Global Real Economic Activity Research Articles

Geopolitical risks and energy uncertainty: Implications for global and domestic energy prices

This paper investigates the interaction between global geopolitical risks and global energy uncertainty by focusing on their implications for global and domestic energy prices of 157 countries. The empirical investigation is based on a structural vector autoregression model covering the monthly sample period between 1996 m1-2022m10, where global real economic activity is controlled for. The results show that a unit shock to global geopolitical risk (normalized to one standard deviation) results in about 1.13 units of an increase in global energy uncertainty (normalized to one standard deviation) in the long run (after two years), whereas the corresponding effects on global energy prices are statistically insignificant. In contrast, a unit shock to global energy uncertainty results in about 52 % (57 %) of a reduction in global energy prices (global economic activity), acting like negative global demand shocks. When statistically significant country-specific results are considered in the long run, a positive shock to the global geopolitical risk affects domestic energy prices positively (negatively) in 10 % (10 %) of oil producing countries, 32.1 % (19.7 %) of non-oil producing countries, 47.2 % (0 %) of advanced economies, 55 % (0 %) of euro area countries, 25 % (22.4 %) of emerging markets, and 22.2 % (26.7 %) of developing countries. In comparison, a positive shock to the global energy uncertainty affects domestic energy prices positively (negatively) in 5 % (40 %) of oil producing countries, 3.6 % (54 %) of non-oil producing countries, 0 % (61.1 %) of advanced economies, 0 % (50 %) of euro area countries, 3.9 % (56.6 %) of emerging markets, and 6.7 % (37.8 %) of developing countries. Important policy implications follow regarding the energy security of countries.

Early Warning Systems for World Energy Crises

Different severe energy crisis episodes have occurred in the world in the last five decades. Energy crises lead to the deterioration of international relations, economic crises, changes in monetary systems, and social problems in countries. This paper aims to show the essential determinants of energy crises by developing a binary logit model that estimates the predictive ability of thirteen indicators in a sample that covers the period from January 1973 to December 2022. The empirical results show that the energy crises are mainly due to energy supply–demand imbalances (petroleum stocks, fossil energy production–consumption imbalances, and changes in energy imports by countries), energy investments (oil and natural gas drilling activities), economic and financial disruptions (inflation, dollar indices, and indices of global real economic activity) and geopolitical risks. Additionally, the model is capable of accurately predicting world energy crisis events with a 99% probability.

Exogenous oil supply shocks and global agricultural commodity prices: The role of biofuels

Using quarterly data ranging from 1986Q1 to 2019Q4, this paper identifies an oil supply shock that is exogenous to global real economic activity in the impact quarter based on the proxy structural vector autoregressions (SVAR). Then, the impact of this shock on global agricultural commodity prices is examined, with a particular focus on the role of biofuels in distributing the impact of this shock on global food commodity prices. We find that unfavorable exogenous oil supply shocks have a significant positive effect on global agricultural commodity prices. Moreover, the significant positive effect of the unfavorable exogenous oil supply shock on global agricultural commodity prices is primarily attributable to the impact of the shock on the prices of oils, meals and grains, which are all key biofuel feedstocks. We find evidence that unfavorable exogenous oil supply shocks affect global food commodity prices partly through the biofuel production channel. Finally, we uncover that exogenous oil supply shocks have played an important role in historical food commodity price movements, especially since the early 2000s. These findings are very useful for policymakers in understanding the relationship between oil supply shocks and global agricultural commodity price fluctuations.

Identifying oil price shocks with global, developed, and emerging latent real economy activity factors

SummaryThis paper proposes an identification strategy for international oil price shocks while accounting for the heterogeneous sources of oil demand from global, developed, and emerging economies. Unlike existing works, we isolate global oil demand shocks, associated with a global real economic activity factor, from oil demand shocks originating specifically from developed and emerging economies, associated with real economic activity factors within these two groups of economies. The paper uses a structural factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model with latent global and specific factors to model crude oil demand and supply. To identify the shocks, we extract real economic activity factors from a large panel of emerging and developed economies' real activity variables using a two‐level factor model. The paper shows how structural shocks can be identified by solving equations that arise from economically meaningful zero restrictions on the impact matrix of the reduced‐form FAVAR model innovations. The empirical application shows that identifying the international oil demand shocks based on the global and specific latent factors is essential to appropriately quantify their heterogeneous impacts on these factors, the crude oil production, and the real oil price.

Measuring the frequency and quantile connectedness between policy categories and global oil price

This study explores the connectedness between various categories of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and global crude oil prices in different frequencies and quantiles using the generalized forecast error variance decomposition and data in the US, China, and Japan from January 2000 to May 2022. The empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, total short and long term connectedness exhibits different patterns and is more sensitive to extreme positive and negative shocks than regular shocks. Second, fiscal policy uncertainty (FPU) and monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) tend to act as net transmitters of shocks, while the roles of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) are mixed in the short term, irrespective of the country. However, under extreme market conditions, no specific-category EPU features a clear net transmitter/recipient. Finally, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively unaffected by the chosen proxy of crude oil prices and are not altered by global real economic activity.

Short-Term Forecasting of Global Energy and Metal Prices: VAR and VECM Approaches

This study introduces a set of multivariate models with the aim of forecasting global prices of 1) crude oil, 2) natural gas, 3) iron ore, and 4) steel. Various versions of vector autoregression and error-correction models are applied to monthly data for the short-term prediction of nominal commodity prices six months ahead, and to examine forecast accuracy. The fundamentals for metal and energy price predictions include inter alia, stock changes, changes in commodity production volumes, export volumes by the largest players, changes in the manufacturing sector of the largest consumers, the state of global real economic activity, freight rates, recession, and so on. Kilian's (2009) index of global real economic activity is found to be a useful proxy for global demand and a reliable input in forecasting both energy and metal prices. The findings suggest that models with smaller lag orders tend to outperform those with a higher number of lags. At the same time, selected individual models, while showing a standalone high performance, have varying forecast precision during different periods, and no individual model outperforms others consistently throughout the forecast horizon.

Which factors drive Bitcoin volatility: Macroeconomic, technical, or both?

AbstractAcademic research relies heavily on exogenous drivers to improve the forecasting accuracy of Bitcoin volatility. The present study provides additional insight into the role of both macroeconomic and technical indicators in forecasting the realized volatility of Bitcoin. Using 17 famous macroeconomic variables and 18 technical indicators between December 2011 and April 2021, the results reveal that the shrinkage methods, including elastic net and LASSO, can powerfully extract predictive information from macroeconomic and technical indicators. We further investigate the forecasting power of macroeconomic factors and technical indicators in terms of variable selection, business cycle, and volatility levels, and the results show strong evidence that the macroeconomic indicators (namely, S&P 500 realized volatility, global real economic activity index, and trade‐weighted USD index return) are the most frequently selected by shrinkage method, suggesting that their ability to forecast Bitcoin volatility is stronger than that of technical indicators. However, technical indicators are more powerful in forecasting Bitcoin volatility during the low volatility state.

Oil prices, exchange rates and interest rates

There has been much interest in the relationship between the price of crude oil, the value of the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. interest rate since the 1980s. For example, the sustained surge in the real price of oil in the 2000s is often attributed to the declining real value of the U.S. dollar as well as low U.S. real interest rates, along with a surge in global real economic activity. Quantifying these effects one at a time is difficult not only because of the close relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate, but also because demand and supply shocks in the oil market in turn may affect the real value of the dollar and real interest rates. We propose a novel identification strategy for disentangling the causal effects of traditional oil demand and oil supply shocks from the effects of exogenous variation in the U.S. real interest rate and in the real value of the U.S. dollar. Our approach exploits a combination of sign and zero restrictions and narrative restrictions motivated by economic theory and extraneous evidence. We empirically evaluate popular views about the role of exogenous real exchange rate shocks in driving the real price of oil, and we examine the extent to which shocks in the global oil market drive the U.S. real exchange rate and U.S. real interest rates. Our evidence for the first time provides direct empirical support for theoretical models of the link between these variables.

Modeling global real economic activity: Evidence from variable selection across quantiles

We conduct an open search of predictors of global real economic activity. To this end, we apply a predictive quantile regression framework, using four alternative proxies of global real economic activity during February 1997–August 2019 and building on a combination of machine learning algorithms to identify their predictors out of 23 candidate explanatory variables. The contemporaneous level of global real economic activity, the Asian and US financial stress are found the most robust predictors. The effect of US financial shocks appears asymmetric, as they undermine global economic growth when the latter is below the median, but do not matter much when the world economy expands fast. Besides, US shadow interest rates are significantly and positively linked to global real economic activity. This effect holds in a high-growth regime of the world economy and suggests that rising US policy rates, contrary to the conventional wisdom, entail US dollar depreciation rather than appreciation. A weaker US dollar stimulates dollar-denominated cross-border bank inflows to the countries other than the USA, leading to a rise in real investment worldwide and industrial output growth. Thus, our empirical findings inform policymakers which indicators should be monitored more closely to predict future shifts in global economic growth and also provide certain insights about optimal policy responses to such shifts.

A global perspective on macroprudential policy interaction with systemic risk, real economic activity, and monetary intervention

The study empirically assesses how macroprudential policy interacts with systemic risk, industrial production, and monetary intervention on a global level from January 2006 to December 2018. We adopt the aggregate proxies of these variables, capturing their global effects, and use a novel econometric technique, namely, smooth local projections. The study finds that global macroprudential policy leads the monetary policy, exhibiting a countercyclical pattern concerning industrial production. The latter has an inverse bidirectional linkage with systemic risk. Thus, an ex-ante tight macroprudential policy can indirectly mitigate global systemic risk through its pro-growth effect on industrial production, although no convincing evidence exists for the direct impact of a macroprudential intervention on systemic risk. The study results endure several extensions and a robustness check, which builds on alternative measures of global systemic stress and real economic activity, thereby legitimizing the increased importance attached to the macroprudential policy since the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.

An observation regarding Hamilton’s recent criticisms of Kilian’s global real economic activity index

Hamilton (2019) offers several criticisms of the global real economic activity (REA) index suggested in Kilian (2009). This study deals with Hamilton (2019)’s arguments regarding the ability of the index to forecast commodity prices. Using in-sample population-level predictability tests, Hamilton (2019) argues that world industrial production index growth rate performs better than Kilian’s REA Index. We show that from an out-of-sample population-level predictability perspective, the REA index performs just as well if not better than world industrial production index. The Clark and West (2007) no population-level predictability null hypothesis is rejected at the same rate if not higher for the REA index, especially as the forecast horizon increases.

Global economic activity indexes revisited

This study contributes to the debate about two measures of global real economic activity: real shipping costs and world industrial production. We show that once both measures are transformed in the same way, both can predict commodity prices. Moreover, we demonstrate that real shipping costs lead world industrial production.

World steel production: A new monthly indicator of global real economic activity

AbstractThis paper proposes world steel production as an indicator of global real economic activity. World steel production data is published with only a one‐month delay, thereby providing timely information for world real GDP forecasters. We find that world steel production and Lutz Kilian's (2009) index of global real economic activity generate large gains in forecasting world real GDP, relative to an autoregressive benchmark. A forecast combination of world steel production, Kilian's (2009) index of global real economic activity and an index of the industrial production of OECD countries plus six non‐OECD emerging economies produces significant gains in forecasting world real GDP, relative to an autoregressive benchmark

Time-varying propagations between oil market shocks and a stock market: Evidence from Turkey

We use a Bayesian time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) model to examine the time-varying transmission mechanisms between structural oil price shocks and Borsa Istanbul, Turkey's stock market (BIST). Our data span the period February 1988 to December 2018, and include monthly West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot crude oil prices, world crude oil production data, a measure of global real economic activity (the Kilian Index), and BIST data. Accordingly, we contribute to the literature by using a novel approach to estimate the time-varying propagations between oil-specific shocks and financial activity in Turkey. Our results are in line with those of related studies, thus verifying the consistency of the TVP-VAR model in capturing the time-varying nature of oil price shocks.

Oil Prices, Exchange Rates and Interest Rates

There has been much interest in the relationship between the price of crude oil, the value of the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. interest rate since the 1980s. For example, the sustained surge in the real price of oil in the 2000s is often attributed to the declining real value of the U.S. dollar as well as low U.S. real interest rates, along with a surge in global real economic activity. Quantifying these effects one at a time is difficult not only because of the close relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate, but also because demand and supply shocks in the oil market in turn may affect the real value of the dollar and real interest rates. We propose a novel identification strategy for disentangling the causal effects of oil demand and oil supply shocks from the effects of exogenous shocks to the U.S. real interest rate and exogenous shocks to the real value of the U.S. dollar. We empirically evaluate popular views about the role of exogenous real exchange rate shocks in driving the real price of oil, and we examine the extent to which shocks in the global oil market drive the U.S. real exchange rate and U.S. real interest rates. Our evidence for the first time provides direct empirical support for theoretical models of the link between oil prices, exchange rates, and interest rates.

Влияние премии за риск на российские макроэкономические показатели

In this study, we estimate the contribution of the risk premium shock to the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables along with other shocks that are crucial for the Russian economy. The relevance of the discussion on risk premium is caused by the crisis of institutions in Russia and the introduction of economic sanctions. The low quality of institutions, in particular the protection of property rights and the judicial system, increases the risk premium and undermines investors’ interest in the Russian economy. The imposition of economic sanctions, especially against specific companies, also leads to some restrictions on operations and increases the risk premium. All this may result in losses in real macroeconomic indicators such as output and investment.The main tool used in this work is a structural vector autoregression model with an exo­genous variable. Using short-term restrictions, we identify 3 types of shocks: output shocks, investment shocks and risk premium shocks. To take into account terms of trade shocks, which play a key role for the Russian economy, we use the price of oil as an exogenous variable, as it is the main driving force for the terms of trade. In this case, the shocks of the risk premium, conditionally on other factors, characterise the institutional and political component. As an alternative exogenous variable, we use the index of global real economic activity, which is a proxy for the dynamics of world demand.As a result, it was discovered that the risk premium shocks had a significant positive effect on output and investment. The negative impact of these shocks in the dynamics of real variables was noticeable in crisis periods, including the period of economic sanctions. Howe­ver, the overall contribution was moderate. The main driving force behind the dynamics real variables were the terms of trade and output shocks. Also, in 2015, negative investment shocks played an important role.

Refining the workhorse oil market model

SummaryThe Kilian and Murphy (Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2014, 29, 454–478) structural vector autoregressive model has become the workhorse model for the analysis of oil markets. I explore various refinements and extensions of this model, including the effects of (1) correcting an error in the measure of global real economic activity, (2) explicitly incorporating narrative sign restrictions into the estimation, (3) relaxing the upper bound on the impact price elasticity of oil supply, (4) evaluating the implied posterior distribution of the structural models, and (5) extending the sample. I demonstrate that the substantive conclusions of Kilian and Murphy (2014) are largely unaffected by these changes.

Monopoly power in the oil market and the macroeconomy

This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks caused by innovations in the monopoly power in the oil market. Monopoly power is interpreted as oil producers' ability to charge a markup over marginal costs. We propose a novel way to identify markup shocks based on meetings of the OPEC and show their unique macroeconomic consequences compared to supply and demand shocks. In particular, global real economic activity expands when oil producers' monopoly power rises. A general equilibrium model suggests that higher monopoly profits attract investments in oil producing capital which drive down marginal costs and stimulate economic growth.

Asymmetric oil prices and trade imbalances: Does the source of the oil shock matter?

We examine the asymmetric effects of oil supply shocks, shocks to global real economic activity, and oil-specific demand shocks on the oil, non-oil and overall trade balances of a large sample of oil exporters and oil importers. Our empirical strategy accounts for endogenous oil prices, heterogeneous parameters, and error cross section dependence within a panel framework. We find that the pattern of asymmetries in the oil price-trade balance relationship depends on the source of the shock. For both oil exporters and oil importers, oil supply expansions are more important than oil supply disruptions; we discuss the role that Saudi Arabia plays in limiting the global effects of oil supply disruptions. Although increases in global demand deteriorate trade balances for oil importers and improve them for oil exporters, decreases in global demand have a similar, rather than an opposite effect. Our results corroborate the existing evidence that oil price increases only generate large global imbalances if they result from demand-side shocks; and we present new evidence that oil price decreases only benefit oil importers if they result from supply-side shocks.

Measuring global economic activity

SummaryA number of economic studies have used a proxy for world real economic activity derived from shipping costs. This measure turns out to depend on a normalization that has substantive consequences, of which users of the index had been unaware prior to this paper. This paper further evaluates this and alternative measures in terms of treatment of trends, coherence with world output, and correlation with commodity prices. I conclude that measures derived from world industrial production offer a better indicator of global real economic activity.