German-Soviet Relations Research Articles

Эволюция представлений западных держав о германо-советских отношениях в 1918–1924 годы

On the basis of the study of the Documents of foreign policy of Great Britain, France and the United States the author identifies the main stages of Soviet and German relations in the socalled Rapallo period. Eachstage has its own features of the perception and their prospects by these countries. The author concludes that Western countries’ assessments of German-Soviet relations are interdependent and interconnected with their foreign policy and foreign economic decisions.

The Role of the German-Polish Border Issue in West German-Soviet Relations 1989/90

The Role of the German-Polish Border Issue in West German-Soviet Relations 1989/90

A neoclassical realist model of overconfidence and the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact in 1941

Why did Japan conclude the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact in 1941, even though it knew the German-Soviet relations were deteriorating and heading towards a disastrous war? Under the Tripartite Pact, it would be irrational for Japan to approach the USSR, which Germany had decided to invade. This article examines this long-standing puzzle in Japanese diplomatic history (also an anomaly of neorealism) by developing a new neoclassical realist model termed ‘neoclassical realist model of overconfidence’ based on self-deception in evolutionary psychology using scientific realism in the philosophy of science as a metatheoretical foundation. Drawing on neoclassical realism, I argue that Japan’s balancing strategy during 1940–41, which initially reflected the tripolar structure of the international system (independent variable), ultimately resulted in the suboptimal balancing of the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact (dependent variable) due to Yosuke Matsuoka’s (Japanese foreign minister) self-deception, including the positive illusion and cognitive dissonance effect (intervening variable).

Niemcy wobec Włoch w pierwszej fazie II wojny światowej (wrzesień 1939 – czerwiec 1940 r.)

Cel studium stanowi przedstawienie polityki Niemiec wobec Wloch w okresie miedzy atakiem niemieckim na Polske 1 IX 1939 r. a przystąpieniem Wloch do wojny 10 VI 1940 r. Byl to okres trudny dla stosunkow bilateralnych ze wzgledu na decyzje Mussoliniego o nieprzystąpieniu do wojny ( non belligeranza ), mimo wiezow sojuszniczych z Niemcami. Dodatkowe trudności wywolalo zacieśnienie stosunkow niemiecko-sowieckich, a zwlaszcza atak ZSRR na Finlandie. Poprawa stosunkow niemiecko-wloskich nastąpila dopiero w związku z wyrazaną przez Mussoliniego gotowością w miare szybkiego przystąpienia do wojny.

The 1963 Krasnodar Trial

In the city of Krasnodar, capital of the Russian Kuban´, a very special public trial took place from 10 to 24 October 1963. Its nine defendants embodied the darkest aspects of the Second World War in the USSR. Former auxiliary members and officers of Sonderkommando 10-a, they had taken part in the extreme violence committed by this subunit of Einsatzgruppe D, a paramilitary group in charge of the “cleansing” of southern Ukraine and Russia in the wake of the Wehrmacht. The echo given to this trial clearly distinguishes it from the dozens of other trials held throughout the Soviet Union after the 1955 partial amnesty of collaborators, and from trials in the south of the RSFSR more specifically. Numerous articles in the local and central press, a radio broadcast, a documentary film (In the Name of the Living), a best-selling book (The Abyss), and an aborted fiction film project added layers of stories, sounds and images to the story of these nine men, their victims, and the investigators who brought them to justice. The variations in the way the story is told in these various media constitute one of the common threads of the article, which also looks at how these works helped prolong the echo of the Krasnodar trial. The example of the media coverage of the Krasnodar trial goes against several preconceived ideas about the relationship between arts professionals and the police and judiciary. It confirms that artists sometimes enjoyed a margin of freedom during the Thaw and some time beyond. It illustrates various ways of filming a trial (1963 and 1965) and more still the wide array of renditions of court proceedings, from a live broadcast in the urban space to an engagé author’s highly literary short story. This case also shows how the same artist conveyed his vision of the trial depending on whether he was acting as a journalist, a screenwriter or author. The study confirms the importance of the political resources available to the various actors in this story between 1963 and 1967 with regard to the limits of the speakable and the demonstrable. The crucial role of a very committed artist, Lev Ginzburg, overcame great institutional and ideological resistance until the writer finally paid the price for his commitment. Ginzburg’s extremely daring depiction of wartime collaboration and – quite atypically – of Nazi ideology and the Holocaust makes his works singular, privileged though he was in literary circles. Last, it should be stressed that the intensity of the media coverage of this trial, Ginzburg’s particular role in German-Soviet relations, and the confidential steps taken in parallel by the Prosecutor-General of the USSR undoubtedly contributed to the (re)opening in the West of investigations of Germans involved in the crimes of Sonderkommando 10a and to their trial in West Germany between 1972 and 1980.

Behind the Curtains of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the middle of the 1930s. On the Edition Deutschland und die Sowjetunion 1933–1941. Dokumente aus russischen und deutschen Archiven (2019)

Research on international relations today is no longer limited to diplomatic contacts but also includes economic and cultural ties. Another factor that should not be neglected is the people themselves; the personalities who shaped politics. This text focuses on those concerned with German-Soviet relations in the 1930s, both at the “centre” in Moscow and at the Soviet plenipotentiary representation in Berlin. This article deals with this range of problems against the background of Soviet-German relations in the 1930s both in the Kremlin and in the Soviet mission in Berlin. The article is based on archival ma- terials discovered and published in the framework of the edition project “Germany and the USSR 1933–1941” pursued under the aegis of the Joint Commission on the Study of Contemporary History in Russian-German Relations. The methodological guidelines are borrowed from the works of Western historiography. The documents under scrutiny shed the light on the functioning of one of the primary foreign-political instruments — the diplomatic corpus of the Soviet Union and Germany. In the documents published in Volume 2, three main areas of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Relations’ (Narko- mindel) functioning are covered: the personnel responsible for the Soviet-German relations, the inner life of the Soviet mission in Berlin, and the work of the central apparatus in Moscow. On the basis of the interdepartmental correspondence of the Narkomindel staff, their memoranda, and the impressions of the German diplomats, one can get an impression of the level of professionalism of at least some Soviet diplomats. In sum- mary, owing to the publication of such a large amount of documents from the Russian and German archives, historians from different countries can now pursue research on a wide range of problems related to the international relations of the 1930s and early 1940s, which is extraordinarily important for understanding the causes and mechanisms which led to World War Two.

MANIFESTATIONS OF CLOSER GERMAN-SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS, IN THE YEARS 1921-1926, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STATE SECURITY, AS ASSESSED BY THE SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

The article attempts to analyse the practical examples of closer political, economic and military relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, and then the Soviet Union, in the years 1921-1926. The paper lays out the thesis that the closer German-Soviet political, economic and military relations, in the years 1921-1926, posed a significant threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic. To justify the above thesis both the literature and source materials were examined, including first of all the materials held in the Central Military Archives (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) in Warszawa-Rembertów. The materials gathered in the groups of records of the Second Department of the Polish Army High Command and the Collections of Russian records were found out to be of key importance. The collected archival materials made it possible to identify different planes of cooperation between the Germans and the Soviets in the discussed period and to establish to what extent the Polish military intelligence was aware of the feasibility and effects of such closer relations, resulting in a direct threat to the security of the Polish state. On the basis of the presented information it can be stated that the Polish military intelligence provided an accurate diagnosis of the examples of German-Soviet cooperation, often anti-Polish in its form and character. In the years 1921-1926, this cooperation was particularly intensified, posing a threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic and leading to negotiations regarding both the western and the eastern borders of Poland established after the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Riga.

A reassessment of E.H. Carr and the realist tradition: Britain, German–Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism

E.H. Carr’s connection to realism has increasingly been called into question. Revisionist literature has pointed to realism’s narrow understanding of Carr and drawn from his wider body of work in order to problematise Carr’s association with realism. Given that it overlooks two key texts produced by Carr, the revisionist literature is incomplete. Refocusing on Britain and German–Soviet Relations, especially the way in which they reflect ideas associated with the realist tradition, this paper demonstrates the continued traditional link between Carr and realism. Having done so, it considers the contemporary relevance of Carr’s lesser known realist work. Drawing parallels between Britain and German–Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism, the paper contends that Carr’s forgotten texts can serve as the foundation for a more classically orientated, European mode of neoclassical realism.

PROBLEMS OF "NON-INTERVENTION" IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-1939) IN THE GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

The article deals with the problem of Non-intervention Policy in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) in the context of German-Soviet relations on the eve of the Second World War. Scientific novelty of the study is due to a significant number of sources. There are many published foreign documents of the leading European countries and the materials from the Archive of Russian foreign policy are involved too. The agreement on Non-interference in the affairs ofSpainwas signed by European countries in August 1936 and also the Committee on its compliance was established. They have become an arena of acute diplomatic struggle between theUSSRand the fascist countries. At the same time, the author reveals a certain similarity in the tactics of the German and Soviet diplomacy: the denial of the facts of their participation in the Spanish conflict, the accusation of the opposite side in the facts of violation of the Non-intervention agreement. Activities in the implementation of the German and Soviet diplomacy in Non-intervention Policy was based on a combination of the need for cooperation with the Western powers and the obligations to uphold the interests of the nationalists in the Committee (Germany) and Republicans (USSR). At the same time, in some cases, greater tactical flexibility was shown by German diplomacy. Soviet policy delayed the defeat of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War, but the obstructionism of the USSR was significantly constrained the work of the Committee, that's why the first of all the fascist countries won, but they didn't have the need to slow down the development of effective forms of monitoring compliance with the agreement on non-interference. Uncompromising Soviet Union prevented the cooperation of theUSSRwith the Western countries and contributed to deepening and widening the political isolation of theSoviet Union. The practice of exclusion of theUSSRfrom the decision of the Spanish question was transferred to the sphere of solutions and resolve issues of pan-European problems.

The Memoirs of Interpreters as a Historical Source: Reports of Russian and German Interpreters Concerning 22 June 1941

There exist incompatible depictions of the Second World War, and specifically of the year 1941. Numerous documents from the archives now available in Moscow and Washington invite comparison with the memoirs of contemporary witnesses. The present article first describes the situation in German–Soviet relations before 22 June 1941. Then it contrasts the memoirs of the interpreters involved (in the German Embassy in Moscow, in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, and at the delivery of the memorandum by Ribbentrop to Dekanozov) with newly available archive material and with the official records of the Nuremberg trial. The goal of this comparison is to form an assessment of these memoirs as subjective historical sources and to arrive at a new evaluation of their reliability.

Mortal Embrace: Germans and (Soviet) Russians in the First Half of the 20th Century

Historical Debates Surrounding German-Russian Relationship This special issue of Kritika spotlights episodes from primarily confrontational relationship between Germany and (Soviet) Russia in first half of 20th century. The multifaceted historiography to which it has given rise has significance beyond specific context of relationship itself, because two countries' history and their ties with each other are paradigmatic cases of aberrant developments and threats from within that face modern societies. (1) After World War II, there were two approaches--both of them decisively influenced by Cold War but potent nonetheless--to causes and phenomena of National Socialism and Stalinism. From field of political science arose totalitarianism theory, which considered totalitarian dictatorships as variants of modern mass society. (2) From another perspective, drawing on theories of modernization, historians and historically oriented social scientists created master narratives determined by developmental determinants that today might be subsumed under heading of path dependence. (3) Through decades, both approaches grew internally differentiated and experienced periods of rejection. After collapse of Soviet Union, they enjoyed a renaissance in a form enriched by cultural history. Beyond theories of totalitarianism, however, comparing two systems remains a challenge. (4) Moreover, although rejected since late 1980s, thesis of a German Sonderweg continues to exercise great attraction in regard to particular spheres of activity, such as continuities of German antisemitism (5) or militaristic organizational culture. (6) The older theories of German Sonderweg were entirely fixated on comparing Germany's development with West--that is, France, Great Britain, and United States. (7) Only since late 1980s was this one-sided orientation questioned through so-called Historikerstreit. Its initiator, Ernst Noite, launched a debate about supposed causal nexus between Bolshevism and National Socialism--to use a catchphrase, nexus between Gulag and Holocaust. The ensuing debates about singularity of Holocaust were marked by a lack of interest (as well as knowledge) among both West German historians and wider public about events east of Germany's borders and German involvement in what occurred there. (8) That Germany had interacted economically, politically, and culturally not only with West but with East as well was never problematized in Sonderweg discussions. Ernst Nolte's work on intellectual and political history forms an exception to extent that his studies on fascism, and even more his monograph on European civil war, addressed Germany's relationship with Western as well as Eastern Europe. (This also revealed, however, pitfalls of a narrowly intellectual- or political-history approach, which seemed a little old-fashioned even then.) (9) The Historikerstreit raised, avant la lettre, questions about mutual influences, about interactions, and about adaptations and transfers and transnationality that Ernst Nolte mostly answered wrongly or not at all. The history of German-Russian and German-Soviet relations and interactions actually has a considerable historiography of its own, but in historiographic mainstream it has always been received with only limited interest for the East. (10) The reasons are manifold and cannot be discussed here. (11) The vast literature that could be cited includes, for 20th century, historiography on debates and conflicts within Second International and communist and socialist movements after 1918, (12) on Berlin as Europe's Eastern Station, (12) role of fellow travelers in interwar period, (14) commitment of German historians and social scientists to creation of a new order, (15) history of prisoners of war in World War I (16) and, especially, World War II, (17) German occupation in both world wars, (18) and lastly Russians in Germany. …

The Russian Germans in the Interwar German National Imaginary

In September 1929, a group of Russian German farmers who were dissatisfied with conditions under Soviet rule traveled to the suburbs of Moscow and demanded that they be allowed to emigrate. The gathering of ethnic Germans, most of whom were Mennonites, grew rapidly and numbered more than 13,000 people at its height. Their demands were widely reported in the German press and brought the subject of Soviet collectivization into the public eye in Germany. The effect of this event on German-Soviet diplomatic relations, which became increasingly strained as Stalinism took hold, is well known. Although studies of the gathering mention the public outcry in the press, they have generally assumed that the German public's identification with the Russian Germans was self-evident and not in need of explanation. In fact, public interest in and government concern for the Russian Germans was a relatively recent phenomenon. In the post-World War I era, Germans came to understand the Russian Germans as emblematic of Germany's fate—as innocent, hard-working farmers who were loyal to Germanness and who worked tirelessly to expand German culture in the world. The Russian Germans also came to represent the larger crisis of legitimacy that affected the Weimar Republic in which parliamentary government was increasingly perceived as not being able to protect the German people and its interests, whether in Germany or abroad.

Book Review: Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941, Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation

Book Review: Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941, Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation

Late Modern

The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’: The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779–1846. By Philip Harling Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Volume 1: Conflicts and Divisions. Edited by Pierre Nora and Lawrence D. Kritzman A Jew in the French Revolution: The Life of Zalkind Hourwitz. By Frances Malino The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806. By Brendan Simms Napoleon's Irish Legion. By John G. Gallaher The Dissenters. Volume II: The Expansion of Evangelical Nonconformity. By Michael R. Watts Fearful Realities: New Perspectives on the Famine. Edited By Chris Monash and Richard Hayes The Homicidal Earl: The Life of Lord Cardigan. By Saul David John Bull's Other Homes: State Housing and British Policy in Ireland, 1883–1922. By Murray Fraser A Kingdom on Earth: Anglo‐American Social Christianity, 1880–1940. By Paul T. Phillips Ernie O'Malley: IRA Intellectual. By Richard English Michael Collins: The Secret File. Edited by A. T. Q. Stewart The Life of Edvard Beneš 1884–1948: Czechoslovakia in Peace and War. By Zbynek Zeman with Antonin Klimek Futurism and Politics: Between Anarchist Rebellion and Fascist Reaction, 1909–1944. By Günter Berghaus His Father's Son: The Life of Randolph Churchill. By Winston S. Churchill What Happened Where: A Guide to Places and Events in Twentieth‐century History. By Chris Cook and Diccon Bewes From Belloc to Churchill: Private Scholars, Public Culture, and the Crisis of British Liberalism, 1900–1939. By Victor Feske The War from Within: German Working‐class Women in the First World War. By Ute Daniel The Great War 1914–1918. By Spencer C. Tucker The Irish Guards in the Great War: The First Battalion. By Rudyard Kipling Germany 1916–1941. By E. J. Feuchtwanger Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1918–1948. By A. J. Sherman Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German–Soviet Relations, 1922–1941. By Aleksandr M. Nekrich The Struggle for Power: Russia in 1923. By Valentina Vilkova Mussolini. By Jasper Ridley Mussolini and the British. By Richard Lamb Brethren in Adversity: Bishop George Bell, the Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933–1939. Edited by Andrew Chandler British Policy and the Refugees, 1933–1941. By Yvonne Kapp and Margaret Mynatt The Blueshirts and Irish Politics. By Mike Cronin Atlantic Roulette: A Merchantman at War, 1940. By Morris Beckman In the Combat Zone: Special Forces since 1945. By Robin Neillands Industrial Policy in Britain 1945–1951: Economic Planning, Nationalisation and the Labour Governments. By Martin Chick Youth in Britain since 1945. By Bill Osgerby The Envy of the World: Fifty Years of the BBC Third Programme and Radio 3. By Humphrey Carpenter The Cold War: An International History, 1947–1991. By S. J. Ball

Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941, by Aleksandr M. Nekrich

<i>Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941</i>, by Aleksandr M. Nekrich

Pariahs, partners, predators: German-Soviet relations, 1922-1941

This work draws on both German archives and the recently opened Central Party Archive in Moscow to provide insight into Stalin's strategy and tactics and Hitler's real agenda in German-Soviet relations. It demonstrates that Hitler's gradual normalization of relations with Stalin was part of a plan to use Russian supplies for the German invasion of Poland. It also addresses the question of whether the Soviet Union was planning a preemptive attack on Germany in 1941, arguing that Stalin could never have countenanced such an attack.

Book Reviews : German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification. By Lothar Gutjahr. London: Pinter. 1994. 258 pp. 35.00. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations since 1974. By Avril Pittman. Cambridge University Press. 1992. xix + 226 pp. 35.00. The Germans and their Neighbors. Edited by Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe. Boulder: Westview Press. 1993. xi + 432

Book Reviews : German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification. By Lothar Gutjahr. London: Pinter. 1994. 258 pp. 35.00. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations since 1974. By Avril Pittman. Cambridge University Press. 1992. xix + 226 pp. 35.00. The Germans and their Neighbors. Edited by Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe. Boulder: Westview Press. 1993. xi + 432

From Ostpolitik to reunification: West German-Soviet political relations since 1974

From Ostpolitik to reunification: West German-Soviet political relations since 1974

German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era: Friendship from Necessity.

German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era: Friendship from Necessity.

Perestroika in Lithuanian Historiography: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

While history on occasion may appear to be politics projected on the past, politics can also reflect history as projected on the present: witness Mikhail Gorbachev's approval on June 1, 1989, of the formation of a special commission to investigate the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. The Soviet president's decision surprised many people, but Baltic historians had already been attacking the official image of the pact for more than a year. On June 1, as a matter of fact, the Lithuanian offensive on the topic could be called exactly one year old; it was my good fortune in 1988 to have participated in some of the historical debates on the topic. The history of German-Soviet relations in 1939-1940 is fairly well known. According to a secret protocol attached to the pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviets recognized Lithuania as belonging to the German sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. After Soviet troops had moved into eastern Poland, on September 28 the two powers signed a new agreement, according to which Lithuania passed into the Soviet sphere of influence. Moscow then forced the Lithuanians to sign a mutual assistance pact and to admit Soviet troops within their borders; it softened the blow by giving the Lithuanians the city and region of Vilnius, which Soviet forces had just taken from Poland. In the subsequent winter and spring of 1939-1940 the Soviets carefully refrained from overt intervention in Lithuanian domestic affairs. Late in the evening of June 14, 1940, Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov charged that the Lithuanians had mistreated Soviet soldiers and that the government was plotting provocative actions in conjunction with Latvia and Estonia, its allies in the Baltic Entente. He demanded that the Lithuanians admit more Soviet troops and that they form a new government more friendly to Moscow. Soviet troops poured over the frontier on June 15, and under their watchful eyes the people elected a new legislature, the People's Seimas, which requested incorporation into the Soviet Union. In August 1940 Lithuania became the fourteenth republic of the USSR.