Germany's European Research Articles

Newsbriefs: Germany's new H2 strategy, plus European and Australian projects worth $6bn

Newsbriefs: Germany's new H2 strategy, plus European and Australian projects worth $6bn

NextGenerationEU and the Future of the European Monetary Union: Shifting Interests and New Fractures in the German Power Bloc

AbstractBased on joint borrowing and a significant transfer component, NextGenerationEU stands in contrast to Germany's longstanding rejection of a ‘debt’ and ‘transfer union’. This article probes into the determinants of this shift in Germany's European policy approach. Focusing on the conflicts in Germany over the ‘deepening’ of the Monetary Union through fiscal capacity building between 2015 and 2020, it investigates which actors, interests and strategies instigated this shift. The analysis is based on trade and exchange rate data, a qualitative document analysis of position papers as well as expert interviews with interest group representatives, parliamentarians and civil servants. Theoretically, the study draws on concepts from regulation theory, materialist state theory and neo‐Gramscianism. It argues that even though not a fundamental paradigm shift, Germany's push for NextGenerationEU indicates a strategic re‐orientation of parts of the German power bloc towards European fiscal integration, amplified by recent geopolitical dynamics and crisis tendencies.

The Religious Foundations of the European Crisis

AbstractThere has been much talk about ordoliberalism recently. Scholars and the press identify it as the dominant economic instruction sheet for Germany's European crisis politics. However, by analyzing ordoliberalism only as an economic theory, the debate downplays that ordoliberalism is also an ethical theory, with strong roots in Protestant social thought. It is this rooting in Protestant social thought that makes Ordoliberalism incompatible with the socioeconomic ethics of most of the European crisis countries, whose ethics originate in Catholic and Orthodox social thought. This divergence is the source of a crisis of understanding between European nations and hinders a collective response to the Euro crisis.

Has Germany “Fallen Out of Love” with Europe? The Eurozone Crisis and the “Normalization” of Germany's European Identity

The European Union has been in its biggest ever crisis since the onset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Beyond the political and economic dimensions, the crisis has also sparked discussions about Germany's European identity. Some scholars have argued that Germany's behavior in the crisis signals a continuation of the process of “normalization” of its European identity toward a stronger articulation of national identity and interests, that it has “fallen out of love” with Europe. This article will seek to reassess these claims, drawing on detailed analysis of political and media discourse in Germany—from political speeches through to both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. It will argue that the crisis is understood broadly as a European crisis in Germany, where the original values of European integration are at stake. Furthermore, the crisis is debated through the lens of European solidarity, albeit with a particular German flavor of solidarity that draws on the economic tradition of ordoliberalism. Rather than strengthening expressions of national identity, this has resulted in the emergence of a new northern European identity in contrast to Greece or “southern Europe.”

Unforgotten Landscapes: Radio and the Reconstruction of Germany's European Mission in the East in the 1950s

Using the example of the audio series Unforgotten Landscapes (Unvergessene Landschaften) aired on Radio Bremen in 1955, this article addresses the important role that radio played in the complex border-negotiation processes in Germany after World War II. For many years, the agency of radio as an interlocutor and discursive tool in the process of renationalization has been more or less neglected in historical research. Indeed, visual and auditory representation of the Eastern borders was a highly contaminated field in Western Germany until the 1970s. Even today, the relations between Poland and Germany are still affected by these issues. By using the German notion of Heimat as an umbrella concept, this article shows how these radio programs tried to shift the understanding of existing territorial borders, as having resulted from World War II and the atrocities of Nazi Germany to being a part of the imaginary construction of Germany as a Kulturnation. The audio series depicted the history of theses landscapes as German since medieval times, with no human beings living there in the present, but also claiming that the voices of death still can be heard. Thus, the territories could be lost, but by anchoring these landscapes in cultural memory, they would still be part of Germanness. Moreover, the programs reinforce West Germany's European mission to connect the east with the west beyond continuities with the völkisch “blood-and-soil ideology” underlying the concept of Heimat.

Power spot price models with negative prices

Negative prices for electricity are a recent development in European power markets. Negative hourly prices have been permitted at Germany's European Energy Exchange (EEX) spot market since autumn 2008 and have occurred frequently since, reaching values as low as €-500/MWh. However, in some non-European markets such as those in the US, Australia and Canada, negative prices have been observed over longer periods. Negative prices are, in fact, natural in electricity spot trading. Plant flexibility is limited and costly, and, therefore, incurring a negative price for an hour can actually be economically optimal overall. Negative prices pose a basic problem for stochastic price modeling in that going from prices to log prices is not possible. So far, this has been dealt with using "workarounds". In this paper, a thorough approach is advocated, based on the area hyperbolic sine transformation. The transformation is applied to spot modeling of the German EEX and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas's West Texas (ERCOT West) market, and an exemplary valuation of an option is carried out. It is concluded that the area hyperbolic sine transform is a natural starting point for modeling negative power prices. It can be integrated into common stochastic price models without adding much complexity. Moreover, this transformation might, in general, be more appropriate for power prices than the log transformation, considering the fundamentals of power price formation. Negative prices can significantly affect a business and a thorough treatment is therefore indispensable.

Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?

The narrative of Germany's European vocation falls into three stages. In the first stage – constituting Germany in Europe – European integration was a vital secondary arena for ensuring that the Federal Republic was able to develop economically, and to become a stable democracy. The second stage, of ever closer union accompanied by institutional export, was already evident under Helmut Schmidt, but became really manifest during the Kohl Chancellorship, reaching a high point in the early 1990s. In the post-Kohl third stage the European vocation persists, but has been very much scaled back.

Germany and the Euro—Domestic Discourse on Monetary Stability and its Political Implications—

The European single currency euro was introduced in 1999, 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The German unification and the establishment of the European Union (EU) were one and indivisible. Both the events led to significant changes in German politics and economy. The development of the EU caused simultaneously the transformation of the domestic system. This article analyzes the interaction between the German domestic politics and the development of the European single currency, and at the same time the influence of the euro to the German domestic politics.In the first section, German discussion on the introduction of the single currency and the characteristics of Germany's European diplomacy are examined. The historical development of the discourse of the currency has the decisive influence on the German policy discussions. And it is discussed that the system of the euro and the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were strongly influenced by the German policy ideas. In the second section, the period after the introduction of the euro is discussed to analyze the institutional and policy changes in Germany after the introduction of the euro. The domestic economic reforms necessary to respond to the changed environment and the changes in the German political process is discussed. In the third section, political developments under the grand coalition (2005-2009) are discussed. The grand coalition was one of the answers to the social hardship caused partly by the euro and its budgetary discipline. Despite the financial crisis in 2008, Germany introduced a new constitutional fiscal discipline. The stable majority by the grand coalition and the discourse on budget consolidation made this reform possible.The case of the euro and the SGP shows that the domestic politics and the European developments are inseparably interconnected. Germany tried to upload its discourse and the system of monetary stability to the European system. At the same time, the constraints set at the European level caused changes in the domestic system.

Führt die Ökonomisierung der Medizin zu einer Ökonomisierung der Ethik?

Future demographic changes will markedly increase the financial burdens on the German healthcare system, which is currently still financed by the general public, and may have a critical impact on the system. Thus, instead of a spate of new, ideologically motivated health laws only marginally adapted to our current needs, we need a fundamental structural reform which would prioritize necessities without sacrificing individual needs. The current policies which include centralization in a government directed healthcare system, the dominance of a free market economy with preeminence given to the regulatory powers of the market over the values of a social economy, the planned large scale abolition of German medical specialists (Facharzt), to whom we owe the high quality of our communally available healthcare, a centralized medicine in which preeminence is given to regulatory bodies, the idolization of QALY (quality-adjusted life years) and a cost/utility philosophy as the basis for a collective, utilitarian healthcare system will lead to a COMMODIFICATION OF ETHICS IN MEDICINE. Such a development has already been observed in some of Germany's European neighbors with, amongst other triage measures, euthanasia as a cost efficient and practical tool in palliative medicine. As a country which experienced the unspeakable horrors of Nazi dictatorship including the designation of “lives unworthy of life” and the extermination of 200 000 disabled persons, we must react extremely sensitively to any developments which could lead to the slippery slope of bending ethical standards to fit economic needs.

Divided West: European security and the transatlantic relationship

Acknowledgments. About the Authors. 1. The Divided West: Challenges, Obstacles and Dilemmas. 2. Theory and Transatlantic Crisis. 3. 'Atlantic Europe': The UK, the US and European Security. 4. 'Core Europe': Germany's National Interest, Transatlantic Relations and European Security. 5. 'New Europe': And Transatlantic Relations. 6. 'Non-Aligned Europe' and Transatlantic Relations. 7. 'Periphery Europe': Russia and Transatlantic Security. 8. Transatlantic Futures in an Age of Strategic Dissonance. Notes. Bibliography. Index.

German Science Policy 2006

![Figure][1] CREDIT: HERBERT KNOSOWSKI/AP The German government recognizes that our future lies in a knowledge-based society founded on freedom and responsibility. This is what will enable Germany to rise to the challenges of today's world, be they national or global, or economic, social, or ecological in nature. That is why the promotion of science, research, and innovation is one of my top priorities. “People love chopping wood,” Albert Einstein once said. “In this activity one immediately sees results.” Science policy, by contrast—like science itself—demands staying power. It requires cooperation between many different actors, the investment of considerable resources, and the courage to strike out in new directions. German science and research have a long and proud tradition that we must cultivate and build on. We want to offer German science and research conditions that rival the best in the world. Our benchmarks are excellence, internationality, and freedom. With our new 6-billion-Euro program to fund innovative beacon projects, we are investing more than ever before in top-flight science and research. The conceptual framework for this will be provided by a comprehensive high-tech strategy action plan. Our efforts to promote higher education and research institutions are geared to encouraging healthy competition. With our Excellence Initiative, Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation, and Pact for the Universities, we want to strengthen institutions and academics that are particularly outstanding and creative and also network successfully. By 2010, we aim to increase spending on R&D to 3% of gross domestic product. Science and research will be one of the priorities of Germany's European Union (EU) presidency. We are working hard to make German higher education more international, because excellence today is defined in global terms. In a few years, we will have completed the switch to internationally compatible bachelor's and master's degree courses. We are keen for our higher education and research institutions to expand their international links and are also committed to strengthening cooperation in Europe. To build new experimental research facilities such as the x-ray free-electron laser in Hamburg, we have joined forces with partners from all over the world. ![Figure][1] CREDIT: JOHN MACDOUGALL/AFP/GETTY IMAGES We also plan to give science and research a freer hand. The task of government is to create conditions in which they can flourish and to provide the right kind of stimulus. That means that our universities and research institutions must be given more independence. They need greater freedom to choose their students and staff, develop their own profiles, cooperate with industry, and spend their funds as they see fit. We believe there should be intensified dialogue between policy-makers, scientists, and industry on all aspects of science and technology policy. This is particularly crucial in fields where new scientific advances may raise difficult ethical issues or where policy decisions on the right innovation strategy for the future are at stake. That is why I have established a Council for Innovation and Growth, which brings together prominent representatives of the scientific, business, and political communities. For the same reason, we strongly support, at the European level, the establishment of a European Research Council to advise and comment on research policy decisions of the EU. Germany's future depends on first-class research, creative talent, and high-quality education and training that are geared toward international standards as well as a fair deal for everyone, irrespective of social or ethnic background, who is willing to contribute to our society. Dedicated people and pioneering spirits are our greatest assets. An important goal of the German government's science policy is to encourage the creative talent of everyone who lives, works, or conducts research in Germany and to ensure that their working conditions and quality of life are continually improved. I profoundly believe (to quote Albert Einstein again) that “Concern for man himself and his fate must always form the chief interest for all technical endeavours … in order that the creations of our mind shall be a blessing and not a curse for mankind.” [1]: pending:yes

De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum

Since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union (EU) has undergone significant changes. Once a model “Europeanist,” Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Neither an instance of a planned strategic change nor a result of an inevitable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level, these changes in German foreign policy, incremental yet significant as they are, evade both deterministic and voluntaristic accounts of foreign policy change. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory, the article develops an innovative framework for analysis that is applied to Germany's European asylum and refugee policy as well as its security and defense policy. The origins of both policy fields at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany. However, as the 1990s progressed Germany increasingly obstructed further institutionalization. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam summit marks a clear turning point in Germany's position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defense proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field more broadly. An unanticipated consequence of earlier initiatives, in both cases Germany has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations it has helped to raise.

Book Reviews

Book reviewed:L. Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European UnionK. Dyson, European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation and ConvergenceK.J. Alter, Establishing a Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in EuropeV.A. Schmidt, The Futures of European CapitalismA. Verdun,The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary UnionT. Atkinson, B. Cantillon, E. Marlier and B. Nolan Social Indicators: The EU and Social InclusionN. Hawke, Environmental Policy: Implementation and EnforcementG. Natalicchi,Wiring Europe: Reshaping the European Telecommunications RegimeS. Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the Process of IntegrationM. Jopp, H. Schneider and U. Schmalz, Germany's European Policy: Perceptions in Key Partner Countries

Shifting Paradigms: Reflecting Germany's European Policy

Germany's presidency of the European Council in the first half of 1999 has focused the attention of schlolars on Germany's attitude towards the EU. Germany's European policy has been guided from the beginning by a pro-European vision of 'the house of Europe'. The hypothesis of the article is that this paradigm of German European policy is in flux. Via a constructivist approach it is argued that we are observing a paradigm shift away from a visionary towards a pragmatic European policy which is oriented around efficiency criteria and national interest. Evidence is given by analysing the following propositions: (1) the advocates of a European vision have vanished in Germany, and the broad coalition in society towards Europe is crumbling; (2) at the same time the discussion on Europe has become highly politicised; (3) in addition, important German institutions such as the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) are reluctant to (re-)strengthen the European idea; and (4) the fit between Germany's and the EU's institutional setting supports the change in paradigm. In conclusion it is argued that Germany is on its way to changing its role from that of a supporting participant to that of a self-confident active player.

Germany, Quo Vadis? a view from Poland

The transformation of Polish–German relations since the end of the Cold War has been a success story. The two countries are linked by a community of interests founded on common values and goals. Although Germany, in its policies towards Central and Eastern Europe, occasionally attaches too much weight to trying to mollify Russia, the united Germany has supported the Eastern enlargement of the EU and, ultimately, of the NATO. It genuinely wants ‘Western’ neighbours to its east. German foreign policy will continue to be characterised by continuity, with a strong emphasis on multilateralism. There is a danger, however, that Germany's European engagement and support for closer integration will be weakened by its preoccupation with its domestic economic and social problems.

Closer integration or re‐nationalization? Recent trends in EU migration and asylum policies: The case of Germany

Although there has been general agreement in the European Union that the problems created by international migration require harmonized policy responses, the Conference at Tampere in October 1999 demonstrated again the ongoing controversies among member states. This article argues that the reason for this integration deficit can be found in the interaction of several factors: migration and refugee policies have been an area in which the Commission and the Council have continuously competed for competences. Within the Council there have been major disagreements (border controls, harmonization, ‘burden‐sharing'). Integration did not occur because it was not in member states’ interest and this has resulted in a certain ‘re‐nationalizing’ of policies. These dilemmas will be illustrated by the example of Germany ‐ the EU's most powerful member and the destination of the greatest number of refugees and migrants. Germany is increasingly behaving more like a ‘normal’ nation state and is to some extent abandoning its ‘reflexive multi‐Iateralism’. In the area of migration and refugee policies this has to a large extent been due to the lack of solidarity among member states. This has also meant that the German Lander have gained greater influence on Germany's European policy‐making.

The German Presidency of the Council: Continuity or Change in Germany's European Policy?

The German Presidency of the Council: Continuity or Change in Germany's European Policy?

Coming to terms with a ‘European identity’: The Sudeten Germans between Bonn and Prague

This assessment of Germany's European identity examines the impact of the ‘Sudeten German question’ on relations between Bonn and Prague. The analysis joins this issue with a proposed theoretical a...

Alice in wonderland or malice in blunderland?

The date is 1 January of the year 2003. Ten years ago the Single European Market was completed in the Europe of the Twelve. As a birthday present, we are witnessing today the inauguration of a Eurofed and the baptism of a single European currency: the franc fort. Guess where we are celebrating. At the ultimately determined seat of the Eurofed—Frankfurt. After a decade of haggling and bargaining, the suggestion of the German Bundesbank, that Frankfurt is the natural location, has apparently hit home with Germany's European partners. On the winding and stormy road to this single currency, the EC was confronted with several serious problems: while in the course of the 1990s the EC had managed to reach considerable common ground in the area of economic and monetary policy (largely due to the anchor function of the Deutschmark), in the wake of German unification the Deutschmark softened and lost some of its dominance, and thus endangered monetary stability. In addition, the enlargement of the Community increased economic divergence and required that 20 national currencies had to be managed and merged. However, the Swedish President of the EC Commission, a crusader for economic and monetary union (EMU), managed to get a compromise accepted, encompassing both rather tight rules on national public spending and borrowing and a handsome amount of money to be given to the weaker member states, to alleviate the inevitable macroeconomic adjustment shock. But the good old days will not be forgotten. In a prominent place of the Luxembourg Museum of Modern Monetary History stands a glass case containing coins and bills of the former national currencies, as well as some accounting documents which were used for dealing with the predecessor of the franc fort, the European Currency Unit (ECU). Unfortunately, the ECU never really lived up to expectations that it would become a single European currency. Let us slip back now for a moment to the year 1991 in order to see how the EMU concept was born and how its progenitors fought with each other about what it should become.

Re-reading "continuity and change"

On the eve of the ?cultural revolution? that is associated with the year 1968, nine authors submitted their chapters on Germany to Henry Kissin ger. He had organized meetings at Harvard, the final outcome of which would be an anthology on the Federal Republic. At the time of the mee tings, Henry Kissinger had been a quiet colleague within the Institute for International Affairs, living down a controversial reputation as an adviser to the late John F. Kennedy. He had been a proponent of the notion of a limited nuclear war, and this was at that time and for a long time to come not popular in intellectual circles. But Henry Kissinger was on his way back as part of the entourage of the then presidential-hopeful Rockefeller. As the manuscripts were acquiring a thin coat of dust, Henry Kissinger advanced to the position of a special adviser on foreign policy and defense to Richard Nixon?the first step on his way to historical fame as the ?Met ternich? of the United States, and the architect of the Camp Davies agree ments. The anthology was never published. It would have indeed been inop portune if not outright embarassing had Henry Kissinger's name been associated with some of the views in the anthology. The public might have taken the editorship of a now active politician as a stamp of approval for all that the two covers of the book were to include. Thus, Alfred Grosser in his chapter ?The Paradox of Foreign Policy? credited Marxism with fa cilitating Western Germany's European identification. Karl Kaiser in ?Germany at the Crossroads Problems of a Policy on Reunification? advocated a stance that was later the core of Willy Brandt's ?Neue Ost politik?. Understandably as it may have been, the burial of the manus cripts by tacit neglect was nevertheless a pity. I still consider Klaus Ep stein's ?The Cultural Situation?, using the broad understanding of Culture that we associate with the term ?Kulturleben?, the best treatment of the topic?and one in which the political significance of developments there was characterized. And Wolfgang F. Stolper's and Karl W. Roskamp's ana lysis of economic policy in post-war Western Germany convincingly de monstrated the gap between a coherent theory on Sundays and a pragmatic practice during workdays.