Melville's Thinking Animal and the Classification Conundrum Elizabeth Heinz Swails (bio) On the third day of the hunt for Moby Dick, Ahab reflects upon his thinking and, in the third person, concludes, "Ahab never thinks; he only feels, feels, feels … to think's audacity," for God "only has that right and privilege." As if to account for his own bold and reckless behavior, he acknowledges that, if humans do think, then "thinking is, or ought to be, a coolness and a calmness." But, he concludes, "our poor hearts throb and our poor brains beat too much for that."1 When Ahab states that thinking should be cool and calm, Melville implicitly references Enlightenment reason's intellectual genealogy of rationality, which, in denying thinking's potential to beat, throb, and move organically as the heart and brain, determines who has the right to think and how. Melville further troubles these assumptions as Ahab realizes that the Pequod passed the ever-cunning, always moving Moby Dick in the night. Frustrated, Ahab claims that when he and the whale finally meet, it will be "forehead to forehead," meaning that the encounter will be as much mental—thought to thought—as physical (WHM, 6:565).2 Evoking Melville's thinking whale, this essay considers how the tortoises of "The Encantadas" (1854) and the swarms of "Benito Cereno" (1855) reveal a connection, however enigmatic, between the [End Page 325] way Melville's animals move and the way he portrays human thinking moving within the mind. What follows maps a series of moving thoughts that Melville, his scientific sources, and his human and nonhuman characters generated simultaneously. In "Sketch Fourth" of "The Encantadas," Melville augments and predicts Charles Darwin's portrayals of tortoise behavior in The Voyage of the Beagle (1839) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) by conveying how his thinking follows the enchanting paths Galapagos tortoises trod. While the tortoises invite the narrator to be embodied, moving thoughts together by participating in their ancient, languageless thinking, the narrator still imprisons and condemns the tortoises to death so the crew may feast upon their meat. Melville's thinking loops, without resolution, around the conundrum the narrator presents as he simultaneously recognizes the tortoises' intelligence and condemns the tortoises to their classificatory fate as "expendable" and "commodified bod[ies]."3 Melville takes his thought experiment a step further in "Benito Cereno" when Babo, a captive, exploited slave, defies nineteenth-century scientific racism's classificatory system by demonstrating his superior swarm intelligence. Against the animalized intellectual parameters Georges Cuvier outlines for different races in his The Animal Kingdom: Arranged in Conformity with Its Organization (1827–35), Melville illustrates a countereffect through Captain Delano's animalization.4 Though Melville shows how the human, Babo, thinks collectively with swarming bats, bees, and crows, Babo's animalized intelligence still faces the extermination classification imposes. Melville provides no solution to these conundrums but rather seems to ask readers how their own thinking evolves when they consider who, in this world, has the right and privilege to think. The notion that Melville's thinking moves through loops and countereffects contributes to the ongoing critical [End Page 326] conversation about his epistemology, especially his desire to think about thinking. But Melville's thinking about animal thinking remains rather elusive despite his preoccupation with thinking animals: white whales, steadfast tortoises, death-tick hummingbirds, oddly tame lizards, and prognostic albatrosses, to name a few. Maybe we are too apt to consider Melville's portrayal of animal intelligence with an artificial "coolness" and "calmness" because we assume humans are the only beings capable of complex thought. The antithesis of throbbing, beating, perpetually moving thoughts, cool and calm thoughts express the classificatory logic of Enlightenment reason. Melville famously mocks this logic's scientific application to animals in "Cetology" because any "systemized exhibition of the whale" is nothing but "the classification of the constituents of a chaos" (WHM, 6:134). He suggests that scientific classification's hierarchical, anthropocentric logic casts thinking not as the motion-bound chaos of nature from which it emerges, throbbing and beating, but as the systematic, linear, and fundamentally conclusive hallmark of humanity. Similarly, practitioners of classification take...