Genoese Trade Research Articles

La colonia genovesa en Valencia durante la guerra civil catalana: el secuestro de sus bienes en 1472

Le commerce génois à Valence a été considéré historiquement com­me une des activités les plus dynamiques de l'économie locale. Jusqu’à maintenant on estimait que le trafic ligure, qui avait établi des maisons co­mmerciales dans la ville de Valence, de même que le trafic local étaient énormes. Cependant, on ne disposait pas d'un paramètre assez ajusté pour évaluer la véracité de cette affirmation. Grâce à la confiscation des biens génois, qui eut lieu en 1472, en raison des soupçons du roi Juan de Nava­rre concernant l'appui ligure aux rebelles catalans pendant la Guerre Civile, nous avons pu avanceroune estimation, partielle mais significative, de l'im­portance commerciale des maisons génoises établies à Valence au XVème siècle. Au contraire de l'opinion générale, le trafic génois ne devait pas être aussi puissant qu'il a été pretendu dans les études historiques citées, tant sur le plan des marchandises disponibles que sur celui du nombre de maisons commerciales établies à Valence.

Orán y el comercio genovés en la transición a los tiempos modernos

A la fin du XVe siècle, le commerce génois avec Tlemcen était exercé fondamentalement vers le port d'Oran. A ce trafic participaient, à la fois, les marchands de Gênes, ceux qui employaient les bateaux navigant per costeriam et, certainement, les Génois habitants des royaumes de Va­lence et Castille, en particulier ceux de Málaga. Après la conquête d'Oran (1509), le commerce génois fut gêné par les conséquences de la désastreuse politique espagnole. Malgré cela, ces marchands ne renonçaient pas à trafi­quer avec Tlemcen, bien qu'ils fussent obligés de suivre voies plus longues et incommodes.

Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700–1830, by Catia Brilli

It is a commonplace that trade within the transatlantic empire of the Spanish Habsburgs and Bourbons was penetrated by foreigners, making a mockery of the supposed Spanish monopoly. In this monograph, however, Catia Brilli explores a rather unusual aspect of that foreign penetration. Instead of considering the role of the Dutch, English and French, she discusses that of the Genoese. The Genoese republic (in the Middle Ages the doyen of the Italian commercial republics) had early on established a niche for itself within the nascent Spanish empire, and, in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Genoese finance oiled the wheels of Spanish imperialism. The Spanish bankruptcy of 1627 brought to a close what has often been thought of as a golden age of Genoese finance, although the republic’s loans continued to keep many a state afloat in Europe down to the French revolution. However, it is Genoese trade (or rather the commercial activity of Genoese, subjects of the republic, down to its disappearance in 1804, a rather different thing) and migration which is Brilli’s concern, rather than finance. After 1627, Genoese merchants continued to play an important role in trade between Genoa and Spain, that is Cadiz, and in that between Cadiz and Spanish America before and after the liberalisation of the latter by Charles III from the 1760s onward. (In 1771, first-generation Genoese merchants represented the second largest group of non-Spanish wholesalers in Cadiz after the French.) The Genoese participated in various ways, including exporting paper (one of Genoa’s chief exports to Spain, and beyond to Spanish America) and participating in abortive Spanish efforts in the eighteenth century to develop a Spanish paper industry to supply its own needs. The Genoese were able to establish themselves in Cadiz but—and this is a crucial element of Brilli’s argument—they did not do so with the help of a republic which was not a major power and which preferred neutrality to intervention. For their part, Genoese merchants in Cadiz were reluctant to fund the republic’s official agent there, the consul. Nor, although they were happy on occasion, and when necessary, to take advantage of Genoese links, did they see themselves as outriders or agents of the republic. (Some, however, built on their commercial success in Spain to enter the Genoese ruling oligarchy.) Instead, they sought to embed themselves in, and to integrate into, local society. This preferred route to success abroad contributed to the ‘invisibility’ of the Genoese which, says Brilli, explains why they have hitherto largely escaped the attention of historians. The movement of men and goods was facilitated by networks of informal and flexible co-operation which helped overcome the lack of support in and from Genoa.

Coping with Iberian monopolies: Genoese trade networks and formal institutions in Spain and Portugal during the second half of the eighteenth century

This article explores Genoese trade interests in Cadiz and Lisbon, the two capitals of Iberian colonial trade at the end of the early-modern period. The author aims to explain the persisting intermediary role of a merchant community that has been largely overlooked by historians. The structure of the trade networks established in the two cities will be reconstructed by using the primary sources conserved in the archive of the Durazzos, a powerful aristocratic family of the Republic which has left a unique collection of private correspondence. This sizeable and largely unexplored documentation illuminates the different strategies used to access the Spanish and Portuguese monopolistic systems, the main actors who traded in both contexts, their relations with the local elite, and the nature of the business networks linking Genoese investors in the mother city with the expatriated agents. The author concludes with a comparative analysis of the institutional resources that Genoese used to maintain their interests, with particular attention paid to the religious institutions established by the ‘nation’ in the two port cities.

Introduction: The Mediterranean Voyage

Introduction: The Mediterranean Voyage

Cultivating Differences: Genoese Trade Identity in the Constantinople of Sultan Mehmed II, 1453–81

The Fall of Constantinople in 1453 marks a historical turning point in Mediterranean history and for many scholars the end of commercial relations between East and West. The Genoese community, however, asserted itself as an economic go-between. The Genoese thrived in a Muslim environment even, and perhaps especially, during times of war. Their economic success was due to their willingness to acculturate while attempting to maintain strong cultural ties with their identity. Examining various strategies, such as their immersion into the urban topography, their treatment in migration policies, and their negotiation of commercial privileges, this article concludes that the Genoese insertion into the Ottoman economy was a product not merely of their economic dexterity but of their cultural aptitude for innovation.

Genoese trade networks in the southern Iberian peninsula: trade, transmission of technical knowledge and economic interactions

This paper presents the results of a research project undertaken at the University of Granada, and in collaboration with several European research groups. We aim to investigate the process of interaction and integration between different economic areas in the western Mediterranean during the late Middle Ages. The southeast of the Iberian Peninsula has been analysed as a case study. Genoese merchants were particularly active within this area; they played a key role in connecting diverse trading areas (including Seville, Granada, and Valencia), thanks to their complex trading network. They controlled a wide range of production activities in key places, playing an important role in the transmission of technical know-how, and thereby promoting the reorganization of production activities. This complex process is exemplified by the production of high-quality pottery (regarded as a luxury item).

Trade and Revenue Collection in later Sixteenth-Century Salonica

Medievalists dealing with Venetian and Genoese trade networks have come to u derstand that the ports visited by Italian m rchants must be studied not merely as the sites of the foreigners' trading activities, but also as economically active human communities in their own right. This involves, among other things, the study of local merchants active in the Byzantine empire and the territories of the Golden Horde. Especially the question to what extent Greeks inhabiting the late Byzantine empire and its Trabzon offshoot were able to participate in long-distance trade has at tracted some scholarly interest.1 A similar issue has also been studied with respect to Ottoman commerce. Customs records dating from the late 15th century have shown that by that time, Italian commercial supremacy in the Black Sea region had come to an end, and Muslim merchants con trolled most of the trade.2 This is quite the opposite of what had been as sumed by earlier scholars; the latter had been very much impressed by the 19th-century pattern, according to which Muslims neglected trade and concentrated on agriculture, administration and military careers. Without too much concrete evidence, historians had tended to conclude that the same thing applied to the 15th century as well.3 Thus, even though there has been but limited contact between Ottomanist and Byzantinist histori ans, their researches in the field of commercial history at present tend to converge. On a different level, historians have attempted to understand the man ner in which states set out to determine the conditions under which trade could be conducted. This included the activities of tax farmers and sala ried tax collectors, as well as the commercial legislation of the sultans, emperors and other relevant rulers.4 Admittedly, in the Byzantine case,

The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes

List of maps Preface A note on the tables Abbreviations Part I. The Foundations: 1. The sources 2. The resources Part II. The Development of Trade: 3. The first phase of alliances, 1116-54 4. The maritime alliance of 1156 and its afternath 5. Crisis and recovery, 1162-79 6. An age of peaceful competition, 1179-89 7. The last phase of alliance, 1189-91 8. Quid plura? 1191-5 Part III. The Structure of Trade: 9. The structure of Genoese trade with Sicily, 1155-64 10. The structure of trade in the late Norman period Conclusion Bibliography Index.

Sardinia and Commercial Reciprocity, 1819-38

EFORE the liberal reforms of 1848 the kingdom of Sardinia had a reputation for being hostile toward foreign trade and for failing to appreciate the potentialities of the excellent harbor and fully developed commercial life of Genoa. This criticism was well deserved for the period before 1838. In that year, however, a revolution in policy occurred during the negotiation of a commercial treaty with the United States. This is an analysis of the reasons for Sardinian commercial isolation before 1838 and for the shift in commercial policy that year. It is based primarily on the record of Sardinian relations with the United States. In 1819 Sardinia considered establishing commercial and navigation reciprocity with the United States and opened a consulate general at Philadelphia. But by 1824 this plan was abandoned in favor of commercial isolation. The negotiations at the time give the clue to Sardinia's failure to facilitate Genoese trade through governmental policy; those of 1838 reveal the reasons for the change. The shortsightedness of Sardinian officials before 1838 was not the result of any dedication to outmoded mercantilist ideas, nor was the shift in 1838 the product of conversion to laissez faire. The issue was one of political rather than economic survival. The problem of the integrity of the small state, wedged between France and Austria, had plagued the Turin government for centuries and almost all action was weighed against security. This concern led to the commercial isolation in the period before 1838. It affected the treaty negotiations of that year, obstructed the fulfillment of the commitments made to the United States in the treaty, and plagued as well the liberal government of Cavour. When in 1819 Sardinia assigned one of the experienced men in her consular service, Gaspard Deabbate, to Philadelphia to negotiate commercial and navigation reciprocity, she did so with a sense of urgency.1 The reason for haste was the peculiar position in which the Sardinian government found itself after it acquired the republic of Genoa in 1815. Since the kingdom already dominated the Alpine passes to Lake Geneva and the excellent roads over them, it was now in a position to assume commercial leadership in south-central Europe. But Genoese ecoX nomic life had already been in decline by the eighteenth century, and the Napoleonic era almost dealt it a death blow. In 1814 the merchants and shippers of Genoa had worked strenuously for the restoration of the republic, hoping thus to recreate the greatness that had once been theirs. When the area was awarded to the king of Sardinia, the Genoese accepted his rule none too graciously. The Sardinian government was challenged with the immediate problem of rehabilitating the economic life of Genoa, not only to serve the best interests of the state, but also to win the loyalty of the Genoese. Many subjects were bringing pressure to bear on the Sardinian government to negotiate commercial reciprocity 1 Marquis de St. Marzano to Gaspard Deabbate, Turin, Oct. 19, 1819, Lettere consoli filadelfia, Archivio di Stato in Torino, Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereinafter cited as AS, MAE).

Genoese Trade with Northwest Africa in the Twelfth Century

Previous articleNext article No AccessGenoese Trade with Northwest Africa in the Twelfth CenturyHilmar C. KruegerHilmar C. Krueger Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Speculum Volume 8, Number 3Jul., 1933 The journal of the Medieval Academy of America Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2848865 Views: 4Total views on this site Citations: 9Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1933 The Mediaeval Academy of AmericaPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Rafael M. Pérez García La llegada del palo brasil americano a los mercados europeos: grupos mercantiles transnacionales y pretensiones monopolísticas, 1499-1530, Revista de Indias 81, no.283283 (Nov 2021): 603–634.https://doi.org/10.3989/revindias.2021.017Guy Massamba, Samuel M. Kariuki, Stephen N. Ndegwa Globalization and Africa's Regional and Local Responses, Journal of Asian and African Studies 39, no.1-21-2 (Apr 2004): 29–45.https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909604048248Avner Greif Self-enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1998).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.49207 Bibliographie, (Jan 1997): 213–237.https://doi.org/10.3917/puf.picar.1997.01.0213 Avner Greif , Paul Milgrom , and Barry R. Weingast Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, Journal of Political Economy 102, no.44 (Oct 2015): 745–776.https://doi.org/10.1086/261953Ora Limor Missionary merchants: Three medieval anti-Jewish works from Genoa, Journal of Medieval History 17, no.11 (Jan 2012): 35–51.https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4181(91)90026-HEdward Miller, Cynthia Postan, M. M. Postan The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire, (Mar 2008).https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521087094David Abulafia Asia, Africa and the Trade of Medieval Europe, (Aug 1987): 402–473.https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521087094.008John L. Vogt CRUSADING AND COMMERCIAL ELEMENTS IN THE PORTUGUESE CAPTURE OF CEUTA (1415), The Muslim World 59, no.3-43-4 (Jul 1969): 287–299.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1969.tb02640.x

Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century

Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century

Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century

Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century