Global Current Account Imbalances Research Articles

The corporate sector and the current account

Abstract We analyze how the corporate sector’s financing position affects national current account balances in a macroeconomic panel analysis for sample of 25 countries for the period 1980–2015. A consistent finding is that an increase (decrease) in corporate net lending is associated with a higher (lower) current account. We disentangle the current account effects of corporate saving and investment and conduct a number of robustness checks. We show that corporate saving and top household income shares are inversely related in our sample and that they have opposite effects on the current account. We conclude that corporate sector saving has contributed considerably to global current account imbalances.

Recessions and external imbalances

This paper empirically examines the relationship between growth (and recessions) and current account imbalances at the global and country level. The results suggest that global current account imbalances are strongly pro-cyclical, and that the strong positive correlation between global growth and imbalances is not driven exclusively by major growth slowdowns. We also find that past recessions and financial crises, both country-specific and global ones, tend to be preceded by a building up in current account imbalances and followed by a sharp and persistent adjustment. This pattern is in marked contrast with the increase in global imbalances observed during the COVID-19 crisis.

Twin deficits revisited: A role for fiscal institutions?

We revisit the twin-deficits relationship for a sample of 65 countries with fiscal rules over the period 1985–2015, using a panel data estimation methods. Our analysis accounts for the role of various types of fiscal rules and institutions: expenditure rules, revenue rules, budget balance rules, debt rules, fiscal councils, and supporting procedures. We find that the twin-deficits hypothesis is confirmed. The impact of the budget balance on the current account balance is increased when fiscal rules are considered, except with revenue rules and debt rules. Well-designed fiscal rules, fiscal councils and features that reinforce compliance with rules improve the current account balance. Our findings highlight the role of fiscal factors in explaining sustained global current account imbalances. They also contribute to the ongoing discussion about the improvement of macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance in the European context.

Cross-country variation in patience, persistent current account imbalances and the external wealth of nations

This paper is the first to utilize large-scale international surveys on economic preferences to examine the long-run relationships between patience, current accounts and external wealth. We find robust empirical evidence that countries with more patient individuals tend to run persistent current account surpluses, which in turn result in the accumulation of foreign assets. This theoretically plausible but empirically unexplored relationship holds true for euro area current account imbalances, global current account imbalances and net foreign asset positions worldwide. While the existing current account literature concentrates on proximate macroeconomic determinants, this paper’s extension of inferences from deep determinants (i.e., time preferences) to the distribution of external wealth of nations (i.e., net foreign asset positions) makes a unique contribution to the literature. Our finding showing that deep heterogeneities contribute to external imbalances suggests that the pattern of current account imbalances as well as the distribution of external wealth of nations might be very persistent.

A Requiem for “Blame It on Beijing” interpreting rotating global current account surpluses

Global current account imbalances have reappeared, although the extent and distribution of these imbalances are noticeably different from those experienced in the middle of the last decade. What does that recurrence mean for our understanding of the origin and nature of such imbalances? Will imbalances persist over time? Informed by empirical estimates of the determinants of current account imbalances encompassing the period after the global recession, we find that – as before – the observable manifestations of the factors driving the global saving glut have limited explanatory power for the time series variation in imbalances. Fiscal factors determine imbalances, and have accounted for a noticeable share of the recent variation in imbalances, including in the U.S. and Germany. For advanced economies, the financial component of the current account has been playing an increasing role in determining the movements of the account. Examining observable policy actions, it is clear that net official flows have been associated with some share of imbalances, although tracing out the motivations for intervention is difficult. Looking forward, it is clear that policy can influence global imbalances, although some component of the U.S. deficit will likely remain given the U.S. role in generating safe assets.

Propagation of the Effects of China’s Changing Economic Development Model to the Rest of the World

This paper tackles the potential effects of the fundamental changes that China’s economy is undergoing on the rest of the world. Thus, a range of effects in the development of China’s imports of goods and services can have on other countries were identified, in terms of China’s switching from investment to consumption and from manufacturing to services and innovations, as well as in exports, in the light of China’s upward movement within the global value chain. The spread of effects via the financial channel is examined for direct investment and external loans, with an emphasis on changes in both the size of financial flows and the motivation of Chinese investors. The emerging trend of relative reduction in China’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as the potential effects of the yuan’s internationalization going forward in terms of diminishing global current account imbalances were evaluated.

Global current account imbalances and the link between income and consumption inequality

AbstractResearch attention to current account imbalances increases because this problem is now manifested as intensified trade wars between countries. Our paper revisits this global issue from a new perspective complementary to previous studies. We propose a simple economics model and find that the current account balance is related inversely to the ratio of income to consumption inequality. This ratio synthesizes all schemes of consumption smoothing, which hinge on political interventions that temporarily attenuate the problem of rising income inequality. Yet shortsighted policy would have a consequential effect on current accounts in the long run. These theoretical findings accord well with our empirical observation that consumption inequality tracks income inequality loosely in deficit countries but closely in surplus economies, with global imbalances affected by financial liberalization and smoothing opportunities.

Global imbalances from a stock perspective: The asymmetry between creditors and debtors

After the global financial crisis, a reduction in global current account (flow) imbalances was observed. Still, global disequilibria as measured in terms of countries’ net foreign assets (stock imbalances) kept increasing. This paper explores the link between stock and flow imbalances. Our results show that stock imbalances are self-correcting or stabilizing in debtor countries but self-feeding or destabilizing in creditor countries. In debtor economies, the negative net foreign asset position improves the current account balance, helping to limit the accumulation of net external debt. In creditor countries, the positive net foreign asset position also improves the current account, leading to additionally increasing net external assets. The decomposition of the current account reveals that the income balance widens stock imbalances in both cases. The asymmetry between creditors and debtors is explained by the differential behavior of the trade balance, which fails to adjust in the case of creditors.

Trade, FDI, and Global Imbalances

We propose a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the implications of trade and FDI liberalizations for the surge of global trade and current account (CA) imbalances. We calibrate our model to replicate the evolution of bilateral trade and FDI flows across 5 major economies as well as their CA balances over 1996–2014. Our counterfactual experiments suggest that the decline in trade and FDI costs accounts for about half of the increase in global trade imbalances and a quarter of the increase in CA imbalances over this period. Moreover, we find that the openness of the Chinese economy after 2001 has little impacts on global imbalances, whereas the unbundling of the U.S. outward FDI is a major driver of global imbalances.

Trade, FDI, and Global Imbalances

We propose a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the implications of trade and FDI liberalizations for the surge of global trade and current account (CA) imbalances. We calibrate our model to replicate the evolution of bilateral trade and FDI flows across 5 major economies as well as their CA balances over 1996-2014. Our counterfactual experiments suggest that the decline in trade and FDI costs accounts for about half of the increase in global trade imbalances and a quarter of the increase in CA imbalances over this period. Moreover, we find that the openness of the Chinese economy after 2001 has little impacts on global imbalances, whereas the unbundling of the U.S. outward FDI is a major driver of global imbalances.

Rebalancing a lopsided global economy

AbstractThe growth in global current account imbalances has produced a lopsided global economy, characterised by large lenders and large borrowers, large savers and large consumers, and large exporters and large importers. For many years, the G20 has committed to reducing these imbalances. But has it been successful? Are the G20's policy prescriptions for reducing these imbalances the right ones? And have countries altered their policies because of the discussions and commitments in the G20 or not? The paper assesses whether the G20 has achieved its goal of reducing global current account imbalances. It then uses the G‐Cubed (G20) model — a multi‐country, multi‐sector, intertemporal general equilibrium model — to assess the impacts of the G20's proposed policy agenda. It shows that the G20's policy prescriptions — reducing the fiscal deficit in the United States, increasing public infrastructure investment in Germany and increasing domestic consumption in China — are not necessarily effective in reducing current account imbalances and, when imbalances are reduced, it often comes at the cost of the real economy. Finally, the paper uses the results from in‐depth interviews with 61 policymakers from across all G20 countries — including Janet Yellen, Kevin Rudd, Ben Bernanke, Haruhiko Kuroda, Jack Lew, Mark Carney and 55 others — to explore whether the G20's focus on current account imbalances influences domestic policies. It finds that, while the G20's influence has been marginal, there are ways in which it could be strengthened. The paper concludes with a discussion on how the G20's agenda could be reformed to help reduce current account imbalances in the future.

Import Dependency of Exports as a Cause of Current Account Deficit

The rapid increase in import dependency of exports and current account imbalances in many countries over the last two decades led many researchers to argue that they may be correlated and the increase in IDE may be the main cause of current account imbalances. This argument is important because historical evidence suggests that large and persistent current account imbalances often lead to subsequent corrective crisis. If the increase in IDE is a major cause of current account imbalances, reducing it becomes an important policy option to prevent further crisis. While there is a large literature on both global value chains (the main cause of IDE) and current account imbalances, the literature that investigates the link between them is very new and limited. This paper aims to contribute to this limited literature.

Modelling the G20

World leaders have declared the G20 to be the premier forum for economic cooperation. But as its influence and policy agenda has grown, so too has the need to be able to effectively model the G20 and the implications of its policy agenda. The paper introduces the G-Cubed (G20) model: a multi-country, multi-sector, intertemporal general equilibrium model of the G20. The paper gives an overview of the model and highlights its key features through four simulated shocks, all of which relate to the G20’s goal of reducing global current account imbalances: a fiscal shock (reducing the fiscal deficit in the United States), a productivity/fiscal shock (increasing infrastructure investment in Germany), a consumption shock (increasing domestic consumption in China) and the collective impact of all three shocks occurring simultaneously. The results demonstrate that, to be effective, any model of the G20 must reflect the complex trade and financial linkages between countries, the structural differences across G20 economies and the short-term rigidities observed empirically in the data, as well as a high level of disaggregation across economies, markets and sectors. The simulations show that reducing current account imbalances through these policies often comes with a real economic cost. The results also explain some of the shifts in global current account balances observed since 2007.

Global Imbalances and the Trade Slowdown

From the mid-1990s until the financial crisis, global trade grew twice as fast as global income, far faster than in previous or subsequent periods. During this period of rapid trade growth, global current account imbalances also expanded rapidly. If excess savings in some countries financed more consumption and investment in other countries, then trade and trade imbalances would move together. Greater capital mobility thus may help to explain why trade surged in the period before 2007 and why it slowed more sharply in later years when demand stalled. Consistent with this explanation, the countries that contributed most to global trade growth during the period of rapid trade growth also experienced large imbalances. Constraining trade deficits to historical norms, this paper shows that trade growth would have been more moderate in the late 1990s and early 2000s and stronger in subsequent years. Going forward, assuming global imbalances remain relatively unconstrained, the relationship between trade growth and income growth will likely be less stable than before the 1990s.

Global Imbalances from a Stock Perspective

After the recent crisis, a reduction was observed in global current account (“flow”) imbalances. Even so, global disequilibria as measured in terms of countries’ net foreign assets (“stock imbalances”) kept increasing. This paper discusses whether stock imbalances have a stabilising or destabilising impact on countries’ accumulation of external wealth. That is, do creditor economies, by virtue of their positive stock of net foreign assets, keep accumulating — everything else equal — external wealth? Do debtor countries, due to their negative net foreign assets position, keep accumulating external debt? Our results show that in debtor economies the existing stock of net debt helps to limit current account deficits, thus halting future debt accumulation. In creditor countries, however, the positive stock of net foreign assets contributes — everything else equal — to increase future current account surpluses, potentially leading to destabilising dynamics in wealth accumulation. This asymmetry between creditors and debtors holds in spite of the stabilising impact that net foreign assets have on the trade balance of creditor countries through real exchange rate fluctuations, and might have major implications for global trade and growth.

FDI outflows, exports and financial development

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to argue that financial development, measured by private credit in the economy, affects exports in an inverted U-shaped manner. The authors use the new trade theory model and empirical data to analyze whether the financial system is the reason of global imbalance.Design/methodology/approachThis paper builds a simple production model to connect financial development with a country’s export or outward foreign direct investment (ODI) decision. Using a panel data covering 108 countries for the period 1990-2011, the authors find strong evidence to show that when a country is at a lower financial development level, further advancements of its financial system will boost exports.FindingsFirst, an inverted U-shaped relationship between exports, imports and financial development is found in the study of 108 countries over the period 1990-2011; second, ODI provides a substitute effect to exports for financially advanced countries. These findings have provided an alternative explanation to international trade imbalances and contribute constructively to the discussion regarding whether exports and financial development are positively related or not.Originality/valueAs a result, the findings shed some light on the issue of global current account imbalances between developing and developed countries from a new perspective.

2017 External Sector Report

Global current account imbalances were broadly unchanged in 2016, with minor shifts adding to the reconfiguration under way since 2013. The fall in commodity prices, uneven cyclical recoveries in systemic economies, and differences in policy responses contributed to the rotation of imbalances. Current account surpluses of oil-exporting economies, as a group, shifted from large surpluses to small deficits, while deficits in emerging and developing economies narrowed markedly. At the same time, surpluses and deficits in key advanced economies widened. These trends were generally supported by real exchange rate movements. Overall excess current account imbalances (i.e., deficits or surpluses that deviate from desirable levels) represented about one-third of total global imbalances in 2016, remaining broadly unchanged since 2013, although increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. In particular, excess imbalances narrowed in emerging and developing economies, led by a smaller excess surplus in China and smaller excess deficits in others (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey). This narrowing, however, was accompanied by a widening of excess imbalances in some advanced economies. The persistence of large excess surpluses in several advanced economies (e.g. Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden) remains a distinguishing feature of the constellation of imbalances, an issue that is explored in greater detail in this year’s report. Persistent global excess imbalances suggest that automatic adjustment mechanisms are weak. While the rotation of excess imbalances toward advanced economies—with deficits increasingly concentrated in the United States and United Kingdom—likely entails lower deficit-financing risks in the near term, the increased concentration of deficits in a few economies carries greater risks of disruptive trade policy actions. Diverging stock positions coupled with continued overreliance on demand from debtor countries could also pose risks to global growth and raise the likelihood of disruptive adjustments down the road. With nearly-closed output gaps in most systemic economies, addressing external imbalances in a growth-friendly fashion requires a recalibration of the policy mix in deficit and surplus economies alike. Excess deficit countries should move forward with fiscal consolidation, while gradually normalizing monetary policy in tandem with inflation developments. Excess surplus economies with fiscal space should reduce their reliance on easy monetary policy and allow for greater fiscal stimulus. Where monetary policy is constrained from playing a role, as in individual euro area members, fiscal and structural policies to facilitate relative price adjustments should take priority. Meanwhile, structural policies in excess surplus countries should focus on lifting distortions that constrain domestic demand or limit trade competition; while in excess deficit economies, policies should be directed to improving external competitiveness and overall saving. Protectionist and mercantilist policies should be avoided as they are detrimental to global growth.

The demand for safe assets in emerging economies and global imbalances: New empirical evidence

AbstractRecent economic theory has singled out mismatches between the supply and the demand of safe financial assets in emerging countries as drivers of international capital flows and, ultimately, global current account imbalances. This paper assesses empirically the contribution of such “search for safe assets” to the size and composition of emerging economies’ international asset portfolios. Excess demand for safe assets in financially less‐developed countries would imply that these countries hold disproportionately high shares of their total portfolios in foreign assets. Moreover, financially less‐developed countries would hold disproportionately high shares of their foreign portfolios in financially developed countries, which are the major producers of ostensibly safe assets. This paper finds little empirical support for these predictions. Financially less‐developed countries allocate a larger proportion of their total holdings to domestic assets. Even when focusing on their foreign portfolios, there is no evidence of a general bias towards the assets of financially developed countries. Overall, asset mismatches do not appear to explain the asset allocation of financially less‐developed countries.

The Limits of Global Economic Governance after the 2007–09 International Financial Crisis

AbstractThe economic and financial crisis of 2007–09 uncovered serious deficiencies in the oversight of the global economy, some of which came to light quickly and induced a concerted response by national authorities and multilateral institutions. Foremost among them was the need for appropriate regulation of financial institutions and oversight of derivative financial instruments. In this area, the G20 led a response that is still underway. Meanwhile, new regional entities emerged to challenge the existing multilateral order built around the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO – a development that has prompted further attempts to reform the current framework, including the creation of new institutions. These responses, however, have left major gaps in global financial governance. We argue that these gaps include: the balkanisation of oversight over global capital flows and current account imbalances; inadequate international burden sharing and policy coordination in response to financial crises; and a persistent inability of global institutions and national governments to ensure that the gains and losses from financial globalisation are equitably distributed across and within countries. Looking forward, the G20 and relevant multilateral institutions need to broaden the agenda to ensure that economic growth can become more resilient to shocks, more generally shared across economies, and more inclusive within countries.

Trade Costs and Current Accounts

AbstractAre trade cost reductions a plausible explanation for growing global current account imbalances? I advocate that changes in trade costs affect trade and production structures, which is likely to affect national savings and investment. Explicitly adding trade costs à la Markusen and Venables into Jin's framework, this augmented model predicts that trade cost reductions affect the current account through changes in the industrial structure. Empirical evidence confirms that the interaction of trade costs and capital intensity drives current account balances. I also provide evidence that the response of current accounts to changes in trade costs depends on the capital intensity of production and on the depth of regional agreements on trade and factor mobility. Aside from the direct effect generally emphasised in standard macro‐level analysis, changes in production patterns could therefore be an additional channel of impact of regional integration on current accounts.