Gibson's Ecological Psychology Research Articles

Contributions of Gibson's Ecological Psychology to the Creation of Interactive Sound Installations

This article explores the potential contributions of Gibson's Ecological Psychology to artistic creation within the scope of Interactive Sound Installations. It provides a historical overview of the evolution of this form of art, highlighting the growing emphasis on the role of space and body (audience action) in shaping interactive art concepts. The article delves into how ecological acoustics research has integrated interdisciplinary perspectives from sociology, anthropology, and cognitive science to promote a more equitable and fair acoustic environment. Considering that the concept of the body embedded in the world is both central to interactive arts and Cognitive Science, particularly to Gibson's Ecological Psychology, this text presents its main aspects. It then discusses how these aspects can be applied in Interactive Sound Installations. In conclusion, it suggests that applying Ecological Psychology concepts to Interactive Sound Installations can contribute to the goals of recent acoustic ecology in creating a fairer acoustic environment.

Mythbusters united? A dialogue over Harris's integrationist linguistics and Gibson's Ecological Psychology

In this paper an integrationist linguist (Peter E Jones) and an Ecological Psychologist (Catherine Read) open a dialogue on the possibility of a productive relationship between the integrationist approach to language and communication of Roy Harris and James Gibson's Ecological Psychology of perceiving/acting/knowing. Within their own disciplinary contexts, each position is one of profound critique and innovation in relation to established and pervasive ‘myths’. Specifically, Harris is concerned with the ‘language myth’—the explicit positions and implicit assumptions in the Western language tradition (including modern linguistics) about the nature of language and the relationship between language and communication. In sharp contrast to mainstream approaches, Harris rejects both coding and representational views of meaning and takes signs (including linguistic signs) to be the product, rather than the precondition, of communicational activity. Similarly, Gibson critiques assumptions about how perception takes place, especially in the case of vision, that have informed Western science at least since Descartes' Optics. In particular, Gibson rejects the passive ‘retinal image fallacy’ of seeing in favour of an activity based non-representational perspective of ‘direct perception’. The paper offers a critical dialogue over the key theoretical perspectives of both traditions, focusing particularly on the import and implications of each theorist's claims and assumptions about the other's field. Highlighting key areas of apparent common ground across the two approaches, we also argue that Gibson appears not to be entirely free of assumptions about language that belong to Harris's ‘language myth’, while Harris appears at times to assume the ‘image’ based model of perception that Gibson rejected. In the context of current interest in a possible reconciliation or combination of integrational linguistics and Ecological Psychology, the paper, therefore, raises fundamental questions around the extent to which these independently developed programmes of demythologization are compatible or possibly synergistic.

News and notes.

This article introduces the publications from H. Heft's Visual art history and the psychology of perception: Perspectivism and its 20th century abandonment in the visual arts and in Gibson's ecological psychology, Wayne Viney's William James's Pluralism: An Antidote for Contemporary Extremism and Absolutism, and Mark Solovey and Christian Daye's Cold War Social Science: Transnational Entanglements. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Visual art history and the psychology of perception: Perspectivism and its 20th century abandonment in the visual arts and in Gibson's ecological psychology.

The development of linear perspective in the early 15th century and the discovery of the retinal image two centuries later became cornerstones of an approach to visual perception theory that eventually took shape primarily in the hands of British Empiricist philosophers. Even as this approach has dominated perceptual theory to the present day, the perspectivist influence on pictorial representation within the visual arts steadily diminished over time. Its decisive break with perspectivism came in the early 20th century with transformative 19th century changes in the sciences and technology. Collectively, these events elevated process and change over fixity and stasis, and ultimately led to the collapse of the distinction between space and time in the physical sciences. Even so, approaches to visual perception in psychology remained remarkably untouched by these occurrences until the 1960s when the experimental psychologist James Gibson drew upon them to challenge the legacy of perspectivism and the visual image and their effect on perceptual theory. His ecological approach to perception recognizes animacy as the essential functional property of living things, and in doing so, conceptualizes seeing as a perception-action process. From this stance, Gibson like the visual artists earlier in the century rejected the assumption that visual perception is best characterized as the capturing of static images. Jointly and yet independently, both efforts loosened the grip that perspectivism and the visual image have maintained on the arts and on visual perception theory, respectively, bringing 19th century scientific advances into 20th century psychological thought.

Investigating the athlete-environment relationship in a form of life: an ethnographic study

ABSTRACT From the theoretical perspective of ecological dynamics, skilful behaviour in performance contexts like sport and education is predicted on the establishment of a functional relationship between an individual and the environment. The strength of this functional relationship is shaped over time by everyday behaviours, values, and customs (sociocultural practices) within a specific sport organisation. A growing body of research seeks to identify these influential sociocultural practices that emerge and exist in sport cultures and organisations. However, little is known from an ecological realism perspective how these practices affect an athlete's engagement with opportunities offered by the environment (e.g. affordances). In this study, we draw on ethnographic data and theoretical tenets of James Gibson's ecological psychology to identify how the sociocultural practices of a British rugby league football academy might shape an athlete's engagement with affordances. Findings revealed that masculinity and disciplined behaviours were the dominant sociocultural practices, instrumental in developing beliefs, values, and customs of athlete development practices. An ecological realism analysis of the data suggested that cultural pressures meant that key actors ignored the potential for development and learning of athletes’ self-organisation tendencies, and inhibited individuals’ capacities to respond to opportunities for action offered in many traditional practice designs. We conclude by discussing implications for sport practitioners that promote ‘affordance-regulated’ practice designs to enhance athlete-environment interactions.

Feeling one's way in the world: Making a life

Translations of summaryThis paper argues for the psychoanalytic relevance of the works of James Gibson and Susanne Langer in explicating the early development of the human child and makes use of this combined formulation of development to think about psychoanalytic theory and practice. From the insights of James Gibson's ecological psychology we can appreciate the embodiment and embeddedness of the child's growing mind within both her physical and social environments. Making use of Susanne Langer's concept of feeling to redefine ecological psychology's perceptual counterpart to action allows us to understand the child's seamless transition into active participation in her culture, as she learns to project her animalian capacity to feel into intersubjectively defined forms of behavior and experience with others. The paper presents a lengthy exposition of Gibson's ecological psychology, before explaining Langer's thinking and launching into the combined insights of these scholars to explicate the nature of the child's mind as she feels her way in the world and makes a life for herself within it. This is the life she will be able to remake in the embeddedness of a psychoanalytic therapeutic relationship where she can learn to feel her way in the world in a new light.

Landscape and Health: Connecting Psychology, Aesthetics, and Philosophy through the Concept of Affordance.

In this paper we address a frontier topic in the humanities, namely how the cultural and natural construction that we call landscape affects well-being and health. Following an updated review of evidence-based literature in the fields of medicine, psychology, and architecture, we propose a new theoretical framework called “processual landscape,” which is able to explain both the health-landscape and the medical agency-structure binomial pairs. We provide a twofold analysis of landscape, from both the cultural and naturalist points of view: in order to take into account its relationship with health, the definition of landscape as a cultural product needs to be broadened through naturalization, grounding it in the scientific domain. Landscape cannot be distinguished from the ecological environment. For this reason, we naturalize the idea of landscape through the notion of affordance and Gibson’s ecological psychology. In doing so, we stress the role of agency in the theory of perception and the health-landscape relationship. Since it is the result of continuous and co-creational interaction between the cultural agent, the biological agent and the affordances offered to the landscape perceiver, the processual landscape is, in our opinion, the most comprehensive framework for explaining the health-landscape relationship. The consequences of our framework are not only theoretical, but ethical also: insofar as health is greatly affected by landscape, this construction represents something more than just part of our heritage or a place to be preserved for the aesthetic pleasure it provides. Rather, we can talk about the right to landscape as something intrinsically linked to the well-being of present and future generations.

S5-5: Dynamic Occlusion Deficiency in Patients with Alzheimer's Disease

At the core of Gibson's ecological psychology is the notion of invariant—specifically, an invariant pattern in the changing energy flux. Among the invariants identified to date are texture gradients, horizon ratio, optic flow, and tau. Gibson considered his discovery of the occluding edge the most radical because observers can perceive the layout of the environment (both unprojected and projected surfaces); and the accretion and deletion of optical texture, or dynamic occlusion, at the occluding edge resulting from observer movement produces an invariant pattern. Here I present the results of an experiment demonstrating diminished sensitivity to dynamic occlusion in Alzheimer's disease (AD) that led to their reduced capacity to recover 3D shape from motion. Young controls, age-matched elderly controls, and AD patients participated in the study. Participants watched computer simulations of an object, depicted as either transparent or opaque, rotating about the vertical axis against a background rendered in...

Cognitive ecology.

Cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context. In particular, it points to the web of mutual dependence among the elements of a cognitive ecosystem. At least three fields were taking a deeply ecological approach to cognition 30 years ago: Gibson's ecological psychology, Bateson's ecology of mind, and Soviet cultural-historical activity theory. The ideas developed in those projects have now found a place in modern views of embodied, situated, distributed cognition. As cognitive theory continues to shift from units of analysis defined by inherent properties of the elements to units defined in terms of dynamic patterns of correlation across elements, the study of cognitive ecosystems will become an increasingly important part of cognitive science.

Behavior analysis and ecological psychology: past, present, and future. a review of Harry Heft's Ecological Psychology in context.

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001)Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology-past and present-as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.

Naturalizing Perception

We believe that one of the most important aspects of Gibson's ecological psychology is his attempted naturalization of perception, that is, his attempt to place perception in the context of evolutionary theory. However, the dominant neo-Gibsonian approach to perception has been criticized for being inconsistent with evolutionary theory. We argue that a central tenet of this approach indeed runs counter to evolutionary considerations. Based on an evolutionary analysis of the use of information, we sketch an alternative development of Gibson's pioneering ideas. A truly naturalistic theory of perception, we argue, should recognize both suboptimalities in perception and variation among the members of a population in what informational variables are used. Like other variable organismal features, the use of information is a function of multiple factors. We will compare this naturalistic ecological approach with both Gibson's own perspective and more recent frameworks.

Comfort and Accessibility Evaluation of Light Rail Vehicles

A quantitative evaluation method for passenger rooms of light rail vehicles from viewpoint of comfort and accessibility is proposed as the result of physical modeling of in-vehicle behavior of passengers upon Gibson's ecological psychology approach. The model parameters are identified from experiments at real vehicles at the depot of Kumamoto municipal transport and at the full-scale mockup of the University of Tokyo. The developed model has realized quantitative evaluation of floor lowering effects by abolishing internal steps at passenger doorways and door usage restriction scenarios from viewpoint of both passengers and operators in comparison to commuter railway vehicles.

The Reality of Brands:

Abstracthe ontology of marketing, particularly the question of what products and brands are, is still largely unexplored. The ontological status of brands hinges on their relationship with products. Idealists about brands see perceptual or cognitive acts of consumers grouped under the heading brand awarencess' or ‘brand image’ as constitutive for the existence of brands so that, in their view, tools of the marketing mix can influence relevant mental dispositions and attitudes. Brand realists, on the other hand reject the view of brands as mere marks or names and interpret them as emergent products with properties that afford branding in the sense of Gibson's ecological psychology. Brand strength is a function of the degree to which brands occupy defensible niches in product space. Branding as a process involves changing external or internal boundaries of products. Several arguments are proposed in favor of brand realism. The fragments of an ontology of marketing are developed in a broadly Aristotelian framework. Brand realism has significant implications for a new understanding of issues ranging from the effects of advertising to financial brand valuation, the nature of trademarks, and marketing strategy in general. It permits one to treat brand equity as a real phenomenon not dependent on associations, attitudinal states such as brand loyalty, or spurious constructs such as brand character or personality.

Some Remarks on a Relational Concept of Mind

This paper inquires whether psychology should be internalist or externalist, that is, whether it should consider mind as an entity in itself, or rather as a relation with the environment. Some influential theoretical arguments for internalist psychology are critically reviewed and it is concluded that there is no compelling reason for internalist psychological taxonomies. Next, some proposals for a functional or relational type of explanation in psychology are explored, and it is argued that they provide a workable alternative for internalist explanations. Finally, Gibson's ecological psychology is adduced to show the empirical feasibility of a psychology that explicitly includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies.

Reconciling Discursive and Materialist Perspectives on Health and Illness

This paper examines the feasibility of developing `material-discursive' approaches suitable for studying the reciprocal interactions between the sociolinguistic and physical aspects of health and illness. The term `discursive' is used in the broadest possible sense, to refer to a mode of description characterized by awareness of the socially constructed and linguistically mediated nature of human experience. Similarly, the term `material' is extended to embrace any non-reductionist account of physical being which appears compatible with a discursive outlook. The obstacles to a material-discursive approach are discussed, with particular reference to the debate between researchers who conduct traditional quantitative and experimental research within the `biopsychosocial' framework and those who advocate a radical anti-realist position and qualitative research. A variety of material-discursive perspectives are explored, ranging from consideration of the physical origins and manifestations of linguistic meaning and socio-cultural processes, to analysis of the consonance between social constructionism, phenomenology and James Gibson's ecological psychology.

The Reciprocity of Perceiver and Environment: The Evolution of James J. Gibson's Ecological Psychology

The Reciprocity of Perceiver and Environment: The Evolution of James J. Gibson's Ecological Psychology

Why natural selection leads to complexity

While science has accepted biological evolution through natural selection, there is no generally agreed explanation for why evolution leads to ever more complex organisms. Evolution yields organismic complexity because the universe is, in its very fabric, inherently complex, as suggested by Ilya Prigogine's work on dissipative structures. Because the universe is complex, increments in organismic complexity yield survival benefits: (1) more efficient extraction of energy and matter, (2) more flexible response to vicissitudes, (3) more effective search. J.J. Gibson's ecological psychology provides a clue to the advantages of sophisticated information processing while the lore of computational theory suggests that a complex computer is needed efficiently to perform complex computations (i.e. sophisticated information processing).