% of all ASes, with government networks, telecoms in developing countries and major backbone ISPs at the top of the list of instability contributors. Small ASes (those who originate only a few prefixes into the global routing system) do not contribute more than their fair share of either route entries or churn to the global routing system. We conclude that during 1999‐2001 many Internet metrics were stable, and that the routing system's growth and instability are mostly caused by large and medium‐sized ISPs.