Global Jihadist Movement Research Articles

A theory of jihadist beheadings

Why do some jihadist organizations engage in beheadings while others do not? Although beheadings have become a signature tactic of the contemporary global jihadist movement, I show that most jihadist groups perpetrate few or no beheadings and only a minority have adopted beheading as a consistent part of their repertoire of violence. Such variation exists even among ideologically similar ‘Salafi-jihadist’ groups, suggesting that ideology alone cannot explain why such violence occurs. Instead, I argue that the use of beheadings is shaped by a combination of local strategic context and transnational ties. Beheadings are strategically useful to jihadist groups engaged in insurgency as a means of deterring civilian collaboration with the enemy, demoralizing enemy combatants and attracting foreign recruits. But the use of beheading is also costly for such groups, notably because of its tendency to alienate potential civilian supporters. Whether or not particular jihadist groups use beheadings depends largely on whether they can afford to ignore these costs. Jihadist insurgents who control significant territory are less sensitive to civilian attitudes because of their ability to obtain support through coercion and are therefore more likely to perpetrate beheadings. The use of beheadings is also shaped by transnational ties: organizations that seek formal affiliation with transnational jihadist networks are more likely to calculate that the benefits of using extreme violence to attract transnational support outweigh its costs. I test this theory using an original dataset of over 1,500 beheading events perpetrated by jihadist organizations between 1998 and 2019.

Afghani crisis and the threat of Islamist extremism in Tajikistan

This article examines terrorist organizations that pose a threat to Tajikistan and analyzes their activities, media products and recruitment campaigns within the context of the Afghan crisis. Particular attention is paid to the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the transformations that occurred during their year in power. It considers not only transformations in Afghanistan itself, but in the global jihadist movement as a whole. Expert interviews gathered during field research are also analyzed. The data collected during the field study are analyzed in addition to databases and academic papers already available in the public domain. Based on the data mentioned above, this article assesses the level of threat posed by various terrorist organizations and the possible prospects for the situation. It also examines the existing laws in the sphere of religious policy in the Republic of Tajikistan and their application. It examines how extremists adjust their recruitment campaigns and how it is reflected in their discourse. The article also reveals the peculiarities of relations between various extremist organizations that are active in Tajikistan or are composed of Tajik citizens and are involved in fighting in other countries. In addition, it investigates which organizations Tajik citizens are more likely to join and what determines their choice. The results of the article contain conclusions for each organization considered in accordance with the results of the study that has been conducted. These findings contribute to existing studies on extremism in general and on extremist activity in Tajikistan in particular against the background of the Afghan crisis. Therefore, it brings new arguments and perspectives to the existing academic debate on this topic.

Social Ties and Jihadist Participation: A Mixed-Methods Approach to the Differential Recruitment of Radicalized Youth in Spain

ABSTRACT The relationship between social ties and jihadist participation has garnered substantial attention from terrorism scholars. However, further research is needed to understand what specific properties of interpersonal bonds influence terrorist involvement and how they operate. Drawing on social network theory, the current study tests the effects of the type, number, and strength of interpersonal ties with jihadist activists in explaining the occurrence and absence of individual engagement in jihadist activities. For that purpose, this paper analyzes the social links of 23 youths involved in terrorism and 21 youths who, despite their attitudinal affinity with jihadism, did not take part in such actions. Combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods of analysis, the study found empirical evidence that participation in jihadism is affected by the number of connections between young people and the global jihadist movement. It also found partial support for the relationship between tie strength and jihadist involvement. However, it rejected the assumption that the type of social tie influences participation.

Extremism as a threat to the national security of Somalia

Al Shabaab is the largest militant organization fighting to oust the Somali government and the foreign military presence supporting it.1Al-shabab seeks to control the country in order to establish a society based on its rigid interpretation of Shariah law. Although based in Somalia, Al Shabaab also conducts attacks in neighboring countries, notably Kenya. Al Shabaab emerged as an independent organization around December 2006 after breaking away from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), for which it had served as the military wing. Since the late 2000s, Al Shabaab has had close ties to Al Qaeda and other external extremism groups and has sought to frame the Somali struggle as part of a global jihadist movement. The group has engaged in bombings, suicide attacks, and armed assaults, especially against Somali government targets, private civilians, Christians, diplomats, foreign troops, and nongovernmental organization or aid workers .

A Struggle for Power: Al Nusra and Al Qaida in Syria

Relying on interviews with members of the organization, the article argues (contrary to the prevailing view) that Al Nusra never split from Al Qaida and even more so from the global jihadist movement. Instead the leadership of Al Nusra was locked in a power struggle with Al Qaida over the control of jihad in Syria and possibly even over the future of Al Qaida itself. Efforts to unify the Syrian opposition, even those limited to jihadist groups, failed also because of the leadership of Al Nusra kept trying to co-opt other opposition groups, rather than forming alliances with them.

ÁFRICA E AS AMEAÇAS À SUA SEGURANÇA

This essay begins by addressing the security context in Africa and the structural violence that is felt throughout the Continent. Later, it addresses the main threats that are manifest in such a differentiated space, emphasizing that in the current context it seems to be the fragility of the States the greatest threat, incapable of guaranteeing their inhabitants the ultimate ends - security, justice and well-being. Despite the failure of the state, people continue to live in these spaces, having various forms of social organization, which subsist and compete with other state structures, in the collection of taxes, in the use of force and also having different forms of social responsibility over the populations they control. The second threat emphasized in the essay, is one of those social structures that seek to impose itself in several geographic spaces: global subversion, which today is materialized in the two main factions of the global jihadist movement (al-Qaeda and Daesh), which seek the conquest of spaces and power also in Africa, using not only political mechanisms, but also, and when necessary, violent actions. Finally, a spectral analysis of other security threats in Africa, whether natural, such as climate change and pandemics, or man-made, such as organized crime and piracy, is presented.

Al Quaeda, the Islamic State and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know. By DanielByman. Pp. xii, 284, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, £7.99.

Al Quaeda, the Islamic State and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know. By DanielByman. Pp. xii, 284, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, £7.99.

Mujahideen Mobilization: Examining the Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement’s Communicative Action Repertoire

Drawing on Tilly’s notion of “repertoire of action,” this article shows how the evolution of the global jihadist movement’s communicative action repertoire has increased the potential resonance of its discourse. It foresees the construction of the global jihadist movement’s discourse of mobilization as the result of the evolution of its network of actors, the context in which its communications are undertaken, and its adaptation to new communication technologies. Accordingly, it argues that the decentralization of the global jihadist movement has led to a widening of its communicative action repertoire and a diversification of its discourse offering.

The Central Asian Militants: Cannon Fodder of Global Jihadism or Revolutionary Vanguard?

Central Asians have long been present within the ranks of organisations linked to the global jihad movement, but has there been an acceleration in their recruitment in recent years? There is growing evidence of substantial numbers of Central Asians (mostly Uzbeks and Tajiks) present in Syria in the ranks of the Islamic State and of a number of organisations linked to Al-Qaida. There is also growing evidence of recruitment inside Kyrgizstan and Tajikistan at least (as opposed as among Central Asian emigrants). The authors argue that distrust towards information provided by the Central Asian regimes should not blind analysts towards an emerging trend, which has substantial destabilising potential. The factors driving this recruitment also seem to be much more complex than a rejection of the authoritarianism of the ruling elites.

Mapping Today's Jihadi Landscape and Threat

This article examines the current state of the global jihad movement and offers reflections on its likely trajectory in the foreseeable future. It concludes that while the global jihad temporarily has been set back by the relative decline of the Islamic State, the movement overall benefits from al-Qaeda's regeneration; its ongoing ideological appeal; and its structural decentralization. In the next years, the movement likely will continue to evolve from its current bipolar structure toward an increasingly multipolar entity. Furthermore, it argues that the future jihadi movement will contain a large number of jihadi actors whose relationships will span cooperative, competitive, or mixed engagements, with implications for the movement as a whole. The article highlights several challenges for counterterrorism, including dealing with a complex movement structure; radicalization; socio-political disenfranchisement; the counter-response of societies targeted by jihadist violence; and technological changes. The article concludes with an assessment that in the next two to five years, the global jihad will remain a potent, although not an existential, threat.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here:https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.

The Global Jihadist Movement: The Most Lethal Ideology?

Prior research has established a link between ideology and lethality, both within the homicide and terrorism literatures. We examine this relationship as it pertains to the Global Jihadist Movement (GJM). Using a series of logit and negative binomial models with a sample from the Global Terrorism Database, we find that the GJM is indeed more deadly. However, this relationship does not seem to differentially affect Americans, despite their role as the GJM’s defined “other.”

Assessing the Effectiveness of High‐Profile Targeted Killings in the “War on Terror”

Research SummarySince the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing “war on terrorism,” the U.S. government has engaged in a series of controversial counterterrorism policies. Perhaps none is more so than the use of targeted killings aimed at eliminating the senior leadership of the global jihadist movement. Nevertheless, prior research has yet to establish that this type of tactic is effective, even among high‐profile targets. Employing a robust methodology, I find that these types of killings primarily yielded negligible effects.Policy ImplicationsGiven the immense controversy surrounding the policy of targeted killings, it has become that much more vital to assess whether such measures are effective. This study's findings, that most of these high‐profile killings either had no influence or were associated with a backlash effect, have important implications for future counterterrorism efforts. All in all, the U.S. government's investment in the policy of targeted killings seems to be counterproductive if its main intention is a decrease in terrorism perpetrated by the global jihadist movement.

Lone wolf terrorism: The new form of the global jihadist movement? Evidence from Afghanistan (1997–2013)

ABSTRACTOverall, there exists a deficit of empirical research on lone wolf terrorism outside a Western operational environment, quantitative research on the global jihadist movement, and, in particular, studies that examine both elements. This research attempts to fill this gap by giving a basic, descriptive overview of what lone wolf terrorism looked like in Afghanistan from 1997 to 2013 and examining whether it is more problematic than other forms.

Actions Speak Louder than Words: A Behavioral Analysis of 183 Individuals Convicted for Terrorist Offenses in the United States from 1995 to 2012.

Involvement in terrorism has traditionally been discussed in relatively simplistic ways with little effort spent on developing a deeper understanding of what involvement actually entails, and how it differs from person to person. In this paper, we present the results of a three-year project focused on 183 individuals associated with the global jihadist movement who were convicted in the United States, for terrorist offenses, between 1995 and 2012. These data were developed by a large-scale, open-source data collection activity that involved a coding dictionary of more than 120 variables. We identify and explore the diversity of behaviors that constitute involvement in terrorism. We also compare lone actors and those who acted as part of a group, finding that lone actors differed from group-based actors in key demographic attributes and were more likely to be involved in attack execution behaviors. Implications for counterterrorism are then discussed.

Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the global jihadist movement: what everyone needs to know

Contents Introduction Chapter One: History What Was Impact of the Anti-Soviet Jihad on the Jihadist Movement? Did the United States Fund Bin Laden and Al Qaeda? Why Was Al Qaeda Founded? What Did Al Qaeda Do in the Sudan? What Were Al Qaeda's Initial Goals? Why Did Al Qaeda Focus on the United States? What Was the Role of Egyptian Militants during Al Qaeda's Formative Years? What Was Al Qaeda's Relationship with the Taliban before 9/11? Chapter Two: Key Attacks and Plots Why Were the 1998 Embassy Attacks So Important? What Were Al Qaeda's Most Important Attacks before 9/11? How Did Al Qaeda Carry Out the 9/11 Attacks? Could the 9/11 attacks have been prevented? How Did Al Qaeda Justify the 9/11 Attacks? What was the fallout from the 9/11 attacks for Al Qaeda? What Attacks Has Al Qaeda Done Since 9/11? Chapter Three: Strategy and Tactics What Are Al Qaeda's Goals Today? Does Al Qaeda Have a Strategy? How Did Al Qaeda Become a Suicide Bombing Factory? How Dangerous Are Lone Wolves? What Do You Learn in an Al Qaeda Training Camp? Could Al Qaeda Get a Nuclear Weapon? Should We Laugh at Al Qaeda? Chapter Four: Ideas and Influences Key Schools of Thought that Influence Salafi Jihadism Who Are the Key Thinkers Jihadists Admire and Read? How Does Al Qaeda Differ from the Muslim Brotherhood? Why Do Other Jihadists Criticize Al Qaeda? How Does Al Qaeda Justify Killing Civilians? What Themes Does Al Qaeda Push in Its Propaganda? Chapter Five: Organization and Recruitment Why Was Bin Laden Such an Effective Leader? How Does Ayman al-Zawahiri differ from Bin Laden? How Is Al Qaeda Organized? So Why Does Al Qaeda Make So Many Mistakes? Is There an Al Qaeda Profile? How Does Al Qaeda Recruit? What is the Role of War? What Is the Role of the Internet? Where Does Al Qaeda Get Its Money? How Does Al Qaeda Spend Its Money? Chapter Six: Friends and Enemies How Did the 2003 Iraq War Shape Al Qaeda? How Does Al Qaeda View Iran and the Shi'a? Is Saudi Arabia Secretly Supporting Al Qaeda? Why Does Pakistan Support Jihadists? What Is the Relationship between Pakistan and Al Qaeda? Why Doesn't Pakistan Cooperate More with the United States? How Important Is Israel? How Do Muslims Perceive Al Qaeda and Why Does It Matter? How Did the Arab Spring Affect Al Qaeda? Chapter Seven: Beyond the Al Qaeda Core What Are the Key Al Qaeda Affiliates? Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb Al Shebaab Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) What About Like-Minded but Unaffiliated Groups? What's In It for Al Qaeda? What's In It for the Affiliates? What are the limits of cooperation? Does the Al Qaeda Core control the Salafi-jihadist movement anymore? So What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Al Qaeda? The Islamic State Who is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? What Should We Call This Group? Where Did the Islamic State Come from? Why Did the Islamic State Fight with Al Qaeda? What Does the Islamic State Want? How Strong Is the Islamic State? How Does the Islamic State Publicize Its Cause? What is the Khorasan Group? Is the Islamic State a Terrorist Threat to the American Homeland? Why Did the United States Go to War with the Islamic State? Chapter Nine: Counterterrorism Isn't Diplomacy Worthless when It Comes to Fighting Terror? What Role Does the Legal System Play? What about military tribunals, Guantanamo, and other post-9/11 legal measures? What Is and Why Is It So Controversial? How Do We Go After Al Qaeda's Money? What is the Role of Military Force? What About Drones and Other Air Strikes? Do Drones and Other Controversial Tools Result in How Do We Collect Intelligence on Al Qaeda? How Do Tools Change When Fighting Affiliate Movements? The Broader Cause as a Whole? How do we win the war of ideas? What is the role of allied governments threatened by terrorists? How Does Al Qaeda Adapt? How do you counter radicalization? What threat does Al Qaeda pose today to Europe? To the United States? Can We Defeat Al Qaeda and the Broader Jihadist Movement? How Is Fighting the Islamic State Different from Fighting Al Qaeda? What Else Should I Read If I Want to Learn More?

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement?

This Policy Brief sheds light on and increases understanding of al-Qaeda Central’s (AQC) latest affiliate al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). In September 2014, AQC launched the regional affiliate AQIS. The new group was created to operate across South Asia, however, with its centre of gravity and leadership based in Pakistan. At first glance, the lack of successful action has led many to argue that AQIS is of limited threat. However, despite early setbacks, the group has not been eliminated and continues to organise and plan for the future.

Shifting the Battleground: The Transformation of Al-Shabab and the Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn

The article sheds light on a two-dimensional explanation of the transformation of Al-Shabab from a Somalian nationalist organization to a global terrorist group. Following James Piazza's insights, these dimensions are characterized as ‘universal/abstract’ versus ‘strategic’ discourse to explain this phenomenon. On the opposite side of the spectrum, a discourse points to a narrative of ‘particularistic’ and ‘symbolic’. The key argument is that Al-Shabab transformed from a ‘particularistic’ (Somali nationalist) and ‘strategic’ (violence as a means to an end) group into a ‘universal’ group that used ‘symbolic’ violence (as an end in-and-of-itself) because of its interaction and collaboration with Al-Qaeda that espouses a ‘universal/abstract’ ideology and uses ‘symbolic’ violence. The article further argues that Al-Shabab's Somali nationalism fits within Al-Qaeda's ideology of restoring Islamic power globally, and as such a proverbial rolling back foreign influence constructed as Western generally and USA in particular. Although the aims of the Westgate attack were decidedly local—to drive out forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia—the article submits that the attack nevertheless points to Al-Shabab's growing capability to shift the battlegrounds and strike at enemy targets outside Somalia. This may also indicate Al-Shabab's evolution as a transnational terrorist group with deepening ties to Al-Qaeda and its global jihadist movement.

GLOBALAUS DŽIHADISTINIO JUDĖJIMO POLITINĖ PROGRAMA: TARP SVAJONIŲ IR REALYBĖS

This article deals with a phenomenon of the ‘global jihadist movement’. The article argues that the main goals that jihadists have in their political programme were not achieved. The only achievement that suits jihadists’ political programme is withdrawal of the US military forces from the Saudi Arabia in 2003. However, it is debatable whether this happened because of jihadists’ efforts.The main aim of the article is to find out how successful jihadists are in imple­menting their political programme. The article begins with a question: ‘What global jihadist movement is?’ At the beginning of the article the meaning of the global jihadist movement is analysed. The structure of the global jihadist movement is reviewed. The ‘Core al-Qaida’ and its place in the global jihadist movement are discussed. Further the article goes with a question: ‘What is the jihadist movement’s politi­cal programme?’ It is argued that the so-called jihadists’ political programme consists of ideological and strategic components. The specific jihadists’ vocabulary presented in the article is considered to be an important piece of movement’s ideology.The last part of the article is directly related to the article’s main aim. In this part the achievements related to implementation of the political programme of the global jihadist movement are analysed. The questions that are answered in the last part of the article: ‘How successful are jihadists in expelling Western forces from the Muslim countries in the Middle East?’, ‘How successful are jihadists in gaining power in the Muslim countries of the Middle East region?’, ‘How successful are jihadists in estab­lishing the Caliphate governed under the Sharia law?’In the article it is argued that jihadists are unable to realize their main goals from their political programme. Many ordinary Muslims see global jihadist movement’s goals as acceptable. However, they think that terrorist attacks, as the mean to achieve these goals, cannot be justified. For the future of the global jihadist movement three scenarios could be drawn. These are worst-case (jihadist movement will fail to achieve its goals) scenario, status quo scenario (jihadist movement will fail to achieve its goals, but continue to exist), and best-case scenario (jihadist movement will succeed in realizing all its goals). Which scenario will be the real one is difficult to say at the moment. Yet, it seems that the third one (best-case scenario) is least realistic, because after almost 10 years since 9–11 jihadists have had achieved none of their openly state goals.

Экстремистская группировка “Боко Харам” в Нигерии: угроза местного или глобального уровня?

Among issues of the US-Africa summit in August 2014 the problem of religious extremism in Africa was most important. In that context Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram plays a significant role. Kidnapping by Boko Haram militants of about 200 schoolgirls in April 2014 added oil to the fire. This action increased the fears of international community about possible linkage between Boko Haram and foreign Al Qaeda-like terrorist organizations. Initially, the group emerged as a local movement of devout Muslims in Northern Nigeria. But eventually it became a very radical militant Salafi-Jihadist group with ambitious goal to build an Islamic state in Nigeria. As is well-known, Nigerian population is divided not only into relatively rich South and poor North, but also into Christian and Muslim communities. As a result of sectarian clashes in Nigeria, thousands people lost their lives. The sectarian violence in this country is connected in part with the Islamist revolt of 1999 (“Sharia conflict”), after adoption of Sharia law in several Northern Nigerian states. Ethnic-religious violence in Nigeria is connected in particular with the British colonial heritage, but also with current serious social-economic problems (including the unemployment, corruption, cruelty of security services, unbalanced national economy etc.). From some point of view Nigeria may be considered even as a “failed state” because its federal government cannot control the whole territory of the country. While some southern regions are under control of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta militants, some areas in northern states are controlled by Islamists of Boko Haram and other radical groups. It's possible to say that Boko Haram has created its own “state within the state”. Boko Haram's ideology is anti-Western and anti-secular. It supports the revival of “pure” Islamic traditional values. Denying any inter-communion with the Western world, above all, the group claims against corrupted – from its point of view – Nigerian authorities and Muslim establishment (local version of the Islamist "Close Enemy"). An issue of the Boko Haram's engagement to global Jihadist movement is rather unclear. On one hand, ideologically, the group is very close to other Islamist groups (e.g. Al Qaeda and its branches in Maghreb, Somalia and Arabic Peninsula). But on the other hand, Boko Haram prefers to act against domestic (Nigerian) targets with very rare exclusions (for instance, an explosion of UN building in the capital-city Abuja). It must be clear that some attempts to find links between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda's network reflect the interest of Nigeria's authority to win international support for its struggle against local Islamist radicals. But it is impossible to ignore the information about logistical and operational links between Nigerian militants and such terrorist organizations as “Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb” or Somalian “Al Shaabab” (not to speak of common ideological agenda). It is necessary to point out that factional splits inside of Boko Haram (e.g. the emergence of the militant group “Ansaru”) make the picture more complex. Actually, the Boko Haram constitutes a danger primarily for Nigeria and potentially for neighboring countries. But considering the current evolution of the group, there is a great danger of further radicalization and internationalization of its activities both at local and regional (and maybe global) levels.

グローバル・ジハードの変容

Ummah, religio-political community, has been imagined and reimagined throughout Islamic history. In this paper, recent development of the notion of Ummah in the Arab-Islamic political thought is analyzed. A voluminous work Call for the Global Islamic Resistance written by Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, a theorist in the Jihadist circle, is cosidered as an important endeavor to reconstitute Ummah as a self-organizing entity. Al-Suri’s organizational theory conceptualizes de-centralized reconstruction of Global Jihad movement. In his view, Global Jihad is composed of voluntary and autonomous activities of small “Individual Jihad.” In dispersing Global Jihad into every corner of society, al-Suri’s theory envisions a worldwide Ummah incessantly constituted as the result of every Muslim's local act of each and individual resistance. Al-Suri’s optimistic view of the present state of Ummah, and particularly of its youths, as spontaneously rising to the call of Global Jihad poses a fundamental turn in the context of Jihadists’ trail of rejection of “Jahiliyya” and alienation from wider Muslim public.