General Staff Officer Research Articles

German and Austro-Hungarian Armies in Perception of Russian Officer Corps in 1870s and 1880s

This article examines the views that emerged among the Russian officer corps during the 1870s and 1880s regarding the German and Austro-Hungarian armies. The aim of the study is to illuminate the process of shaping these perceptions, trace their historical dynamics, and identify the factors influencing the transformation of Russian officers’ views during this period. Investigating this topic contributes to a deeper understanding of Russian foreign and military policy in the 1870s and 1880s, a time when a specific balance of power was taking shape in Europe and the outlines of military-political alliances that defined the nature of bloc opposition during World War I began to emerge. The study focuses primarily on the perspectives of the General Staff officer corps, as their responsibilities included the systematic study of foreign armies and the application of this knowledge for Russian military needs. Based on the conducted research, it is concluded that between the 1870s and 1880s, the attitude of the Russian officer corps towards the German army underwent changes that aligned with a sequence of “adversary” — “competitor” — “enemy,” while the Austro-Hungarian army was perceived as Russia’s key “competitor” in the Balkans.

Pitfalls of Sovereignty: Romanian State Building on the Eve of Independence from the Ottoman Empire

ABSTRACT The present article explores the trials and tribulations of the Romanian state in building viable institutions and acquiring independence in the latter half of the 19th century. Starting from a flurry of diplomatic exchanges on the eve of the Russian-Turkish war (1877–1878), which were aimed at securing experienced General Staff officers for the young Romanian army, this article shows how intimately interconnected the domestic and international dimensions of state building were for such fledgling states and explores the inversely proportional relationship between Krasner’s notions of sovereignty – legal-international and Westphalian. The article thus proposes a more institutional-oriented approach to state building in South-Eastern Europe and seeks to bring the state and the pragmatics of its creation back into a discussion of independence and sovereignty in the region.

Political Self-consciousness of Captured White General Staff Officers Based on the Materials of Soviet Questionnaires of the Early 1920s

Based on Soviet questionnaires of captured White General Staff officers of the early 1920s kept in the funds of the Russian State Military Archive, this article considers the problem of political self-identification of the “former” officers in Red captivity. The survey of former Whites was carried out to account for them. Sections of questionnaires about the prisoners’ attitude to the events of the February and October Revolutions, as well as about their current beliefs were of particular importance for assessing their views. The analysis of questionnaires as a mass historical source makes it possible to get an idea of the sociopolitical position of the group of captured White General Staff officers. On most issues, the prisoners’ views converged. As a rule, they accepted the February Revolution and did not accept the October Revolution. Also, they were highly critical of the old regime. Explanations of the reasons for the rejection of the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks are of considerable interest. For many, an acceptable answer was an indication of a lack of understanding of the tasks of the new revolution. At the same time, some pointed out the real reasons for such rejection, i.e. the Red Terror, the collapse of the old army, and the hard Brest peace treaty. The strategies used by the questionnaire compilers in answering acute and potentially dangerous questions draw the researchers’ attention. Often, the answers indicated that the revolution was of a popular nature, and the author of the questionnaire sought to serve the people or welcomed the rule of the people and was in solidarity with the policy of the RCP(b). Some authors, not wanting to express their true views, declared the need to work honestly for the benefit of society. The “former” tried to give answers that would appeal to the new superiors and regulatory authorities, which would allow them to integrate into the command structure of the Red Army more quickly and remove from themselves the discriminatory status of former White officers who were on special registry.

“He changed his orientation depending on the political situation.” Denikin intelligence about the General staff officers who served in the Ukrainian troops. 1919

The material represents the first publication of White intelligence documents with the characteristics of General staff officers who served in the Ukrainian armies (headed by the Hetman, by Petliura, and by the Soviets) in 1918–1919. Of particular interest are the assessments of the political views of the officers. The published documents have been identified in the collections of the Russian State Military Archive.

Обзор документов военно-разведывательных экспедиций барона Ф. Ф. Торнау на Черноморское побережье Кавказа. 1830-е гг.

The article analyses the corpus of documents from the fonds of the Russian State Military History Archive, formed in the 1830s during the General Staff officer Feodor Turnau’s expeditions of to the Black Sea coast zone, which lay outside the Imperial control. Although his activities among the Circassian tribes can be termed one of the best Russian secret scouting missions and his memoirs published in 1864 are still considered an important source for studying the military and political history of the region, materials and reports of the survey missions have never been examined in modern Caucasus studies. The author compares the data included by Turnau in his secret reports to the Imperial authorities with what he mentioned in his memoirs. It shows which issues the Imperial authorities and the Caucasus Army command were interested in during the Russo-highlanders confrontation of the second half of the 1830s. The materials collected by F. F. Turnau can be useful not only in terms of clarifying certain aspects of his personal activities, but also in demonstrating the running of secret survey scouting in unexplored and dangerous ethnic territories off the Imperial frontier. They show high erudition and good training of the candidates selected from the ranks of the General Staff officers to run these scouting missions. The correspondence of the Caucasus Army commander with the central authorities in St. Petersburg on the issue of Turnau’s captivity shows differences in their understanding of the Russo-Caucasus relations. The author comes to the conclusion that the corpus of collected materials on topography, ethnography, political and cultural description of the Transkubanian region peoples could have formed a basis for a revision of the Imperial stand on the subjugation of tribal groups. Although this political alternative was missed, the materials collected by Turnau became a precious addition to the Caucasus studies source base.

The former chief of P. N. Wrangel’ staff P. S. Makhrov on the Red Army campaign to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in 1939

The memoirs of general P. S. Makhrov are devoted to the events of 1939 and the campaign of the Red army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Pyotr Semyonovich Makhrov was a General staff officer, participant of the Russian-Japanese war, World War I, and the Russian Civil war. In 1918, Makhrov lived in Ukraine, and in 1919-1920 he took part in the White movement in Southern Russia, after which he emigrated. In exile he lived in France, where he wrote his extensive memoirs. The events of September 1939 could not pass past his attention. At that time, the Red army committed approach in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Contrary to the widespread Anti-Sovietism among the white emigrants, Makhrov perceived the incident with enthusiasm as a return of Russia to its ancestral lands occupied by the Poles.

Иномир Кавказа: на пороге открытия (об одном из опытов «невольного сближения» россиян и горцев)

This work considers the section of memoirs written by Russian General Staff officer Baron F.F. Thornau (he carried out reconnaissance missions in the North-Western Caucasus in 1830s), which concerns his time being held captive by the mountaineers. The authors analyze information from one of the most competent “Caucasian captives”, which allows them to learn more about the specifics of Russians' stay in captivity. They pay attention to the unusual status of the captive officer, the involuntary guest (prisoner-guest), with a particular focus on Thornau’s behavior, who took into account the mountain mentality, thus being able to maintain respect from his “masters” despite his servitude. F.F. Thornau’s Behavior in captivity describes him as an ideological officer who does not buy himself out of captivity, so as not to encourage the mountain practice of capturing prisoners. Thornau gives interesting characteristics to some representatives of the mountain society. F.F. Thornau sees the mountain people as human beings, worthy of understanding and respect. His accounts of them are generally devoid of negativism and arrogance in the spirit of the so-called Orientalism. The verdict of Thornau's judgments is the phrase pronounced in the title of the article, which speaks of his humanistic approach to the representatives of the mountainous Inomir.

“Phlegm defines the Russian national character …”

In current historiography, the German General Staff with its responsibility for war planning and military intelligence is usually playing a key role in the emergence of World War One. Surprisingly, no recent study focuses the military agency’s perceptions of Russia and the Russian people, although these notions build an important part of the bilateral relationship between the Russian and the German Empire. This study shows that the views of certain leading General Staff officers about Russia were based for the most part on long-standing Russophobe resentments felt by the German bourgeoisie. Most of the German General Staff members thought of their eastern neighbor as a vast and hostile country with a barbaric and despotic government, while the Russian people were seen as dumb and lazy, frugal and naive. In addition, German perceptions were characterized by a sort of flamboyant ambiguity, with contempt and disdain going hand in hand with fear of Russia’s irresistible demographic economic and military growth. Together with underestimation of the Russian national character, especially those fearful German perceptions were an important factor in the German military leadership’s decision to go to war in July 1914.

Russian General Staff Officer, saved Twice by L. D. Trotsky: General Staff Major-General S. I. Odintsov

Russian General Staff Officer, saved Twice by L. D. Trotsky: General Staff Major-General S. I. Odintsov

Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?

ABSTRACT: This article questions the hasty rush to label Moscow's actions in Ukraine and Donbas as proof of an alleged adoption of and raises issues concerning Russia's capacity to replicate such approaches in future conflict. ********** For two years, commentators, experts, and politicians alike have expressed a myriad of views concerning Russia's involvement in separatist activities in southeastern Ukraine. Opinions and perspectives have emerged especially in non-Russian commentary on the Donbas conflict that either complicate or mislead discussions concerning Moscow's actions or the nature of the challenge Russia represents in NATOs north-eastern and eastern flanks. Among these untested and certainly unproven assertions are the ideas that Moscow has developed a doctrine and operational strategy referred to as or that its operations in Ukraine can be explained by reference to new and evolving defense and security capabilities. (1) Unfortunately, hybrid warfare is an alien concept in Russian military theory and in its approach to modern warfare; almost all Russian military analyses of the concept ascribe its existence and parameters to Western states. (2) In order to understand the actual nature of Russia's involvement in Donbas or the challenges it poses to European security, it is necessary to re-examine Russia's actual defense capabilities, the traditions, training, and hallmarks of its military and how Moscow views its strategic threat environment. Russia's General Staff and the Utility of Operational Models All militaries have their own distinctive culture and seek to preserve their traditions. Likewise, Russia's armed forces despite undergoing reform, modernization, and force transformation in recent years have retained their distinctive approaches, traditions, and uniqueness. In assessing developments in the Russian military, force structure, training, exercises or perspectives on strategic issues, it is necessary to contextualize such analyses and eschew reading into the Russian experience Western approaches or assumptions. For example, the term sergeant is common to NATO and Russian militaries, but used very differently in Russia; even in the post-reformed Russian armed forces, the noncommissioned officer is not akin to his western counterpart who plays a critical role in the training of subordinates--a task still mainly in the domain of Russian officers. (3) Equally, there are a number of additional distinctive features of the Russian armed forces and the way they conduct military operations that are unique to the system. Two examples illustrate the point: the Russian armed forces historically avoid entering into conflict without careful and thorough preparation of the battlefield, which means conducting an analysis of the operational environment and making tangible efforts to shape it according to the requirements of the mission; part of that process avoids the use of models of warfare to allow for the differences inherent in each new conflict. General Staff officers are equally well versed in examining historical examples of military conflict to glean lessons relevant to present-day operations, while the top brass retains some level of interest in future warfare, building on how well versed they are in the history of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), strong interest in the events of June 1941 and drawing on a more recent tradition going back to Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (1917-1994, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR 1977-84) and the Revolution in Military Affairs. (4) Western advocates of the theory that Moscow devised, adopted, and used a hybrid warfare methodology in its operations in Ukraine, tend to root their arguments to a critical article in the Russian military press. In February 2013, Russia's Chief of the General Staff Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov, authored an article in Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, The Value of Science is in Foresight. …

Louise Thaden's “Noble Experiment”: An American Aviation Dystopia

IntroductionIn 1921, Giulio Douhet (1869-1930), a retired brigadier general in Italian army, published The Command of Air (II Domino delTAria), a bluntly explicit consideration of evolving role of air power in wars of future. The book went into a second, enlarged edition in 1927 and by time of Douhet's death was receiving serious attention from world's major air forces. Chief among these was United States Army Air Service, headed by Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell (1879-1936), a vigorous and outspoken proponent of air power as principal element of modern war. Mitchell's views on strategic bombing in total war paralleled Douhet's, and by time Douhet's book was being disseminated War Department General Staff and Air Service Field Officers' School in 1930s, their combined contention that the bomber will always get through was shaping American air force's aerial strategy and tactics (Buckley 74-79; Hurley 76-91, 146; see also Sherry 23-28,238-239).For all their attractiveness to American military, views espoused by Douhet and Mitchell had their critics, some military, some civilian. Among latter was Iris Louise Thaden (19051979), one of most prominent American female pilots of 1920s and 1930s. She won first National Women's Air Derby (the Powder Puff Derby) in 1929, set a women's endurance record (196 hours, 5 minutes) in 1932, and in 1936 was first woman to win transcontinental race for Bendix Trophy, flying a stock Beechcraft Model Cl7 Staggerwing. She worked, in addition, as a salesperson and test/demonstration pilot for Beechcraft manufacturing firm. Her accomplishments were recognized later in 1936, when she received Harmon Trophy as outstanding woman flier of 1936. She was also no stranger to military practices: her husband, Herbert von Thaden, had been a member of United States Army Air Corps Reserve, and in 1935 was on active duty with Air Corps at Langley Field. During his assignment there, Louise Thaden had opportunity to pilot a twinengined Martin B-10 bomber, then most advanced aircraft in American air arsenal (Thaden [2004] 141-44; Sherman 633-34; Oakes 65).Thaden retired from active competition in 1938 and shortly thereafter published her autobiography, High, Wide, and Frightened (1938). The book is of interest for candid view it gives of life of a female pilot in 1920s and 1930s and issues confronting her, but takes on even greater interest with Chapter Thirteen. Here, in Noble Experiment, a chapter omitted from 1973 and 2004 reissues of book, Thaden offers a little-known and intriguingly dystopian vision of life in a Douhet-influenced future. She postulates a time when Douhet's theories have been comprehensively embraced by world's air forces, then goes on to consider just what those theories might mean to-and might cost-the female pilots who have been reluctantly pressed into service. Writing as a committed but nonmilitant feminist of 1930s, she pays little heed to geopolitical elements of war she records; instead, she focuses on personal and emotional consequences of military policy.Douhet builds his argument in several stages. Recognizing that his policies would require a significantly enlarged air force, he calls upon civil aviation to supplement military resources. For all its innocuousness as recreational or commercial flying, civil aviation has military applicability, for it employs planes, trains pilots and maintains them in active service, and makes use of various aviation accessories ... directly utilizable by organs of national defense. The active nature of civil aviation dictates that pilots will be flying the latest types of plane (as opposed to antiquated types likely to be found in military, where research and development is subject to governmental policies and whims). …

The Imperative of Education

AbstractTeaching midgrade leaders at the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) located in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, comes with many unique challenges. At CGSOC, students arrive having led soldiers in combat and having served in leadership positions in the United States Army for at least 10 years. When they walk into the classroom and see an instructor with a dress shirt and tie—not in a uniform—their immediate thought is, “What can this civilian teach me? I have fought in foreign lands and had to watch people die and lead soldiers through intensely difficult circumstances.” Through most of their careers, their approach to learning in Professional Military Education (PME) has been through training. CGSOC is the first time they experience learning from mostly an educational pedagogy as opposed to training. We focus on teaching how to think instead of what to think. At CGSOC we use an Experiential Learning Model (ELM), based on Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory. The ELM takes Kolb's experiential learning cycle and superimposes five steps on the preferred learning styles described by Kolb. We promote student‐to‐student dialogue, drawing out the experience resident in the classroom, and add leadership theory to reinforce the learning.

Recalibrating U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Afghanistan is America's longest war. Thousands of U.S. troops and those from nearly 50 other countries have fought in Afghanistan against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, but it was in nuclear-armed P...

An Abstract Approach. Rational Non-Sense To Replace Historical Nonsense in Educating Leaders

Abstract This research questions the value of empiricism and historical case studies in higher level officer education. It will instead emphasize the need and importance of a rationalist approach to knowledge. It will outline a tentative example of an abstract approach to case studies. By doing this the author seeks to enhance the education of abstract thinking - an art that is required from joint level and general staff officers.

Recollections of the War with Mexico (review)

1 24Southwestern Historical QuarterlyJuly Recollections oftíte War with Mexico. ByJohn Corey Henshaw. Edited with an introduction by Gary F. Kurutz. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008. Pp 268. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 9780826217998, $44.95 cloth.) In 1 989, the University of North Carolina Press published Fighting For the Confederacy, the private memoir of General Edward Porter Alexander, artillerist and staff officer to Confederate army commander General Robert E. Lee. Intended for a limited audience, Fighting For the Confederacy provided a closer analysis of men and events than did his earlier popular work, Military Memoirs ofa Confederate, and was critical of some wartime aspects rendered sacred by the "Lost Cause" syndrome. Although Alexander embraced the Confederacy's raison d'être, John Corey Henshaw opposed the War with Mexico (1846-1848), referring to it as a "most unfortunate event . . . brought about by the foolish act" of committing U.S. troops under controversial circumstances (circumstances prescient of the Gulf of Tonkin or Iraq). Henshaw served as a line infantry officer in the United States Army's Seventh Regiment during die war, a training exercise for many American Civil War officers on both sides. Gary F. Kurutz has skillfully edited Henshaw's reminisces, titled Recollections ofthe War with Mexico, by weaving Henshaw's manuscripts , memoranda, as well as portions of letters to his wife, Amelia, to provide a critical view of die United States's decision to invade Mexico prompted by the Texas-Mexico boundary dispute. In spite of his reservations, Henshaw complied with orders and saw action at several key battles from March 1846 to December 1847, though claiming that during his entire combat tour, he never killed anyone. His account of the seminal confrontation between American dragoons and Mexican infantry at Fort Texas in April 1846 that opened hostilities leaves little room for doubt that American bungling rather than bravery characterized the initial clash. At the following action in Monterrey, Henshaw encountered depredations committed by militia and irregulars. Henshaw's indictments focus particularly on "Texians" guilty of various outrages and may have contributed to the disdain he felt for all southerners until his death. The Seventh Infantry saw action at Veracruz and later at Mexico City, where Henshaw had time to record his impressions of the exotic Latin theater that at once fascinated and repelled him. His descriptions of other engagements that he did not see firsthand are impressive digests from contemporary sources (newspapers, after-action reports, and interviews with fellow officers and with prisoners of war) . Beyond Henshaw's military history is a fine travelogue of nineteenth-century Mexico, at war, and described by the reluctant participant. Kurutz's introduction includes a brief biography ofJohn Henshaw, a temperamental man given to quarrels that eventually resulted in his dismissal from the army in 1856 (although six years later, President Abraham Lincoln reinstated Henshaw who served another two years before poor health led to his honorable discharge). Henshaw had a difficult personality that resulted in several courts martial. Four of the twelve manuscript sources cited by Kurutz are transcripts 20ogBook Reviews125 from four different trials involving Henshaw. His troubled career either colored his judgment or freed him to assess national policy as well as comrades in occasionally severe tones, heedless of recrimination. Kurutz maintains an evenhanded treatment of this officer, although one detects Kurutz's shrewd regard for this cantankerous man. Henshaw's recollections may have been therapy as well as a self-interested defense of his career. Whatever his motivation, he left behind for a larger audience than he anticipated, a colorful and critical record of Manifest Destiny without so muchjingoistic panache. Austin Community CollegeBob Cavendish New Mexico Territory during the Civil War: Wallen and Evans Inspection Reports, 1862-1863. Edited with an introduction by Jerry D. Thompson. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008. Pp. 312. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 9780826344793, $34.85 cloth.) Jerry Thompson's introduction to this edited collection details events and conditions in Civil War-era New Mexico and focuses on Federal administration of the region after the ill-fated Confederate invasion led by Henry Hopkins Sibley. Union officers encountered several significant problems in their attempts to administer the Department of New...

A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid To Save His Country (review)

Reviewed by: A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid To Save His Country Mark M. Lowenthal A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid To Save His Country. By Benjamin Weiser. New York: Public Affairs, 2005 [2004]. ISBN 1-58648-305-6. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. xv, 383. $16.00. Espionage is the staple of intelligence fiction. In reality, espionage provides a very small part of intelligence collection, much more of it coming from technical sources. But the right spy in the right place with good access can be crucial. And, as most intelligence practitioners will acknowledge, the most useful spies tend to be "walk ins," spies who volunteer rather than being recruited. Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and several others "walked in" to the Soviet Union; Oleg Penkovsky and Ryszard Kuklinski "walked in" to the United States. Kuklinski, a Polish General Staff officer, became convinced that he was on the wrong side in the Cold War and that Poland was a poorly treated [End Page 1184] Soviet vassal, not a truly independent state. He believed that spying for the U.S. was an act of Polish patriotism. Bernard Weiser's A Secret Life is a well-written account of Kuklinski's life. Weiser is especially good on what motivated Kuklinski to become a spy. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the subservience of all Warsaw Pact militaries to an evidently aggressive Soviet military were major factors. Kuklinski comes across as patriotic, moral, and driven. On several occasions his CIA handlers suggested that he suspend his activities, either to allay suspicion or to give Kuklinski a rest. Kuklinski would agree but would go on copying crucial documents nonetheless, providing a voluminous trove over seven years. Weiser's book is based on CIA files and interviews. He handled the issue of access to classified material rather deftly, getting the CIA to allow a retired officer to read the files and pull material, which the CIA then reviewed and passed to Weiser. Thus, Weiser could write from documents without worrying that he was including something that he could not use or might have inadvertently committed to memory. Some of the quotes from documents seem a bit long but the sources are solid and there is abundant espionage "tradecraft." A key component of Kuklinski's story is what happened after he and his family were brought out of Poland by the CIA in 1981. Kuklinski was tried in absentia and sentenced to death. Even after the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, the sentence remained in effect, although it was later commuted to twenty-five years. President Lech Walensa deflected U.S. efforts to have the sentence overturned. Many Poles felt Kuklinski had betrayed Poland, disagreeing with his motives. Many Polish officers resented his actions and opposed his exoneration. After all, if Kuklinski was a patriot for spying on Poland, what did that say about all those officers who faithfully served the Polish government and, by extension, the Soviet Union? Weiser does not delve too deeply into the broader military ethical issues but he does provide a good starting point. What are the responsibilities of a soldier who has profound problems with the ethical, moral, and political nature of his government? We laud Kuklinski, or Claus von Stauffenberg, but we do not want to end up in a situation where the ethical and moral bar is set so low for officers to act that we have near chaos. How do we determine the limits of military dissent and the point at which acts like Kuklinski's can be justified? For those interested in military affairs these issues, highlighted by Kuklinski's extraordinary life, may be the real value of this book. Mark M. Lowenthal Intelligence & Security Academy Arlington, Virginia Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History

Redl—Spy of the Century?

The case of Colonel Alfred Redl, the notorious Austrian General Staff officer and traitor, is one of the classic spy stories. Redl's place in espionage history, as the first great double agent, is ...

The ‘Revolution’ of 27 May 1960 in Turkey: British Policy towards Turkey

The ‘Revolution’ of 27 May 1960 in Turkey: British Policy towards Turkey

From Kirkilisse to the great offensive Turkish operational encirclement planning, 1912–22

The Ottoman army after the 1 880s was modelled on the German army in its doctrine, administration, and training. It is however almost unknown in the west exactly how the German art of war was realized in the minds and plans of the Ottoman officer corps. This article seeks to provide an understanding of the importance of the German art of war in Ottoman Army offensive operations by demonstrating its attachment to the doctrine of encirclement battles of annihilation (ku~atma harekati).' Reflecting its German style of philosophy and thinking, the Ottoman Army routinely planned and attempted to execute encirclement operations during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and in the First World War. That the early battles were, for the most part, operationally unsuccessful does not diminish the importance of the military thought from which they originated. Later, in the War of Independence the consistent and successful application of the operational encirclement in campaign planning by the Turkish high command culminated in decisive victory. It is well known that the German army established and maintained a military mission in the Ottoman Empire from 1882 until 1918.2 Numerous distinguished and capable German General Staff officers were assigned to the mission during its tenure, including Wilhelm Leopold Colmar von der Goltz, Otto Liman von Sanders, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, and Hans von Seeckt. The actions of these officers (and others) are well documented by memoirs and histories as is the growth and impact of the German Military Mission itself. The Ottoman army modelled itself on the German army during this period. Of particular significance was the institutionalization of an Ottoman general staff officer corps and war academy copied directly from the Prussian model in which Ottoman general staff officers received training in the German art of war.3 The Ottoman general staff officer selection process, war academy curriculum, and its operational planning process were direct copies of the Prussian system.4

Relocating Dersim: Turkish State-Building and Kurdish Resistance, 1931–1938

According to the deputy chief of the General Staff and other Turkish officers, it is hoped eventually to make the Tunçeli [Tunceli] region into a “second Switzerland,” as it is extremely beautiful. It appears to me, however, that its inaccessibility and the difficulties which visitors experience while travelling in Turkey will be considerable obstacles to the realisation of this dream.A. Ross, Military attaché to the British representative in Turkey, 5 September 1938