General Theory Of Rationality Research Articles

Radicalization toward violent extremism: a typology based on a general theory of rationality

ABSTRACT In the past twenty years, a persistent concern about the growing phenomenon of homegrown terrorism in the West has led researchers to study the radicalization process toward violent extremism. The potential link between ideology and behaviors is at the center of scientific debates. Some argue that adhesion to an ideology is not a necessary condition for political violence. According to this perspective, research should focus on the study of behaviors. Others argue that ideological aspects have an influence at every stage of engagement and that neglecting ideas would be a mistake in attempts at understanding radicalization. In this article, we contribute to that discussion by proposing a better way to understand the connection between ideology and behaviors. Using Raymond Boudon’s general theory of rationality, we argue that engagement in violent extremism is a complex combination of actions, decisions, attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs the understanding of which requires the use of a comprehensive sociological approach. Thus, we defend a theoretical perspective based on methodological individualism and we develop a general typology for radicalization processes based on this perspective. We also point out how this perspective differs from conventional rational choice theory and other theoretical perspectives used in the field of radicalization.

Simmelian Elements in Raymond Boudon’s General Theory of Rationality

Raymond Boudon (1934–2013) developed his own general theory of rationality as an extension and original synthesis of the work already provided by classical sociology and rational choice theory. To achieve this, he had to interpret and reinterpret many classical authors and schools of thought. One classical author that inspired Boudon’s theory was German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918). The following article seeks to delineate the particular Simmelian influences that can be found in Raymond Boudon’s theoretical work.

Problem Gambling in Adolescence: An Analysis Conducted from the Actor’s Perspective

ABSTRACTThe objective of this study is, by using the general theory of rationality (GTR), to better understand the rationale underlying gambling behavior in adolescents considered to have gambling problems. The study explore gambling associated benefits, negative consequences of gambling, and the adolescents’ perceptions of the severity of their gambling behavior. The qualitative research is based on semi-structured interviews with 31 adolescents considered as having gambling problems. The analysis revealed that gambling behavior are based on a threefold rationality: instrumental, cognitive and axiological. The GTR allows to better understand why most of them do not consider to have gambling problems.

Max Weber, Entre relativismo e individualismo metodológico: hacia un trabajo de aplicación conceptual al caso de los mexicanos inmigrantes de los Estados Unidos

Resumen:En esta comunicación discutimos 1) acerca de la teorí­a general de la racionalidad de Raymond Boudon y la teorí­a de la posmodernidad de Michel Maffesoli, 2) de la lectura que ambos autores ofrecen de las nociones weberianas de desencantamiento del mundo y la guerra de los dioses, y 3) de la manera particular como estas dos nociones, interpretadas distintamente, aclaran los objetos de investigación. Nos inspiramos de la problemática relativa a la presencia de inmigrantes mexicanos en los Estados Unidos para ofrecer algunos ejemplos de aplicación.

Liberté, Egalité, Modularité: In Memory of Werner Callebaut (1952–2014)

Werner Callebaut, the scientific director of The KLI Institute, professor of philosophy, president of the ISHPSSB, editor-in-chief of Biological Theory, and dear colleague of innumerable members of the academic community, died in Vienna, Austria, on November 6, 2014, at the age of 62. We deplore the loss of a brilliant intellectual, a philosopher in the full meaning of the word, and a sparkling mobilizer of ideas. Werner was born in Mechelen, Belgium, on October 7, 1952. His early leaning towards learning and knowledge had already come to the fore as a schoolboy, when he would dig for Roman archaeological remains in his family’s backyard and had developed a liking for academic publications. He was notorious for getting on his teachers’ nerves by ‘‘knowing too much.’’ After visiting high school at the Koninklijk Atheneum Vilvoorde, he went on to study philosophy at Ghent University, where, in 1983, he received his PhD with a thesis entitled ‘‘Contribution to a General Theory of Rationality on Evolutionary Foundations—With an Application to the Organization of Scientific Knowledge.’’ He subsequently pursued an academic career that led him via the Universities of Brussels, Limburg, and Ghent to Hasselt University, where he became a professor of philosophy in 1995. Following two visiting fellow periods at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (The KLI Institute), he moved to Austria and, in 1999, became the scientific manager and eventually the scientific director of the KLI while continuing a part-time affiliation at Hasselt University and offering courses at the University of Vienna. Rarely have I met anyone who understood the workings of science better than Werner did. Equally profoundly, he understood and unflinchingly pointed his finger at the conceptual deficits in science. Werner’s ambitious philosophical quest derived from an early-formed conviction that the humanities-based approach to the philosophy of science needed to be overcome. While learned in classical philosophy, logic, ethics, and epistemology, it was his firm opinion that ‘‘real’’ philosophy of science needs to be concerned with, and based on, science. He became a role model for this attitude by extensively studying theoretical and empirical evolutionary biology, from which he derived his view that epistemological naturalism was the inevitable philosophical consequence of Darwinian theory. He fought strongly for this naturalized approach and, influenced by the work of Herbert Simon, extended it to the philosophy of economics, exploring the evolutionary study of human decision making. Furthermore, in his philosophical examinations of the theoretical content of biology, Werner used his method to address the multiple challenges from different fields of biology to the standard theory of evolution, devising a perspectivist take to handle incompatible models in scientific practice. To him, perspectives represented analyses at different levels of a system that, necessarily, can coexist at the same time but may lose explanatory rigor when they are combined. Together with Ron Giere (2006), Bill Wimsatt (2007), and Bas van Fraassen (2008), Werner advocated a philosophy of science according to which science cannot—as a matter of principle—transcend the human perspective. He integrated these views and applied his own version of scientific perspectivism to the conceptual issues associated with the modeling of complex, multilevel, and multiscale phenomena (Callebaut 2012). He suggested that this approach could be extended to G. B. Muller (&) Department of Theoretical Biology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria e-mail: gerhard.mueller@univie.ac.at

Problem gambling among adolescents: toward a social and interactionist reading

There are two aspects that distinguish the approaches used to conceptualize problem gambling in adolescence. The first aspect concerns the type of variables involved in conceptualizing the phenomenon: most approaches integrate variables of an individual nature in their modelling and give little consideration to social type variables. The second aspect concerns the distinction between determinism and interactionism: many of the approaches seem to follow a determinist line of thinking and few consider people as social actors in interaction with their environment. Consequently, this article aims to conceptually prepare the ground for later studies that will adopt a more sociological and interactionist approach. To do so, the theoretical perspectives that are most commonly used in conceptualizing the phenomenon will be analysed by way of the two above aspects. A new analysis perspective will then be presented, namely the general theory of rationality (GTR) by Raymond Boudon. The GTR proposes a theoretical reversal to other approaches by focusing on social actors and variables of a social nature rather than on a person's psychology. In this sense, the theory adopts a viewpoint that has not been greatly employed in the analysis of adolescent problem gambling.

“Method in their madness”: understanding the behaviour of VSE owner‐managers

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand the sound practical reasons underlying the behaviour of very small enterprise (VSE) owner‐managers with respect to their perceived resistance to the dominant entrepreneurial and managerial models in areas such as management methods, marketing or internationalisation.Design/methodology/approachThe current literature on VSE managers was reviewed in the light of Raymond Boudon's general theory of rationality. Starting from the premise that in science, the simplest explanation tends to be the best, the paper highlights the practical reasons why VSE owner‐managers behave the way they do.FindingsWhile there may be cultural or personality‐based reasons why VSE owner‐managers often appear to reject the traditional entrepreneurial model, these are not the sole or even the main explanation. In most cases, the behaviour in question can be explained much more simply by practical, down‐to‐earth reasons. From the actor's point of view, his behaviour is always rational.Research limitations/implicationsThis new model of the behaviour of VSE owner‐managers has not been empirically tested.Originality/valueThe paper presents a novel vision of the behaviour of VSE owner‐managers, based on the practical reasons underlying their actions, that goes beyond the existing typologies such as the “Traditional‐vs‐Opportunistic” entrepreneur.

Is Scientific Knowledge Rational? (review)

Reviewed by: Is Scientific Knowledge Rational? Clint Jones Is Scientific Knowledge Rational? By Halil Rahman Açar. Istanbul: Insan Publications, 2008. Pp. 245. U.S. $50.00. In his new book Is Scientific Knowledge Rational? Halil Rahman Açar probes the problem that rationality has presented to paradigms of epistemology throughout the history of Western thought. He claims early on that “we do not at present, have a general theory of rationality that can explain both the rationality of action and the rationality of a set of beliefs” (p. 14). His purpose is to address this problem by defending rationality and by building up a coherent reconstruction of it through an analysis of truth and science, which are currently the dominant paradigms of human rationality. The chapters of the text are set up to address the problem through a series of stages that will build up to a theory of meta-rationality—but more on that later. Chapter 1 is devoted to rationality in general, and its primary focus is the development of a clearer understanding of what exactly rationality is by way of analyses of human nature, human culture, and human interaction. Chapter 2 takes up the question of the superiority of rationality in science; that is, it focuses on knowledge as the product of science. Chapter 3, on objectivity and subjectivity in science, deals with the problem of science as a human endeavor and tries to separate out the subjective preferences of scientists (and philosophers) from objective knowledge characterized through scientific theories. Chapter 4 deals with truth in science, but the author is clear that he does not mean capital T truth, but rather a truth we produce by participating in each level of knowledge. Chapter 5 shifts the focus of the text away from fundamental questions about science to look at the progress science has made in its pursuit of truth and rationality. Açar begins by offering his own definition of rationality as a guide to the intention of the text: “Rationality . . . must be seen as an alternative system of interpreting knowledge” (p. 15). However, he goes on to add the following addendums to his definition in the first chapter: rationality is not intelligence, it differs from noncognitive aspects of human community and communication, and it is the manner in which humans grasp and relate to the world they inhabit. By arguing this way he ultimately makes a positive claim for a fundamental, or foundational, rationality that unites all of humankind. Eventually, following Jonathan Bennett, he argues that rationality is what marks humans off as separate from animals. Rational acts become acts that one ought to perform and irrational acts are those that one ought not to perform. Making his case, though, that rational acts are different, or require a different rationality, than rational beliefs, Açar argues that while there may be objectivity in science there is not objectivity in scientists. Because we cannot have absolute certainty through an empirical discipline we hold our rational beliefs on insufficient evidence. This is because [End Page 561] scientists are subjective agents susceptible to feelings or commitments that erode their ability to perform objectively. Developing an adequate theory of rationality that can transcend the context of both scientists and experiments becomes the final focus of the text in chapter 6. It is for this reason that I want to spend a little more time on the arguments in favor of the meta-rationality that Açar proposes. In chapter 6, he attempts to explain his theory of meta-rationality, without which, he claims, “we will not be able to solve the problem [of rationality]” (p. 159). The problem with his meta-rationality theory is that it offers no substantial help to his argument because it ultimately concludes with an acknowledgment that no meta-theory can be tested; it can only be acknowledged. Before he gets to this point, however, he moves through arguments about monism and pluralism in order to make the groundbreaking claim that his theory is “radically different from the proposals considered [in the preceding chapters] . . . [because] it allows for a variety of conceptions of rationality and it takes none of them as the only correct...

Collective, universal, and joint rationality

Rationality's extension from individuals to groups yields collective rationality. Just as individuals should be rational, groups should be collectively rational. This paper briefly presents collective rationality and then compares it to universal rationality and joint rationality. Universal rationality is the rationality of all members of a group. It directs individualistic evaluation of a collective act. Joint rationality is the rationality of each individual's part in a collective act given the collective act's realization. Game theory uses it to characterize solutions to games. Collective rationality is not the same as either universal or joint rationality. How- ever, in certain ideal conditions collective rationality agrees with universal rationality, and in other ideal conditions it agrees with joint rationality. Distinguishing the three types of evaluation and explaining their relations contributes to a general theory of rationality.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF STRATEGY‐AS‐RATIONALITY

The knowledge that human rationality is itself an area of active inquiry should be a sobering thought for those who confidently peddle simple remedies to contemporary managerial, political and economic concerns. Yet mainstream strategic management, as a body of theory and practices, has so far absorbed only a few of the elements of the rapidly evolving general theory of rationality.

Pollock on How to Build a Person

Pollock's How to Build a Person is a highly sophisticated defence of the “strong” Artificial Intelligence (AI) program within the framework of a physicalist/functionalist ontology. Its central thesis is as robust as any defender of strong AI could possibly want it to be: to build a person—“a thing that literally thinks, feels, and is conscious” (p. ix)—is to build a physical system that adequately models human rationality; and building such a system is, essentially, a computational task. The epistemological groundwork for the computational task (a task already underway at the University of Arizona under the name “the OSCAR project”) is sketched in the sixth and last chapter of the book—a 64-page-long chapter (“Cognitive Carpentry”) where Pollock presents the main lines of a general theory of rationality which he has been developing over the course of many years. The bulk of the book (chaps. 1 to 4) is devoted to an articulation and defence of what Pollock takes to be the metaphysical underpinnings of his conception of a person as an intelligent machine: token-physicalism, agent materialism, psychophysical supervenience and (a form of) analytical functionalism. This part of the book, which will be the focus of this review, provides an account of “the physical basis for mentality”—an account of what it is that makes a physical structure capable of having mental states relevantly like our own. And since on the proposed account mental capacity “involves a way of codifying information—a system of mental representations” (p. 93), Pollock devotes a chapter (chap. 5) to the semantics of “the language of thought”; though basically a digression, since “semantics plays no role” in the computations involved in rational thought, the chapter is intrinsically very interesting, bearing as it does on current debates on thought ascription and content individuation.

Formal Decision Theory and Majority Rule

In a paper entitled "Beyond the Voter's Paradox" (Ethics, October 1977), I outlined a general theory of rationality for social decision procedures according to which rationality consists in procedural determinacy, a condition in which the aggregated desiderative data wholly entail the decision drawn from them, and irrationality consists in procedural indeterminacy, a condition which makes possible the Voter's Paradox and the various other deficiencies of existing voting practices. I also argued that, with a minor modification, C. L. Dodgson's Method of Marks would conform to this criterion of rationality, and, further, that use of this Modified Method of Marks in practice would have the effect of eliminating many cumbersome features of majority rule. In a response to this paper, Elaine Mates Spitz claims, not only that there are defects in the Modified Method of Marks, but also that all formal models of decision theory fail to reflect fully the political, social, and moral complexities of majority rule, and therefore have no place either in justifying or attacking it (Elaine Mates Spitz, "Majority Rule: The Virtue of Numbers," Ethics, vol. 89, no. 1 [October 1978]). My main concern in this paper will be to defend the use of such formal models against this sort of attack. However, because it is made to appear that the attack draws much of its force from its seemingly devastating criticisms of the Modified Method of Marks, I will begin by correcting the distortions of this method which make that sham seem plausible.

Inference and the Logical "Ought"

This paper is the beginning of an explication of the normative-descriptive or ought-is distinction by way of the notion that our knowledge of other minds is the result of our imposition of constraints on the interpretation of events as actions by agents. My hope is that a general theory of rationality and the normative can be derived from an examination of the constraints it is rational to impose on agent-interpretation, i.e., of the fundamental knowledge we have of persons as persons. My attempt at an explication of the ought-is distinction takes the following form: I want to find an absolutely general way of determining when ought-sentences are true. Since the extensions of the account given below to interesting cases of ought-sentences such as moral and prudential cases depend on relatively complicated constraints on agent-interpretation,l this paper will deal only with the simplest case of ought-sentences, the ought. logic is thought of as a normative science of belief, it yields one of the simplest cases of the normative-descriptive dichotomy. By the I understand what might be called consequences of the canons of obedience to the laws of thought. An instance of such an occurs in If you believe that frogs are green, you ought to believe that anything that's not green is not a frog. The is, as it were, the minimal rational ought, the one that prescribes closure of belief under logical consequence and proscribes inconsistency of belief. It should be pointed out that the principles of the often come into conflict with other canons of rationality, just as principles of moral oughts come into conflict with each other. The example above is surely true even if