How German Is It? Alan Kramer and John Horne understand by Sonderweg something quite spe- cific: ‘the Wehler interpretation of German history,’ one refuted by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in 1980. Now ‘things have moved on.’ Since they agree with Blackbourn and Eley on all counts, for me to open my discussion with a question about the Sonderweg looks like an attempt to tar them with the Wehler brush, part them from his vanquishers, and ‘reduce’ their book to a con- tribution to a moribund debate. I understand ‘Sonderweg’ differently. To me, it refers to the inner motors pushing modern German history in a direction unhappily different from the ‘West’ (a collectivity coterminous with the Allies in the world wars). Identifying and examining these motors have produced a great variety of Sonderweg inter- pretations, by many distinguished historians, in political, intellectual, and (espe- cially in the syntheses of Ralf Dahrendorf in 1965 and Hans-Ulrich Wehler in 1972) social history, and not a few challenges to each. Having myself done battle with the Sonderweg, I believed the stake had been driven into its heart. One of the great merits of German Atrocities is that it has forced me, and I suspect others as well, to think again. Thus the question with which my review opened, ‘Is it too soon to retire the Sonderweg?’, was directed first of all against myself. Their book was a vigor- ous reminder that the ‘German Problem,’ to which all those investigations into Germany’s domestic history that we now label ‘Sonderweg’ had sought a solu- tion, was from the outset (and long before the Holocaust became central to our understanding of the German twentieth century) posed by German behaviour in the international arena. Had the European experience between 1914 and 1945 been no more bloody than the years between 1871 and 1914, such ques- tions as whether Germany’s Junkers had been unnaturally preserved in an aspic of high tariffs, or whether its middle class was unpolitical and allergic to con- flict, to name only two, would hardly have exercised our attention. Germany’s domestic idiosyncrasies, such as they were, would not have carried the freight of explanation that made their investigation so exigent. The war changed that. And, as Horne and Kramer reveal so convincingly, it was the atrocities that for many gave this catastrophe its meaning and shaped its memory—on both sides. Like Barbara Tuchman, who also perceived that ‘Belgium … became to many the “supreme issue” of the war’ (Guns of August, p. 359), Horne and Kramer endorse the Entente’s explanation when they move beyond the contingent frictions of battle (‘proximate causes’, which my review acknowledged they German History Vol. 24 No. 1 10.1191/0266355406gh369xx © 2006 The German History Society
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